§；1019。Wearetold，thatsuchawildandirrationalabuseof
powerisnottobeapprehended，andisnottobetakenintoview，when
discussingitsexistence。Allpowermaybeabused；andifthefearofitsabuse
isCH。XIV。]POWERSOFCONGRESS——TAXES。479
toconstituteanargumentagainstitsexistence，itmightbeurgedagainst
theexistenceofthat，whichisuniversallyacknowledged，andwhichis
indispensabletothegeneralsafety。Thestateswillneverbesomad，asto
destroytheirowncommerce，oreventolessenit。Wedonotdissentfromthese
generalpropositions。Wedonotsupposeanystatewouldactsounwisely。Butwe
donotplacethequestiononthatground。Theseargumentsapplywithprecisely
thesameforceagainstthewholeprohibition。Itmight，withthesamereasonbe
said，thatnostatewouldbesoblindtoitsowninterests，astolaydutieson
importation，whichwouldeitherprohibit，ordiminishitstrade。Yetthe
framersofourconstitutionhavethoughtthisapower，whichnostateoughtto
exercise。Conceding，tothefullextent，whichisrequired，thateverystate
would，initslegislationonthissubject，providejudiciouslyforitsown
interests，itcannotbeconceded，thateachwouldrespecttheinterestsof
others。Adutyonimportsisataxonthearticle，whichispaidbythe
consumer。Thegreatimportingstateswouldthuslevyataxonthenon—importing
states，whichwouldnotbelessatax，becausetheirinterestwouldaffordample
securityagainstitseverbeingsoheavy，astoexpelcommercefromtheirports。
Thiswouldnecessarilyproducecountervailingmeasuresonthepartofthose
states，whosesituationwaslessfavourabletoimportation。Forthis，among
otherreasons，thewholepoweroflayingdutiesonimportswas，withasingle
andslightexception，takenfromthestates。Whenweareinquiring，whethera
particularactiswithinthisprohibition，thequestionisnot，whetherthe
statemaysolegislate，astohurtitself，butwhethertheactiswithinthe
wordsandmischiefoftheprohibitoryclause。Ithasalready480CONSTITUTIONOFTHEU。STATES。[BOOKIII。
beenshown，thatataxonthearticleinthehandsoftheimporteriswithin
itswords；andwethinkittooclearforcontroversy，thatthesametaxis
withinitsmischief。Wethinkitunquestionable，thatsuchataxhasprecisely
thesametendencytoenhancethepriceofthearticle，asifimposeduponit，
whileenteringtheport。
§；1020。"ThecounselforthestateofMarylandinsist
withgreatreason，thatifthewordsoftheprohibitionbetakenintheirutmost
latitude，theywillabridgethepoweroftaxation，whichalladmittobe
essentialtothestates，toanextent，whichhasneveryetbeensuspected；and
willdeprivethemofresources，whicharenecessarytosupplyrevenue，andwhich
theyhaveheretoforebeenadmittedtopossess。Thesewordsmust，therefore，be
construedwithsomelimitation；and，ifthisbeadmitted，theyinsist，that
enteringthecountryisthepointoftime，whentheprohibitionceases，andthe
powerofthestatetotaxcommences。Itmaybeconceded，thatthewordsofthe
prohibitionoughtnottobepressedtotheirutmostextent；thatinourcomplex
systemtheobjectofthepowersconferredonthegovernmentoftheUnion，and
thenatureoftheoftenconflictingpowers，whichremaininthestates，must
alwaysbetakenintoview，andmayaidinexpoundingthewords。ofany
particularclause。Butwhileweadmit，thatsoundprinciplesofconstruction
oughttorestrainallcourtsfromcarryingthewordsoftheprohibitionbeyond
theobject，whichtheconstitutionisintendedtosecure；thattheremustbea
pointoftime，whentheprohibitionceases，andthepowerofthestatetotax
commences；wecannotadmit，thatthispointoftimeistheinstant，thatthe
articlesenterthecountry。Itis，wethink，obvious，thatthisconstruction
woulddefeattheprohibition。
CH。XIV。]POWERSOFCONGRESS——TAXES。481
§；1021。"Theconstitutionalprohibitiononthestatestolayaduty
onimports，aprohibition，whichavastmajorityofthemmustfeelaninterest
inpreserving，maycertainlycomeinconflictwiththeiracknowledgedpowerto
taxpersonsandpropertywithintheirterritory。Thepower，andtherestriction
onit，thoughquitedistinguishable，whentheydonotapproacheachother，may
yet，liketheinterveningcolorsbetweenwhiteandblack，approachsonearly，as
toperplextheunderstanding，ascolorsperplexthevisioninmarkingthe
distinctionbetweenthem。Yetthedistinctionexists，andmustbemarked，as
thecasesarise。Tilltheydoarise，itmightbeprematuretostateanyrule，
asbeinguniversalinitsapplication。Itissufficientforthepresent，to
say，generally，thatwhentheimporterhassoacteduponthethingimported，
thatithasbecomeincorporatedandmixedupwiththemassofpropertyinthe
country，ithas，perhaps，lostitsdistinctivecharacter，asanimport，andhas
becomesubjecttothetaxingpowerofthestate。But，whileremainingthe
propertyoftheimporter，inhiswarehouse，inthe，originalformorpackage，in
whichitwasimported，ataxuponitistooplainlyadutyonimportstoescape
theprohibitionintheconstitution。
§；1022。"Thecounselfortheplaintiffsinerrorcontend，
thattheimporterpurchases，bypaymentofthedutytotheUnitedStates，a
righttodisposeofhismerchandise，aswellastobringitintothecountry；
andcertainlytheargumentissupportedbystrongreason，aswellasbythe
practiceofnations，includingourown。Theobjectofimportationissale；it
constitutesthemotiveforpayingtheduties；andiftheUnitedStatespossess
thepowerofconferringtherighttosell，astheconsideration，forwhichthe
dutyispaid，482CONSTITUTIONOFTHEU。STATES。[BOOKIII
everyprincipleoffairdealingrequites，thattheyshouldbeunderstoodto
conferit。Thepracticeofthemostcommercialnationsconformstothisidea。
Duties，accordingtothatpractice，arechargedonthosearticlesonly，which
areintendedforsaleorconsumptioninthecountry。Thus，seastores，goods
importedandre—exportedinthesamevessel，goodslandedandcarriedoverland
forthepurposeofbeingre—exportedfromsomeotherport，goodsforcedinby
stressofweather，andlanded，butnotforsale，areexemptedfromthepayment
ofduties。Thewholecourseoflegislationonthesubjectshows，that，inthe
opinionofthelegislature，therighttosellisconnectedwiththepaymentof
duties。
§；1093。"Thecounselforthedefendantinerrorhave
endeavouredtoillustratetheirproposition，thattheconstitutionalprohibition
ceasestheinstantthegoodsenterthecountry，byanarrayoftheconsequences，
whichtheysupposemustfollowthedenialofit。Iftheimporteracquiresthe
righttosellbythepaymentofduties，hemay，theysay，exertthatright，when，
where，andashepleases；andthestatecannotregulateit。Hemaysellby
retail，atauction，orasanitinerantpedlar。Hemayintroducearticles，as
gun—powder，whichendangeracity，intothemidstofitspopulation；hemay
introducearticles，whichendangerthepublichealth，andthepowerof
self—preservationisdenied。Animportermaybringingoods，asplate，forhis
ownuse，andthusretainmuchvaluablepropertyexemptfromtaxation。
§；1024。"Theseobjectionstotheprinciple，ifwell
founded，wouldcertainlybeentitledtoseriousconsideration。But，wethink，
theywillbefound，onexamination，nottobelongnecessarilytotheprinciple，
and，conse—
CH。XIV。]POWERSOFCONGRESS——TAXES。483
quently，nottoprove，thatitmaynotberesortedtowithsafety，asa
criterion，bywhichtomeasuretheextentoftheprohibition。Thisindictment
isagainsttheimporterforsellingapackageofdrygoodsintheform，inwhich
itwasimported，withoutalicense。Thisstateofthingsischanged，ifhe
sellsthem，orotherwisemixesthemwiththegeneralpropertyofthestate，by
breakinguphispackages，andtravellingwiththem，asanitinerantpedlar。In
thefirstcase，thetaxinterceptstheimport，asanimport，initswayto
becomeincorporatedwiththegeneralmassofproperty，anddeniesitthe
privilegeofbecomingsoincorporated，untilitshallhavecontributedtothe
revenueofthestate。Itdeniestotheimportertherightofusingthe
privilege，whichhehaspurchasedfromtheUnitedStates，untilheshallhave
alsopurchaseditfromthestate。Inthelastcase，thetaxfindsthearticle
alreadyincorporatedwiththemassofpropertybytheactoftheimporter。He
hasusedtheprivilegehehadpurchased，andhashimselfmixedthemupwiththe
commonmass，andthelawmaytreatthem，asitfindsthem。Thesameobservations
applytoplate，orotherfurnitureusedbytheimporter。So，ifhesellsby
auction。Auctioneersarepersonslicensedbythestate，andiftheimporter
choosestoemploythem，hecanaslittleobjecttopayingforthisservice，as
foranyother，forwhichhemayapplytoanofficerofthestate。Therightof
salemayverywellbeannexedtoimportation，withoutannexingtoit，also，the
privilegeofusingtheofficerslicensedbythestatetomakesalesina
peculiarway。Thepowertodirecttheremovalofgun—powderisabranchofthe
policepower，whichunquestionablyremains，andoughttoremainwiththestates。
Ifthepossessorstoresithimselfoutoftown，theremovalcannotbeadutyon484CONSTITUTIONOFTHEU。STATES。[BOOKIII。
imports，becauseitcontributesnothingtotherevenue。Ifheprefers
placingitinapublicmagazine，itisbecausehestoresitthere，inhisown
opinion，moreadvantageouslythanelsewhere。Wearenotsure，thatthismaynot
heclassedamonginspectionlaws。Theremovalordestructionofinfectiousor
unsoundarticlesis，undoubtedly，anexerciseofthatpower，andformsan
expressexceptiontotheprohibitionweareconsidering。Indeed，thelawsof
theUnitedStatesexpresslysanctionthehealthlawsofastate。
§；1095。"Theprinciple，then，forwhichtheplaintiffsin
errorcontend，thattheimporteracquiresaright，notonlytobringthe
articlesintothecountry，buttomixthemwiththecommonmassofproperty，
doesnotinterferewiththenecessarypoweroftaxation，whichisacknowledged
toresideinthestates，tothatdangerousextent，whichthecounselforthe
defendantsinerrorseemtoapprehend。Itcarriestheprohibitioninthe
constitutionnofarther，thantopreventthestatesfromdoingthat，whichit
wasthegreatobjectoftheconstitutiontoprevent。
§；1026。"Butifitshouldbeproved，thatadutyonthe
articleitselfwouldberepugnanttotheconstitution，itisstillargued，that
thisisnotataxuponthearticle，butontheperson。Thestate，itissaid，
maytaxoccupations，andthisisnothingmore。Itisimpossibletoconcealfrom
ourselves，thatthisisvaryingtheform，withoutvaryingthesubstance。Itis
treatingaprohibition，whichisgeneral，asifitwereconfinedtoaparticular
modeofdoingtheforbiddenthing。Allmustperceive，thatataxonthesaleof
anarticle，importedonlyforsale，isataxonthearticleitself。Itistrue，
thestatemaytaxoccupationsgenerally；butthistaxmustbepaidbythose，who
employtheindividual，orisatax。onhisbusiness。
CH。XIV。]POWERSOFCONGRESS——TAXES。485
Thelawyer，thephysician，orthemechanic，musteitherchargemoreonthe
article，inwhichhedeals，orthethingitselfistaxedthroughhisperson。
Thisthestatehasarighttodo，becausenoconstitutionalprohibitionextends
toit。So，ataxontheoccupationofanimporteris，inlikemanner，ataxon
importation。Itmustaddtothepriceofthearticle，andbepaidbythe
consumer，orbytheimporterhimself，inlikemanner，asadirectdutyonthe
articleitselfwouldbemade。Thisthestatehasnotarighttodo，becauseit
isprohibitedbytheconstitution。
§；1027。"Insupportoftheargument，thattheprohibition
ceasestheinstantthegoodsarebroughtintothecountry，acomparisonhasbeen
drawnbetweentheoppositewords，exportandimport。As，toexport，itissaid，
meansonlytocarrygoodsoutofthecountry；so，toimport，meansonlytobring
themintoit。But，supposeweextendthiscomparisontothetwoprohibitions。
Thestatesareforbiddentolayadutyonexports，andtheUnitedStatesare
forbiddentolayataxordutyonarticlesexportedfromanystate。Thereis
somediversityinlanguage，butnoneisperceivableintheact，whichis
prohibited。TheUnitedStateshavethesamerighttotaxoccupations，whichis
possessedbythestates。Now，supposetheUnitedStatesshouldrequireevery
exportertotakeoutalicense，forwhichheshouldpaysuchtax，ascongress
mightthinkpropertoimpose；wouldthegovernmentbepermittedtoshielditself
fromthejustcensure，towhichthisattempttoevadetheprohibitionsofthe
constitutionwouldexposeit，bysaying，thatthiswasataxontheperson，not
onthearticle，andthatthelegislaturehadarighttotaxoccupations？Or，
supposerevenuecuttersweretobestationedoffthecoastforthepurposeof
levyingaduty486CONSTITUTIONOFTHEU。STATES。[BOOKIII。
onallmerchandisefoundinvessels，whichwereleavingtheUnitedStates
forforeigncountries，woulditbereceived，asanexcuseforthisoutrage，were
thegovernmenttosay，thatexportationmeantnomorethancarryinggoodsoutof
thecountry，andastheprohibitiontolayataxonimports，orthingsimported，
ceasedtheinstanttheywerebroughtintotimcountry，sotheprohibitiontotax
articlesexportedceased，whentheywerecarriedoutorthecountry？
§；1028。"Wethink，then，thattheact，underwhichthe
plaintiffsinerrorwereindicted，isrepugnanttothatarticleofthe
constitution，whichdeclares，that’nostateshalllayanyimpostordutieson
importsorexports。’"1
§；1029。Asthepoweroftaxationexistsinthestates
concurrentlywiththeUnitedStates，subjectonlytotherestrictionsimposedby
theconstitution，severalquestionshavefromtimetotimeariseninregardto
thenatureandextentofthestatepoweroftaxation。
§；1030。Intheyear1818，thestateofMarylandpassedanact，
layingataxonallbanks，andbranchesthereof，notcharteredbythe
legislatureofthatstate；andaquestionwasmade，whetherthestatehada
rightunderthatact，tolayataxontheBranchBankoftheUnitedStatesin
thatstate。ThisgaverisetoamostanimateddiscussionintheSupremeCourt
oftheUnitedStates；whereitwasfinallydecided，thatthetaxwas，astothe
BankoftheUnitedStates，unconstitutional。2ThereasoningoftheSupreme
Court，onthissubject，wasasfollows。
________________________________
1Theopinionalsoproceededtodeclare，thattheactwasaviolation。of
theexclusivepowerofcongresstoregulatecommerce。Buttheexaminationof
thispartofthequestionproperlybelongstoanotherhead。2M’Cullochv。
StateofMaryland，4Wheat。R。316；1Kent’sComm。Lect。19，p。398；Id。401。
CH。XIV。]POWERSOFCONGRESS——TAXES。487
§；1031。"WhetherthestateofMarylandmay，withoutviolatingthe
constitution，taxthatbranch？Thatthepoweroftaxationisoneofvital
importance；thatitisretainedbythestates；thatitisnotabridgedby，the
grantofasimilarpowertothegovernmentoftheUnion；thatitistobe
concurrentlyexercisedbythetwogovernments：aretruths，whichhaveneverbeen
denied。But，suchistheparamountcharacteroftheconstitution，thatits
capacitytowithdrawanysubjectfromtheactionofoventhispowerisadmitted。
Thestatesareexpresslyforbiddentolayanydutiesonimportsorexports，
exceptwhatmaybeabsolutelynecessaryforexecutingtheirinspectionlaws。If
theobligationofthisprohibitionmustbeconceded；ifitmayrestrainastate
fromtheexerciseofitstaxingpoweronimportsandexports；thesameparamount
characterwouldseemtorestrain，asitcertainlymayrestrain，astatefrom
suchotherexerciseofthispower，asisinitsnatureincompatiblewith，and
repugnantto，theconstitutionallawsoftheUnion。Alaw，absolutelyrepugnant
toanother，asentirelyrepealsthatother，asifexpresstermsofrepealwere
used。
§；1032。"Onthisgroundthecounselforthebankplace
itsclaimtobeexemptedfromthepowerofastatetotaxitsoperations。There
isnoexpressprovisionforthecase；buttheclaimhasbeensustainedona
principle，whichsoentirelypervadestheconstitution；issointermixedwith
thematerials，whichcomposeit；sointerwovenwithitsweb，soblendedwithits
texture，astobeincapableofbeingseparatedfromitwithoutrendingitinto
shreds。Thisgreatprincipleis，thattheconstitutionandthelawsmadein
pursuancethereofaresupreme；thattheycontroltheconstitutionandlawsof
therespectivestates，andcannotbecontrolledbythem。
488CONSTITUTIONOFTHEU。STATES。[BOOKIII。
Fromthis，whichmaybealmosttermedanaxiom，otherpropositionsare
deduced，ascorollaries，onthetruthorerrorofwhich，andontheir
applicationtothiscase，thecausehasbeensupposedtodepend。Theseare，
1st。thatapowertocreate。impliesapowertopreserve。2nd。Thatapowerto
destroy，ifwieldedbyadifferenthand，ishostileto，and，incompatiblewith
thepowerstocreateandtopreserve。3d。Thatwherethisrepugnancyexists，
thatauthority，whichissupreme，mustcontrol，notyieldtothatover，whichit
issupreme。Thesepropositions，asabstracttruths，would，perhaps，neverbe
controverted。Theirapplicationtothiscase，however，hasbeendenied；and，
bothinmaintainingtheaffirmativeandthenegative，asplendorofeloquence，
andstrengthofargument，seldom，ifever，surpassed，havebeendisplayed。
§；1033。"Thepowerofcongresstocreate，andofcourse
tocontinue，thebank，wasthesubjectoftheprecedingpartofthisopinion；
andisnolongertobeconsideredasquestionable。Thatthepoweroftaxingit
bythestatesmaybeexercisedso，astodestroyit，istooobvioustobe
denied。Buttaxationissaidtobeanabsolutepower，whichacknowledgesno
otherlimits，thanthoseexpresslyprescribedintheconstitution；andlike
sovereignpowerofeveryotherdescription，istrustedtothediscretionof
those，whouseit。Buttheverytermsofthisargumentadmit，thatthe
sovereigntyofthestateinthearticleoftaxationitself，issubordinateto，
andmaybecontrolledby，theconstitutionoftheUnitedStates。Howfarithas
beencontrolledbythatinstrument，mustbeaquestionofconstruction。In
makingthisconstruction，noprinciple，notdeclared，canbeadmissible，which
woulddefeatthelegitimateoperationsofasupremegovernment。Itisofthe
veryessenceofCH。XIV。]POWERSOFCONGRESS——TAXES。489
supremacytoremoveallobstaclestoitsactionwithinitsownsphere，and
sotomodifyeverypowervestedinsubordinategovernments，astoexemptitsown
operationsfromtheirowninfluence。Thiseffectneednotbestatedinterms。
Itissoinvolvedinthedeclarationofsupremacy，sonecessarilyimpliedinit，
thattheexpressionofitcouldnotmakeitmorecertain。Wemust，therefore，
keepitinview，whileconstruingtheconstitution。
§；1034。"Theargument，onthepartofthestateof
Maryland，is，notthatthestatesmaydirectlyresistalawofcongress，but
thattheymayexercisetheiracknowledgedpowersuponit，andthatthe
constitutionleavesthemthisrightintheconfidence，thattheywillnotabuse
it。Beforeweproceedtoexaminethisargument，andtosubjectittothetestof
theconstitution，wemustbepermittedtobestowafewconsiderationsonthe
natureandextentofthisoriginalrightoftaxation，whichisacknowledgedto
remainwiththestates。Itisadmitted，thatthepoweroftaxingthepeopleand
theirpropertyisessentialtotheveryexistenceofgovernment，andmaybe
legitimatelyexercisedontheobjects，towhichitisapplicable，totheutmost
extent，towhichthegovernmentmaychoosetocarryit。Theonlysecurity
againsttheabuseofthispowerisfoundinthestructureofthegovernment
itself。Inimposingataxthelegislatureactsuponitsconstituents。Thisis
ingeneralasufficientsecurityagainsterroneousandoppressivetaxation。The
peopleofastate，therefore，givetotheirgovernmentarightoftaxing
themselvesandtheirproperty；andastheexigenciesofgovernmentcannotbe
limited，theyprescribenolimitstotheexerciseofthisright，resting
confidentlyontheinterestofthelegislator，andontheinfluenceofthe
constituentsover490CONSTITUTIONOFTHEU。STATES。[BOOKIII。
theirrepresentative，toguardthemagainstitsabuse。Butthemeans
employedbythegovernmentoftheUnionhavenosuchsecurity；noristheright
ofastatetotaxthemsustainedbythesametheory。Thosemeansarenotgiven
bythepeopleofaparticularstate；notgivenbytheconstituentsofthe
legislature，whichclaimtherighttotaxthem；butbythepeopleofallthe
states。Theyaregivenbyall，forthebenefitofall；andupontheory，should
besubjectedtothatgovernmentonly，whichbelongstoall。
§；1035。"Itmaybeobjectedtothisdefinition，thatthe
poweroftaxationisnotconfinedtothepeopleandpropertyofastate。Itmay
beexerciseduponeveryobjectbroughtwithinitsjurisdiction。Thisistrue。
Buttowhatsourcedowetracethisright？Itisobvious，thatitisan
incidentofsovereignty，andisco—extensivewiththat，towhichitisan
incident。Allsubjects，overwhichthesovereignpowerofastateextends，are
objectsoftaxation；butthose，overwhichitdoesnotextend，are，uponthe
soundestprinciples，exemptfromtaxation。Thispropositionmayalmostbe
pronouncedself—evident。Thesovereigntyofastateextendstoeverything，
whichexistsbyitsownauthority，orisintroducedbyitspermission；butdoes
itextendtothosemeans，whichareemployedbycongresstocarryintoexecution
powersconferredonthatbodybythepeopleoftheUnitedStates？Wethinkit
demonstrable，thatitdoesnot。Thosepowersarenotgivenbythepeopleofa
singlestate。TheyaregivenbythepeopleoftheUnitedStatestoa
government，whoselaws，madeinpursuanceoftheconstitution，aredeclaredto
besupreme。Consequently，thepeopleofasinglestatecannotconfera
sovereignty，whichwillextendoverthem。
CH。XIV。]POWERSOFCONGRESS——TAXES。491
§；1036。"Ifwemeasurethepoweroftaxationresidinginastate，by
theextentofsovereignty，whichthepeopleofasinglestatepossess，andcan
conferon，itsgovernment，wehaveanintelligiblestandard，applicabletoevery
case，towhichthepowermaybeapplied。Wehaveaprinciple，whichleavesthe
poweroftaxingthepeopleandpropertyofastateunimpaired；whichleavestoa
statethecommandofallitsresources；andwhichplacesbeyonditsreachall
thosepowers，whichareconferredbythepeopleoftheUnitedStatesonthe
governmentoftheUnion，andallthosemeans，whicharegivenforthepurposeof
carryingthosepowersintoexecution。Wehaveaprinciple，whichissafefor
thestates，andsafefortheUnion。Wearerelieved，asweoughttobe，from
clashingsovereignty；frominterferingpowers；fromarepugnancybetweenaright
inonegovernmenttopulldown，whatthereisanacknowledgedrightinanother
tobuildup；fromtheincompatibilityofarightinonegovernmenttodestroy，
whatthereisarightinanothertopreserve。Wearenotdriventothe
perplexinginquiry，sounfitforthejudicialdepartment，whatdegreeof
taxationisthelegitimateuse，andwhatdegreemayamounttotheabuseofthe
power。Theattempttouseitonthemeansemployedbythegovernmentofthe
Union，inpursuanceoftheconstitution，isitselfanabuse，becauseitisthe
usurpationofapower，whichthepeopleofasinglestatecannotgive。
§；1037。"Wefind，then，onjusttheory，atotalfailure
ofthisoriginalrighttotaxthemeansemployedbythegovernmentoftheUnion，
fortheexecutionofitspowers。Therightneverexisted；andthequestion，
whetherithasbeensurrendered，cannotarise。
§；1038。"Butwaivingthistheoryforthepresent，let492CONSTITUTIONOFTHEU。STATES。[BOOKIII。
usresumetheinquiry，whetherthispowercanbeexercisedbytherespective
states，consistentlywithafairconstructionoftheconstitution？Thatthe
powertotaxinvolvesthepowertodestroy；thatthepowertodestroymay
defeat，andrenderuselessthepowertocreate；thatthereisaplainrepugnance
inconferringononegovernmentapowertocontroltheconstitutionalmeasures
ofanother，whichother，withrespecttothoseverymeasures，isdeclaredtobe
supremeoverthat，whichexertsthecontrol，arepropositionsnottobedenied。
Butallinconsistenciesaretobereconciledbythemagicoftheword
confidence。Taxation，itissaid，doesnotnecessarilyandunavoidablydestroy。
Tocarryittotheexcessofdestructionwouldbeanabuse，topresumewhich，
wouldbanishthatconfidence，whichisessentialtoallgovernment。Butisthis
acaseofconfidence？Wouldthepeopleofanyonestatetrustthoseofanother
withapowertocontrolthemostinsignificantoperationsoftheirstate
government？Weknowtheywouldnot。Why，then，shouldwesuppose，thatthe
peopleofanyonestatewouldbewillingtotrustthoseofanotherwithapower
tocontroltheoperationsofagovernment，towhichtheyhaveconfidedtheir
mostimportantandmostvaluableinterests？InthelegislatureoftheUnion
aloneareallrepresented。ThelegislatureoftheUnionalone，therefore，can
betrustedbythepeoplewiththepowerofcontrollingmeasures，whichconcern
all，intheconfidence，thatitwillnotbeabused。This，then，isnotacaseof
confidence，andwemustconsiderit，asitreallyis。
§；1039。"Ifweapplytheprinciple，forwhichthestate
ofMarylandcontends，totheconstitutiongenerally，weshallfinditcapableof
changingtotallythecharacterofthatinstrument。Weshallfinditcapableof
arrestingCH。XIV。]POWERSOFCONGRESS——TAXES。493
allthemeasuresofthegovernment，andofprostratingit，atthefootof
thestates。TheAmericanpeoplehavedeclaredtheirconstitution，andthelaws
madeinpursuancethereof，tobesupreme；butthisprinciplewouldtransferthe
supremacy，infact，tothestates。Ifthestatesmaytaxoneinstrument，
employedbythegovernmentintheexecutionofitspowers，theymaytaxany，and
everyotherinstrument。Theymaytaxthemall；theymaytaxthemint；theymay
taxpatentrights；theymaytaxthepapersofthecustom—house；theymaytax
judicialprocess；theymaytaxallthemeansemployedbythegovernment，toan
excess，whichwoulddefeatalltheendsofgovernment。Thiswasnotintendedby
theAmericanpeople。Theydidnotdesigntomaketheirgovernmentdependenton
thestates。Gentlemensay，theydonotc]altotherighttoextendstatetaxation
totheseobjects。Theylimittheirpretensionstoproperty。Butonwhat
principleisthisdistinctionmade？Those，whomakeit，havefurnishedno
reasonforit；andtheprinciple，forwhichtheycontend，deniesit。They
contend，thatthepoweroftaxationhasnootherlimit，thanisfoundinthe
lothsectionofthe1starticleoftheconstitution；that，withrespecttoevery
thingelse，thepowerofthestatesissupreme，andadmitsofnocontrol。If
thisbetrue，thedistinctionbetweenpropertyandothersubjects，towhichthe
poweroftaxationisapplicable，ismerelyarbitrary，andcanneverbe
sustained。ThisisnotallIfthecontrollingpowerofthestatesbe
established；iftheirsupremacy，astotaxation，beacknowledged；whatisto
restraintheirexercisingthiscontrol，inanyshapetheymaypleasetogiveit？
Theirsovereigntyisnotconfinedtotaxation。Thisisnottheonlymode，in
whichitmightbedisplayed。Thequestionis，intruth，494CONSTITUTIONOFTHEU。STATES。[BOOKIII。
aquestionofsupremacy；andiftherightofthestatestotaxthemeans
employedbythegeneralgovernmentbeconceded，thedeclaration，that
the。constitution，andthelawsmadeinpursuancethereof，shallbethesupreme
lawoftheland，isemptyandunmeaningdeclamation。"
§；1040。"Ithasalsobeeninsisted，that，asthepowerof
taxationinthegeneralandstategovernments，isacknowledgedtobeconcurrent，
everyargument，whichwouldsustaintherightofthegeneralgovernmenttotax
banks，charteredbythestates，willequallysustaintherightofthestatesto
taxbanks，charteredbythegeneralgovernment。But，thetwocasesarenoton
thesamereason。Thepeopleofallthestateshavecreatedthegeneral
government，andhaveconferreduponitthegeneralpoweroftaxation。The
peopleofallthestates，andthestatesthemselves，arerepresentedin
congress，and，bytheirrepresentatives，exercisethispower。Whentheytaxthe
charteredinstitutionsofthestates，theytaxtheirconstituents；andthese
taxesmustbeuniform。But，whenastatetaxestheoperationsofthegovernment
oftheUnitedStates，itactsuponinstitutionscreated，notbytheirown
constituents，butbypeople，overwhomtheyclaimnocontrol。Itactsuponthe
measuresofagovernment，createdbyothers，aswellasthemselves，forthe
benefitofothersincommonwiththemselves。Thedifferenceis，that，which
alwaysexists，andalwaysmustexist，betweentheactionofthewholeonapart，
andtheactionofapartonthewhole；betweenthelawsofagovernmentdeclared
tobesupreme，andthoseofagovernment，which，wheninoppositiontothose
laws，isnotsupreme。Butifthefullapplicationofthisargumentcouldbe
admitted，itmightbringintoquestiontheCH。XIV。]POWERSOFCONGRESS——TAXES。495
rightofcongresstotaxthestatebanks，andcouldnotprovetherightof
thestatestotaxthebankoftheUnitedStates。
§；1041。"Thecourthasbestowedonthissubjectitsmost
deliberateconsideration。Theresultisaconviction，thatthestateshaveno
power，bytaxationorotherwise，toretard，impede，burden，orinanymanner
control，theoperationsoftheconstitutionallawsenactedbycongress，tocarry
intoexecutionthepowersvestedinthegeneralgovernment。Thisis，wethink，
theunavoidableconsequenceofthatsupremacy，whichtheconstitutionhas
declared。Weareunanimouslyofopinion，thatthelawpassedbythelegislature
ofMaryland，imposingataxonthebankoftheUnitedStates，is
unconstitutionalandvoid。"1
§；1049。Inanothercasethequestionwasraised，whethera
statehadaconstitutionalauthoritytotaxstockissuedforloanstotheUnited
States；anditwasheldbytheSupremeCourt，thatastatehadnot。2The
reasoningofthecourtwasasfollows。"Isthestock，issuedforloansmade
tothegovernmentoftheUnitedStates，liabletobetaxedbystatesand
corporations？Congresshaspower，’toborrowmoneyonthecreditoftheUnited
States。’Thestockitissuesistheevidenceofadebtcreatedbytheexercise
ofthispower。Thetaxinquestionisataxuponthecontract，subsisting
betweenthegovernmentandtheindividual。Itbearsdirectlyuponthatcontract，
whilesubsisting，________________________________
1Thedoctrinewasagainre—examinedbytheSupremeCourtinalatercase，
anddeliberatelyre—affirmed；Osbornv。BankoftheUnitedStates，9Wheat。R。
738，859to868；1Kent’sComm。Lect。12，p。235to239。2Westonv。TheCity
CouncilofCharleston，2Peters’sR。449。
496CONSTITUTIONOFTHEU。STATES。[BOOKIII。
andinfullforce。Thepoweroperatesuponthecontract；theinstantitis
framed，andmustimplyarighttoaffectthatcontract。Ifthestatesand
corporationsthroughouttheUnion，possessthepowertotaxacontractforthe
loanofmoney，whatshallarrestthisprincipleinitsapplicationtoevery
othercontract？Whatmeasurecangovernmentadopt，whichwillnotbeexposedto
itsinfluence？
§；1043。"Butitisunnecessarytopursuethisprinciple，
throughitsdiversifiedapplicationtoallthecontracts，andtothevarious
operationsofgovernment。Noonecanbeselected，whichisofmorevital
interesttothecommunity，thanthisofborrowingmoneyonthecreditofthe
UnitedStates。NopowerhasbeenconferredbytheAmericanpeopleontheir
government，thefreeandunburthenedexerciseofwhichmoredeeplyaffectsevery
memberofourrepublic。Inwar，whenthehonour，thesafety，theindependence
ofthenationaretobedefended，whenallitsresourcesaretobestrainedto
theutmost，creditmustbebroughtinaidoftaxation，andtheabundantrevenue
ofpeaceandprosperitymustbeanticipatedtosupplytheexigencies，theurgent
demandsofthemoment。Thepeople，forobjectsthemostimportant，whichcan
occurintheprogressofnations，haveempoweredtheirgovernmenttomakethese
anticipations，’toborrow，moneyonthecreditoftheUnitedStates。’Canany
thingbemoredangerous，ormoreinjurious，thantheadmissionofaprinciple，
whichauthorizeseverystate，andeverycorporationintheUnion，which
possessestherightoftaxation，toburthentheexerciseofthispowerattheir
discretion？
§；1044。"Iftherighttoimposethetaxexists，it。isa
right，whichinitsnatureacknowledgesnolimits。ItCH。XIV。]POWERSOFCONGRESS——TAXES。497
maybecarriedtoanyextentwithinthejurisdictionofthestateor
corporation，whichimposesit，whichthewillofeachstateandcorporationmay
prescribe。Apower，whichisgivenbythewholeAmericanpeoplefortheir
commongood；whichistobeexercisedatthemostcriticalperiodsforthemost
importantpurposes；onthefreeexerciseofwhichtheinterestscertainly，
perhapstheliberty，ofthewholemaydepend；maybeburthened，impeded，ifnot
arrested，byanyoftheorganizedpartsoftheconfederacy。
§；1044。"Inasociety，formedlikeours，withonesupreme
governmentfornationalpurposes，andnumerousstategovernmentsforother
purposes；inmanyrespectsindependent，andintheuncontrolledexerciseofmany
importantpowers，occasionalinterferencesoughtnottosurpriseus。Thepower
oftaxationisoneofthemostessentialtoastate，andoneofthemost
extensiveinitsoperation。Theattempttomaintainarule，whichshalllimit
itsexercise，isundoubtedlyamongthemostdelicateanddifficultduties，which
candevolveonthose，whoseprovinceitistoexpoundthesupremelawofthe
landinitsapplicationtothecasesofindividuals。Thisdutyhasmorethan
oncedevolvedonthisCourt。Intheperformanceofitwehaveconsideredit，as
anecessaryconsequence，fromthesupremacyofthegovernmentofthewhole，that
itsactionintheexerciseofitslegitimatepowersshouldbefreeand
unembarrassedbyanyconflictingpowersinthepossessionofitsparts；thatthe
powersofastatecannot，rightfully，besoexercised，astoimpedeandobstruct
thefreecourseofthosemeasures，whichthegovernmentoftheUnitedStates，
mayrightfullyadopt。
§；1045。"ThissubjectwasbroughtbeforetheCourt498CONSTITUTIONOFTHEU。STATES。[BOOKIII。
inthecaseofM’Cullochv。TheStateofMaryland，1whenitwasthoroughly
argued，anddeliberatelyconsidered。Thequestiondecidedinthatcasebearsa
nearresemblancetothat，whichisinvolvedinthis。Itwasdiscussedatthebar
inallitsrelations，andexaminedby，theCourtwithits。utmostattention。We
willnotrepeatthereasoning，whichconductedustotheconclusionthusformed；
butthatconclusionwas，that’allsubjects，overwhichthesovereignpowerofa
stateextends，areobjectsoftaxation；butthose，overwhichitdoes
not—extend，are，uponthesoundestprinciples，exemptfromtaxation。’’The
sovereigntyofastateextendstoeverything，whichexistsbyitsown
authority，orisintroducedbyitspermission；’butnot’tothosemeans，which
areemployedbycongresstocarryintoexecutionpowersconferredonthatbody
bythepeopleoftheUnitedStates。’’Theattempttouse’thepoweroftaxation
’onthemeansemployedbythegovernmentoftheUnion，inpursuanceofthe
constitution，isitselfanabuse；becauseitistheusurpationofapower，which
thepeopleofasinglestatecannotgive。’’Thestateshavenopowerby
taxation，orotherwise，toretard，impede，burthen，orinanymannercontrolthe
operationoftheconstitutionallaws，enactedbycongresstocarryinto
executionthepowersvestedinthegeneralgovernment。’Weretaintheopinions，
whichwerethenexpressed。Acontractmadebythegovernmentintheexerciseof
itspower，toborrowmoneyonthecreditoftheUnitedStates，isundoubtedly
independentofthewillofanystate，inwhichtheindividual，wholends，may
reside；andisundoubtedlyanoperationessential___________________________________
14Wheaton，316。
CH。XIV。]POWERSOFCONGRESS——TAXES。499
totheimportantobjects，forwhichthegovernmentwascreated。Itought，
therefore，ontheprinciplessettledinthecaseofM’Cullochv。TheStateof
Marylandtobeexemptfromstatetaxation，andconsequentlyfrombeingtaxedby
corporations，derivingtheirpowerfromstates。
§；1046。"Itisadmitted，thatthepowerofthegovernment
toborrowmoneycannotbedirectlyopposed；andthatanylaw，directly
obstructingitsoperations，wouldbevoid。Butadistinctionistakenbetween
directopposition，and。thosemeasures，whichmayconsequentiallyaffectit；that
is，alawprohibitingloanstotheUnitedStates，wouldbevoid；butataxon
themtoanyamountisallowable。Itis，wethink，impossiblenottoperceive
theintimateconnexion，whichexistsbetweenthesetwomodesofactingonthe
subject。Itisnotthewantoforiginalpowerinanindependentsovereignstate，
toprohibitloanstoaforeigngovernment，whichrestrainsthelegislaturefrom
directoppositiontothosemadebytheUnitedStates。Therestraintisimposed
byourconstitution。TheAmericanpeoplehaveconferredthepowerofborrowing
moneyontheirgovernment；andbymakingthatgovernmentsupreme，haveshielded
itsaction，intheexerciseofthispower，fromtheactionofthelocal
governments。Thegrantofthepowerisincompatiblewitharestrainingor
controllingpower；andthedeclarationofsupremacyisadeclaration，thatno
suchrestrainingorcontrollingpowershallbeexercised。Therighttotaxthe
contracttoanyextent，whenmade，mustoperateuponthepowertoborrow，before
itisexercised，andhaveasensibleinfluenceonthecontract。Theextentof
thisinfluencedependson？？
500CONSTITUTIONOFTHEU。STATES。[BOOKIII。
thewillofadistinctgovernment。Toanyextent，howeverinconsiderable，
itisaburthenontheoperationsofgovernment。Itmaybecarriedtoan
extent，whichwillarrestthementirely。
§；1047。"Itisadmittedbythecounselforthe
defendants，thatthepowertotaxstockmustaffecttheterms，onwhichloans
willbemade。Butthisobjection，itissaid，hasnomoreweight，whenurged
againsttheapplicationofanacknowledgedpowertogovernmentstock，thanif
urgedagainstitsapplicationtolandssoldbytheUnitedStates。The
distinctionis，wethink，apparent。Whenlandsaresold，noconnexionremains
betweenthepurchaserandthegovernment。Thelandspurchasedbecomeapartof
themassofpropertyinthecountry，withnoimpliedexemptionfromcommon
burthens。Alllandsarederivedfromthegeneralorparticulargovernment，and
alllandsaresubjecttotaxation。Landssoldareintheconditionofmoney
borrowedandrepaid。Itsliabilitytotaxation，inanyformitmaythenassume，
isnotquestioned。Theconnexionbetweentheborrowerandthelenderis
dissolved。Itisnoburthenonloans；itisnoimpedimenttothepowerof
borrowing，thatthemoney，whenrepaid，losesitsexemptionfromtaxation。Buta
taxupondebtsduefromthegovernmentstands，wethink，onverydifferent
principlesfromataxonlands，whichthegovernmenthassold。TheFederalist
hasbeenquotedintheargument，andaneloquentandwellmeritedeulogyhas
beenbestowedonthegreatstatesman，whoissupposedtobetheauthorofthe
number，fromwhichthequotationwasmade。Thishighauthoritywasalsorelied
uponinthecaseofM’Cullochv。TheStateofMaryland，andwasconsideredby
theCourt。WithoutCH。XIV。]POWERSOFCONGRESS——TAXES。501
repeating，whatwasthensaid，werefertoit，asexhibitingourviewofthe
sentimentsexpressedonthissubjectbytheauthorsofthatwork。
§；1048。"Ithasbeensupposed，thatataxonstockcomes
withintheexceptionsstatedinthecaseofM’Cullochv。TheStateofMaryland。
Wedonotthinkso。ThebankoftheUnitedStatesisaninstrument，essential
tothefiscaloperationsofthegovernment；andthepower，whichmightbe
exercisedtoitsdestruction，wasdenied。Butproperty，acquiredbythat
corporationinastate，wassupposedtobeplacedinthesameconditionwith
propertyacquiredbyanindividual。Thetaxongovernmentstockisthoughtby
thisCourttobeataxonthecontract，ataxonthepowertoborrowmoneyon
thecreditoftheUnitedStates，andconsequentlytoberepugnanttothe
constitution。"
§；1049。Itisobservable，thatthesedecisionsturnuponthe
point，thatnostatecanhaveauthoritytotaxaninstrumentoftheUnited
States，ortherebytodiminishthemeansoftheUnitedStates，usedinthe
exerciseofpowersconfidedtoit。Butthereisnoprohibitionuponanystate
totaxanybankorothercorporationcreatedbyitsown。authority，unlessithas
restraineditself，bythecharterofincorporation，fromthepoweroftaxation。1
Thissubject，however，willmoreproperlyfallundernoticeinsomefuture
discussions。Itmaybeadded，thatcongressmay，withoutdoubt，taxstatebanks；
foritisclearlywithinthetaxingpowerconfidedtothegeneralgovernment。
Whencongresstaxthecharteredinstitutionsofthestates，theytaxtheir______________________________
1ProvidenceBankv。Billings，4Peters’sR。514。
ownconstituents；andsuchtaxesmustbeuniform。1Butwhenastatetaxesan
institutioncreatedbycongress，ittaxesaninstrumentofasuperiorand
independentsovereignty，notrepresentedinthestatelegislature。
______________________________
1M’Cullochv。Maryland，RWheatR。316，435。
JosephStory：CommentariesontheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates：
Book3Chapter15CHAPTERXV。POWERTOBORROWMONEYANDREGULATECOMMERCE。§；1050。Havingfinishedthisexaminationofthepoweroftaxation，andoftheaccompanyingrestrictionsandprohibitions，theotherpowersofcongresswillbenowexaminedintheorder，inwhichtheystandintheeighthsection。
§；1051。Thenext，isthepowerofcongress"toborrowmoneyonthecreditoftheUnitedStates。"Thispowerseemsindispensabletothesovereigntyandexistenceofanationalgovernment。
Evenundertheconfederationthispowerwasexpresslydelegated。1Theremarkisunquestionablyjust，thatitisapowerinseparablyconnectedwiththatofraisingarevenue，andwiththedutyofprotection，whichthatpowerimposesuponthegeneralgovernment。Thoughintimesofprofoundpeaceitmaynotbeordinarilynecessarytoanticipatetherevenuesofastate；yettheexperienceofallnationsmustconvinceus，thattheburthenandexpensesofoneyear，intimeofwar，maymorethanequaltheordinaryrevenueoftenyears。Hence，adebtisalmostunavoidable，whenanationisplungedintoastateofwar。Theleastburthensomemodeofcontractingadebtisbyaloan。Indeed，thisrecoursebecomesthemorenecessary，becausetheordinarydutiesuponimportationsaresubjecttogreatdiminutionandfluctuationsintimesofwar；andaresorttodirecttaxesforthewholesupplywould，undersuchcircumstances，becomeoppressiveandruinoustotheagriculturalinterestsofthecountry。2Evenintimesofpeaceexigenciesmayoccur，whichrenderaloanthemostfacile，economical，andreadymeansofsupply，eithertomeetexpenses，ortoavertcalamities，ortosavethecountryfromanunduedepressionofitsstapleproductions。ThegovernmentoftheUnitedStateshas，onseveraloccasionsintimesofprofoundpeace，obtainedlargeloans，amongwhichastrikingillustrationoftheeconomyandconvenienceofsucharrangementswiltbefoundinthecreationofstockonthepurchaseofLouisiana。ThepowertoborrowmoneybytheUnitedStatescannotashasbeenalreadyseeninanywaybecontrolled，orinterferedwithbythestates。Thegrantingofthepowerisincompatiblewithanyrestrainingorcontrollingpower；
andthedeclarationofsupremacyintheconstitutionisadeclaration，thatnosuchrestrainingorcontrollingpowershallbeexercised。3
§；1052。Thenextpowerofcongressis，"toregulatecommercewithforeignnations，andamongtheseveralstates，andwiththeIndiantribes。"
§；1053。Thewantofthispowerashasbeenalreadyseenwasoneoftheleadingdefectsoftheconfederation，andprobably，asmuchasanyonecause，conducedtotheestablishmentoftheconstitution。4ItisapowervitaltotheprosperityoftheUnion；andwithoutitthegovernmentwouldscarcelydeservethenameofanationalgovernment；andwouldsoonsinkintodiscreditandimbecility。5ItWouldstand，asamereshadoworsovereignty，tomockourhopes，andinvolveusinacommonruin。
§；1054。Theoppressedanddegradedstateofcommerce，previoustotheadoptionoftheconstitution，canscarcelybeforgotten。Itwasregulatedbyforeignnationswithasingleviewtotheirowninterests；andourdisunitedeffortstocounteracttheirrestrictionswererenderedimpotentbyawantofcombination。Congress，indeed，possessedthepowerofmakingtreaties；buttheinabilityofthefederalgovernmenttoenforcethemhadbecomesoapparent，astorenderthatpowerinagreatdegreeuseless。Those，whofelttheinjuryarisingfromthisstateofthings，andthose，whowerecapableofestimatingtheinfluenceofcommerceontheprosperityofnations，perceivedthenecessityofgivingthecontroloverthisimportantsubjecttoasinglegovernment。Itisnot，therefore，matterofsurprise，thatthegrantshouldbeasextensive，asthemischief，andshouldcomprehendallforeigncommerce，andallcommerceamongthestates。6
§；1055。Butthissubjecthasbeenalreadysomuchdiscussed，andthereasonsforconferringthepowersofully。developed，thatitseemsunnecessarytodwellfartheruponitsimportanceandnecessity。7Intheconventiontheredoesnotappeartohavebeenanyconsiderableif，indeed，therewasanyoppositiontothegrantofthepower。Itwasreportedinthefirstdraftoftheconstitutionexactly，asitnowstands，exceptthatthewords，"andwiththeIndiantribes，"wereafterwardsadded；anditpassedwithoutadivision。8
§；1056。Inconsideringthisclauseoftheconstitutionseveralimportantinquiriesarepresented。Inthefirstplace，Whatisthenaturalimportoftheterms；inthenextplace，howfarthepowerisexclusiveofthatofthestates；inthethirdplace，towhatpurposesandforwhatobjectsthepowermaybeconstitutionallyapplied；
andinthefourthplace，whatarethetruenatureandextentofthepowertoregulatecommercewiththeIndiantribes。
§；1057。Inthefirstplace，then，whatistheconstitutionalmeaningofthewords，"toregulatecommerce；"fortheconstitutionbeingashasbeenaptlysaidoneofenumeration，andnotofdefinition，itbecomesnecessary，inordertoascertaintheextentofthepower，toascertainthemeaningofthewords。9Thepoweristoregulate；thatis，toprescribetherule。bywhichcommerceistobegoverned。10Thesubjecttoberegulatediscommerce。Isthatlimitedtotraffic，tobuyingandselling，ortheinterchangeofcommodities？Ordoesitcomprehendnavigationandintercourse？Iftheformerconstructionisadopted，thenageneraltermapplicabletomanyobjectsisrestrictedtooneofitssignifications。
Ifthelatter，thenageneraltermisretainedinitsgeneralsense。Toadopttheformer，withoutsomeguidinggroundsfurnishedbythecontext，orthenatureofthepower，wouldbeimproper。Thewordsbeinggeneral，thesensemustbegeneralalso，andembraceallsubjectscomprehendedunderthem，unlesstherebesomeobviousmischieforrepugnancetootherclausestolimitthem。Inthepresentcasethereisnothingtojustifysuchalimitation。
Commerceundoubtedlyistraffic；butitissomethingmore。Itisintercourse。
Itdescribesthecommercialintercoursebetweennations，andpartsofnations，inallitsbranches；andisregulatedbyprescribingrulesforcarryingonthatintercourse。Themindcanscarcelyconceiveasystemforregulatingcommercebetweennations，whichshallexcludealllawsconcerningnavigation；
whichshallbesilentontheadmissionofthevesselsofonenationintotheportsofanother；andbeconfinedtoprescribingrulesfortheconductofindividualsintheactualemploymentofbuyingandselling，orbarter。11
§；1058。Ifcommercedoesnotincludenavigation，thegovernmentoftheUnionhasnodirectpoweroverthatsubject，andcanmakenolawprescribing，whatshallconstituteAmericanvessels，orrequiring，thattheyshallbenavigatedbyAmericanseamen。Yetthispowerhasbeenexercisedfromthecommencementofthegovernment；ithasbeenexercisedwiththeconsentofallAmerica；andithasbeenalwaysunderstoodtobeacommercialregulation。Thepowerovernavigation，andovercommercialintercourse，wasoneoftheprimaryobjects，forwhichthepeopleofAmericaadoptedtheirgovernment；anditisimpossible，thattheconventionshouldnotsohaveunderstoodtheword"commerce，"asembracingit。12Indeed，toconstruethepower，soastoimpairitsefficacy，woulddefeattheveryobject，forwhichitwasintroducedintotheconstitution；13fortherecannotbeadoubt，thattoexcludenavigationandintercoursefromitsscopewouldbetoentailuponusalltheprominentdefectsoftheconfederation，andsubjecttheUniontotheill—adjustedsystemsofrivalstates，andtheoppressivepreferencesofforeignnationsinfavouroftheirownnavigation。14
§；1059。Theveryexceptionsfoundintheconstitutiondemonstratethis；foritwouldbeabsurd，aswellasuseless，toexceptfromagrantedpowerthat，whichwasnotgranted，orthat，whichthewordsdidnotcomprehend。Thereareplainexceptionsintheconstitutionfromthepowerovernavigation，andplaininhibitionstotheexerciseofthatpowerinaparticularway。Whyshouldthesebemade，ifthepoweritselfwasnotunderstoodtobegranted？Theclausealreadycited，thatnopreferenceshallbegivenbyanyregulationofcommerceorrevenuetotheportsofonestateoverthoseofanother，isorthisnature。Thisclausecannotbeunderstood，asapplicabletothoselawsonly，whicharepassedforpurposesofrevenue，becauseitisexpresslyappliedtocommercialregulations；andthemostobviouspreference，whichcanbegiventooneportoveranother，relatestonavigation。Buttheremainingpartofthesentencedirectlypointstonavigation。"Norshallvessels，boundtoorfromonestate，beobligedtoenter，clear，orpaydutiesinanother。"15Inshort，ourwholesystemfortheencouragementofnavigationinthecoastingtradeandfisheries，isexclusivelyfoundeduponthissupposition。Yetnoonehaseverbeenboldenoughtoquestiontheconstitutionalityofthelaws，creatingthissystem。16
§；1060。Foreignanddomesticintercoursehasbeenuniversallyunderstoodtobewithinthereachofthepower。How，otherwise，couldoursystemsofprohibitionandnon—intercoursebedefended？
Fromwhatothersourcehasbeenderivedthepoweroflayingembargoesinatimeofpeace，andwithoutanyreferencetowar，oritsoperations？Yetthispowerhasbeenuniversallyadmittedtobeconstitutional，evenintimesofthehighestpoliticalexcitement。Andalthoughthelayingofanembargointheformofaperpetuallawwascontested，asunconstitutional，atoneperiodofourpoliticalhistory，itwasso，notbecauseanembargowasnotaregulationofcommerce，butbecauseaperpetualembargowasanannihilation，andnotaregulationofcommerce。17Itmay，therefore，besafelyaffirmed，thatthetermsoftheconstitutionhaveatalltimesbeenunderstoodtoincludeapowerovernavigation，aswellastrade，overintercourse，aswellastraffic；18and，that，inthepracticeofothercountries，andespeciallyinourown，therehasbeennodiversityofjudgmentoropinion。Duringourwholecolonialhistory，thiswasacteduponbytheBritishparliament，asanuncontesteddoctrine。Thatgovernmentregulatednotmerelyourtrafficwithforeignnations，butournavigation，andintercourse，asunquestionedfunctionsofthepowertoregulatecommerce。19
§；1061。Thispowertheconstitutionextendstocommercewithforeignnations，andamongtheseveralstates，andwiththeIndiantribes。Inregardtoforeignnations，itisuniversallyadmitted，thatthewordscomprehendeveryspeciesofcommercialintercourse。Nosortoftradeorintercoursecanbecarriedonbetweenthiscountryandanother，towhichitdoesnotextend。Commerce，asusedintheconstitution，isaunit，everypartofwhichisindicatedbytheterm。Ifthisbeitsadmittedmeaninginitsapplicationtoforeignnations，itmustcarrythesamemeaningthroughoutthesentence。20Thenextwordsare"amongtheseveralstates。"Theword"among"meansintermingledwith。Athing，whichisamongothers，isintermingledwiththem。Commerceamongthestatescannotstopattheexternalboundarylineofeachstate，butmaybeintroducedintotheinterior。Itdoesnot，indeed，comprehendanycommerce，whichispurelyinternal，betweenmanandmaninasinglestate，orbetweendifferentpartsofthesamestate，andnotextendingto，oraffectingotherstates。Commerceamongthestatesmeans，commerce，whichconcernsmorestatesthanone。Itisnotanaptphrasetoindicatethemereinteriortrafficofasinglestate。Thecompletelyinternalcommerceofastatemaybeproperlyconsidered，asreservedtothestateitself。21
§；1062。Theimportanceofthepowerofregulatingcommerceamongthestates，forthepurposesoftheUnion，isscarcelyless，thanthatofregulatingitwithforeignstates。22Averymaterialobjectofthispoweristhereliefofthestates，whichimportandexportthroughotherstates，fromthelevyofimpropercontributionsonthembythelatter。Ifeachstatewereatlibertytoregulatethetradebetweenstateandstate，itiseasytoforesee，thatwayswouldbefoundouttoloadthearticlesofimportandexport，duringtheirpassagethroughthejurisdiction，withduties，whichshouldfailonthemakersofthelatter，andtheconsumersoftheformer。23TheexperienceoftheAmericanstatesduringtheconfederationabundantlyestablishes，thatsucharrangementscouldbe，andwouldbemadeunderthestimulatinginfluenceoflocalinterests，andthedesireofunduegain。24Insteadofactingasanationinregardtoforeignpowers，thestatesindividuallycommencedasystemofrestraintuponeachother，wherebytheinterestsofforeignpowerswerepromotedattheirexpense。Whenonestateimposedhighdutiesonthegoodsorvesselsofaforeignpowertocountervailtheregulationsofsuchpowers，thenextadjoiningstatesimposedlighterdutiestoinvitethosearticlesintotheirports，thattheymightbetransferredthenceintotheotherstates，securingthedutiestothemselves。Thiscontractedpolicyinsomeofthestateswassooncounteractedbyothers。Restraintswereimmediatelylaidonsuchcommercebythesufferingstates；andthusastateofaffairsdisorderlyandunnaturalgrewup，thenecessarytendencyofwhichwastodestroytheUnionitself。25Thehistoryofothernations，also，furnishesthesameadmonition。InSwitzerland，wheretheunionisveryslight，ithasbeenfoundnecessarytoprovide，thateachcantonshallbeobligedtoallowapassagetomerchandisethroughitsjurisdictionintoothercantonswithoutanaugmentationoftolls。InGermany，itisalawoftheempire，thattheprincesshallnotlaytollsoncustomsorbridges，rivers，orpassages，withouttheconsentortheemperoranddiet。Buttheseregulationsarebutimperfectlyobeyed；andgreatpublicmischiefshaveconsequentlyfollowed。26Indeed，withoutthispowertoregulatecommerceamongthestates，thepowerofregulatingforeigncommercewouldbeincompleteandineffectual。27TheverylawsoftheUnioninregardtothelatter，whetherforrevenue，forrestriction，forretaliation，orforencouragementordomesticproductsorpursuits，might—beevadedatpleasure，orrenderedimpotent。28Inshort，inapracticalview，itisimpossibletoseparatetheregulationofforeigncommerceanddomesticcommerceamongthestatesfromeachother。
Thesamepublicpolicyappliestoeach；andnotareasoncanbeassignedforconfidingthepowerovertheone，whichdoesnotconducetoestablishtheproprietyofconcedingthepowerovertheother。29
§；1063。Thenextinquiryis，whetherthispowertoregulatecommerceisexclusiveorthesamepowerinthestates，orisConcurrentwithit。30Ithasbeensettleduponthemostsolemndeliberation，thatthepowerisexclusiveinthegovernmentoftheUnitedStates。32Thereasoning，uponwhichthisdoctrineisfounded，istothefollowingeffect。’Thepowertoregulatecommerceisgeneralandunlimitedinitsterms。Thefullpowertoregulateaparticularsubjectimpliesthewholepower，andleavesnoresiduum。Agrantofthewholeisincompatiblewiththeexistenceofarightinanothertoanypartofit。Agrantofapowertoregulatenecessarilyexcludestheactionofallothers，whowouldperformthesameoperationonthesamething。Regulationisdesignedtoindicatetheentireresult，applyingtothoseparts，whichremainastheywere，aswellastothose，whicharealtered。Itproducesauniformwhole，whichisasmuchdisturbedandderangedbychanging，whattheregulatingpowerdesignstohaveunbounded，asthat，onwhichithasoperated。33
§；1064。Thepowertoregulatecommerceisnotatalllikethattolaytaxes。Thelattermaywellbeconcurrent，whiletheformerisexclusive，resultingfromthedifferentnatureofthetwopowers。Thepowerofcongressinlayingtaxesisnotnecessarily，ornaturallyinconsistentwiththatofthestates。Eachmaylayataxonthesameproperty，withoutinterferingwiththeactionoftheother；fortaxationisbuttakingsmall。portionsfromthemassofproperty，whichissusceptibleofalmostinfinitedivision。Inimposingtaxesforstatepurposes，astateisnotdoing，whatcongressisempoweredtodo。Congressisnotempoweredtotaxforthosepurposes，whicharewithintheexclusiveprovinceofthestates。When，then，eachgovernmentexercisesthepoweroftaxation，neitherisexercisingthepoweroftheother。Butwhenastateproceedstoregulatecommercewithforeignnations，oramongtheseveralstates，itisexercisingtheverypower，whichisgrantedtocongress；andisdoingtheverything，whichcongressisauthorizedtodo。Thereisnoanalogy，then，betweenthepoweroftaxation，andthepowerofregulatingcommerce。34
§；1065。Norcananypowerbeinferredinthestatestoregulatecommercefromotherclausesintheconstitution，ortheacknowledgedrightsexercisedbythestates。Theconstitutionhasprohibitedthestatesfromlayinganyimpostordutyonimportsorexports；
butthisdoesnotadmit，thatthestatemightotherwisehaveexercisedthepower，asaregulationofcommerce。Thelayingofsuchimpostsanddutiesmaybe，andindeedoftenisused，asamereregulationofcommerce，bygovernmentspossessingthatpower。35Butthelayingofsuchimpostsanddutiesisascertainly，andmoreusually，arightexercisedasapartofthepowertolaytaxes；andwiththislatterpowerthestatesareclearlyentrusted。So，thattheprohibitionisanexceptionfromtheacknowledgedpowerofthestatetolaytaxes，andnotfromthequestionablepowertoregulatecommerce。Indeed，theconstitutiontreatstheseasdistinctandindependentpowers。Thesameremarksapplytoadutyontonnage。36
§；1066。Nordotheacknowledgedpowersofthestatesovercertainsubjects，havingaconnexionwithcommerce，inanydegreeimpugnthisreasoning。Thesepowersareentirelydistinctintheirnaturefromthattoregulatecommerce；andthoughthesamemeansmayberesortedto，forthepurposeofcarryingeachofthesepowersintoeffect，thisbynojustreasoningfurnishesanygroundtoassert，thattheyareidentical。37Amongthese，areinspectionlaws，healthlaws，lawsregulatingturnpikes，roads，andferries，allofwhich，whenexercisedbyastate，arelegitimate，arisingfromthegeneralpowersbelongingtoit。，unlesssofarastheyconflictwiththepowersdelegatedtocongress。38Theyarenotsomuchregulationsofcommerce，asofpolice；andmaytrulybesaidtobelong，ifatalltocommerce，tothatwhichispurelyinternal。
Thepilotagelawsofthestatesmayfallunderthesamedescription。Buttheyhavebeenadoptedbycongress，andwithoutquestionarecontrollablebyit。39
§；1067。Thereasoning，bywhichthepowergiventocongresstoregulatecommerceismaintainedtobeexclusive，hasnotbeenoflateseriouslycontroverted；anditseemstohavethecheerfulacquiescenceofthelearnedtribunalsofaparticularstate，oneofwhoseactsbroughtitfirstunderjudicialexamination。40
§；1068。Thepowertocongress，then，beingexclusive，nostateisatlibertytopassanylawsimposingataxuponimporters，importinggoodsfromforeigncountries，orfromotherstates。
Itiswhollyimmaterial，whetherthetaxbelaidonthegoodsimported，oronthepersonoftheimporter。Ineachcase，itisarestrictionoftherightofcommerce，notconcededtothestates。Asthepowerofcongresstoregulatecommercereachestheinteriorofastate，41itmightbecapableofauthorizingthesaleofthearticles，whichitintroduces。
Commerceisintercourse；andoneofitsmostordinaryingredientsistraffic。
Itisinconceivable，thatthepowertoauthorizetraffic，whengiveninthemostcomprehensiveterms，withtheintent，thatitsefficacyshouldbecomplete，shouldceaseatthepoint，whenitscontinuanceisindispensabletoitsvalue。Towhatpurposeshouldthepowertoallowimportationbegiven，unaccompaniedwiththepowertoauthorizethesaleofthethingimported？Saleistheobjectofimportation；anditisanessentialingredientofthatintercourse，ofwhichimportationconstitutesapart。Ascongresshastherighttoauthorizeimportation，itmusthavearighttoauthorizetheimportertosell。Whatwouldbethelanguageofaforeigngovernment，whichshouldbeinformed，thatitsmerchantsafterimportationwereforbiddentosellthemerchandizeimported？WhatanswercouldtheUnitedStatesgivetothecomplaintsandjustreproaches，towhichsuchextraordinaryconductwouldexposethem？Noapologycouldbereceived，oroffered。Suchastateofthingswouldannihilatecommerce。Itisnoanswer，thatthetaxmaybemoderate；for，ifthepowerexistsinthestates，itmaybecarriedtoanyextenttheymaychoose。Ifitdoesnotexist，everyexerciseofitis，protanto，aviolationofthepowerofcongresstoregulatecommerce。42
§；1069。Howfaranystatepossessesthepowertoauthorizeanobstructionofanynavigablestreamorcreek，inwhichthetideebbsandflows，withinitsterritoriallimits，asbyauthorizingtheerectionofadamacrossit，hasbeenasubjectofmuchrecentdiscussion。