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第16章

  Thingsaresaidto’be’1inanaccidentalsense,2bytheir
  ownnature。
  1Inanaccidentalsense,e。g。wesay’therighteousdoeris
  musical’,and’themanismusical’,and’themusicianisaman’,
  justaswesay’themusicianbuilds’,becausethebuilderhappensto
  bemusicalorthemusiciantobeabuilder;forhere’onethingis
  another’means’oneisanaccidentofanother’。Sointhecaseswe
  havementioned;forwhenwesay’themanismusical’and’themusician
  isaman’,or’hewhoispaleismusical’or’themusicianispale’,
  thelasttwomeanthatbothattributesareaccidentsofthesame
  thing;thefirstthattheattributeisanaccidentofthatwhichis,
  while’themusicalisaman’meansthat’musical’isanaccidentof
  aman。Inthissense,too,thenot-paleissaidtobe,becausethat
  ofwhichitisanaccidentis。Thuswhenonethingissaidinan
  accidentalsensetobeanother,thisiseitherbecausebothbelong
  tothesamething,andthisis,orbecausethattowhichtheattribute
  belongsis,orbecausethesubjectwhichhasasanattributethatof
  whichitisitselfpredicated,itselfis。
  2Thekindsofessentialbeingarepreciselythosethatare
  indicatedbythefiguresofpredication;forthesensesof’being’are
  justasmanyasthesefigures。Since,then,somepredicatesindicate
  whatthesubjectis,othersitsquality,othersquantity,others
  relation,othersactivityorpassivity,othersits’where’,othersits
  ’when’,’being’hasameaningansweringtoeachofthese。Forthereis
  nodifferencebetween’themanisrecovering’and’theman
  recovers’,norbetween’themaniswalkingorcutting’and’theman
  walks’or’cuts’;andsimilarlyinallothercases。
  Again,’being’and’is’meanthatastatementistrue,’not
  being’thatitisnottruebutfalses-andthisalikeinthecaseof
  affirmationandofnegation;e。g。’Socratesismusical’meansthat
  thisistrue,or’Socratesisnot-pale’meansthatthisistrue;but
  ’thediagonalofthesquareisnotcommensuratewiththeside’means
  thatitisfalsetosayitis。
  Again,’being’and’thatwhichis’meanthatsomeofthe
  thingswehavementioned’are’potentially,othersincomplete
  reality。Forwesaybothofthatwhichseespotentiallyandofthat
  whichseesactually,thatitis’seeing’,andbothofthatwhichcan
  actualizeitsknowledgeandofthatwhichisactualizingit,thatit
  knows,andbothofthattowhichrestisalreadypresentandofthat
  whichcanrest,thatitrests。Andsimilarlyinthecaseof
  substances;wesaytheHermesisinthestone,andthehalfofthe
  lineisintheline,andwesayofthatwhichisnotyetripethat
  itiscorn。Whenathingispotentialandwhenitisnotyetpotential
  mustbeexplainedelsewhere。
  Wecall’substance’1thesimplebodies,i。e。earthandfireand
  waterandeverythingofthesort,andingeneralbodiesandthethings
  composedofthem,bothanimalsanddivinebeings,andthepartsof
  these。Allthesearecalledsubstancebecausetheyarenot
  predicatedofasubjectbuteverythingelseispredicatedofthem-2
  Thatwhich,beingpresentinsuchthingsasarenotpredicatedofa
  subject,isthecauseoftheirbeing,asthesoulisofthebeingof
  ananimal-3Thepartswhicharepresentinsuchthings,limiting
  themandmarkingthemasindividuals,andbywhosedestructionthe
  wholeisdestroyed,asthebodyisbythedestructionoftheplane,as
  somesay,andtheplanebythedestructionoftheline;andingeneral
  numberisthoughtbysometobeofthisnature;forifitis
  destroyed,theysay,nothingexists,anditlimitsallthings-4The
  essence,theformulaofwhichisadefinition,isalsocalledthe
  substanceofeachthing。
  Itfollows,then,that’substance’hastwosenses,Aultimate
  substratum,whichisnolongerpredicatedofanythingelse,andB
  thatwhich,beinga’this’,isalsoseparableandofthisnatureis
  theshapeorformofeachthing。
  ’Thesame’means1thatwhichisthesameinanaccidental
  sense,e。g。’thepale’and’themusical’arethesamebecausetheyare
  accidentsofthesamething,and’aman’and’musical’becausetheone
  isanaccidentoftheother;and’themusical’is’aman’becauseit
  isanaccidentoftheman。Thecomplexentityisthesameaseither
  ofthesimpleonesandeachoftheseisthesameasit;forboth
  ’theman’and’themusical’aresaidtobethesameas’themusical
  man’,andthisthesameasthey。Thisiswhyallofthese
  statementsaremadenotuniversally;foritisnottruetosaythat
  everymanisthesameas’themusical’foruniversalattributes
  belongtothingsinvirtueoftheirownnature,butaccidentsdonot
  belongtotheminvirtueoftheirownnature;butofthe
  individualsthestatementsaremadewithoutqualification。For
  ’Socrates’and’musicalSocrates’arethoughttobethesame;but
  ’Socrates’isnotpredicableofmorethanonesubject,andtherefore
  wedonotsay’everySocrates’aswesay’everyman’。
  Somethingsaresaidtobethesameinthissense,others2
  arethesamebytheirownnature,inasmanysensesasthatwhichis
  onebyitsownnatureisso;forboththethingswhosematterisone
  eitherinkindorinnumber,andthosewhoseessenceisone,are
  saidtobethesame。Clearly,therefore,samenessisaunityofthe
  beingeitherofmorethanonethingorofonethingwhenitistreated
  asmorethanone,ie。whenwesayathingisthesameasitself;for
  wetreatitastwo。
  Thingsarecalled’other’ifeithertheirkindsortheirmatters
  orthedefinitionsoftheiressencearemorethanone;andin
  general’other’hasmeaningsoppositetothoseof’thesame’。
  ’Different’isapplied1tothosethingswhichthoughother
  arethesameinsomerespect,onlynotinnumberbuteitherinspecies
  oringenusorbyanalogy;2tothosewhosegenusisother,andto
  contraries,andtoanthingsthathavetheirothernessintheir
  essence。
  Thosethingsarecalled’like’whichhavethesameattributesin
  everyrespect,andthosewhichhavemoreattributesthesamethan
  different,andthosewhosequalityisone;andthatwhichshares
  withanotherthingthegreaternumberorthemoreimportantofthe
  attributeseachofthemoneoftwocontrariesinrespectofwhich
  thingsarecapableofaltering,islikethatotherthing。Thesenses
  of’unlike’areoppositetothoseof’like’。
  Theterm’opposite’isappliedtocontradictories,andto
  contraries,andtorelativeterms,andtoprivationandpossession,
  andtotheextremesfromwhichandintowhichgenerationand
  dissolutiontakeplace;andtheattributesthatcannotbepresentat
  thesametimeinthatwhichisreceptiveofboth,aresaidtobe
  opposed,-eitherthemselvesoftheirconstituents。Greyandwhite
  colourdonotbelongatthesametimetothesamething;hencetheir
  constituentsareopposed。
  Theterm’contrary’isapplied1tothoseattributesdiffering
  ingenuswhichcannotbelongatthesametimetothesamesubject,2
  tothemostdifferentofthethingsinthesamegenus,3tothemost
  differentoftheattributesinthesamerecipientsubject,4to
  themostdifferentofthethingsthatfallunderthesamefaculty,5
  tothethingswhosedifferenceisgreatesteitherabsolutelyorin
  genusorinspecies。Theotherthingsthatarecalledcontraryare
  socalled,somebecausetheypossesscontrariesoftheabovekind,
  somebecausetheyarereceptiveofsuch,somebecausetheyare
  productiveoforsusceptibletosuch,orareproducingorsuffering
  them,orarelossesoracquisitions,orpossessionsorprivations,
  ofsuch。Since’one’and’being’havemanysenses,theotherterms
  whicharederivedfromthese,andtherefore’same’,’other’,and
  ’contrary’,mustcorrespond,sothattheymustbedifferentforeach
  category。
  Theterm’otherinspecies’isappliedtothingswhichbeingof
  thesamegenusarenotsubordinatetheonetotheother,orwhich
  beinginthesamegenushaveadifference,orwhichhaveacontrariety
  intheirsubstance;andcontrariesareotherthanoneanotherin
  specieseitherallcontrariesorthosewhicharesocalledinthe
  primarysense,andsoarethosethingswhosedefinitionsdifferin
  theinfimaspeciesofthegenuse。g。manandhorseareindivisiblein
  genus,buttheirdefinitionsaredifferent,andthosewhichbeing
  inthesamesubstancehaveadifference。’Thesameinspecies’hasthe
  variousmeaningsoppositetothese。
  Thewords’prior’and’posterior’areapplied1tosomethings
  ontheassumptionthatthereisafirst,i。e。abeginning,ineach
  classbecausetheyarenearersomebeginningdeterminedeither
  absolutelyandbynature,orbyreferencetosomethingorinsome
  placeorbycertainpeople;e。g。thingsarepriorinplacebecause
  theyarenearereithertosomeplacedeterminedbynaturee。g。the
  middleorthelastplace,ortosomechanceobject;andthatwhichis
  fartherisposterior-Otherthingsarepriorintime;somebybeing
  fartherfromthepresent,i。e。inthecaseofpasteventsforthe
  TrojanwarispriortothePersian,becauseitisfartherfromthe
  present,othersbybeingnearerthepresent,i。e。inthecaseof
  futureeventsfortheNemeangamesarepriortothePythian,ifwe
  treatthepresentasbeginningandfirstpoint,becausetheyare
  nearerthepresent-Otherthingsarepriorinmovement;forthat
  whichisnearerthefirstmoverispriore。g。theboyispriortothe
  man;andtheprimemoveralsoisabeginningabsolutely-Othersare
  priorinpower;forthatwhichexceedsinpower,i。e。themore
  powerful,isprior;andsuchisthataccordingtowhosewillthe
  other-i。e。theposterior-mustfollow,sothatifthepriordoesnot
  setitinmotiontheotherdoesnotmove,andifitsetsitin
  motionitdoesmove;andherewillisabeginning-Othersarepriorin
  arrangement;thesearethethingsthatareplacedatintervalsin
  referencetosomeonedefinitethingaccordingtosomerule,e。g。in
  thechorusthesecondmanispriortothethird,andinthelyrethe
  secondloweststringispriortothelowest;forintheonecasethe
  leaderandintheotherthemiddlestringisthebeginning。
  These,then,arecalledpriorinthissense,but2inanother
  sensethatwhichispriorforknowledgeistreatedasalso
  absolutelyprior;ofthese,thethingsthatarepriorindefinitiondo
  notcoincidewiththosethatarepriorinrelationtoperception。
  Forindefinitionuniversalsareprior,inrelationtoperception
  individuals。Andindefinitionalsotheaccidentispriortothe
  whole,e。g。’musical’to’musicalman’,forthedefinitioncannot
  existasawholewithoutthepart;yetmusicalnesscannotexistunless
  thereissomeonewhoismusical。
  3Theattributesofpriorthingsarecalledprior,e。g。
  straightnessispriortosmoothness;foroneisanattributeofaline
  assuch,andtheotherofasurface。
  Somethingsthenarecalledpriorandposteriorinthissense,
  others4inrespectofnatureandsubstance,i。e。thosewhichcanbe
  withoutotherthings,whiletheotherscannotbewithoutthem,-a
  distinctionwhichPlatoused。Ifweconsiderthevarioussensesof
  ’being’,firstlythesubjectisprior,sothatsubstanceisprior;
  secondly,accordingaspotencyorcompleterealityistakeninto
  account,differentthingsareprior,forsomethingsarepriorin
  respectofpotency,othersinrespectofcompletereality,e。g。in
  potencythehalflineispriortothewholeline,andthepartto
  thewhole,andthemattertotheconcretesubstance,butincomplete
  realitytheseareposterior;foritisonlywhenthewholehasbeen
  dissolvedthattheywillexistincompletereality。Inasense,
  therefore,allthingsthatarecalledpriorandposteriorareso
  calledwithreferencetothisfourthsense;forsomethingscan
  existwithoutothersinrespectofgeneration,e。g。thewhole
  withouttheparts,andothersinrespectofdissolution,e。g。thepart
  withoutthewhole。Andthesameistrueinallothercases。