Those，then，whomaintainthisviewaredriventothisconclusion，
　　andtothefurtherconclusionthatitisnotnecessaryeitherto
　　assertortodeny。Forifitistruethatathingisamananda
　　not-man，evidentlyalsoitwillbeneitheramannoranot-man。Forto
　　thetwoassertionsthereanswertwonegations，andiftheformeris
　　treatedasasinglepropositioncompoundedoutoftwo，thelatteralso
　　isasinglepropositionoppositetotheformer。
　　Again，eitherthetheoryistrueinallcases，andathingisboth
　　whiteandnot-white，andexistentandnon-existent，andallother
　　assertionsandnegationsaresimilarly-KanbaAPp点com-compatibleorthetheoryis
　　trueofsomestatementsandnotofothers。Andifnotofall，the
　　exceptionswillbecontradictoriesofwhichadmittedlyonlyoneis
　　true；butifofall，againeitherthenegationwillbetruewherever
　　theassertionis，andtheassertiontruewhereverthenegationis，
　　orthenegationwillbetruewheretheassertionis，buttheassertion
　　notalwaystruewherethenegationis。Andainthelattercase
　　therewillbesomethingwhichfixedlyisnot，andthiswillbean
　　indisputablebelief；andifnon-beingissomethingindisputableand
　　knowable，theoppositeassertionwillbemoreknowable。Butbif
　　itisequallypossiblealsotoassertallthatitispossibletodeny，
　　onemusteitherbesayingwhatistruewhenoneseparatesthe
　　predicatesandsays，forinstance，thatathingiswhite，andagain
　　thatitisnot-white，ornot。Andifiitisnottruetoapply
　　thepredicatesseparately，ouropponentisnotsayingwhathe
　　professestosay，andalsonothingatallexists；buthowcould
　　non-existentthingsspeakorwalk，ashedoes？Alsoallthingswould
　　onthisviewbeone，ashasbeenalreadysaid，andmanandGodand
　　triremeandtheircontradictorieswillbethesame。Forif
　　contradictoriescanbepredicatedalikeofeachsubject，onething
　　willinnowisedifferfromanother；forifitdiffer，thisdifference
　　willbesomethingtrueandpeculiartoit。Andiiifonemaywith
　　truthapplythepredicatesseparately，theabove-mentionedresult
　　followsnonetheless，and，further，itfollowsthatallwouldthenbe
　　rightandallwouldbeinerror，andouropponenthimselfconfesses
　　himselftobeinerror-Andatthesametimeourdiscussionwithhim
　　isevidentlyaboutnothingatall；forhesaysnothing。Forhesays
　　neither’yes’nor’no’，but’yesandno’；andagainhedeniesboth
　　oftheseandsays’neitheryesnorno’；forotherwisetherewould
　　alreadybesomethingdefinite。
　　Againifwhentheassertionistrue，thenegationisfalse，and
　　whenthisistrue，theaffirmationisfalse，itwillnotbepossible
　　toassertanddenythesamethingtrulyatthesametime。But
　　perhapstheymightsaythiswastheveryquestionatissue。
　　Again，isheinerrorwhojudgeseitherthatthethingissoor
　　thatitisnotso，andisherightwhojudgesboth？Ifheisright，
　　whatcantheymeanbysayingthatthenatureofexistingthingsis
　　ofthiskind？Andifheisnotright，butmorerightthanhewho
　　judgesintheotherway，beingwillalreadybeofadefinitenature，
　　andthiswillbetrue，andnotatthesametimealsonottrue。But
　　ifallarealikebothwrongandright，onewhoisinthiscondition
　　willnotbeableeithertospeakortosayanythingintelligible；
　　forhesaysatthesametimeboth’yes’and’no。’Andifhemakesno
　　judgementbut’thinks’and’doesnotthink’，indifferently，what
　　differencewilltherebebetweenhimandavegetable？-Thus，then，it
　　isinthehighestdegreeevidentthatneitheranyoneofthosewho
　　maintainthisviewnoranyoneelseisreallyinthisposition。For
　　whydoesamanwalktoMegaraandnotstayathome，whenhethinks
　　heoughttobewalkingthere？Whydoeshenotwalkearlysome
　　morningintoawelloroveraprecipice，ifonehappenstobeinhis
　　way？Whydoweobservehimguardingagainstthis，evidentlybecausehe
　　doesnotthinkthatfallinginisalikegoodandnotgood？
　　Evidently，then，hejudgesonethingtobebetterandanotherworse。
　　Andifthisisso，hemustalsojudgeonethingtobeamanand
　　anothertobenot-a-man，onethingtobesweetandanothertobe
　　not-sweet。Forhedoesnotaimatandjudgeallthingsalike，when，
　　thinkingitdesirabletodrinkwaterortoseeaman，heproceedsto
　　aimatthesethings；yetheought，ifthesamethingwerealikea
　　manandnot-a-man。But，aswassaid，thereisnoonewhodoesnot
　　obviouslyavoidsomethingsandnotothers。Therefore，asitseems，
　　allmenmakeunqualifiedjudgements，ifnotaboutallthings，still
　　aboutwhatisbetterandworse。Andifthisisnotknowledgebut
　　opinion，theyshouldbeallthemoreanxiousaboutthetruth，asa
　　sickmanshouldbemoreanxiousabouthishealththanonewhois
　　healthy；forhewhohasopinionsis，incomparisonwiththemanwho
　　knows，notinahealthystateasfarasthetruthisconcerned。
　　Again，howevermuchallthingsmaybe’soandnotso’，stillthere
　　isamoreandalessinthenatureofthings；forweshouldnotsay
　　thattwoandthreeareequallyeven，norishewhothinksfour
　　thingsarefiveequallywrongwithhimwhothinkstheyareathousand。
　　Ifthentheyarenotequallywrong，obviouslyoneislesswrongand
　　thereforemoreright。Ifthenthatwhichhasmoreofanyqualityis
　　nearerthenorm，theremustbesometruthtowhichthemoretrueis
　　nearer。Andevenifthereisnot，stillthereisalreadysomething
　　betterfoundedandlikerthetruth，andweshallhavegotridofthe
　　unqualifieddoctrinewhichwouldpreventusfromdetermining
　　anythinginourthought。
　　FromthesameopinionproceedsthedoctrineofProtagoras，and
　　bothdoctrinesmustbealiketrueoralikeuntrue。Forontheone
　　hand，ifallopinionsandappearancesaretrue，allstatementsmustbe
　　atthesametimetrueandfalse。Formanymenholdbeliefsinwhich
　　theyconflictwithoneanother，andthinkthosemistakenwhohave
　　notthesameopinionsasthemselves；sothatthesamethingmust
　　bothbeandnotbe。Andontheotherhand，ifthisisso，allopinions
　　mustbetrue；forthosewhoaremistakenandthosewhoarerightare
　　opposedtooneanotherintheiropinions；if，then，realityissuchas
　　theviewinquestionsupposes，allwillberightintheirbeliefs。
　　Evidently，then，bothdoctrinesproceedfromthesamewayof
　　thinking。Butthesamemethodofdiscussionmustnotbeusedwith
　　allopponents；forsomeneedpersuasion，andotherscompulsion。
　　Thosewhohavebeendriventothispositionbydifficultiesintheir
　　thinkingcaneasilybecuredoftheirignorance；foritisnottheir
　　expressedargumentbuttheirthoughtthatonehastomeet。Butthose
　　whoargueforthesakeofargumentcanbecuredonlybyrefutingthe
　　argumentasexpressedinspeechandinwords。
　　Thosewhoreallyfeelthedifficultieshavebeenledtothis
　　opinionbyobservationofthesensibleworld。1Theythinkthat
　　contradictoriesorcontrariesaretrueatthesametime，because
　　theyseecontrariescomingintoexistenceoutofthesamething。If，
　　then，thatwhichisnotcannotcometobe，thethingmusthaveexisted
　　beforeasbothcontrariesalike，asAnaxagorassaysallismixedin
　　all，andDemocritustoo；forhesaysthevoidandthefullexistalike
　　ineverypart，andyetoneoftheseisbeing，andtheothernon-being。
　　Tothose，then，whosebeliefrestsonthesegrounds，weshallsaythat
　　inasensetheyspeakrightlyandinasensetheyerr。For’thatwhich
　　is’hastwomeanings，sothatinsomesenseathingcancometobeout
　　ofthatwhichisnot，whileinsomesenseitcannot，andthesame
　　thingcanatthesametimebeinbeingandnotinbeing-butnotinthe
　　samerespect。Forthesamethingcanbepotentiallyatthesametime
　　twocontraries，butitcannotactually。Andagainweshallaskthemto
　　believethatamongexistingthingsthereisalsoanotherkindof
　　substancetowhichneithermovementnordestructionnorgeneration
　　atallbelongs。
　　And2similarlysomehaveinferredfromobservationofthe
　　sensibleworldthetruthofappearances。Fortheythinkthatthetruth
　　shouldnotbedeterminedbythelargeorsmallnumberofthosewho
　　holdabelief，andthatthesamethingisthoughtsweetbysomewhen
　　theytasteit，andbitterbyothers，sothatifallwereillorall
　　weremad，andonlytwoorthreewerewellorsane，thesewouldbe
　　thoughtillandmad，andnottheothers。
　　Andagain，theysaythatmanyoftheotheranimalsreceive
　　impressionscontrarytoours；andthateventothesensesofeach
　　individual，thingsdonotalwaysseemthesame。Which，then，of
　　theseimpressionsaretrueandwhicharefalseisnotobvious；forthe
　　onesetisnomoretruethantheother，butbotharealike。Andthis
　　iswhyDemocritus，atanyrate，saysthateitherthereisnotruth
　　ortousatleastitisnotevident。
　　Andingeneralitisbecausethesethinkerssupposeknowledgeto
　　besensation，andthistobeaphysicalalteration，thattheysaythat
　　whatappearstooursensesmustbetrue；foritisforthesereasons
　　thatbothEmpedoclesandDemocritusand，onemayalmostsay，allthe
　　othershavefallenvictimstoopinionsofthissort。ForEmpedocles
　　saysthatwhenmenchangetheirconditiontheychangetheirknowledge；
　　Forwisdomincreasesinmenaccordingtowhatisbeforethem。
　　Andelsewherehesaysthat:-
　　Sofarastheirnaturechanged，sofartothemalways
　　Camechangedthoughtsintomind。
　　AndParmenidesalsoexpresseshimselfinthesameway:
　　Forasateachtimethemuch-bentlimbsarecomposed，
　　Soisthemindofmen；forineachandallmen
　　’Tisonethingthinks-thesubstanceoftheirlimbs:
　　Forthatofwhichthereismoreisthought。
　　AsayingofAnaxagorastosomeofhisfriendsisalso
　　related，-thatthingswouldbeforthemsuchastheysupposedthemto
　　be。AndtheysaythatHomeralsoevidentlyhadthisopinion，because
　　hemadeHector，whenhewasunconsciousfromtheblow，lie’thinking
　　otherthoughts’，-whichimpliesthateventhosewhoarebereftof
　　thoughthavethoughts，thoughnotthesamethoughts。Evidently，
　　then，ifbothareformsofknowledge，therealthingsalsoareat
　　thesametime’bothsoandnotso’。Anditisinthisdirectionthat
　　theconsequencesaremostdifficult。Forifthosewhohaveseenmost
　　ofsuchtruthasispossibleforusandthesearethosewhoseek
　　andloveitmost-ifthesehavesuchopinionsandexpressthese
　　viewsaboutthetruth，isitnotnaturalthatbeginnersin
　　philosophyshouldloseheart？Fortoseekthetruthwouldbetofollow
　　flyinggame。
　　Butthereasonwhythesethinkersheldthisopinionisthat
　　whiletheywereinquiringintothetruthofthatwhichis，they
　　thought，’thatwhichis’wasidenticalwiththesensibleworld；in
　　this，however，thereislargelypresentthenatureofthe
　　indeterminate-ofthatwhichexistsinthepeculiarsensewhichwehave
　　explained；andtherefore，whiletheyspeakplausibly，theydonot
　　saywhatistrueforitisfittingtoputthemattersoratherthan
　　asEpicharmusputitagainstXenophanes。Andagain，becausethey
　　sawthatallthisworldofnatureisinmovementandthataboutthat
　　whichchangesnotruestatementcanbemade，theysaidthatofcourse，
　　regardingthatwhicheverywhereineveryrespectischanging，
　　nothingcouldtrulybeaffirmed。Itwasthisbeliefthatblossomed
　　intothemostextremeoftheviewsabovementioned，thatofthe
　　professedHeracliteans，suchaswasheldbyCratylus，whofinally
　　didnotthinkitrighttosayanythingbutonlymovedhisfinger，
　　andcriticizedHeraclitusforsayingthatitisimpossibletostep
　　twiceintothesameriver；forhethoughtonecouldnotdoiteven
　　once。