首页 >出版文学> Commentaries on the Constitution of US>第36章
  Theyarejustsuch,asareusuallygrantedtostatebanks;andjustsuch,asgiveincreasedfacilitiestoallitsoperations。Tosay,thatthebankmighthavegoneonwithoutthisorthatfaculty,isnothing。Who,butcongress,shallsay,howfew,orhowmanyitshallhave,ifallarestillappropriatetoit,asaninstrumentofgovernment,andmaymakeitmoreconvenient,andmoreusefulinitsoperations?Nomancansay,thatasinglefacultyinanynationalcharterisuseless,orirrelevant,orstrictlyimproper,thatisconducivetoitsend,asanationalinstrument。Depriveabankofitstradeandbusiness,anditsvitalprinciplesaredestroyed。Itsformmayremain,butitssubstanceisgone。Allthepowersgiventothebankaretogiveefficacytoitsfunctionsoftradeandbusiness。27
  §;1265。Astoanothersuggestion,thatthesameobjectsmighthavebeenaccomplishedthroughthestatebanks,itissufficienttosay,thatnotracecanbefoundintheconstitutionofanyintentiontocreateadependenceonthestates,orstateinstitutions,fortheexecutionofitsgreatpowers。Itsownmeansareadequatetoitsend;andonthosemeansitwasexpectedtorelyfortheiraccomplishment。
  Itwouldbeutterlyabsurdtomakethepowersoftheconstitutionwhollydependentonstateinstitutions。Butifstatebanksmightbeemployed,ascongresshaveachoiceofmeans,theyhadarighttochooseanationalbank,inpreferencetostatebanks,forthefinancialoperationsofthegovernment。28Proof,thattheymightuseonemeans,isnoproof,thattheycannotconstitutionallyuseanothermeans。
  §;1266。Afterall,thesubjecthasbeensettledrepeatedlybyeverydepartmentofthegovernment,legislative,executive,andjudicial。Thestateshaveacquiesced;andamajorityhaveconstantlysustainedthepower。Ifitisnotnowsettled,itnevercanbe。Ifitissettled,itwouldbetoomuchtoexpectare—argument,wheneveranypersonmaychoosetoquestionit。29
  1。4Jefferson’sCorrespondence,523,526;Id。506。
  2。Ibid;4Elliot’sDebates,219。
  3。4Jefferson’sCorrespondence,523,525,526;5Marsh。Wash。App。Note3。
  4。Ibid;4Elliot’sDebates,220。
  5。4Jefferson’sCorrespondence,523,526,527;5Marsh。Wash。App。Note3;1Hamilton’sWorks,130。
  6。4Elliot’sDebates,217,219,224,225。
  7。4Elliot’sDebates,219,220,223。
  8。HamiltononBank,1Hamilton’sWorks,113;4Wheat。R。405,406,409,410。
  9。M’Cullochv。Maryland,4Wheat。
  R。409。
  10。HamiltononBank,1Hamilton’sWorks,113,114,124。
  11。HamiltononBank,1Hamilton’sWorks,113,114,131。
  12。HamiltononBank,1Hamilton’sWorks,115,116,130,131,136。
  13。M’Cullochv。Maryland,4
  Wheat。R。411;HamiltononBank,1Hamilton’sWorks,116,117,136。
  14。M’Cullochv。Maryland,4
  Wheat。R。406,407,408,409,410,411。
  15。Journ。ofConvention,p。200。
  16。Journ。ofConvention,p。376。?
  Inthefirstcongressof1789,whentheamendmentsproposedbycongresswerebeforetheHouseofRepresentativesforconsideration,Mr。Gerrymovedtoaddaclause,"Thatcongresserectnocompanyofmerchantswithexclusiveadvantagesofcommerce。"Thepropositionwasnegatived。2Lloyd’sDeb。
  257。
  17。M’Cullochv。Maryland,4
  Wheat。R。421,422。
  18。M’Cullochv。Maryland,4
  Wheat。R。422;HamiltononBank,1Hamilton’sWorks,135,136。
  19。HamiltononBank,1Hamilton’sWorks,128,129,135。
  20。HamiltononBank,1Hamilton’sWorks,p。138。
  21。HamiltononBank,1Hamilton’sWorks,p。152,153。
  22。M’Cullochv。Maryland,4
  Wheat。R。422,423。
  23。InMr。Hamilton’scelebratedArgumentontheConstitutionalityoftheBankoftheUnitedStates,inFeb。1791,thereisanadmirableexpositionofthewholeofthisbranchofthesubject。
  Asthedocumentisrare,thefollowingpassagesareinserted:
  "Itispresumedtohavebeensatisfactorilyshown,inthecourseoftheprecedingobservations,1。Thatthepowerofthegovernment,astotheobjectsintrustedtoitsmanagement,is,initsnature,sovereign2。Thattherightoferectingcorporations,isone,inherentin,andinseparablefrom,theideaofsovereignpower。3。Thattheposition,thatthegovernmentoftheUnitedStatescanexercisenopower,butsuchasisdelegatedtoitbyitsconstitution,doesnotmilitateagainstthisprinciple。4。Thatthewordnecessary,inthegeneralclause,canhavenorestrictiveoperation,derogatingfromtheforceofthisprinciple;indeed,thatthedegree,inwhichameasureis,orisnotnecessary,cannotbeatestofconstitutionalright,butofexpediencyonly。5。Thatthepowertoerectcorporationsisnottobeconsidered,asanindependentandsubstantivepower,butasanincidentalandauxiliaryone;andwas,therefore,moreproperlylefttoimplication,thanexpresslygranted。6。Thattheprincipleinquestiondoesnotextendthepowerofthegovernmentbeyondtheprescribedlimits,becauseitonlyaffirmsapowertoincorporateforpurposeswithinthesphereofthespecifiedpowers。Andlastly,thattherighttoexercisesuchapower,incertaincases,isunequivocallygrantedinthemostpositiveandcomprehensiveterms。Toallwhichitonlyremainstobeadded,thatsuchapowerhasactuallybeenexercisedintwoveryeminentinstances,namely,intheerectionoftwogovernments;onenorthwestoftheriverOhio,andtheothersouthwest;thelast,independentofanyantecedentcompact。Andthereresultsafullandcompletedemonstration,thatthesecretaryofstateandattorney—generalaremistaken,whentheydenygenerallythepowerofthenationalgovernmenttoerectcorporations。
  "Itshallnowbeendeavouredtobeshown,thatthereisapowertoerectoneofthekindproposedbythebill。Thiswillbedonebytracinganaturalandobviousrelationbetweentheinstitutionofabank,andtheobjectsofseveraloftheenumeratedpowersofthegovernment;
  andbyshowing,that,politicallyspeaking,itisnecessarytotheeffectualexecutionofoneormoreofthosepowers。Inthecourseofthisinvestigationvariousinstanceswillbestated,bywayofillustration,ofarighttoerectcorporationsunderthosepowers。Somepreliminaryobservationsmaybeproper。Theproposedbankistoconsistofanassociationofpersonsforthepurposeofcreatingajointcapitaltobeemployed,chieflyandessentially,inloans。Sofartheobjectisnotonlylawful,butitisthemereexerciseofaright,whichthelawallowstoeveryindividual。
  ThebankofNew—York,whichisnotincorporated,isanexampleofsuchanassociation。Thebillproposes,inaddition,thatthegovernmentshallbecomeajointproprietorinthisundertaking;andthatitshallpermitthebillsofthecompany,payableondemand,tobereceivableinitsrevenues;
  andstipulates,thatitshallnotgrantprivileges,similartothose,whicharetobeallowedtothiscompany,toanyothers。Allthisisincontrovertiblywithinthecompassofthediscretionofthegovernment。Theonlyquestionis,whetherithasarighttoincorporatethiscompany,inordertoenableitthemoreeffectuallytoaccomplishends,whichareinthemselveslawful。
  Toestablishsucharight,itremainstoshowtherelationofsuchaninstitutiontooneormoreofthespecifiedpowersofthegovernment。Accordingly,itisaffirmed,thatithasarelation,moreorlessdirect,tothepowerofcollectingtaxes;tothatofborrowingmoney;tothatofregulatingtradebetweenthestates;andtothoseofraisingandmaintainingfleetsandarmies。Tothetwoformer,therelationmaybesaidtobeimmediate。
  And,inthelastplace,itwillbeargued,thatitisclearlywithintheprovision,whichauthorizesthemakingofallneedfulrulesandregulationsconcerningthepropertyoftheUnitedStates,asthesamehasbeenpracticeduponbythegovernment。
  "Abankrelatestothecollectionoftaxesintwoways。Indirectly,byincreasingthequantityofcirculatingmedium,andquickeningcirculation,whichfacilitatesthemeansofpaying;directly,bycreatingaconvenientspeciesofmedium,inwhichtheyaretobepaid。Todesignateorappointthemoneyorthing,inwhichtaxesaretobepaid,isnotonlyaproper,butanecessary,exerciseofthepowerofcollectingthem。Accordingly,congress,inthelawconcerningthecollectionofthedutiesonimpostsandtonnage,haveprovided,thattheyshallbepayableingoldandsilver。Butwhileitwasanindispensablepartoftheworktosayinwhattheyshouldbepaid,thechoiceofthespecificthingwasmerematterofdiscretion。Thepaymentmighthavebeenrequiredinthecommoditiesthemselves。Taxesinkind,howeverill—judged,arenotwithoutprecedentsevenintheUnitedstates;oritmighthavebeeninthepapermoneyoftheseveralstates,orinthebillsofthebankofNorth—America,New—York,andMassachusetts,alloreitherofthem;oritmighthavebeeninbillsissuedundertheauthorityoftheUnitedStates。
  Nopartofthiscan,itispresumed,bedisputed。Theappointment,then,ofthemoneyorthing,inwhichthetaxesaretobepaid,isanincidenttothepowerofcollection。Andamongtheexpedients,whichmaybeadopted,isthatofbillsissuedundertheauthorityoftheUnitedStates。
  Nowthemannerofissuingthesebillsisagainmatterofdiscretion。Thegovernmentmight,doubtless,proceedinthefollowingmanner:Itmightprovidethattheyshouldbeissuedunderthedirectionofcertainofficers,payableondemand;andinordertosupporttheircredit,andgivethemareadycirculation,itmight,besidesgivingthemacurrencyinitstaxes,setapart,outofanymoniesinitstreasuryagivensum,andappropriateit,underthedirectionofthoseofficers,asafundforansweringthebills,aspresentedforpayment。
  "Theconstitutionalityofallthiswouldnotadmitofaquestion,andyetitwouldamounttotheinstitutionofabank,withaviewtothemoreconvenientcollectionoftaxes。Forthesimplestandmostpreciseideaofabankis,adepositofcoinorotherproperty,asafundforcirculatingacredituponit,whichistoanswerthepurposeofmoney。Thatsuchanarrangementwouldbeequivalenttotheestablishmentofabank,wouldbecomeobvious,iftheplace,wherethefundtobesetapartwaskept,shouldbemadeareceptacleofthemoniesofallotherpersons,whoshouldinclinetodepositthemthereforsafekeeping;andwouldbecomestillmoreso,iftheofficers,chargedwiththedirectionofthefundwereauthorizedtomakediscountsattheusualrateofinterest,upongoodsecurity。Todenythepowerofthegovernmenttoaddthisingredienttotheplan,wouldbetorefineawayallgovernment。Afurtherprocesswillstillmoreclearlyillustratethepoint。Suppose,whenthespeciesofbank,whichhasbeendescribed,wasabouttobeinstituteditweretobeurged,thatinordertosecuretoitaduedegreeofconfidence,thefundoughtnotonlytobesetapartandappropriatedgenerally,butoughttobespecificallyvestedintheofficers,whoweretohavethedirectionofit,andintheirsuccessorsinoffice,totheend,thatitmightacquirethecharacterofprivateproperty,incapableofbeingresumedwithoutaviolationofthesanction,bywhichtherightsofpropertyareprotected;
  andoccasioningmoreseriousandgeneralalarm:theapprehensionofwhichmightoperateasacheckuponthegovernment。Suchapropositionmightbeopposedbyargumentsagainsttheexpediencyofit,orthesolidityofthereasonassignedforit;butitisnotconceivable,whatcouldbeurgedagainstitsconstitutionality。Andyetsuchadispositionofthethingwouldamounttotheerectionofacorporation;forthetruedefinitionofacorporationseemstobethis:Itisalegalperson,orapersoncreatedbyactoflaw;consistingofoneormorenaturalpersons,authorizedtoholdpropertyorafranchiseinsuccession,inalegal,ascontradistinguishedfromanaturalcapacity。Lettheillustrationproceedastepfurther。Supposeabank,ofthenature,whichhasbeendescribed,withoutorwithincorporation,hadbeeninstituted,andthatexperiencehadevinced,asitprobablywould,thatbeingwhollyunderapublicdirection,itpossessednottheconfidencerequisitetothecreditofitsbills。Supposealso,thatbysomeofthoseadverseconjunctures,whichoccasionallyattendnations,therehadbeenaverygreatdrainofthespecieofthecountry,soasnotonlytocausegeneraldistressforwantofanadequatemediumofcirculation;buttoproduce,inconsequenceofthatcircumstance,considerabledefalcationsinthepublicrevenues。Suppose,also,thattherewasnobankinstitutedinanystate;insuchapostureofthings,woulditnotbemostmanifest,thattheincorporationofabank,likethatproposedbythebill,wouldbeameasureimmediatelyrelativetotheeffectualcollectionofthetaxes,andcompletelywithintheprovinceofasovereignpowerofproviding,byalllawsnecessaryandproper,forthatcollection。
  "Ifitbesaid,thatsuchastateofthingswouldrenderthatnecessary,andthereforeconstitutional,whichisnotsonow;theanswertothis,andasolidoneitdoubtlessis,muststillbe,thatwhichhasbeenalreadystated;circumstancesmayaffecttheexpediencyofthemeasure,buttheycanneitheraddto,nordiminishitsconstitutionality。Abankhasadirectrelationtothepowerofborrowingmoney,becauseitisanusual,andinsuddenemergencies,anessentialinstrument,intheobtainingofloanstogovernment。Anationisthreatenedwithawar;largesumsarewantedonasuddentomaketherequisitepreparations;taxesarelaidforthepurpose;butitrequirestimetoobtainthebenefitofthem;
  anticipationisindispensable。Iftherebeabank,thesupplycanatoncebehad;iftherebenone,loansfromindividualsmustbesought。Theprogressoftheseisoftentooslowfortheexigency;insomesituationstheyarenotpracticableatall。Frequentlywhentheyare,itisofgreatconsequencetobeabletoanticipatetheproductofthembyadvancesfromabank。Theessentialityofsuchaninstitution,asaninstrumentofloans,isexemplifiedatthisverymoment。AnIndianexpeditionistobeprosecuted。Theonlyfund,outofwhichthemoneycanariseconsistentlywiththepublicengagements,isatax,whichonlybeginstobecollectedinJulynext。Thepreparations,however,areinstantlytobemade。Themoneymust,therefore,beborrowed;
  andofwhomcoulditbeborrowed,iftherewerenopublicbanks?Ithappens,thatthereareinstitutionsofthiskind;butiftherewerenone,itwouldbeindispensabletocreateone。Letitthenbesupposed,thatthenecessityexisted,asbutforacasualtywouldbethecase,thatproposalsweremadeforobtainingaloan;thatanumberofindividualscameforwardandsaid,wearewillingtoaccommodatethegovernmentwiththismoney;withwhatwehaveinhand,andthecreditwecanraiseuponit,wedoubtnotofbeingabletofurnishthesumrequired。Butinordertothis,itisindispensable,thatweshouldbeincorporatedasabank。Thisisessentialtowardsputtingitinourpowertodowhatisdesired,andweareobliged,onthataccount,tomakeittheconsiderationorconditionoftheloan。Canitbebelieved,thatacompliancewiththispropositionwouldbeunconstitutional?Doesnotthisaloneevincethecontrary?Itisanecessarypartofapowertoborrow,tobeabletostipulatetheconsiderationsorconditionsofaloan。Itisevident,ashasbeenremarkedelsewhere,thatthisisnotconfinedtothemerestipulationofafranchise。Ifitmay,anditisnotperceivedwhyitmaynot,thenthegrantofacorporatecapacitymaybestipulated,asaconsiderationoftheloan。Thereseemstobenothingunfit,orforeignfromthenatureofthething,ingivingindividuality,oracorporatecapacity,toanumberofpersons,whoarewillingtolendasumofmoneytothegovernment,thebettertoenablethemtodoit,andmakethemanordinaryinstrumentofloansinfutureemergenciesofstate。
  "Butthemoregeneralviewofthesubjectisstillmoresatisfactory。Thelegislativepowerofborrowingmoney,andofmakingalllawsnecessaryandproperforcarryingintoexecutionthatpower,seemsobviouslycompetenttotheappointmentoftheorgan,throughwhichtheabilitiesandwillsofindividualsmaybemostefficaciouslyexerted,fortheaccommodationofthegovernmentbyloans。Theattorney—generalopposestothisreasoningthefollowingobservation。Borrowingmoneypresupposestheaccumulationofafundtobelent;andissecondarytothecreationofanabilitytolend。Thisisplausibleintheory,butitisnottrueinfact。Inagreatnumberofcases,apreviousaccumulationofafund,equaltothewholesumrequired,doesnotexist;andnothingmorecanbeactuallypresupposed,thanthatthereexistsresources,which,putintoactivitytothegreatestadvantage,bythenatureoftheoperationwiththegovernment,willbeequaltotheeffectdesiredtobeproduced。Alltheprovisionsandoperationsofgovernmentmustbepresumedtocontemplatethingsastheyreallyare。Theinstitutionofabankhasalsoanaturalrelationtotheregulationoftradebetweenthestates,insofarasitisconducivetothecreationofaconvenientmediumofexchangebetweenthem,andtothekeepingupafullcirculation,bypreventingthefrequentdisplacementofthemetalsinreciprocalremittances。Moneyistheveryhingeonwhichcommerceturns。Andthisdoesnotmeanmerelygoldandsilver;
  manyotherthingshaveservedthepurposewithdifferentdegreesofutility。
  Paperhasbeenextensivelyemployed。Itcannot,therefore,beadmittedwiththeattorney—general,thattheregulationoftradebetweenthestates,asitconcernsthemediumofcirculationandexchange,oughttobeconsideredasconfinedtocoin。Itisevensupposable,thatthewhole,orthegreatestpart,ofthecoinofthecountry,mightbecarriedoutofit。Thesecretaryofstateobjectstotherelationhereinsistedupon,bythefollowingmodeofreasoning:Toerectabank,sayshe,andtoregulatecommerce,areverydifferentacts。Hewhoerectsabank,createsasubjectofcommerce。Sodoeshe,whoraisesabushelofwheat,ordigsadollaroutofthemines;
  yetneitherofthesepersonsregulatescommercethereby。Tomakeathing,whichmaybeboughtandsold,isnottoprescriberegulationsforbuyingandselling。Thisismakingtheregulationofcommercetoconsistinprescribingrulesforbuyingandselling。This,indeed,isaspeciesofregulationoftrade,butitisone,whichfallsmoreaptlywithintheprovinceofthelocaljurisdictions,thanwithinthatofthegeneralgovernment,whosecaretheymusthavepresumedtohavebeenintendedtobedirectedtothosegeneralpoliticalarrangementconcerningtrade,onwhichitsaggregateinterestsdepend,ratherthantothedetailsofbuyingandselling。Accordingly,suchonlyaretheregulationstobefoundinthelawsoftheUnitedStates;
  whoseobjectsaretogiveencouragementtotheenterpriseofourownmerchants,andtoadvanceournavigationandmanufactures。Anditisinreferencetothesegeneralrelationsofcommerce,thatanestablishment,whichfurnishesfacilitiestocirculation,andaconvenientmediumofexchangeandalienation,istoberegardedasaregulationoftrade。
  "Thesecretaryofstatefurtherurges,thatifthiswasaregulationofcommerce,itwouldbevoid,asextendingasmuchtotheinternalpartofeverystate,astoitsexternal。Butwhatregulationofcommercedoesnotextendtotheinternalcommerceofeverystate?Whatareallthedutiesuponimportedarticles,amounting,insomecases,toprohibitions,butsomanybountiesupondomesticmanufactures,affectingtheinterestofdifferentclassesofcitizensindifferentways?
  Whatarealltheprovisionsinthecoastingact,whichrelatetothetradebetweendistrictanddistrictofthesamestate?Inshort,whatregulationoftradebetweenthestates,butmustaffecttheinternaltradeofeachstate?Whatcanoperateuponthewhole,butmustextendtoeverypart?
  Therelationofabanktotheexecutionofthepowers,thatconcernthecommondefence,hasbeenanticipated。Ithasbeennoted,thatatthisverymoment,theaidofsuchaninstitutionisessentialtothemeasuretobepursuedfortheprotectionofourfrontiers。
  "Itnowremainstoshow,thattheincorporationofabankiswithintheoperationoftheprovision,whichauthorizescongresstomakeallneedfulrulesandregulationsconcerningthepropertyoftheUnitedStates。Butitispreviouslynecessarytoadverttoadistinction,whichhasbeentakenupbytheattorney—general。Headmits,thatthewordpropertymaysignifypersonalproperty,howeveracquired;andyetasserts,thatitcannotsignifymoneyarisingfromthesourcesofrevenuepointedoutintheconstitution,’because,’sayshe,’thedisposalandregulationofmoneyisthefinalcauseforraisingitbytaxes。’Butitwouldbemoreaccurate,tosay,thattheobjecttowhichmoneyisintendedtobeapplied,isthefinalcauseforraisingit,thanthatthedisposalandregulationofit,issuch。Thesupportofagovernment,thesupportoftroopsforthecommondefence,thepaymentofthepublicdebt,arethetruefinalcausesforraisingmoney。Thedispositionandregulationofit,whenraised。arethesteps,bywhichitisappliedtotheends,forwhichitwasraised,nottheendsthemselves。Hence,thereforethemoneytoberaisedbytaxes,aswellasanyotherpersonalproperty,mustbesupposedtocomewithinthemeaning,astheycertainlydowithintheletter,ofauthoritytomakeallneedfulrulesandregulationsconcerningthepropertyoftheUnitedStates。Acasewillmakethisplainer。Supposethepublicdebtdischarged,andthefundsnowpledgedforit,liberated。
  Insomeinstancesitwouldbefoundexpedienttorepealthetaxes;inothers,therepealmightinjureourownindustry,ouragriculture,andmanufactures。
  Inthesecases,theywould,ofcourse,beretained。Here,then,wouldbemoniesarisingfromtheauthorizedsourcesofrevenue,whichwouldnotfallwithintherule,bywhichtheattorney—generalendeavourstoexceptthemfromotherpersonalproperty,andfromtheoperationoftheclauseinquestion。Themoniesbeinginthecoffersofgovernment,whatistohindersuchadispositiontobemadeofthem,asiscontemplatedinthebill;orwhatanincorporationofthepartiesconcerned,undertheclause,whichhasbeencited。
  "Itisadmitted,that,withregardtothewesternterritory,theygiveapowertoerectacorporation;thatis,toconstituteagovernment。
  Andbywhatruleofconstructioncanitbemaintained,thatthesamewords,inaconstitutionofgovernment,willnothavethesameeffect,whenappliedtoonespeciesofpropertyastoanother,asfarasthesubjectiscapableofit?Orthatalegislativepowertomakeallneedfulrulesandregulations,ortopassalllawsnecessaryandproperconcerningthepublicproperty,whichisadmittedtoauthorizeanincorporation,inonecase,willnotauthorizeitinanother?WilljustifytheinstitutionofagovernmentovertheWesternTerritory,andwillnotjustifytheincorporationofabank,forthemoreusefulmanagementofthemoneyofthenation?Ifitwilldothelastaswellasthefirst,then,underthisprovisionalone,thebillisconstitutional,becauseitcontemplates,thattheUnitedStatesshallbejointproprietorsofthestockofthebank。Thereisanobservationofthesecretaryofstate,tothiseffect,whichmayrequirenoticeinthisplace。?Congress,sayshe,arenottolaytaxesadlibitum,foranypurposetheyplease,butonlytopaythedebts,orprovideforthewelfareoftheUnion。Certainly,noinferencecanbedrawnfromthis,againstthepowerofapplyingtheirmoneyfortheinstitutionofabank。
  Itistrue,thattheycannot,withoutbreachoftrust,laytaxesforanyotherpurpose,thanthegeneralwelfare;butsoneithercananyothergovernment。
  Thewelfareofthecommunityistheonlylegitimateend,forwhichmoneycanberaisedonthecommunity。Congresscanbeconsideredasonlyunderonerestriction,whichdoesnotapplytoothergovernments。Theycannotrightfullyapplythemoneytheyraisetoanypurpose,merelyorpurelylocal,Butwiththisexception,theyhaveaslargeadiscretion,inrelationtotheapplicationofmoney,asanylegislaturewhatever。
  "Theconstitutionaltestofarightapplication,mustalwaysbe,whetheritbeforapurposeofgeneralorlocalnature。Iftheformer,therecanbenowantofconstitutionalpower。Thequalityoftheobjectashowfaritwillreallypromote,ornot,thewelfareoftheUnion,mustbematterofconscientiousdiscretion;andtheargumentsfororagainstameasure,inthislight,mustbeargumentsconcerningexpediencyorinexpediency,notconstitutionalright;whateverrelatestothegeneralorderofthefinances,tothegeneralinterestsoftrade,&;c。,beinggeneralobjects,areconstitutionalones,fortheapplicationofmoney。Abank,then,whosebillsaretocirculateinalltherevenuesofthecountry,isevidentlyageneralobject;andforthatveryreason,aconstitutionalone,asfarasregardstheappropriationofmoneytoit,whetheritwillreallybeabeneficialoneornot,isworthyofcarefulexamination;butisnomoreaconstitutionalpoint,intheparticularreferredto,thanthequestion,whetherthewesternlandsshallbesoldfortwentyorthirtycentsperacre?Ahopeisentertained,that,bythistime,ithasbeenmadetoappeartothesatisfactionofthePresident,thatthebankhasanaturalrelationtothepowerofcollectingtaxes;tothatofregulatingtrade;tothatofprovidingforthecommondefence;andthat,asthebillunderconsiderationcontemplatesthegovernmentinthelightofajointproprietorofthestockofthebank,itbringsthecasewithintheprovisionoftheclauseoftheconstitution,whichimmediatelyrespectsthepropertyoftheUnitedStates。Underaconviction,thatsucharelationsubsists,thesecretaryofthetreasury,withalldeference,conceives,thatitwillresult,asanecessaryconsequencefromtheposition,thatallthespecifiedpowersofgovernmentaresovereign,astotheproperobjects,thattheincorporationofabankisaconstitutionalmeasure:andthattheobjections,takentothebillinthisrespect,areill—founded。
  "But,fromanearnestdesiretogivetheutmostpossiblesatisfactiontothemindofthepresident,onsodelicateandimportantasubject,thesecretaryofthetreasurywillaskhisindulgence,whilehegivessomeadditionalillustrationsofcases,inwhichapoweroferectingcorporationsmaybeexercised,undersomeofthoseheadsofthespecifiedpowersofthegovernment,whichareallegedtoincludetherightofincorporatingabank。1。Itdoesnotappearsusceptibleofadoubt,thatifcongresshadthoughtpropertoprovideinthecollectionlaw,thatthebonds,tobegivenfortheduties,shouldbegiventothecollectorofthedistrictA。orB。asthecasemightrequire,toinuretohimandhissuccessorsinoffice,intrustfortheUnitedStates;thatitwouldhavebeenconsistentwiththeconstitutiontomakesuchanarrangement。Andyetthis,itisconceived,wouldamounttoanincorporation。2。Itisnotanunusualexpedientoftaxation,tofarmparticularbranchesofrevenue;thatis,tosellormortgagetheproductofthemforcertaindefinitesums,leavingthecollectiontotheparties,towhomtheyaremortgagedorsold。ThereareevenexamplesofthisintheUnitedStates。Supposethattherewasanyparticularbranchofrevenue,whichitwasmanifestlyexpedienttoplaceonthisfooting,andtherewereanumberofpersonswillingtoengagewiththegovernment,uponconditionthattheyshouldbeincorporated,andthefundsvestedinthem,aswellfortheirgreatersafety,asforthemoreconvenientrecoveryandmanagementofthetaxes;isitsupposablethattherecouldbeanyconstitutionalobstacletothemeasure?Itispresumed,thattherecouldbenone。Itiscertainlyamodeofcollection,whichitwouldbeinthediscretionofthegovernmenttoadopt;thoughthecircumstancesmustbeveryextraordinary,thatwouldinducethesecretarytothinkitexpedient。3。Supposeanewandunexploredbranchoftradeshouldpresentitselfwithsomeforeigncountry。Supposeitwasmanifest,thattoundertakeitwithadvantage,requiredaunionofthecapitalsofanumberofindividuals,andthatthoseindividualswouldnotbedisposedtoembarkwithoutanincorporation,aswelltoobviatetheconsequencesofaprivatepartnership,whichmakeseveryindividualliableinhiswholeestateforthedebtsofthecompanytotheirutmostextent,asforthemoreconvenientmanagementofthebusiness;
  whatreasoncantherebetodoubt,thatthenationalgovernmentwouldhaveaconstitutionalrighttoinstituteandincorporatesuchacompany?None。
  Theypossessageneralauthoritytoregulatetradewithforeigncountries。
  Thisisamean,whichhasbeenpracticedtothatendbyalltheprincipalcommercialnations,whohavetradingcompaniestothisday,whichhavesubsistedforcenturies。WhymaynottheUnitedStatesconstitutionallyemploythemeansusualinothercountriesforattainingtheendsintrustedtothem?Apowertomakeallneedfulrulesandregulationsconcerningterritory,hasbeenconstruedtomeanapowertoerectagovernment。Apowertoregulatetradeisapowertomakeallneedfulrulesandregulationsconcerningtrade。
  Whymayitnot,then,includethatoferectingatradingcompany,aswellasinothercasestoerectagovernment?
  "Itisremarkable,thatthestateconventions,whohaveproposedamendmentsinrelationtothispoint,havemost,ifnotallofthem,expressedthemselvesnearlythus:Congressshallnotgrantmonopolies,norerectanycompanywithexclusiveadvantagesofcommerce!Thusatthesametimeexpressingtheirsense,thatthepowertoerecttradingcompanies,orcorporations,wasinherentincongress,andobjectingtoitnofurther,thanastothegrantofexclusiveprivileges。Thesecretaryentertainsallthedoubts,whichprevailconcerningtheutilityofsuchcompanies;buthecannotfashiontohisownmindareasontoinduceadoubt,thatthereisaconstitutionalauthorityintheUnitedStatestoestablishthem。Ifsuchareasonweredemanded,nonecouldbegiven,unlessitwerethis?thatcongresscannoterectacorporation;whichwouldbenobetter,thantosay,theycannotdoit,becausetheycannotdoit。
  First,presuminganinabilitywithoutreason,andthenassigningthatinability,asthecauseofitself。Illustrationsofthiskindmightbemultipliedwithoutend。Theywill,however,bepursuednofurther。
  "Thereisasortofevidenceonthispoint,arisingfromanaggregateviewoftheconstitution,whichisofnoinconsiderableweight。
  Theverygeneralpoweroflayingandcollectingtaxes,andappropriatingtheirproceeds;thatofborrowingmoneyindefinitely;thatofcoiningmoneyandregulatingforeigncoins;thatofmakingallneedfulrulesandregulationsrespectingthepropertyoftheUnitedStates;?thesepowerscombined,aswellasthereasonandnatureofthething,speakstronglythislanguage;
  thatitisthemanifestdesignandscopeoftheconstitutiontovestincongressallthepowersrequisitetotheeffectualadministrationofthefinancesoftheUnitedStates。Asfarasconcernsthisobject,thereappearstobenoparsimonyofpower。Tosuppose,then,thatthegovernmentisprecludedfromtheemploymentofsousual,andsoimportantaninstrumentfortheadministrationofitsfinances,asthatofabank,istosuppose,whatdoesnotcoincidewiththegeneraltenourandcomplexionoftheconstitution,andwhatisnotagreeabletoimpressions,thatanymerespectatorwouldentertainconcerningit。Littleless,thanaprohibitoryclause,candestroythestrongpresumptions,whichresultfromthegeneralaspectofthegovernment。
  Nothingbutdemonstrationshouldexcludetheidea,thatthepowerexists。
  "Inallquestionsofthisnature,thepracticeofmankindoughttohavegreatweightagainstthetheoriesofindividuals。Thefact,forinstance,thatalltheprincipalcommercialnationshavemadeuseoftradingcorporationsorcompanies,forthepurposeofexternalcommerce,isasatisfactoryproof,thattheestablishmentofthemisanincidenttotheregulationofcommerce。Thisotherfact,thatbanksareanusualengineintheadministrationofnationalfinances,andanordinary,andthemosteffectualinstrumentofloans,andone,which,inthiscountry,hasbeenfoundessential,pleadsstronglyagainstthesupposition,thatagovernmentclothedwithmostoftheimportantprerogativesofsovereignty,inrelationtoitsrevenues,itsdebt,itscredit,itsdefence,itstrade,itsintercoursewithforeignnations,isforbiddentomakeuseofthatinstrument,asanappendagetoitsownauthority。Ithasbeenusual,asanauxiliarytestofconstitutionalauthority,totry,whetheritabridgesanypre—existingrightofmystate,oranyindividual。Theproposedmeasurewillstandthemostsevereexaminationonthispoint。Eachstatemaystillerectasmanybanks,asitpleases;everyindividualmaystillcarryonthebankingbusinesstoanyextenthepleases。Anothercriterionmaybethis;whethertheinstitutionorthinghasamoredirectrelation,astoitsuses,totheobjectsofthereservedpowersofthestategovernment,thantothoseofthepowersdelegatedbytheUnitedStates?Thisrule,indeed,islessprecise,thantheformer;butitmaystillserveassomeguide。Surely,abankhasmorereferencetotheobjects,intrustedtothenationalgovernment,thantothoselefttothecareofthestategovernments。
  Thecommondefenceisdecisiveinthiscomparison。"1Hamilton’sWorks,138to154。
  24。JournalofConvention,p。376。
  25。HamiltononBank,1Hamilton’sWorks,127。
  26。HamiltononBank,1Hamilton’sWorks,127,128。
  27。Osbornv。BankofUnitedStates,9Wheat。R。861,862to865。
  28。M’Cullochv。Maryland,4
  Wheat。R。424。
  29。See4Elliot’sDebates,216to229;M’Cullochv。Maryland,4Wheat。R。316;Osbornv。BankofUnitedStates,9Wheat。R。738,859;1Kent’sComm。Lect。12,p。233to239;
  SergeantonConstitution,ch。28,[ch。30;]5Marsh。Wash。App。Note3。
  JosephStory:CommentariesontheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates:
  Book3Chapter26CHAPTERXXVI。POWERSOFCONGRESS?INTERNALIMPROVEMENTS。§;1267。ANOTHERquestion,whichhasforalongtimeagitatedthepubliccouncilsofthenation,is,astotheauthorityofcongresstomakeroads,canals,andotherinternalimprovements。
  §;1268。Sofar,asregardstherighttoappropriatemoneytointernalimprovementsgenerally,thesubjecthasalreadypassedunderreviewinconsideringthepowertolayandcollecttaxes。Thedoctrinetherecontendedfor,whichhasbeeninagreatmeasureborneoutbytheactualpracticeofthegovernment,is,thatcongressmayappropriatemoney,notonlytoclearobstructionstonavigablerivers;
  toimproveharbours;tobuildbreakwaters;toassistnavigation;toerectforts,light—houses,andpiers;andforotherpurposesalliedtosomeoftheenumeratedpowers;butmayalsoappropriateitinaidofcanals,roads,andotherinstitutionsofasimilarnature,existingunderstateauthority。
  Theonlylimitationsuponthepowerarethoseprescribedbythetermsoftheconstitution,thattheobjectsshallbeforthecommondefence,orthegeneralwelfareoftheUnion。Thetruetestis,whethertheobjectbeofalocalcharacter,andlocaluse;or,whetheritbeofgeneralbenefittothestates。1Ifitbepurelylocal,congresscannotconstitutionallyappropriatemoneyfortheobject。But,ifthebenefitbegeneral,itmattersnot,whetherinpointoflocalityitbeinonestate,orseveral;whetheritbeoflargeorofsmallextent;
  itsnatureandcharacterdeterminetheright,andcongressmayappropriatemoneyinaidofit;foritistheninajustsenseforthegeneralwelfare。
  §;1269。Butithasbeencontended,thattheconstitutionisnotconfinedtomereappropriationsofmoney;butauthorizescongressdirectlytoundertakeandcarryonasystemofinternalimprovementsforthegeneralwelfare;whereversuchimprovementsfallwithinthescopeofanyoftheenumeratedpowers。Congressmaynot,indeed,engageinsuchundertakingsmerelybecausetheyareinternalimprovementsforthegeneralwelfare,unlesstheyfallwithinthescopeoftheenumeratedpowers。Thedistinctionbetweenthispower,andthepowerofappropriationis,thatinthelatter,congressmayappropriatetoanypurpose,whichisforthecommondefenceorgeneralwelfare;butintheformer,theycanengageinsuchundertakingsonly,asaremeans,orincidentstoitsenumeratedpowers。
  Congressmay,therefore,authorizethemakingofacanal,asincidenttothepowertoregulatecommerce,wheresuchcanalmayfacilitatetheintercoursebetweenstateandstate。Theymayauthorizelight—houses,piers,buoys,andbeaconstobebuiltforthepurposesofnavigation。Theymayauthorizethepurchaseandbuildingofcustom—houses,andrevenuecutters,andpublicwarehouses,asincidentstothepowertolayandcollecttaxes。Theymaypurchaseplacesforpublicuses;anderectforts,arsenals,dock—yards,navy—yards,andmagazines,asincidentstothepowertomakewar。
  §;1270。Forthesamereasoncongressmayauthorizethelayingoutandmakingofamilitaryroad,andacquirearightoverthesoilforsuchpurposes;andasincidenttheretotheyhaveapowertokeeptheroadinrepair,andpreventallobstructionsthereto。
  Butinthese,andthelikecases,thegeneraljurisdictionofthestateoverthesoil,subjectonlytotherightsoftheUnitedStates,isnotexcluded。As,forexample,incaseofamilitaryroad;althoughastatecannotpreventrepairsonthepartoftheUnitedStates,orauthorizeanyobstructionsoftheroad,itsgeneraljurisdictionremainsuntouched。Itmaypunishallcrimescommittedontheroad;anditretainsinotherrespectsitsterritorialsovereigntyoverit。Therightofsoilmaystillremaininthestate,orinindividuals,andtherighttotheeasementonlyinthenationalgovernment。Thereisagreatdistinctionbetweentheexerciseofapower,excludingaltogetherstatejurisdiction,andtheexerciseofapower,whichleavesthestatejurisdictiongenerallyinforce,andyetincludes,onthepartofthenationalgovernment,apowertopreserve,whatithascreated。2
  §;1271。Inallthese,andothercases,inwhichthepowerofcongressisasserted,itissouponthegeneralgroundofitsbeinganincidentalpower;andthecourseofreasoning,bywhichitissupported,ispreciselythesame,asthatadoptedinrelationtoothercasesalreadyconsidered。Itis,forinstance,admitted,thatcongresscannotauthorizethemakingofacanal,exceptforsomepurposeofcommerceamongthestates,orforsomeotherpurposebelongingtotheUnion;anditcannotmakeamilitaryroad,unlessitbenecessaryandproperforpurposesofwar。Togooverthereasoningatlargewould,therefore,belittlemore,thanarepetitionofwhathasbeenalreadyfullyexpounded。3TheJournaloftheConventionisnotsupposedtofurnishanyadditionallightsonthesubject,beyondwhathavebeenalreadystated。4
  §;1272。Theresistancetothisextendedreachofthenationalpowersturnsalsouponthesamegeneralreasoning,bywhichastrictconstructionoftheconstitutionhasbeenconstantlymaintained。Itissaid,thatsuchapowerisnotamongthoseenumeratedintheconstitution;norisitimplied,asameansofexecutinganyofthem。Thepowertoregulatecommercecannotincludeapowertoconstructroadsandcanals,andimprovethenavigationofwater—coursesinordertofacilitate,promote,andsecuresuchcommerce,withoutalatitudeofconstructiondepartingfromtheordinaryimportoftheterms,andincompatiblewiththenatureoftheconstitution。5Theliberalinterpretationhasbeenveryuniformlyassertedbycongress;
  thestrictinterpretationhasnotuniformly,buthasuponseveralimportantoccasionsbeeninsisteduponbytheexecutive。6Inthepresentstateofthecontroversy,thedutyofforbearanceseemsinculcateduponthecommentator;andthereadermustdecideforhimselfuponhisownviewsofthesubject。
  §;1273。Anotherquestionhasbeenmade,howfarcongresscouldmakealawgivingtotheUnitedStatesapreferenceandpriorityofpaymentoftheirdebts,incasesofthedeath,orinsolvency,orbankruptcyoftheirdebtors,outoftheirestates。Ithasbeensettled,upondeliberateargument,thatcongresspossesssuchaconstitutionalpower。
  Itisanecessaryandproperpowertocarryintoeffecttheotherpowersofthegovernment。ThegovernmentistopaythedebtsoftheUnion;andmustbeauthorizedtousethemeans,whichappeartoitselfmosteligibletoeffectthatobject。Itmaypurchase,andremitbillsforthisobject;
  anditmaytakeallthoseprecautions,andmakeallthoseregulations,whichwillrenderthetransmissionsafe。Itmay,inlikemanner,passalllawstorendereffectualthecollectionofitsdebts。Itisnoobjectiontothisrightofpriority,thatitwillinterferewiththerightsofthestatesovereigntiesrespectingthedignityofdebts,andwilldefeatthemeasures,whichtheyhavearighttoadopttosecurethemselvesagainstdelinquenciesonthepartoftheirownrevenueorotherofficers。Thisobjection,ifofanyavail,isanobjectiontothepowersgivenbytheconstitution。Themischiefsuggested,sofarasitcanreallyhappen,isthenecessaryconsequenceofthesupremacyofthelawsoftheUnitedStatesonallsubjects,towhichthelegislativepowerofcongressextends。7
  §;1274。Itisunderthesameimpliedauthority,thattheUnitedStateshaveanyrighteventosueintheirowncourts;foranexpresspowerisnowheregivenintheconstitution,thoughitisclearlyimpliedinthatpartrespectingthejudicialpower。AndcongressmaynotonlyauthorizesuitstobebroughtinthenameoftheUnitedStates,butinthenameofanyartificialperson,suchasthePostmaster—General,8ornaturalpersonfortheirbenefit。9Indeed,alltheusualincidentsappertainingtoapersonalsovereign,inrelationtocontracts,andsuing,andenforcingfights,sofarastheyarewithinthescopeofthepowersofthegovernment,belongtotheUnitedStates,astheydotoothersovereigns。10Therightofmakingcontractsandinstitutingsuitsisanincidenttothegeneralrightofsovereignty;andtheUnitedStates,beingabodypolitic,may,withinthesphereoftheconstitutionalpowersconfidedtoit,andthroughtheinstrumentalityoftheproperdepartment,towhichthosepowersareconfided,enterintocontractsnotprohibitedbylaw,andappropriatetothejustexerciseofthosepowers;
  andenforcetheobservanceofthembysuitsandjudicialprocess。11
  §;1275。Therearealmostinnumerablecases,inwhichtheauxiliaryandimpliedpowersbelongingtocongresshavebeenputintooperation。ButtheobjectoftheseCommentariesis,rathertotakenoticeofthose,whichhavebeenthesubjectofanimadversion,thanofthose,whichhavehithertoescapedreproof,orhavebeensilentlyapproved。
  §;1276。Uponthegroundofastrictinterpretation,someextraordinaryobjectionshavebeentakeninthecourseofthepracticaloperationsofthegovernment。Theveryfirstact,passedunderthegovernment,whichregulatedthetime,form,andmanner,ofadministeringtheoathsprescribedbytheconstitution,12wasdeniedtobeconstitutional。Buttheobjectionhaslongsincebeenabandoned。13Ithasbeendoubted,whetheritisconstitutionaltopermitthesecretariestodraftbillsonsubjectsconnectedwiththeirdepartments,tobepresentedtothehouseofrepresentativesfortheirconsideration。14Ithasbeendoubted,whetheranactauthorizingthepresidenttolay,regulate,andrevoke,embargoeswasconstitutional。15Ithasbeendoubted,whethercongresshaveauthoritytoestablishamilitaryacademy。16Buttheseobjectionshavebeensilently,orpracticallyabandoned。
  1。Hamilton’sReportonManufactures,1791,1Hamilton’sWorks,231,232;1Kent’sComm。Lect。12,p。250,251,2ed。p。267,268;SergeantonConstitution,ch。28,[ch。30;]PresidentMonroe’sExpositionandMessage,4thMay,1822,p。38,39。
  2。See1Kent’sComm。Lect。12,p。250,251;SergeantonConstitution,ch。28,[ch。30,ed。1830;]2U。S。LawJournal,April,1826,p。251,&;c。;3Elliot’sDebates,309,310;4Elliot’sDebates,244,265,279,291,356;Webster’sSpeeches,p。392to397。
  3。SeeM’Cullochv。Maryland,4WheatR。406,407,413to421;Webster’sSpeeches,p。392to397;4Elliot’sDebate。280。
  4。JournalofConvention,p。260,376。
  5。PresidentMadison’sMessage。3dMarch,1817;4Elliot’sDebates,280,281;PresidentMonroe’sMessage,4thMay,1822,p。22to35;PresidentJackson’sMessage,27thMay,1830;4Elliot’sDebates,333,334。335;1Kent’sComm。Lect。12,p。250,251;4Elliot’sDebates,291,292,354,355;SergeantonConstitution,ch。28,[ch。30
  ;]4Jefferson’sCorresp。421。?PresidentMonroe,inhiselaborateExpositionaccompanyinghisMessageofthe4thofMay,1822,deniestheindependentrightofcongresstoconstructroadsandcanals;butassertsinthestrongestmannertheirrighttoappropriatemoneytosuchobjects。Hisreasoningforthelatteristhoughtbymanytobequiteirresistibleinfavouroftheformer。Seethemessagefrompage。35topage47。Oneshortpassagemaybequoted。"Goodroadsandcanalswillpromotemanyveryimportantnationalpurposes。Theywillfacilitatetheoperationsofwar;themovementsoftroops;thetransportationofcannon,ofprovisionsandeverywarlikestore,muchtoouradvantage,andthedisadvantageoftheenemyintimeofwar。Goodroadswillfacilitatethetransportationofthemail,andtherebypromotethepurposesofcommerceandpoliticalintelligenceamongthepeople。Theywill,bybeingproperlydirectedtotheseobjects,enhancethevalueofourvacantlands,atreasureofvastresourcetothenation。"
  Thisistheveryreasoning,bywhichthefriendsof:。thegeneralpowersupportitsconstitutionality。
  6。4Jefferson’sCorresp。421;1Kent’sComm。Lect。12,p。250,251。
  7。UnitedStatesv。Fisher,2
  Cranch,358;1Peters’sCondensedRep。421;Harrisonv。Sterry,5Cranch,289;2Peters’sCondensedRep。260;1Kent’sComm。Lect。19,p。229to233。
  8。Postmaster—Generalv。Early,12Wheat。R。136。
  9。SeeDuganv。UnitedStates,3Wheat。R。173,179;UnitedStatesv。Buford,3Peters’sR。12,30;UnitedState:v。Tingey,5Peters’sR。115,127,128。
  10。Coxv。UnitedStates,6Peters’sR。172。
  11。UnitedStatesv。Tingey,5Peters’sR。115,128。
  12。Actof1stJune,1789,ch。1。
  13。4Elliot’sDeb。139,140,141;1
  Lloyd’sDeb。218to225。
  14。4Elliot’sDebates,238,239,240。
  15。Elliot’sDebates,240。SeeId。265。
  16。4Jefferson’sCorresp。499。
  JosephStory:CommentariesontheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates:
  Book3Chapter27CHAPTERXXVII。POWERSOFCONGRESS——PURCHASESOFFOREIGNTERRITORY——EMBARGOES。§;1277。BUTthemostremarkablepowers,whichhavebeenexercisedbythegovernment,asauxiliaryandimpliedpowers,andwhich,ifany,gototheutmostvergeofliberalconstruction,arethelayingofanunlimitedembargoin1807,andthepurchaseofLouisianain1803,anditssubsequentadmissionintotheUnion,asastate。Thesemeasureswerebroughtforward,andsupported,andcarried,bytheknownandavowedfriendsofastrictconstructionoftheconstitution;
  andtheywerejustifiedatthetime,andcanbenowjustified,onlyuponthedoctrinesofthose,whosupportaliberalconstructionoftheconstitution。
  Thesubjecthasbeenalreadyhintedat;butitdeservesamoredeliberatereview。
  §;1278。InregardtotheacquisitionofLouisiana:Thetreatyof1803containsacessionofthewholeofthatvastterritorybyFrancetotheUnitedStates,forasumexceedingelevenmillionsofdollars。ThereisastipulationinthetreatyonthepartoftheUnitedStates,thattheinhabitantsofthecededterritoryshallbeincorporatedintotheUnion,andadmitted,assoonaspossible,accordingtotheprinciplesofthefederalconstitution,totheenjoymentofalltherights,advantages,andimmunitiesofcitizensoftheUnitedStates。1
  §;1279。Itisobvious,thatthetreatyembracedseveralveryimportantquestions,eachofthemuponthegroundsofastrictconstructionfullofdifficultyanddelicacy。Inthefirstplace,hadtheUnitedStatesaconstitutionalauthoritytoacceptthecessionandpayforit?Inthenextplace,iftheyhad,wasthestipulationfortheadmissionoftheinhabitantsintotheUnion,asastate,constitutional,orwithinthepowerofcongresstogiveiteffect?
  §;1280。Thereisnopretence,thatthepurchase,orcessionofanyforeignterritoryiswithinanyofthepowersexpresslyenumeratedintheconstitution。Itisnowhereinthatinstrumentsaid,thatcongress,oranyotherdepartmentofthenationalgovernment,shallhavearighttopurchase,oracceptofanycessionofforeignterritory。
  Thepoweritselfithasbeensaidcouldscarcelyhavebeeninthecontemplationoftheframersofit。Itis,initsownnature,asdangeroustoliberty,assusceptibleofabuseinitsactualapplication,andaslikelyasany,whichcouldbeimagined,toleadtoadissolutionoftheUnion。Ifcongresshavethepower,itmayuniteanyforeignterritorywhatsoevertoourown,howeverdistant,howeverpopulous,andhoweverpowerful。Undertheformofacession,wemaybecomeunitedtoamorepowerfulneighbourorrival;
  andbeinvolvedinEuropean,orotherforeigninterests,andcontests,toaninterminableextent。AndiftheremaybeastipulationfortheadmissionofforeignstatesintotheUnion,thewholebalanceoftheconstitutionmaybedestroyed,andtheoldstatessunkintoutterinsignificance。Itisincredible,thatitshouldhavebeencontemplated,thatanysuchoverwhelmingauthorityshouldbeconfidedtothenationalgovernmentwiththeconsentofthepeopleoftheoldstates。Ifitexistsatall,itisunforeseen,andtheresultofasovereignty,intendedtobelimited,andyetnotsufficientlyguarded。TheverycaseofthecessionofLouisianaisastrikingillustrationofthedoctrine。Itadmits,byconsequence,intotheUnionanimmenseterritory,equalto,ifnotgreater,thanthatofalltheUnitedStatesunderthepeaceof1783。Inthenaturalprogressofevents,itmust,withinashortperiod,changethewholebalanceofpowerintheUnion,andtransfertotheWestalltheimportantattributesofthesovereigntyofthewhole。
  If,asiswellknown,oneofthestrongobjectionsurgedagainsttheconstitutionwas,thattheoriginalterritoryoftheUnitedStateswastoolargeforanationalgovernment;itisinconceivable,thatitcouldhavebeenwithintheintentionofthepeople,thatanyadditionsofforeignterritoryshouldbemade,whichshouldthusdoubleeverydangerfromthissource。Thetreaty—makingpowermustbeconstrued,asconfinedtoobjectswithinthescopeoftheconstitution。And,althoughcongresshaveauthoritytoadmitnewstatesintothefirm,yetitisdemonstrable,thatthisclausehadsolereferencetotheterritorythenbelongingtotheUnitedStates;andwasdesignedfortheadmissionofthestates,which,undertheordinanceof1787,werecontemplatedtobeformedwithinitsoldboundaries。Inregardtotheappropriationofmoneyforthepurposesofthecessionthecaseisstillstronger。Ifnoappropriationofmoneycanbemade,exceptforcaseswithintheenumeratedpowers,andthisclearlyisnotone,howcantheenormoussumofelevenmillionsbejustifiedforthisobject?Ifitbesaid,thatitwillbe"forthecommondefence,andgeneralwelfare"topurchasetheterritory,howisthisreconcileablewiththestrictconstructionoftheconstitution?
  Ifcongresscanappropriatemoneyforoneobject,becauseitisdeemedforthecommondefenceandgeneralwelfare,whymaytheynotappropriateitforallobjectsofthesamesort?Iftheterritorycanbepurchased,itmustbegoverned;andaterritorialgovernmentmustbecreated。Butwherecancongressfindauthorityintheconstitutiontoerectaterritorialgovernment,sinceitdoesnotpossessthepowertoerectcorporations?
  §;1281。Suchweretheobjections,whichhavebeen,andinfactmaybe,urgedagainstthecession,andtheappropriationsmadetocarrythetreatyintoeffect。Thefriendsofthemeasureweredriventotheadoptionofthedoctrine,thattherighttoacquireterritorywasincidenttonationalsovereignty;thatitwasaresultingpower,growingnecessarilyoutoftheaggregatepowersconfidedbythefederalconstitution;
  thattheappropriationmightjustlybevindicateduponthisground,andalsoupontheground,thatitwasforthecommondefenceandgeneralwelfare。
  Inshort,thereisnopossibilityofdefendingtheconstitutionalityofthismeasure,butupontheprinciplesoftheliberalconstruction,whichhasbeen,uponotheroccasions,soearnestlyresisted。2
  §;1282。Asanincidentalpower,theconstitutionalrightoftheUnitedStatestoacquireterritorywouldseemsonaturallytoflowfromthesovereigntyconfidedtoit,asnottoadmitofveryseriousquestion。TheconstitutionconfersonthegovernmentoftheUnionthepowerofmakingwar,andofmakingtreaties;anditseemsconsequentlytopossessthepowerofacquiringterritoryeitherbyconquestoftreaty。3Ifthecessionbebytreaty,thetermsofthattreatymustbeobligatory;
  foritisthelawoftheland。Andifitstipulatesfortheenjoymentbytheinhabitantsoftherights,privileges,andimmunitiesofcitizensoftheUnitedStates,andfortheadmissionoftheterritoryintotheUnion,asastate,thesestipulationsmustbeequallyobligatory。Theyarewithinthescopeoftheconstitutionalauthorityofthegovernment,whichhastherighttoacquireterritory,tomaketreaties,andtoadmitnewstatesintotheUnion。4
  §;1283。ThemererecentacquisitionofFlorida,whichhasbeenuniversallyapproved,oracquiescedinbyallthestates,canbemaintainedonlyonthesameprinciples;andfurnishesastrikingillustrationofthetruth,thatconstitutionsofgovernmentrequirealiberalconstructiontoeffecttheirobjects,andthatanarrowinterpretationoftheirpowers,howeveritmaysuittheviewsofspeculativephilosophers,ortheaccidentalinterestsofpoliticalparties,isincompatiblewiththepermanentinterestsofthestate,andsubversiveofthegreatendsofallgovernment,thesafetyandindependenceofthepeople。
  §;1284。Theotherinstanceofanextraordinaryapplicationoftheimpliedpowersofthegovernment,abovealludedto,istheembargolaidintheyear1807,bythespecialrecommendationofPresidentJefferson。Itwasavowedlyrecommended,asameasureofsafetyforourvessels,ourseamen,andourmerchandisefromthethenthreateningdangersfromthebelligerentsofEurope;5anditwasexplicitlystated"tobeameasureofprecautioncalledforbytheoccasion;"and"neitherhostileinitscharacter,norasjustifying,orinciting,orleadingtohostilitywithanynationwhatever。"6Itwasinnosense,then,awarmeasure。Ifitcouldbeclassedatall,asflowingfrom,orasanincidentto,anyoftheenumeratedpowers,itwasthatofregulatingcommerce。Initsterms,theactprovided,thatanembargobe,andherebyis,laidonallshipsandvesselsintheports,orwithinthelimitsorjurisdiction,oftheUnitedStates,&;c。boundtoanyforeignportorplace。7Itwasinitstermsunlimitedinduration;andcouldberemovedonlybyasubsequentactofcongress,havingtheassentofalltheconstitutionalbranchesofthelegislature。8
  §;1285。Noonecanreasonablydoubt,thatthelayingofanembargo,suspendingcommerceforalimitedperiod,iswithinthescopeoftheconstitution。Butthequestionofdifficultywas,whethercongress,underthepowertoregulatecommercewithforeignnations,couldconstitutionallysuspendandinterdictitwhollyforanunlimitedperiod,thatis,byapermanentact,havingnolimitationastoduration,eitheroftheact,oroftheembargo。Itwasmostseriouslycontroverted,anditsconstitutionalitydeniedintheEasternstatesoftheUnion,duringitsexistence。Anappealwasmadetothejudiciaryuponthequestion;andithavingbeensettledtobeconstitutionalbythatdepartmentofthegovernment,thedecisionwasacquiescedin,thoughthemeasureborewithalmostunexampledseverity,upontheEasternstates;anditsruinouseffectscanstillbetracedalongtheirextensiveseaboard。Theargumentwas,thatthepowertoregulatedidnotincludethepowertoannihilatecommerce,byinterdictingitpermanentlyandentirelywithforeignnations。
  Thedecisionwas,thatthepowerofcongresswassovereign,relativetocommercialintercourse,qualifiedbythelimitationsandrestrictionscontainedintheconstitutionitself。Non—intercourseandEmbargolawsarewithintherangeoflegislativediscretion;andifcongresshavethepower,forpurposesofsafety,ofpreparation,orcounteraction,tosuspendcommercialintercoursewithforeignnations,theyarenotlimited,astotheduration,anymore,thanastothemannerandextentofthemeasure。9
  §;1286。Thatthismeasurewenttotheutmostvergeofconstitutionalpower,andespeciallyofimpliedpower,hasneverbeendenied。Thatitcouldnotbejustifiedbyany,butthemostliberalconstructionoftheconstitution,isequallyundeniable。Itwasthefavouritemeasureofthose,whoweregenerallytheadvocatesofthestrictestconstruction。Itwassustainedbythepeoplefromabelief,thatitwaspromotiveoftheinterests,andimportanttothesafetyoftheUnion。
  §;1287。Atthepresentday,fewstatesmenaretobefound,whoseriouslycontesttheconstitutionalityoftheactsrespectingeithertheembargo,orthepurchaseandadmissionofLouisianaintotheUnion。Thegeneralvoiceofthenationhassustained,andsupportedthem。Why,then,shouldnotthatgeneralvoicebeequallyrespectedinrelationtoothermeasuresofvastpublicimportance,andbymanydeemedofstillmorevitalinteresttothecountry,suchasthetarifflaws,andthenationalbankcharter?Cananymeasuresfurnishamoreinstructivelesson,oramoresalutaryadmonition,inthewholehistoryofparties,atoncetomoderateourzeal,andawakenourvigilance,thanthose,whichstanduponprinciplesrepudiatedatonetimeuponconstitutionalscruples,andsolemnlyadoptedatanothertime,tosubserveapresentgood,orfostertheparticularpolicyofanadministration?Whiletheprinciplesoftheconstitutionshouldbepreservedwithamostguardedcaution,andamostsacredregardtotherightsofthestates;itisatoncethedictateofwisdom,andenlightenedpatriotismtoavoidthatnarrownessofinterpretation,whichwoulddryupallitsvitalpowers,orcompelthegovernmentaswasdoneundertheconfederation,tobreakdownallconstitutionalbarriers,andtrustforitsvindicationtothepeople,uponthedangerouspoliticalmaxim,thatthesafetyofthepeopleisthesupremelaw,saluspopulisupremalex;amaxim,whichmightbeusedtojustifytheappointmentofadictator,oranyotherusurpation。10
  §;1288。Thereremainoneortwoothermeasuresofapoliticalnature,whoseconstitutionalityhasbeendenied;
  butwhich,beingofatransientcharacter,haveleftnopermanenttracesintheconstitutionaljurisprudenceofthecountry。ReferenceisheremadetotheAlienandSeditionlaws,passedin1798,bothofwhichwerelimitedtoashortduration,andexpiredbytheirownlimitation。11OnetheAlienactauthorizedthepresidenttoorderoutofthecountrysuchaliens,asheshoulddeemdangeroustothepeaceandsafetyoftheUnitedStates;orshouldhavereasonablegroundstosuspecttobeconcernedinanytreasonable,orsecretmachinationsagainstthegovernmentoftheUnitedStates,underseverepenaltiesfordisobedience。Theotherdeclareditapubliccrime,punishablewithfineandimprisonment,foranypersonsunlawfullytocombine,andconspiretogether,withintenttoopposeanymeasureormeasuresoftheUnitedStates,&;c。;orwithsuchintent,tocounsel,advise,orattempttoprocureanyinsurrection,unlawfulassembly,orcombination;ortowrite,print,utter,orpublish,orcause,orprocuretobewritten,&;c。,orwillinglytoassistinwriting,&;c。,anyfalse,scandalous,andmaliciouswritingorwritingsagainstthegovernmentoftheUnitedStates,oreitherhouseofcongress,orthepresident,withintenttodefamethem,ortobringthemintocontempt,ordisrepute,ortoexciteagainstthemthehatredofthepeople,ortostirupsedition;
  ortoexciteanyunlawfulcombinationforopposing,orresistinganylaw,oranylawfulactofthepresident,ortoresist,oppose,ordefeatanysuchlaworact;ortoaid,encourage,orabetanyhostiledesignsofanyforeignnationsagainsttheUnitedStates。Itprovided,however,thatthetruthofthewritingorlibelmightbegiveninevidence;andthatthejury,whotriedthecause,shouldhavearighttodeterminethelawandthefact,underthedirectionofthecourt,asinothercases。
  §;1289。Theconstitutionalityofboththeactswasassailedwithgreatearnestnessandabilityatthetime;andwasdefendedwithequalmasculinevigour。Thegroundoftheadvocates,infavouroftheselaws,was,thattheyresultedfromtherightanddutyinthegovernmentofself—preservation,andthelikedutyandprotectionofitsfunctionariesintheproperdischargeoftheirofficialduties。
  Theywereimpugned,asnotconformabletotheletterorspiritoftheconstitution;
  andasinconsistentintheirprincipleswiththerightsofcitizens,andthelibertyofthepress。TheAlienactwasdenounced,asexercisingapowernotdelegatedbytheconstitution;asunitinglegislativeandjudicialfunctions,withthatoftheexecutive;andbythisUnionassubvertingthegeneralprinciplesoffreegovernment,andtheparticularorganizationandpositiveprovisionsoftheconstitution。Itwasadded,thattheSeditionactwasopentothesameobjection,andwasexpresslyforbiddenbyoneoftheamendmentsoftheconstitution,onwhichtherewillbeoccasionhereaftertocomment。12Atpresentitdoesnotseemnecessarytopresentmorethanthisgeneraloutline,asthemeasuresarenotlikelytoberenewed;andasthedoctrines,onwhichtheyaremaintained,anddenounced,arenotmateriallydifferentfromthose,whichhavebeenalreadyconsidered。13
  1。Art。3。
  2。SeetheDebatesin1803,ontheLouisianaTreaty,printedbyT。&;G。PalmerinPhiladelphia,in1804,and4Elliot’sDebates257to260。——Theobjectionswerenottakenmerelybypersons,whowereatthattimeinoppositiontothenationaladministration。PresidentJeffersonhimselfunderwhoseauspicesthetreatywasmade,wasofopinion,thatthemeasurewasunconstitutional,andrequiredanamendmentoftheconstitutiontojustifyit。Heaccordinglyurgedhisfriendsstrenuouslytothatcourse;atthesametimeheadded,"thatitwillbedesirableforcongresstodowhatisnecessaryinsilence";"whatevercongressshallthinknecessarytodoshouldbedonewithaslittledebateaspossible,andparticularlysofarasrespectstheconstitutionaldifficulty。"
  "Iconfess,then,Ithinkitimportantinthepresentcase,tosetanexampleagainstbroadconstructionbyappealingfornewpowertothepeople。If,however,ourfriendsshallthinkdifferently,certainlyIshallacquiescewithsatisfaction;confiding,thatthegoodsenseofourcountrywillcorrecttheevilofconstruction,whenitshallproduceilleffects。"Whatalatitudeofinterpretationisthis!Theconstitutionmaybeover—leaped,andabroadconstructionadoptedforfavouritemeasures,andresistanceistobemadetosuchaconstructiononly,whenitshallproduceilleffects!HislettertoDr。SibleyinJune,1803}recentlypublishedisdecisive,thathethoughtanamendmentoftheconstitutionnecessary。Yethedidnothesitatewithoutsuchamendmenttogiveeffecttoeverymeasuretocarrythetreatyintoeffectduringhisadministration。See4Jefferson’sCorresp。p。It2,3,LettertoDr。Sibley,andMr。3。Q。Adams’sLettertoMr。SpeakerStevenson,July11,1832。
  3。Amer。Insur。Co。v。Canter,1Peters’sSup。R。511,542;Id。517,note,Mr。JusticeJohnson’sOpinion。
  4。Ibid。——InthecelebratedHartfordConvention,inJanuary,1815,apropositionwasmadetoamendtheconstitutionso,astoprohibittheadmissionofnewstatesintotheUnionwithouttheconsentoftwo—thirdsorbothhousesofcongress。IntheaccompanyingreportthereisastrongthoughindirectdenialofthepowertoadmitnewstateswithouttheoriginallimitsoftheUnitedStates。
  5。6Wait’sStatePapers,57。
  6。7Wait’sStatePapers,25,Mr。Madison’sLettertoMr。Pinkney;Gibbonsv。Ogden,9Wheat。R。191,192,193。
  7。Act,22dDecember,1807,ch。5。
  8。Inpointoffact,itremainedinforceuntilthe29thofJune,1809,beingrepealedbyanactpassedonthefirstofMarch,1809:totakeeffectattheendofthenextsessionofcongresswhichterminatedonthe28thofJune,1809。
  9。UnitedStatesv。TheBrigWilliam,2Hall’sLawJournal,255;1Kent’sComm。Lect。19,p。405;SergeantonConst。Law,ch。28,ch。30;Gibbonsv。Ogden,9Wheat。R。1,191
  to193。
  10。Mr。Jefferson,onmanyoccasions,wasnotslowtopropose,orjustifymeasuresofaverystrongcharacter;
  andsuchasproceededaltogetheruponthegroundofimpliedpowers。Thus,inwritingtoMr。Crawford,on20thofJune,1816,hedeliberatelyproposed,withaviewtoenableusinfuturetomeetanywar,toadopt"thereportofthethensecretaryofthewardepartment,forplacingtheforceofthenationateffectualcommand,"andto"ensureresourcesformoneybythesuppressionofallpapercirculationduringpeace,andlicensingthatofthenationaloneduringwar。"4Jefferson’sCorresp。285。Whencearethesevastpowersderived?Thelatterwouldamounttoadirectprohibitionofthecirculationofanybanknotesofthestatebanks;andinfactwouldamounttoasuppressionofthemosteffectivepowersofthestatebanks。
  11。Actof25thofJune,1798,ch。75;
  Actof14thofJuly,1798,ch。91;1Tuck。Black。Comm。App。part2,noteG,p。11to30。
  12。TheAlien,andSeditionActsweretheimmediatecauseoftheVirginiaResolutionsofDecember,1798,andoftheelaboratevindicationofthem,inthecelebratedReportofthe7thofJanuary,1800。Thelearnedreaderwilltherefindanampleexpositionofthewholeconstitutionalobjections。Seealso4Jefferson’sCorrespondence,93,27。ThereasoningontheothersidemaybefoundintheDebatesinCongress,atthetimeofthepassageoftheseacts。Itisgreatlytobelamented,thatthereisnoauthenticcollectionofalltheDebatesincongress,inaform,likethatoftheParliamentaryDebates。Seealso4Elliot’sDeb。251,252;DebatesontheJudiciary,in1802,Mr。Bayard’sSpeech,p。371,372;Addison’sChargestotheGrandJury,No。25,p。270;Id。No。
  26。p。289。ThesechargesarecommonlyboundwithAddison’sReports。Seealso1Tuck。Black。Comm。296to300;Id。Part2,App。note6,p。11to36;ReportofCommitteeofHouseofRepresentativesofcongress,25thFebruary,1799,andResolveofKentucky,of1798,andResolveofMassachusetts,of9thand13thofFebruary,1799,onthesamesubject。