ALLmenbynaturedesiretoknow。Anindicationofthisisthe
delightwetakeinoursenses;forevenapartfromtheirusefulness
theyarelovedforthemselves;andaboveallothersthesenseof
sight。Fornotonlywithaviewtoaction,butevenwhenwearenot
goingtodoanything,wepreferseeingonemightsaytoeverything
else。Thereasonisthatthis,mostofallthesenses,makesusknow
andbringstolightmanydifferencesbetweenthings。
Bynatureanimalsarebornwiththefacultyofsensation,andfrom
sensationmemoryisproducedinsomeofthem,thoughnotinothers。
Andthereforetheformeraremoreintelligentandaptatlearningthan
thosewhichcannotremember;thosewhichareincapableofhearing
soundsareintelligentthoughtheycannotbetaught,e。g。thebee,and
anyotherraceofanimalsthatmaybelikeit;andthosewhichbesides
memoryhavethissenseofhearingcanbetaught。
Theanimalsotherthanmanlivebyappearancesandmemories,and
havebutlittleofconnectedexperience;butthehumanracelivesalso
byartandreasonings。Nowfrommemoryexperienceisproducedin
men;fortheseveralmemoriesofthesamethingproducefinallythe
capacityforasingleexperience。Andexperienceseemsprettymuch
likescienceandart,butreallyscienceandartcometomenthrough
experience;for’experiencemadeart’,asPolussays,’but
inexperienceluck。’Nowartariseswhenfrommanynotionsgainedby
experienceoneuniversaljudgementaboutaclassofobjectsis
produced。FortohaveajudgementthatwhenCalliaswasillofthis
diseasethisdidhimgood,andsimilarlyinthecaseofSocratesand
inmanyindividualcases,isamatterofexperience;buttojudgethat
ithasdonegoodtoallpersonsofacertainconstitution,marked
offinoneclass,whentheywereillofthisdisease,e。g。to
phlegmaticorbiliouspeoplewhenburningwithfevers-thisisamatter
ofart。
Withaviewtoactionexperienceseemsinnorespectinferiorto
art,andmenofexperiencesucceedevenbetterthanthosewhohave
theorywithoutexperience。Thereasonisthatexperienceisknowledge
ofindividuals,artofuniversals,andactionsandproductionsareall
concernedwiththeindividual;forthephysiciandoesnotcureman,
exceptinanincidentalway,butCalliasorSocratesorsomeother
calledbysomesuchindividualname,whohappenstobeaman。If,
then,amanhasthetheorywithouttheexperience,andrecognizes
theuniversalbutdoesnotknowtheindividualincludedinthis,he
willoftenfailtocure;foritistheindividualthatistobe
cured。Butyetwethinkthatknowledgeandunderstandingbelongto
artratherthantoexperience,andwesupposeartiststobewiserthan
menofexperiencewhichimpliesthatWisdomdependsinallcases
ratheronknowledge;andthisbecausetheformerknowthecause,
butthelatterdonot。Formenofexperienceknowthatthethingis
so,butdonotknowwhy,whiletheothersknowthe’why’andthe
cause。Hencewethinkalsothatthemasterworkersineachcraftare
morehonourableandknowinatruersenseandarewiserthanthe
manualworkers,becausetheyknowthecausesofthethingsthatare
donewethinkthemanualworkersarelikecertainlifelessthings
whichactindeed,butactwithoutknowingwhattheydo,asfire
burns,-butwhilethelifelessthingsperformeachoftheirfunctions
byanaturaltendency,thelabourersperformthemthroughhabit;thus
weviewthemasbeingwisernotinvirtueofbeingabletoact,butof
havingthetheoryforthemselvesandknowingthecauses。Andin
generalitisasignofthemanwhoknowsandofthemanwhodoes
notknow,thattheformercanteach,andthereforewethinkartmore
trulyknowledgethanexperienceis;forartistscanteach,andmen
ofmereexperiencecannot。
Again,wedonotregardanyofthesensesasWisdom;yetsurely
thesegivethemostauthoritativeknowledgeofparticulars。Butthey
donottellusthe’why’ofanything-e。g。whyfireishot;theyonly
saythatitishot。
Atfirsthewhoinventedanyartwhateverthatwentbeyondthe
commonperceptionsofmanwasnaturallyadmiredbymen,notonly
becausetherewassomethingusefulintheinventions,butbecausehe
wasthoughtwiseandsuperiortotherest。Butasmoreartswere
invented,andsomeweredirectedtothenecessitiesoflife,othersto
recreation,theinventorsofthelatterwerenaturallyalwaysregarded
aswiserthantheinventorsoftheformer,becausetheirbranchesof
knowledgedidnotaimatutility。Hencewhenallsuchinventions
werealreadyestablished,thescienceswhichdonotaimatgiving
pleasureoratthenecessitiesoflifewerediscovered,andfirstin
theplaceswheremenfirstbegantohaveleisure。Thisiswhythe
mathematicalartswerefoundedinEgypt;fortherethepriestly
castewasallowedtobeatleisure。
WehavesaidintheEthicswhatthedifferenceisbetweenart
andscienceandtheotherkindredfaculties;butthepointofour
presentdiscussionisthis,thatallmensupposewhatiscalledWisdom
todealwiththefirstcausesandtheprinciplesofthings;sothat,
ashasbeensaidbefore,themanofexperienceisthoughttobe
wiserthanthepossessorsofanysense-perceptionwhatever,theartist
wiserthanthemenofexperience,themasterworkerthanthe
mechanic,andthetheoreticalkindsofknowledgetobemoreofthe
natureofWisdomthantheproductive。ClearlythenWisdomisknowledge
aboutcertainprinciplesandcauses。
2
Sinceweareseekingthisknowledge,wemustinquireofwhat
kindarethecausesandtheprinciples,theknowledgeofwhichis
Wisdom。Ifoneweretotakethenotionswehaveaboutthewiseman,
thismightperhapsmaketheanswermoreevident。Wesupposefirst,
then,thatthewisemanknowsallthings,asfaraspossible,although
hehasnotknowledgeofeachofthemindetail;secondly,thathe
whocanlearnthingsthataredifficult,andnoteasyformantoknow,
iswisesense-perceptioniscommontoall,andthereforeeasyand
nomarkofWisdom;again,thathewhoismoreexactandmore
capableofteachingthecausesiswiser,ineverybranchofknowledge;
andthatofthesciences,also,thatwhichisdesirableonitsown
accountandforthesakeofknowingitismoreofthenatureofWisdom
thanthatwhichisdesirableonaccountofitsresults,andthe
superiorscienceismoreofthenatureofWisdomthantheancillary;
forthewisemanmustnotbeorderedbutmustorder,andhemustnot
obeyanother,butthelesswisemustobeyhim。
Suchandsomanyarethenotions,then,whichwehaveaboutWisdom
andthewise。Nowofthesecharacteristicsthatofknowingall
thingsmustbelongtohimwhohasinthehighestdegreeuniversal
knowledge;forheknowsinasensealltheinstancesthatfallunder
theuniversal。Andthesethings,themostuniversal,areonthe
wholethehardestformentoknow;fortheyarefarthestfromthe
senses。Andthemostexactofthesciencesarethosewhichdealmost
withfirstprinciples;forthosewhichinvolvefewerprinciplesare
moreexactthanthosewhichinvolveadditionalprinciples,e。g。
arithmeticthangeometry。Butthesciencewhichinvestigatescausesis
alsoinstructive,inahigherdegree,forthepeoplewhoinstructus
arethosewhotellthecausesofeachthing。Andunderstandingand
knowledgepursuedfortheirownsakearefoundmostintheknowledge
ofthatwhichismostknowableforhewhochoosestoknowforthe
sakeofknowingwillchoosemostreadilythatwhichismosttruly
knowledge,andsuchistheknowledgeofthatwhichismost
knowable;andthefirstprinciplesandthecausesaremost
knowable;forbyreasonofthese,andfromthese,allotherthings
cometobeknown,andnotthesebymeansofthethingssubordinate
tothem。Andthesciencewhichknowstowhatendeachthingmustbe
doneisthemostauthoritativeofthesciences,andmoreauthoritative
thananyancillaryscience;andthisendisthegoodofthatthing,
andingeneralthesupremegoodinthewholeofnature。Judgedby
allthetestswehavementioned,then,thenameinquestionfallsto
thesamescience;thismustbeasciencethatinvestigatesthefirst
principlesandcauses;forthegood,i。e。theend,isoneofthe
causes。
Thatitisnotascienceofproductionisclearevenfromthe
historyoftheearliestphilosophers。Foritisowingtotheir
wonderthatmenbothnowbeginandatfirstbegantophilosophize;
theywonderedoriginallyattheobviousdifficulties,thenadvanced
littlebylittleandstateddifficultiesaboutthegreatermatters,
e。g。aboutthephenomenaofthemoonandthoseofthesunandofthe
stars,andaboutthegenesisoftheuniverse。Andamanwhoispuzzled
andwondersthinkshimselfignorantwhenceeventheloverofmyth
isinasensealoverofWisdom,forthemythiscomposedofwonders;
thereforesincetheyphilosophizedordertoescapefromignorance,
evidentlytheywerepursuingscienceinordertoknow,andnotforany
utilitarianend。Andthisisconfirmedbythefacts;foritwaswhen
almostallthenecessitiesoflifeandthethingsthatmakefor
comfortandrecreationhadbeensecured,thatsuchknowledgebegan
tobesought。Evidentlythenwedonotseekitforthesakeofany
otheradvantage;butasthemanisfree,wesay,whoexistsforhis
ownsakeandnotforanother’s,sowepursuethisastheonlyfree
science,foritaloneexistsforitsownsake。
Hencealsothepossessionofitmightbejustlyregardedasbeyond
humanpower;forinmanywayshumannatureisinbondage,sothat
accordingtoSimonides’Godalonecanhavethisprivilege’,andit
isunfittingthatmanshouldnotbecontenttoseektheknowledgethat
issuitedtohim。If,then,thereissomethinginwhatthepoets
say,andjealousyisnaturaltothedivinepower,itwouldprobably
occurinthiscaseaboveall,andallwhoexcelledinthisknowledge
wouldbeunfortunate。Butthedivinepowercannotbejealousnay,
accordingtotheproverb,’bardstellalie’,norshouldanyother
sciencebethoughtmorehonourablethanoneofthissort。Forthemost
divinescienceisalsomosthonourable;andthissciencealonemust
be,intwoways,mostdivine。Forthesciencewhichitwouldbemost
meetforGodtohaveisadivinescience,andsoisanysciencethat
dealswithdivineobjects;andthissciencealonehasboththese
qualities;for1Godisthoughttobeamongthecausesofallthings
andtobeafirstprinciple,and2suchascienceeitherGodalone
canhave,orGodaboveallothers。Allthesciences,indeed,are
morenecessarythanthis,butnoneisbetter。
Yettheacquisitionofitmustinasenseendinsomethingwhich
istheoppositeofouroriginalinquiries。Forallmenbegin,aswe
said,bywonderingthatthingsareastheyare,astheydoabout
self-movingmarionettes,oraboutthesolsticesorthe
incommensurabilityofthediagonalofasquarewiththeside;forit
seemswonderfultoallwhohavenotyetseenthereason,thatthereis
athingwhichcannotbemeasuredevenbythesmallestunit。Butwe
mustendinthecontraryand,accordingtotheproverb,thebetter
state,asisthecaseintheseinstancestoowhenmenlearnthecause;
forthereisnothingwhichwouldsurpriseageometersomuchasifthe
diagonalturnedouttobecommensurable。
Wehavestated,then,whatisthenatureofthescienceweare
searchingfor,andwhatisthemarkwhichoursearchandourwhole
investigationmustreach。
Evidentlywehavetoacquireknowledgeoftheoriginalcausesfor
wesayweknoweachthingonlywhenwethinkwerecognizeitsfirst
cause,andcausesarespokenofinfoursenses。Inoneofthesewe
meanthesubstance,i。e。theessenceforthe’why’isreducible
finallytothedefinition,andtheultimate’why’isacauseand
principle;inanotherthematterorsubstratum,inathirdthesource
ofthechange,andinafourththecauseopposedtothis,the
purposeandthegoodforthisistheendofallgenerationand
change。Wehavestudiedthesecausessufficientlyinourworkon
nature,butyetletuscalltoouraidthosewhohaveattackedthe
investigationofbeingandphilosophizedaboutrealitybeforeus。
Forobviouslytheytoospeakofcertainprinciplesandcauses;togo
overtheirviews,then,willbeofprofittothepresentinquiry,
forweshalleitherfindanotherkindofcause,orbemoreconvinced
ofthecorrectnessofthosewhichwenowmaintain。
Ofthefirstphilosophers,then,mostthoughttheprincipleswhich
wereofthenatureofmatterweretheonlyprinciplesofallthings。
Thatofwhichallthingsthatareconsist,thefirstfromwhichthey
cometobe,thelastintowhichtheyareresolvedthesubstance
remaining,butchanginginitsmodifications,thistheysayisthe
elementandthistheprincipleofthings,andthereforetheythink
nothingiseithergeneratedordestroyed,sincethissortofentityis
alwaysconserved,aswesaySocratesneithercomestobeabsolutely
whenhecomestobebeautifulormusical,norceasestobewhen
losesthesecharacteristics,becausethesubstratum,Socrates
himselfremains。justsotheysaynothingelsecomestobeorceases
tobe;fortheremustbesomeentity-eitheroneormorethan
one-fromwhichallotherthingscometobe,itbeingconserved。
Yettheydonotallagreeastothenumberandthenatureofthese
principles。Thales,thefounderofthistypeofphilosophy,saysthe
principleiswaterforwhichreasonhedeclaredthattheearth
restsonwater,gettingthenotionperhapsfromseeingthatthe
nutrimentofallthingsismoist,andthatheatitselfisgenerated
fromthemoistandkeptalivebyitandthatfromwhichtheycome
tobeisaprincipleofallthings。Hegothisnotionfromthisfact,
andfromthefactthattheseedsofallthingshaveamoistnature,
andthatwateristheoriginofthenatureofmoistthings。
第1章