§；1169。Thepower，todeclarewarmaybeexercisedbycongress，notonlybyauthorizinggeneralhostilities，inwhichcasethegenerallawsofwarapplytooursituation；orbypartialhostilities，inwhichcasethelawsofwar，sofarastheyactuallyapplytooursituation，aretobeobserved。12TheformercoursewasresortedtoinourwarwithGreatBritainin1812，inwhichcongressenacted，"thatwarbe，andherebyisdeclaredtoexist，betweentheUnitedKingdomofGreatBritainandIrelandandthedependenciesthereof，andtheUnitedStatesofAmericaandtheirterritories。"13Thelattercoursewaspursuedinthequalifiedwarof1798withFrance，whichwas—regulatedbydiversactsofcongress，andofcoursewasconfinedtothelimitsprescribedbythoseacts。14
　　§；1170。Thepowertodeclarewarwouldofitselfcarrytheincidentalpowertograntlettersofmarqueandreprisal，andmakerulesconcerningcaptures。Itismostprobable，thatanextremesolicitudetofollowoutthepowersenumeratedintheconfederationoccasionedtheintroductionoftheseclausesintotheConstitution。Intheformerinstrument，whereallpowers，notexpresslydelegated，wereprohibited，thisenumerationwaspeculiarlyappropriate。Butinthelatter，whereincidentalpowerswereexpresslycontemplated，andprovidedfor，thesamenecessitydidnotexist。Ashasbeenalreadyremarkedinanotherplace，andwillabundantlyappearfromtheremainingauxiliaryclausestothepowertodeclarewar，theconstitutionaboundswithpleonasmsandrepetitions，sometimesintroducedfromcaution，sometimesfrominattention，andsometimesfromtheimperfectionsoflanguage。15
　　§；1171。Buttheexpresspower"tograntlettersofmarqueandreprisal"maynothavebeenthoughtwhollyunnecessary，becauseitisoftenameasureofpeace，topreventthenecessityofaresorttowar。Thus，individualsofanationsometimessufferfromthedepredationsofforeignpotentates；andyetitmaynotbedeemedeitherexpedientornecessarytoredresssuchgrievancesbyageneraldeclarationofwar。Undersuchcircumstancesthelawofnationsauthorizesthesovereignoftheinjuredindividualtogranthimthismodeofredress，wheneverjusticeisdeniedtohimbythestate，towhichtheparty，whohasdonetheinjury，belongs。
　　Inthiscasethelettersofmarqueandreprisalwordsusedassynonymous，thelatterreprisalsignifying，atakinginreturn，theformerlettersofmarquethepassingthefrontiersinordertosuchtaking，containanauthoritytoseizethebodiesorgoodsofthesubjectsoftheoffendingstate，wherevertheymaybefound，untilsatisfactionismadefortheinjury。16Thispowerofreprisalseemsindeedtobeadictatealmostofnatureitself，andisnearlyrelatedto，andplainlyderivedfromthatofmakingwar。Itisonlyanincompletestateofhostilities，andoftenultimatelyleadstoaformaldenunciationofwar，iftheinjuryisunredressed，orextensiveinitsoperations。17
　　§；1172。Thepowertodeclarewarisexclusiveincongress；andaswillbehereafterseen，thestatesareprohibitedfromengaginginit，unlessincasesofactualinvasionorimminentdangerthereof。Itincludestheexerciseofalltheordinaryrightsofbelligerents；
　　andcongressmaythereforepasssuitablelawstoenforcethem。Theymayauthorizetheseizureandcondemnationofthepropertyoftheenemywithin，orwithouttheterritoryoftheUnitedStates；andtheconfiscationofdebtsduetotheenemy。But，untillawshavebeenpasseduponthesesubjects，noprivatecitizenscanenforceanysuchrights；andthejudiciaryisincapableofgivingthemanylegitimateoperation。18
　　§；1173。Thenextpowerofcongressis，"toraiseandsupportarmies；butnoappropriationofmoneytothatuseshallbeforalongertermthantwoyears。"
　　§；1174。Thepowertoraisearmiesisanindispensableincidenttothepowertodeclarewar；andthelatterwouldbeliterallybrutumfulmenwithouttheformer，ameansofmischiefwithoutapowerofdefence。19Undertheconfederationcongresspossessednopowerwhatsoevertoraisearmies；
　　butonly"toagreeuponthenumberoflandforces，andtomakerequisitionsfromeachstateforitsquota，inproportiontothenumberofwhiteinhabitantsinsuchstate；"whichrequisitionsweretobebinding；andthereuponthelegislatureofeachstateweretoappointtheregimentalofficers，raisethemen，andclothe，arm，andequiptheminasoldier—likemanner，attheexpenseoftheUnitedStates。20Theexperienceofthewholecountry，duringtherevolutionarywar，established，tothesatisfactionofeverystatesman，theutterinadequacyandimproprietyofthissystemofrequisition。Itwasequallyatwarwitheconomy，efficiency，andsafety。21Itgavebirthtoacompetitionbetweenthestates，whichcreatedakindofauctionofmen。
　　Inordertofurnishthequotasrequiredofthem，theyoutbideachother，tillbountiesgrewtoanenormousandinsupportablesize。Onthisaccountmanypersonsprocrastinatedtheirenlistment，orenlistedonlyforshortperiods。Hence，therewerebutslowandscantyleviesofmeninthemostcriticalemergenciesofouraffairs；shortenlistmentsatanunparalleledexpense；andcontinualfluctuationsinthetroops，ruinoustotheirdiscipline，andsubjectingthepublicsafetyfrequentlytotheperilouscrisisofadisbandedarmy。Hencealsoarosethoseoppressiveexpedientsforraisingmen，whichwereoccasionallypractised，andwhichnothing，buttheenthusiasmofliberty，couldhaveinducedthepeopletoendure。22Theburthenwasalsoveryunequallydistributed。Thestatesneartheseatofwar，influencedbymotivesofself—preservation，madeeffortstofurnishtheirquotas，whichevenexceededtheirabilities；whilethoseatadistancewereexceedinglyremissintheirexertions。Inshort，thearmywasfrequentlycomposedofthreebodiesofmen；first，rawrecruits；secondly，persons，whowerejustaboutcompletingtheirtermofservice；andthirdly，ofpersons，whohadservedouthalftheirterm，andwerequietlywaitingforitsdetermination。
　　Undersuchcircumstances，thewonderisnot，thatitsmilitaryoperationsweretardy，irregular，andoftenunsuccessful；but，thatitwaseverabletomakehead—wayatallagainstanenemy，possessingafineestablishment，wellappointed，wellarmed，wellclothed，andwellpaid。23Theappointment，too，bythestates，ofallregimentalofficers，hadatendencytodestroyallharmonyandsubordination，sonecessarytothesuccessofmilitarylife。
　　§；1175。Thereisgreatwisdomandproprietyinrelievingthegovernmentfromtheponderousandunwieldymachineryoftherequisitionsandappointmentsundertheconfederation。ThepresentsystemoftheUnionisgeneralanddirect，andcapableofauniformorganizationandaction。Itisessentialtothecommondefence，thatthenationalgovernmentshouldpossessthepowertoraisearmies；buildandequipfleets；prescriberulesforthegovernmentofboth；directtheiroperations；andprovidefortheirsupport。24
　　§；1176。Theclause，asoriginallyreported，was"toraisearmies；"andsubsequentlyitwas，uponthereportofacommittee，amended，soastostandinitspresentform；andasamendeditseemstohaveencounterednooppositionintheconvention。25Itwas，however，afterwardsassailedinthestateconventions，andbeforethepeople，withincrediblezealandpertinacity，asdangeroustoliberty，andsubversiveofthestategovernments。Objectionsweremadeagainstthegeneralandindefinitepowertoraisearmies，notlimitingthenumberoftroops；andtothemaintenanceoftheminpeace，aswellasinwar。
　　§；1177。Itwassaid，thatcongress，havinganunlimitedpowertoraiseandsupportarmies，might，ifintheiropinionthegeneralwelfarerequiredit，keeplargearmiesconstantlyonfoot，andthusexhausttheresourcesoftheUnitedStates。Thereisnocontroloncongress，astonumbers，stations，orgovernmentofthem。Theymaybilletthemonthepeopleatpleasure。Suchanunlimitedauthorityismostdangerous，andinitsprinciplesdespotic；forbeingunbounded，itmustleadtodespotism。
　　Weshall，therefore，liveunderagovernmentofmilitaryforce。26Inrespecttotimesofpeace，itwassuggested，thatthereisnonecessityforhavingastandingarmy，whichhadalwaysbeenheld，undersuchcircumstances，tobefataltothepublicrightsandpoliticalfreedom。27
　　§；1178。Tothesesuggestionsitwasreplied，withequalforceandtruth，thattobeofanyvalue，thepowermustbeunlimited。Itisimpossibletoforesee，ordefinetheextentandvarietyofnationalexigencies，andthecorrespondentextentandvarietyofthenationalmeansnecessarytosatisfythem。Thepowermustbeco—extensivewithallpossiblecombinationsofcircumstances，andunderthedirectionofthecouncilsentrustedwiththecommondefence。Todenythiswouldbetodenythemeans，andyetrequiretheend。Thesemust，therefore，beunlimitedineverymatteressentialtoitsefficacy，thatis，intheformation，direction，andsupportofthenationalforces。28Thiswasnotdoubtedundertheconfederation；thoughthemodeadoptedtocarryitintoeffectwasutterlyinadequateandillusory。29Therecouldbenorealdangerfromtheexerciseofthepower。Itwasnothere，asinEngland，wheretheexecutivepossessedthepowertoraisearmiesatpleasure；whichpower，sofarasrespectedstandingarmiesintimeofpeace，itbecamenecessarytoprovidebythebillofrights，in1688，shouldnotbeexercisedwithouttheconsentofparliament。30Herethepowerisexclusivelyconfinedtothelegislativebody，totherepresentativesofthestates，andofthepeopleofthestates。Andtosupposeitwillnotbesafeintheirhands，istosuppose，thatnopowersofgovernment，adaptedtonationalexigencies，caneverbesafeinanypoliticalbody。31Besides，thepowerislimitedbythenecessityaswillbeseenofbiennialappropriations。32Theobjection，too，isthemorestrange，becausetherearebuttwoconstitutionsofthethirteenstates，whichattemptinanymannertolimitthepower；andthesearerathercautionsfortimesofpeace，thanprohibitions。33Theconfederationitselfcontainsnoprohibitionorlimitationofthepower。34Indeed，inregardtotimesofwar，itseemsutterlypreposteroustoimposeanylimitationsuponthepower；
　　sinceitisobvious，thatemergenciesmayarise，whichwouldrequirethemostvarious，andindependentexercisesofit。Thecountrywouldotherwisebeindangeroflosingbothitslibertyanditssovereignty，fromitsdreadofinvestingthepubliccouncilswiththepowerofdefendingit。Itwouldbemorewillingtosubmittoforeignconquest，thantodomesticrule。
　　§；1179。Butintimesofpeacethepowermaybeatleastequallyimportant，thoughnotsooftenrequiredtobeputinfullexercise。TheUnitedStatesaresurroundedbythecoloniesanddependenciesofpotentforeigngovernments，whosemaritimepowermayfurnishthemwiththemeansofannoyance，andmischief，andinvasion。Toguardourselvesagainstevilsofthissort，itisindispensableforustohaveproperfortsandgarrisons，stationedattheweakpoints，tooveraweorcheckincursions。Besides；itwillbeequallyimportanttoprotectourfrontiersagainsttheIndians，andkeeptheminastateofduesubmissionandcontrol。35Thegarrisonscanbefurnishedonlybyoccasionaldetachmentsofmilitia，orbyregulartroopsinthepayofthegovernment。Thefirstwouldbeimpracticable，orextremelyinconvenient，ifnotpositivelypernicious。Themilitiawouldnot，intimesofprofoundpeace，submittobedraggedfromtheiroccupationsandfamiliestoperformsuchadisagreeableduty。Andiftheywould，theincreasedexpensesofafrequentrotationintheservice；thelossoftimeandlabour；andthebreakingupoftheordinaryemploymentsoflife；wouldmakeitanextremelyineligibleschemeofmilitarypower。Thetrueandproperrecourseshould，therefore，betoapermanent，butsmallstandingarmyforsuchpurposes。36Anditwouldonlybe，whenourneighboursshouldgreatlyincreasetheirmilitaryforce，thatprudenceandadueregardtoourownsafetywouldrequireanyaugmentationofourown。37Itwouldbewhollyunjustifiabletothrowuponthestatesthedefenceoftheirownfrontiers，eitheragainsttheIndians，oragainstforeignfoes。Theburthenwouldoftenbedisproportionatetotheirmeans，andthebenefitwouldoftenbelargelysharedbytheneighbouringstates。Thecommondefenceshouldbeprovidedforoutofthecommontreasury。
　　Theexistenceofafederalgovernment，andatthesametimeofmilitaryestablishmentsunderstateauthority，arenotlessatvariancewitheachother，thanaduesupplyofthefederaltreasury，andthesystemofquotasandrequisitions。38
　　§；1180。Itisimportantalsotoconsider，thatthesurestmeansofavoidingwaristobepreparedforitinpeace。
　　IfaprohibitionshouldbeimposedupontheUnitedStatesagainstraisingarmiesintimeofpeace，itwouldpresenttheextraordinaryspectacletotheworldofanationincapacitatedbyaconstitutionofitsownchoicefrompreparingfordefencebeforeanactualinvasion。Asformaldenunciationsofwarareinmoderntimesoftenneglected，andarenevernecessary，thepresenceofanenemywithinourterritorieswouldberequired，beforethegovernmentwouldbewarrantedtobeginleviesofmenfortheprotectionofthestate。Theblowmustbereceived，beforeanyattemptscouldbemadetowarditoff，ortoreturnit。Suchacourseofconductwouldatalltimesinviteaggressionandinsult；andenableaformidablerivalorsecretenemytoseizeuponthecountry，asadefenselessprey；ortodrainitsresourcesbyalevyofcontributions，atonceirresistibleandruinous。39Itwouldbeinvaintolooktothemilitiaforanadequatedefenceundersuchcircumstances。Thisreliancecameverynearlosingusourindependence，andwastheoccasionoftheuselessexpenditureofmanymillions。Thehistoryofothercountries，andourpastexperience，admonishus，thataregularforce，welldisciplinedandwellsupplied，isthecheapest，andtheonlyeffectualmeansofresistingtheinroadsofawelldisciplinedforeignarmy。40Inshort，undersuchcircumstancestheconstitutionmustbeeitherviolated，asitinfactwasbythestatesundertheconfederation，41
　　orourlibertiesmustbeplacedinextremejeopardy。Toomuchprecautionoftenleadstoasmanydifficulties，astoomuchconfidence。Howcouldareadinessforwarintimeofpeacebesafelyprohibited，unlesswecouldinlikemannerprohibitthepreparationsandestablishmentsofeveryhostilenation？Themeansofsecuritycanbeonlyregulatedbythemeansandthedangerofattack。Theywill，infact，everbedeterminedbytheserules，andnoother。Itwillbeinvaintoopposeconstitutionalbarrierstotheimpulseofself—preservation。42
　　§；1181。Butthedangersfromabroadarenotalonethose，whicharetobeguardedagainstinthestructureofthenationalgovernment。Casesmayoccur，andindeedarecontemplatedbytheconstitutionitselftooccur，inwhichmilitaryforcemaybeindispensabletoenforcethelaws，ortosuppressdomesticinsurrections。Wheretheresistanceisconfinedtoafewinsurgents，thesuppressionmaybeordinarily，andsafelyconfidedtothemilitia。Butwhereitisextensive，andespeciallyifitshouldpervadeone，ormorestates，itmaybecomeimportantandevennecessarytoemployregulartroops，asatoncethemosteffective，andthemosteconomicalforce。43Withoutthepowertoemploysuchaforceintimeofpeacefordomesticpurposes，itisplain，thatthegovernmentmightbeindangerofbeingoverthrownbythecombinationsofasinglefaction。44
　　§；1182。Thedangerofanundueexerciseofthepowerispurelyimaginary。Itcanneverbeexerted，butbytherepresentativesofthepeopleofthestates；anditmustbesafethere，ortherecanbenosafetyatallinanyrepublicanformofgovernment。45Ournotions，indeed，ofthedangersofstandingarmiesintimeofpeace，arederivedinagreatmeasurefromtheprinciplesandexamplesofourEnglishancestors。InEngland，thekingpossessedthepowerofraisingarmiesinthetimeofpeaceaccordingtohisowngoodpleasure。Andthisprerogativewasjustlyesteemeddangeroustothepublicliberties。Upontherevolutionof1688，parliamentwiselyinsisteduponabillofrights，whichshouldfurnishanadequatesecurityforthefuture。Buthowwasthisdone？Notbyprohibitingstandingarmiesaltogetherintimeofpeace；butashasbeenalreadyseenbyprohibitingthemwithouttheconsentofparliament。46Thisistheverypropositioncontainedintheconstitution；forcongresscanaloneraisearmies；andmayputthemdown，whenevertheychoose。
　　§；1183。Itmayheadmitted，thatstandingarmiesmayprovedangeroustothestate。Butitisequallytrue，thatthewantofthemmayalsoprovedangeroustothestate。Whatthenistobedone？Thetruecourseistochecktheundueexerciseofthepower，nottowithholdit。47Thistheconstitutionhasattemptedtodobyproviding，that"noappropriationofmoneytothatuseshallbeforalongertermthantwoyears。"Thus，unlessthenecessarysuppliesarevotedbytherepresentativesofthepeopleeverytwoyears，thewholeestablishmentmustfall。Congressmayindeed，byanactforthispurpose，disbandastandingarmyatanytime；orvotethesuppliesonlyforoneyear，orforashorterperiod。Buttheconstitutionisimperative，thatnoappropriationshallprospectivelyreachbeyondthebiennialperiod。
　　Sothattherewouldseemtobeeveryhumansecurityagainstthepossibleabuseofthepower。48
　　§；1184。But，hereagainitwasobjected，thattheexecutivemightkeepupastandingarmyintimeofpeace，notwithstandingnosuppliesshouldbevoted。Buthowcanthispossiblybedone？Thearmycannotgowithoutsupplies；itmaybedisbandedatthepleasureofthelegislature；anditwouldbeabsolutelyimpossibleforanypresident，againstthewillofthenation，tokeepupastandingarmyinterrorempopuli。49
　　§；1185。Itwasalsoasked，whyanappropriationshouldnotbeannuallymade，insteadofbiennially，asisthecaseintheBritishparliament。50Theansweris，thatcongressmayintheirpleasurelimittheappropriationtoasingleyear；butexigenciesmayarise，inwhich，withaviewtotheadvantagesofthepublicserviceandthepressureofwar，abiennialappropriationmightbefarmoreexpedient，ifnotabsolutelyindispensable。Casesmaybesupposed，inwhichitmightbeimpracticableforcongress，inconsequenceofpubliccalamities，tomeetannuallyforthedespatchofbusiness。ButthesupposedexampleoftheBritishparliamentprovesnothing。Thatbodyisnotrestrainedbyanyconstitutionalprovisionfromvotingsuppliesforastandingarmyforanunlimitedperiod。Itisthemerepracticeofparliament，intheexerciseofitsowndiscretion，tomakeanannualvoteofsupplies。Surely，ifthereisnodangerinconfidinganunlimitedpowerofthisnaturetoabodychosenforsevenyears，therecanbenoneinconfidingalimitedpowertoanAmericancongress，chosenfortwoyears。51
　　§；1186。Insomeofthestateconventionsanamendmentwasproposed，requiring，thatnostandingarmy，orregularforcesbekeptupintimeofpeace，exceptforthenecessaryprotectionanddefenceofforts，arsenals，anddockyards，withouttheconsentoftwothirdsofbothhousesofcongress。52Butitwassilentlysufferedtodieawaywiththejealousiesoftheday。
　　Thepracticalcourseofthegovernmentonthisheadhasallayedallfearsofthepeople，andfullyjustifiedtheopinionsofthefriendsoftheconstitution。
　　Itisremarkable，thatscarcelyanypowerofthenationalgovernmentwasatthetimemorestronglyassailedbyappealstopopularprejudices，orvindicatedwithmorefullandmasculinediscussion。TheFederalistgaveitamostelaboratediscussion，asoneofthecriticalpointsoftheconstitution。53Inthepresenttimesthesubjectattractsnonotice，andwouldscarcelyfurnishatopic，evenforpopulardeclamation。Eversincetheconstitutionwasputintooperation，congresshaverestrainedtheirappropriationstothecurrentyear；andthuspracticallyshownthevisionarynatureoftheseobjections。
　　§；1187。Congressin1798，inexpectationofawarwithFrance，authorizedthepresidenttoaccepttheservicesofanycompaniesofvolunteers，whoshouldassociatethemselvesfortheservice，andshouldbearmed，clothed，andequippedattheirownexpense，andtocommissiontheirofficers。54Thisexerciseofpowerwascomplainedofatthetime，asavirtualinfringementoftheconstitutionalauthorityofthestatesinregardtothemilitia；
　　and，assuch，itmetwiththedisapprobationofalearnedcommentator。55Hisopiniondoesnot，however，seemsincetohavereceivedthedeliberateassentofthenation。DuringthelatewarwithGreatBritain，lawswererepeatedlypassed，authorizingtheacceptanceofvolunteercorpsofthemilitiaundertheirownofficers；
　　andeventually，thepresidentwasauthorized，withtheconsentofthesenate，tocommissionofficersforsuchvolunteercorps。Theselawsexhibitthedecidedchangeofthepublicopiniononthissubject；andtheydeservemoreattention，sincethemeasureswerepromotedandapprovedundertheauspicesoftheveryparty，whichhadinculcatedanoppositeopinion。56Itispropertoremark，thattheFederalistmaintained，thatthediscipliningandeffectiveorganizationorthewholemilitiawouldbeimpracticable；
　　thattheattentionorthegovernmentoughtparticularlytobedirectedtotheformationoraselectcorpsofmoderatesize，uponsuchprinciples，aswouldreallyfitthemforserviceincaseorneed；andthatsuchselectcorpswouldconstitutethebestsubstituteforalargestandingarmy，andthemostformidablecheckuponanyunduemilitarypowers；sinceitwouldbecomposedorcitizenswelldisciplined，andwellinstructedintheirrightsandduties。57
　　§；1188。Thenextpowerorcongressis"toprovideandmaintainanavy。"
　　§；1189。Undertheconfederationcongresspossessedthepower"tobuildandequipanavy。"58Thesamelanguagewasadoptedintheoriginaldraftoftheconstitution；
　　anditwasamendedbysubstitutingthepresentwords，apparentlywithoutobjection，asmorebroadandappropriate。59Intheconvention，theproprietyorgrantingthepowerseemsnottohavebeenquestioned。Butitwasassailedinthestateconventionsasdangerous。
　　Itwassaid，thatcommerceandnavigationaretheprincipalsourcesorthewealthorthemaritimepowersorEurope；andifweengagedincommerce，weshouldsoonbecometheirrivals。Anavywouldsoonbethoughtindispensabletoprotectit。Buttheattemptonourparttoprovideanavywouldprovokethesepowers，whowouldnotsufferustobecomeanavalpower。Thus，weshouldbeimmediatelyinvolvedinwarswiththem。Theexpenses，too，ofmaintainingasuitablenavywouldbeenormous；andwhollydisproportionatetoourresources。Ifanavyshouldbeprovidedatall，itoughttobelimitedtothemereprotectionofourtrade。60Itwasfurtherurged，thattheSouthernstateswouldsharealargeportionoftheburthensofmaintaininganavy，withoutanycorrespondingadvantages。61
　　§；1190。Withthenationatlargetheseobjectionswerenotdeemedofanyvalidity。Thenecessityofanavyfortheprotectionofcommerceandnavigationwasnotonlyadmitted，butmadeastronggroundforthegrantofthepower。Oneofthegreatobjectsoftheconstitutionwastheencouragementandprotectionofnavigationandtrade。Withoutanavy，itwouldbeutterlyimpossibletomaintainourrighttothefisheries，andourtradeandnavigationonthelakes，andtheMississippi，aswellasourforeigncommerce。ItwasoneoftheblessingsoftheUnion，thatitwouldbeabletoprovideanadequatesupportandprotectionforalltheseimportantobjects。Besides；anavywouldbeabsolutelyindispensabletoprotectourwholeAtlanticfrontier，incaseofawarwithaforeignmaritimepower。Weshouldotherwisebeliable，notonlytotheinvasionofstrongregularforcesoftheenemy；buttotheattacksandincursionsofeverypredatoryadventurer。Ourmaritimetownsmightallbeputundercontribution；andeventheentranceanddeparturefromourownportsbeinterdictedatthecaprice，orthehostilityofaforeignpower。Itwouldalsobeourcheapest，aswellasourbestdefence；asitwouldsaveustheexpenseofnumerousfortsandgarrisonsupontheseacoast，which，thoughnoteffectualforall，wouldstillberequiredforsomepurposes。Inshort，inamaritimewarfarewithoutthismeansofdefence，ourcommercewouldbedrivenfromtheocean，ourportswouldbeblockaded，oursea—coastinfestedwithplunderers，andourvitalinterestsputathazard。62
　　§；1191。Althoughtheseconsiderationsweredecisivewiththepeopleatlargeinfavourofthepower，fromitspalpablenecessityandimportancetoallthegreatinterestsofthecountry，itiswithinthememoryofallofus，thatthesameobjectionsforalongtimeprevailedwithaleadingpartyinthecountry，63andnurturedapolicy，whichwasutterlyatvariancewithourduties，aswellasourhonour。ItwasnotuntilduringthelatewarwithGreatBritain，whenourlittlenavy，byagallantryandbrilliancyofachievementalmostwithoutparallel，hadliterallyfoughtitselfintofavour，thatthenationatlargebegantoawakefromitslethargyonthissubject，andtoinsistuponapolicy，whichshouldatoncemakeusrespectedandformidableabroad，andsecureprotectionandhonourathome。64IthasbeenproudlysaidbyalearnedcommentatoronthelawsofEngland，thattheroyalnavyofEnglandhatheverbeenitsgreatestdefenceandornament。Itisitsancientandnaturalstrength；thefloatingbulwarkoftheisland；anarmy，fromwhich，howeverstrongandpowerful，nodangercanbeapprehendedtoliberty。65EveryAmericancitizenoughttocherishthesamesentiment，asapplicabletothenavyofhisowncountry。
　　§；1192。Thenextpowerofcongressis"tomakerulesforthegovernmentandregulationofthelandandnavalforces。"Thisisanaturalincidenttotheprecedingpowerstomakewar，toraisearmies，andtoprovideandmaintainanavy。Itspropriety，therefore，scarcelycouldbe，andneverhasbeendenied，andneednotnowbeinsistedon。Theclausewasnotintheoriginaldraftoftheconstitution；butwasaddedwithoutobjectionbywayofamendment。66Itwaswithoutquestionborrowedfromacorrespondingclauseinthearticlesofconfederation，67whereitwaswithmoreproprietygiven，becausetherewasaprohibitionofallimpliedpowers。InGreatBritain，theking，inhiscapacityofgeneralissimoofthewholekingdom，hasthesolepowerofregulatingfleetsandarmies。68Butparliamenthasrepeatedlyinterposed；
　　andtheregulationofbothisnowinaconsiderablemeasureprovidedforbyactsofparliament。69Thewholepowerisfarmoresafeinthehandsofcongress，thanoftheexecutive；
　　sinceotherwisethemostsummaryandseverepunishmentsmightbeinflictedatthemerewilloftheexecutive。
　　§；1193。ItisanaturalresultofthesovereigntyoverthenavyoftheUnitedStates，thatitshouldbeexclusive。
　　Whatevercrimes，therefore，arecommittedonboardofpublic，shipsofwaroftheUnitedStates，whethertheyareinportoratsea，theyareexclusivelycognizableandpunishablebythegovernmentoftheUnitedStates。
　　Thepublicshipsofsovereigns，wherevertheymaybe，aredeemedtobeextraterritorial，andenjoytheimmunitiesfromthelocaljurisdictionbelongingtotheirsovereign。70
　　1。Art。9；TheFederalist，No。41。
　　2。SeeTheFederalist，No。23，41。
　　3。1Tucker’sBlack。Comm。App。271。
　　4。1Black。Comm。257，258。
　　5。Mr。Hamilton’sPlan，JournalofConvention，p。131。
　　6。Severalofthestatesproposedanamendmenttotheconstitutiontothiseffect。Butitwasneveradoptedbyamajority。7Undertheconfederation，theassentofninestateswasnecessarytoadeclarationofwar，Art。
　　9。
　　7。1Tucker’sBlack。Comm。App。271，272，374。
　　8。1Tucker’sBlack。Comm。App。269
　　to272；RawleontheConst。ch。9，p。109。
　　9。JournalofConvention，221，258，259，327，328。
　　10。Ibid，259。
　　11。TheFederalist，No。64。SeealsoRawleontheConst。ch。9，p。110；NorthAmer；Rev。Oct。1827，p。263。
　　12。Talbotv。Seeman，1Cranch’sR。1，28；Basv。Tingey，4Dall。37。
　　13。Actof1812，ch。102。
　　14。RawleontheConst。ch。9，p。109；
　　SergeantonConst。ch。28，[ch。30；]Basv。Tingey，4Dall。R。37。
　　15。SeeMr。Madison’sLettertoMr。
　　Cabell。，18thSept。1828。
　　16。1Black。Comm。258，259。
　　17。1Black：Comm。258，259；BynkershoekonWar，ch。24，p。182，byDuponceau；ValinTraitedesPrises，p。223，321；1Tuck。Black。Comm。App。271；4Elliot’sDeb。251。
　　18。Brownv。UnitedStates，8
　　Cranch’sR。1。
　　19。4Elliot’sDeb。220，221。
　　20。Art。9；Art。7。
　　21。1AmericanMuseum，270，273，283；
　　5Marshall’sLifeofWashington，App。note1。
　　22。TheFederalist，No。22，23。？ThedifficultiesconnectedwiththissubjectwillappearstillmorestrikinginapracticalviewfromthelettersofGeneralWashington，andotherpublicdocumentsattheperiod。See5Marshall’sLifeofWashington，ch。3，p。
　　125，126；ch。5，p。212to220；ch。6，p。238to248。See6JournalsofCongressin1780passim。CircularLetterofCongress，inMay，1779；5Jour。
　　ofCong。224to231。
　　23。TheFederalist，No。22，23。
　　24。TheFederalist，No。23；2Elliot’sDebates，92，91。
　　25。JournalofConvention，221，327，328。
　　26。2Elliot’sDebates，285，286，307，308，430。
　　27。2Elliot’sDebates，307，308，430。
　　28。TheFederalist，No。23；2Elliot’sDebates，92，93，438。
　　29。2Elliot’sDebates，438。
　　30。1Black。Comm。262，413。
　　31。TheFederalist，No。23，26。
　　32。TheFederalist，No。24，25。
　　33。TheFederalist，No。24，andnote；
　　Id。No。26。
　　34。TheFederalist，No。24；2Elliot’sDebates，438。
　　35。TheFederalist，No。24，25；2Elliot’sDebates，292，293。
　　36。TheFederalist，No。24；2Elliot’sDebates，292，293。
　　37。TheFederalist，No。24，41。
　　38。Id。No。25。
　　39。TheFederalist，No。25；2Elliot’sDebates，92，93。
　　40。TheFederalist，No。25，41。
　　41。Id。25。
　　42。TheFederalist，No。41；3Elliot’sDebates，305。
　　43。TheFederalist，No。28，26。
　　44。2Elliot’sDebates，92，93。
　　45。3TheFederalist，No。98，26，98。
　　46。TheFederalist，No。26；1Black。
　　Comm。413。
　　47。TheFederalist，No。41；2Elliot’sDebates，93，308，309。
　　48。TheFederalist，No。26，41。
　　49。TheFederalist，No。26。
　　50。1Tucker’sBlack。Comm，App。272；
　　1Black。Comm。414，415。
　　51。TheFederalist，No。41。
　　52。1Tucker’sBlack。Comm。App。271，272，379。？Anattemptwasalsomadeintheconvention，toinsertaclause，limitingthenumberofthearmyintimeofpeacetoa？number；butitwasnegatived。JournalofConvention，p。262。
　　53。TheFederalist，No。24to29。
　　54。Actof28thofMay，1798，ch。64；
　　Actof22dofJune，1798，ch。74；Actof2dofMarch，1799，ch。187。
　　55。1Tucker’sBlack。Comm。App。273，274，329，330。SeealsoVirginiaReportandResolutions，9thofJanuary，1800，p。53to56。
　　56。SeeActof8thofFeb。1812，ch。
　　22；Actof6thofJuly，1812，ch。538；Actof24thofFeb。1814，ch。75；
　　Actof30thofMarch，1814，ch。96；Actof27thofJan。1815，ch。178。
　　SeealsoActof24thofFeb。1807，ch。70。
　　57。TheFederalist，No。29。
　　58。Art。9。
　　59。Journ。ofConvention，221，262。
　　60。2Elliot’sDeb。224，319，320。
　　61。2Elliot’sDeb。319，320。
　　62。TheFederalist，No。11，24，41。
　　Seealso1Tucker’sBlack。Comm。App。272。
　　63。See5Marshall’sLifeofWashington，ch。7，p。523to531。
　　64。Lestitshouldbesupposed，thattheseremarksarenotwellfounded，thefollowingpassageisextractedfromthecelebratedReportandResolutionsoftheVirginialegislature，of7thand11thJan。1800，whichformedthetext—bookofmanypoliticalopinionsforalongperiod。"Withrespecttothenavy，itmaybepropertoremindyou，thatwhatevermaybetheproposedobjectofitsestablishment，orwhatevertheprospectoftemporaryadvantagesresultingtherefrom，itisdemonstrated。bytheexperienceofallnations，whohaveadventuredfarintonavalpolicy，thatsuchprospectisultimatelydelusive；andthatanavyhaseverinpracticebeenknownmoreasaninstrumentofpower，asourceofexpense，andanoccasionofcollisionsandwarswithothernations，thanasaninstrumentofdefence，ofeconomy，orofprotectiontocommerce。Noristhereanynation，inthejudgmentofthegeneralassembly，towhosecircumstancesthisremarkismoreapplicable，thantotheUnitedStates。"p。57，58。Andthesenatorsandrepresentativeswereinstructedandrequestedbyoneoftheresolutions"topreventanyaugmentationofthenavy，andtopromoteanypropositionforreducingit，ascircumstanceswillpermit，withinthenarrowestlimitscompatiblewiththeprotectionofthesea—coasts，ports，andharboursoftheUnitedStates。"p。59。
　　65。1Black。Comm。418。
　　66。JournalofConvention，p。221，262。
　　67。Art。9。
　　68。1Black。Comm。262，421。
　　69。1Black。Comm。413，414，415，420，421。
　　70。SeeUnitedStatesv。Bevans，3Wheaton’sR。336，390。TheSchr。Exchange，7Cranch’sR。116。
　　JosephStory：CommentariesontheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates：
　　Book3Chapter22CHAPTERXXII。POWEROVERTHEMILITIA。§；1194。THEnextpowerofcongressis"toprovideforcallingforththemilitiatoexecutethelawsoftheUnion，suppressinsurrections，andrepelinvasions。"
　　§；1195。Thisclauseseems，afteraslightamendment，tohavepassedtheconventionwithoutopposition。1Itcuredadefectseverelyfeltundertheconfederation，whichcontainednoprovisiononthesubject。
　　§；1196。Thepowerofregulatingthemilitia，andofcommandingitsservicestoenforcethelaws，andtosuppressinsurrections，andrepelinvasions，isanaturalincidenttothedutyofsuperintendingthecommondefence，andpreservingtheinternalpeaceofthenation。Inshort，everyargument，whichisurged，orcanbeurgedagainststandingarmiesintimeofpeace，appliesforciblytotheproprietyofvestingthispowerinthenationalgovernment。Thereisbutoneoftwoalternatives，whichcanberesortedtoincasesofinsurrection，invasion，orviolentoppositiontothelaws；eithertoemployregulartroops，ortoemploythemilitiatosuppressthem。Inordinarycases，indeed，theresistancetothelawsmaybeputdownbythepossecomitatus，ortheassistanceofthecommonmagistracy。Butcasesmayoccur，inwhichsucharesortwouldbeutterlyvain，andevenmischievous；sinceitmightencouragethefactioustomorerashmeasures，andpreventtheapplicationofaforce，whichwouldatoncedestroythehopes，andcrushtheeffortsofthedisaffected。Thegeneralpowerofthegovernmenttopassalllawsnecessaryandpropertoexecuteitsdeclaredpowers，woulddoubtlessauthorizelawstocallforththepossecomitatus，andemploythecommonmagistracy，incases，wheresuchmeasureswouldsuittheemergency。2Butifthemilitiacouldnotbecalledinaid，itwouldbeabsolutelyindispensabletothecommonsafetytokeepupastrongregularforceintimeofpeace。3Thelatterwouldcertainlynotbedesirable，oreconomical；andthereforethispoweroverthemilitiaishighlysalutarytothepublicrepose，andatthesametimeanadditionalsecuritytothepublicliberty。Intimesofinsurrectionorinvasion，itwouldbenaturalandproper，thatthemilitiaofaneighbouringstateshouldbemarchedintoanothertoresistacommonenemy，orguardtherepublicagainsttheviolenceofadomesticfactionorsedition。Butitisscarcelypossible，thatintheexerciseofthepowerthemilitiashouldeverbecalledtomarchgreatdistances，sinceitwouldbeatoncethemostexpensiveandthemostinconvenientforce，whichthegovernmentcouldemployfordistantexpeditions。4Theregulationofthewholesubjectisalwaystobeinthepowerofcongress；anditmayfromtimetotimebemouldedso，astoescapefromalldangerousabuses。
　　§；1197。Notwithstandingthereasonablenessofthesesuggestions，thepowerwasmadethesubjectofthemostwarmappealstothepeople，toalarmtheirfears，andsurprisetheirjudgment。5Atonetimeitwassaid，thatthemilitiaunderthecommandofthenationalgovernmentmightbedangeroustothepublicliberty；atanother，thattheymightbeorderedtothemostdistantplaces，andburthenedwiththemostoppressiveservices；andatanother，thatthestatesmightthusberobbedoftheirimmediatemeansofdefence。6Howthesethingscouldbeaccomplishedwiththeconsentofbothhousesofcongress，inwhichthestatesandthepeopleofthestatesarerepresented，itisdifficulttoconceive。Butthehighlycolouredandimpassionedaddresses，usedonthisoccasion，producedsomepropositionsofamendmentinthestateconventions，7which，however，wereneverdulyratified，andhavelongsinceceasedtobefelt，asmattersofgeneralconcern。
　　§；1198。Thenextpowerofcongressis，"toprovidefororganizing，arming，anddiscipliningthemilitia，andforgoverningsuchpartofthem，asmaybeemployedintheserviceoftheUnitedStates；reservingtothestatesrespectivelytheappointmentoftheofficers，andtheauthorityoftrainingthemilitiaaccordingtothedisciplineprescribedbycongress。"
　　§；1199。Thispowerhasanaturalconnexionwiththepreceding，and，ifnotindispensabletoitsexercise，furnishestheonlyadequatemeansofgivingitpromptitudeandefficiencyinitsoperations。Itrequiresnoskillinthescienceofwartodiscern，thatuniformityintheorganizationanddisciplineofthemilitiawillbeattendedwiththemostbeneficialeffects，whenevertheyarecalledintoactiveservice。Itwillenablethemtodischargethedutiesofthecampandfieldwithmutualintelligenceandconcert，anadvantageofpeculiarmomentintheoperationsofanarmy；anditwillenablethemtoacquire，inamuchshorterperiod，thatdegreeofproficiencyinmilitaryfunctions，whichisessentialtotheirusefulness。Suchanuniformity，itisevident，canbeattainedonlythroughthesuperintendingpowerofthenationalgovernment。8
　　§；1200。Thisclausewasnotintheoriginaldraftoftheconstitution；butitwassubsequentlyreferredtoacommittee，whoreportedinfavourofthepower；andafterconsiderablediscussionitwasadoptedinitspresentshapebyadecidedmajority。Thefirstclauseinregardtoorganizing，arming，disciplining，andgoverningthemilitia，waspassedbyavoteofninestatesagainsttwo；thenext，referringtheappointmentofofficerstothestates，afteranineffectualefforttoamenditbyconfiningtheappointmenttoofficersundertherankofgeneralofficers，waspassedwithoutadivision；andthelast，referringtheauthoritytotrainthemilitiaaccordingtothedisciplineprescribedbycongress，waspassedbyavoteofsevenstatesagainstfour。9
　　§；1201。Itwasconceivedbythefriendsoftheconstitution，thatthepowerthusgiven，withtheguards，reservingtheappointmentoftheofficers，andthetrainingofthemilitiatothestates，madeitnotonlywhollyunexceptionable，butinrealityanadditionalsecuritytothepublicliberties。10Itwasneverthelessmadeatopicofseriousalarmandpowerfulobjection。
　　Itwassuggested，thatitwasindispensabletothestates，thattheyshouldpossessthecontrolanddisciplineofthemilitia。Congressmight，underpretenceoforganizinganddiscipliningthem，inflictsevereandignominiouspunishmentsonthem。11Thepowermightbeconstruedtobeexclusiveincongress。Suppose，then，thatcongressshouldrefusetoprovideforarmingororganizingthem，theresultwouldbe，thatthestateswouldbeutterlywithoutthemeansofdefence，andprostrateatthefeetofthenationalgovernment。12Itmightalsobesaid，thatcongresspossessedtheexclusivepowertosuppressinsurrections，andrepelinvasions，whichwouldtakefromthestatesalleffectivemeansofresistance。13Themilitiamightbeputundermartiallaw，whennotunderdutyinthepublicservice。14
　　§；1202。Itisdifficultfullytocomprehendtheinfluenceofsuchobjections，urgedwithmuchapparentsincerityandearnestnessatsuchaneventfulperiod。Theanswersthengivenseemtohavebeenintheirstructureandreasoningsatisfactoryandconclusive。
　　Buttheamendmentsproposedtotheconstitutionsomeofwhichhavebeensinceadopted15show，thattheobjectionswereextensivelyfelt，andsedulouslycherished。Thepowerofcongressoverthemilitiaitwasurgedwaslimited，andconcurrentwiththatofthestates。TherightofgoverningthemwasconfinedtothesinglecaseoftheirbeingintheactualserviceoftheUnitedStates，insomeofthecasespointedoutintheconstitution。Itwasthen，andthenonly，thattheycouldbesubjectedbythegeneralgovernmenttomartiallaw。16Ifcongressdidnotchoosetoarm，organize，ordisciplinethemilitia，therewouldbeaninherentrightinthestatestodoit。17All，thattheconstitutionintended，was，togiveapowertocongresstoensureuniformity，andtherebyefficiency。But，ifcongressrefused，orneglectedtoperformtheduty，thestateshadaperfectconcurrentright，andmightactuponittotheutmostextentofsovereignty。18Aslittlepretencewastheretosay，thatcongresspossessedtheexclusivepowertosuppressinsurrectionsandrepelinvasions。Theirpowerwasmerelycompetenttoreachtheseobjects；butdidnot，andcouldnot，inregardtothemilitia，supersedetheordinaryrightsofthestates。Itwas，indeed，madeadutyofcongresstoprovideforsuchcases；butthisdidnotexcludetheco—operationofthestates。19Theideaofcongressinflictingsevereandignominiouspunishmentsuponthemilitiaintimesofpeacewasabsurd。20Itpresupposed，thattherepresentativeshadaninterest，andwouldintentionallytakemeasurestooppressthem，andalienatetheiraffections。Theappointmentoftheofficersofthemilitiawasexclusivelyinthestates；andhowcoulditbepresumed，thatsuchmenwouldeverconsenttothedestructionoftherightsorprivilegesoftheirfellow—citizens。21Thepowertodisciplineandtrainthemilitia，exceptwhenintheactualserviceoftheUnitedStates，wasalsoexclusivelyvestedinthestates；
　　andundersuchcircumstances，itwassecureagainstanyseriousabuses。22Itwasadded，thatanyprojectofdiscipliningthewholemilitiaoftheUnitedStateswouldbesoutterlyimpracticableandmischievous，thatitwouldprobablyneverbeattempted。23Themost，thatcouldbedone，wouldbetoorganizeanddisciplineselectcorps；andtheseforallgeneralpurposes，eitherofthestates，oroftheUnion，wouldbefoundtocombineall，thatwasusefulordesirableinmilitiaservices。
　　§；1203。Itishardlynecessarytosay，howutterlywithoutanypracticaljustificationhavebeenthealarms，soindustriouslyspreaduponthissubjectatthetime，whentheconstitutionwasputuponitstrial。Upontwooccasionsonlyhasitbeenfoundnecessaryonthepartofthegeneralgovernment，torequiretheaidofthemilitiaofthestates，forthepurposeofexecutingthelawsoftheUnion，suppressinginsurrections，orrepellinginvasions。ThefirstwastosuppresstheinsurrectioninPennsylvaniain1794；24andtheother，torepeltheenemyintherecentwarwithGreatBritain。Onotheroccasions，themilitiahasindeedbeencalledintoservicetorepeltheincursionsoftheIndians；butinallsuchcases，theinjuredstateshaveledtheway，andrequestedtheco—operationofthenationalgovernment。
　　Inregardtotheotherpoweroforganizing，arming，anddiscipliningthemilitia，congresspassedanactin1792，25moreeffectuallytoprovideforthenationaldefence，byestablishingauniformmilitiathroughouttheUnitedStates。Thesystemprovidedbythisact，withtheexceptionofthatportion，whichestablishedtherulesofdisciplineandfieldservice，haseversinceremainedinforce。Andthemilitiaarenowgovernedbythesamegeneralsystemofdisciplineandfieldexercise，whichisobservedbytheregulararmyoftheUnitedStates。26Nojealousyofmilitarypower，andnodreadorseverepunishmentsarenowindulged。Andthewholemilitiasystemhasbeenasmildinitsoperation，asithasbeensatisfactorytothenation。
　　§；1204。Severalquestionsofgreatpracticalimportancehavearisenundertheclausesoftheconstitutionrespectingthepoweroverthemilitia，whichdeservementioninthisplace。Itisobservable，thatpowerisgiventocongress"toprovideforcallingforththemilitiatoexecutethelawsoftheUnion，suppressinsurrections，andrepelinvasions。"Accordingly，congressin1795，inpursuanceofthisauthority，andtogiveitapracticaloperation，providedbylaw，"thatwhenevertheUnitedStatesshallbeinvaded，orbeinimminentdangerofinvasionfromanyforeignnationorIndiantribe，itshallbelawfulforthepresidenttocallforthsuchnumberofthemilitiaofthestate，orstatesmostconvenienttotheplaceofdanger，orsceneofaction，ashemayjudgenecessary，torepelsuchinvasion，andtoissuehisorderforthatpurposetosuchofficerorofficersofthemilitia，asheshallthinkproper。"Likeprovisionsaremadefortheothercasesstatedintheconstitution。27Theconstitutionalityofthisacthasnotbeenquestioned，28althoughitprovidesforcallingforththemilitia，notonlyincasesofinvasion，butofimminentdangerofinvasion；forthepowertorepelinvasionsmustincludethepowertoprovideagainstanyattemptanddangerofinvasion，asthenecessaryandpropermeanstoeffectuatetheobject。Oneofthebestmeanstorepelinvasionis，toprovidetherequisiteforceforaction，beforetheinvaderhasreachedtheterritoryofthenation。29Norcantherebeadoubt，thatthepresident，whoisaswillbepresentlyseenbytheconstitutionthecommander—in—chiefofthearmyandnavyoftheUnitedStates，andofthemilitia，whencalledintotheactualserviceoftheUnitedStates，istheproperfunctionary，towhomthishighanddelicatetrustoughttobeconfided。Afreepeoplewillnaturallybejealousoftheexerciseofmilitarypower；andthatofcallingforththemilitiaiscertainlyoneofnoordinarymagnitude。Itis，however，apowerlimitedinitsnaturetocertainexigencies；andbywhomsoeveritistobeexecuted，itcarrieswithitacorrespondingresponsibility。30Whoissofittoexercisethepower，andtoincurtheresponsibility，asthepresident？
　　§；1205。Butamostmaterialquestionarises：Bywhomistheexigencythecasusfæ；deris，ifonemaysosaytobedecided？Isthepresidentthesoleandexclusivejudge，whethertheexigencyhasarisen，orisittobeconsidered，asanopenquestion，whicheveryofficer，towhomtheordersofthepresidentareaddressed，maydecideforhimself，andequallyopentobecontestedbyeverymilitia—man，whoshallrefusetoobeytheordersofthepresident？31ThisquestionwasmuchagitatedduringthelatewarwithGreatBritain，althoughitiswellknown，thatithadbeenpracticallysettledbythegovernment，intheyear1794，tobelongexclusivelytothepresident；32andnoinconsiderablediversityofopinionwasthenmanifestedintheheatofthecontroversy，pendentelite，etflagrantebello。InConnecticutandMassachusetts，itwasheld，thatthegovernorsofthestates，towhomorderswereaddressedbythepresidenttocallforththemilitiaonaccountofdangerofinvasion，wereentitledtojudgeforthemselves，whethertheexigencyhadarisen；andwerenotboundbytheopinionorordersofthepresident？Thisdoctrine，however，wasdisapprovedelsewhere。33ItwascontestedbythegovernmentoftheUnitedStates；34andwasrenouncedbyotherstates。35
　　§；1206。Ataveryrecentperiod，thequestioncamebeforetheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesforajudicialdecision；anditwasthenunanimouslydetermined，thattheauthoritytodecide，whethertheexigencyhasarisen，belongsexclusivelytothepresident；
　　andthathisdecisionisconclusiveuponallotherpersons。Thecourtsaid，thatthisconstructionnecessarilyresultedfromthenatureofthepoweritself，andfromthemanifestobjectscontemplatedbytheactofcongress。
　　Thepoweritselfistobeexerciseduponsuddenemergencies，upongreatoccasionsofstate，andundercircumstances，whichmaybevitaltotheexistenceoftheUnion。Apromptandunhesitatingobediencetoordersisindispensabletothecompleteattainmentoftheobject。Theserviceisamilitaryservice，andthecommandofamilitarynature；andinsuchcases，everydelayandeveryobstacletoanefficientandimmediatecompliancewouldnecessarilytendtojeopardthepublicinterests。Whilesubordinateofficersorsoldiersarepausingtoconsider，whethertheyoughttoobey，orarescrupulouslyweighingthefacts，uponwhichthecommander—in—chiefexercisestherighttodemandtheirservices，thehostileenterprizemaybeaccomplished，withoutthemeansofresistance。Ifthepowerofregulatingthemilitia，andofcommandingitsservicesintimesofinsurrectionandinvasion，are，asithasbeenemphaticallysaid，theyare，36naturalincidentstothedutiesofsuperintendingthecommondefence，andofwatchingovertheinternalpeaceoftheconfederacy，thesepowersmustbesoconstrued，astothemodesoftheirexercise，asnottodefeatthegreatendinview。Ifasuperiorofficerhasarighttocontesttheordersofthepresident，uponhisowndoubts，astotheexigencyhavingarisen，itmustbeequallytherightofeveryinferiorofficerandsoldier。Andanyactdonebyanypersoninfurtheranceofsuchorderswouldsubjecthimtoresponsibilityinacivilsuit，inwhichhisdefencemustfinallyrestuponhisabilitytoestablishthefactsbycompetentproofs。Besides；
　　inmanyinstancestheevidence，uponwhichthepresidentmightdecide，thattherewasimminentdangerofinvasion，mightbeofanaturenotconstitutingstricttechnicalproof；orthedisclosureoftheevidencemightrevealimportantstatesecrets，whichthepublicinterest，andevensafety，mightimperiouslydemandtobekeptinconcealment。37Theactof1795wasmanifestlyframeduponthisreasoning。Thepresidentisbyitnecessarilyconstituted，inthefirstinstance，thejudgeoftheexistenceoftheexigency，andisboundtoactaccordingtohisbeliefofthefacts。Ifhedoessoact，anddecidestocalloutthemilitia，hisordersforthispurposeareinstrictconformitytothelaw；anditwouldseemtofollow，asanecessaryconsequence，thateveryactdonebyasubordinateofficerinobediencetosuchordersisequallyjustifiable。Thelawcontemplates，thatundersuchcircumstancesordersshallbegiventocarrythepowerintoeffect；anditcannotbe，thatitisacorrectinference，thatanyotherpersonhasarighttodisobeythem。Noprovisionismadeforanappealfrom，orreviewofthepresident’sopinion。Andwheneverastatutegivesadiscretionarypowertoanypersontobeexercisedbyhimuponhisownopinionofcertainfacts，thegeneralruleofconstructionis，thatheistherebyconstitutedthesoleandexclusivejudgeoftheexistenceofthosefacts。38
　　§；1207。Itseemstobeadmitted，thatthepowertocallforththemilitiamaybeexercisedeitherbyrequisitionsupontheexecutiveofthestates；orbyordersdirectedtosuchexecutive，ortoanysubordinateofficersofthemilitia。Itisnot，however，tobeunderstood，thatthestateexecutiveisinanycaseboundtoleavehisexecutiveduties，andgopersonallyintotheactualserviceoftheUnitedStates。39
　　§；1208。Thepowertogovernthemilitia，whenintheactualserviceoftheUnitedStates，isdeniedbynoonetobeanexclusiveone。Indeed，fromitsverynature，itmustbesoconstrued；
　　forthenotionofdistinctandindependentordersfromauthoritieswhollyunconnected，wouldbeutterlyinconsistentwiththatunityofcommandandaction，onwhichthesuccessofallmilitary，operationsmustessentiallydepend。40Butthereisnothingintheconstitution，whichprohibitsastatefromcallingforthitsownmilitia，notdetachedintotheserviceoftheUnion，toaidtheUnitedStatesinexecutingthelaws，insuppressinginsurrections，andinrepellinginvasions。
　　Suchaconcurrentexerciseofpowerinnodegreeinterfereswith，orobstructstheexerciseofthepowersoftheUnion。Congressmay，bysuitablelaws，provideforthecallingforthofthemilitia，andannexsuitablepenaltiestodisobedienceoftheirorders，anddirectthemanner，inwhichthedelinquentsmaybetried。Buttheauthoritytocallforth，andtheauthorityexclusivelytogovern，arequitedistinctintheirnature。Thequestion，whentheauthorityofcongressoverthemilitiabecomesexclusive，mustessentiallydependuponthefact，whentheyaretobedeemedintheactualserviceoftheUnitedStates。Thereisacleardistinctionbetweencallingforththemilitia，andtheirbeinginactualservice。Thesearenotcontemporaneousacts，nornecessarilyidenticalintheirconstitutionalbearings。Thepresidentisnotcommander—in—chiefofthemilitia，exceptwheninactualservice；
　　andnot，whentheyaremerelyorderedintoservice。Theyaresubjectedtomartiallawonly，wheninactualservice，andnotmerelywhencalledforth，beforetheyhaveobeyedthecall。Theactof1795，andotheractsonthissubject，manifestlycontemplateandrecognisethisdistinction。
　　Tobringthemilitiawithinthemeaningofbeinginactualservice，theremustbeanobediencetothecall，andsomeactsoforganization，mustering，rendezvous，ormarching，doneinobediencetothecall，inthepublicservice。41
　　§；1209。Butwhetherthepowerisexclusiveincongresstopunishdelinquenciesinnotobeyingthecallonthemilitia，bytheirowncourts—martial，hasbeenaquestionmuchdiscussed，anduponwhichnoinconsiderablecontrarietyofopinionhasbeenexpressed。Thatitmay，bylaw，bemadeexclusive，isnotdenied。Butifnosuchlawbemade，whetherastatemaynot，byitsownlaws，constitutecourts—martialtotryandpunishthedelinquencies，andinflictthepenaltiesprescribedbytheactofcongress，hasbeenthepointofcontroversy。Itisnowsettled，that，undersuchcircumstances，astatecourt—martialmayconstitutionallytakecognizanceof，andinflictthepunishment。Butastatecannotaddto，orvarythepunishmentsinflictedbytheactsofcongressuponthedelinquents。42
　　§；1210。AquestionofanothersortwasalsomadeduringthelatewarwithGreatBritain；whetherthemilitia，calledintotheactualserviceoftheUnitedStates，weretobegovernedandcommandedbyanyofficer，butofthesamemilitia，exceptthepresidentoftheUnitedStates；inotherwords，whetherthepresidentcoulddelegateanyotherofficeroftheregulararmy，ofequalorsuperiorrank，tocommandthemilitiainhisabsence。ItwasheldinseveraloftheEasternstates，thatthemilitiawereexclusivelyunderthecommandoftheirownofficers，subjecttothepersonalordersofthepresident；andthathecouldnotauthorizeanyofficerofthearmyoftheUnitedStatestocommandtheminhisabsence，norplacethemunderthecommandofanysuchofficer。43ThisdoctrinewasdeemedinadmissiblebythefunctionariesoftheUnitedStates。Ithasneveryetbeensettledbyanydefinitivejudgmentofanytribunalcompetenttodecideit。44If，however，thedoctrinecanbemaintained，itisobvious，thatthepublicservicemustbecontinuallyliabletoverygreatembarrassmentsinalleases，wherethemilitiaarecalledintothepublicserviceinconnexionwiththeregulartroops。
　　1。JournalofConvention。212，283。
　　2。2Elliot’sDebates，300，304，305，308，309。
　　3。TheFederalist，No。29；2Elliot’sDebates，292，293，294，308，309。
　　4。TheFederalist，No。29；2Elliot’sDeb。92，107，108，292，293，294，308，109；3Elliot’sDeb。305，306。
　　5。2Elliot’sDeb。66，67，307，310，314，315；TheFederalist，No。29；LutherMartin’sAddress，Yates’sMinutes；
　　4Elliot’sDeb。31，34。
　　6。SeetheFederalist，No。29；2Elliot’sDeb。，285，286，287，289，307，310。
　　7。1Tucker’sBlack。Comm。App。273。
　　8。TheFederalist，No。4，29；1Tucker’sBlack。Comm。App。273，274；5Marshall’sLifeofWashington，ch。1，p。
　　51。SeeVirginiaReportandResolutions，7Jan。1800，p。51to57。
　　9。JournalofConvention，221，263，272，280，281，282，357，376，377。
　　10。2Elliot’sDeb。92，301，310，312，314，317。
　　11。2Elliot’sDebates，101，307，310，312。
　　12。2Elliot’sDebates，145，290，310，311，312；LutherMartin’sAddress，Yates’sMinutes；4Elliot’sDebates，34，35。
　　13。2Elliot’sDebates，310，311，312，314，315，316，317，318。
　　14。2Elliot’sDebates，287，288，294。
　　15。1Tuck。Black。Comm。App。273。
　　16。2Elliot’sDebates，299，311。
　　17。2Elliot’sDebates，293，294，312，313，311，326，327，439；1Tuck。Black。Comm。App。272，273；RawleontheConstitution，ch。9，p。111，112；Houstonv。Moore，5Wheat。R。
　　1，21，45，48to52。
　　18。Houstonv。Moore，5Wheat。
　　R。1，16，17，21，22，24，32，51，52，56；3Sergeant&；Rawle，169。
　　19。2Elliot’sDebates，312，313，316，317，318，368；RawleontheConstitution，ch。9，p。111。
　　20。2Elliot’sDebates，304，309。
　　21。2Elliot’sDebates，368；RawleontheConstitution，ch。9，p。112。
　　22。SeeTheFederalist，No。29；1Tucker’sBlack。Comm。App。274；RawleontheConstitution，ch。9，p。112。
　　23。TheFederalist，No。29。
　　24。5Marsh。LifeofWashington，ch。
　　8，p。576to592；2Pitk。Hist。ch。23，p。421to428。
　　25。Actof8thMay，1792，ch。13。
　　26。Actof1820，ch。97；Actof1821，ch。68。
　　27。Actof1795，ch。101。
　　28。Houstonv。Moore，5Wheat。
　　R。1，60；Martinv。Mott，12Wheat。R。19；Houstonv。Moore，3Sergeant&；Rawle，169；Duffieldv。Smith，3Sergeant&；
　　Rawle，590；Vanderheydenv。Young，11Johns。R。150。
　　29。Martinv。Mott，12Wheat。
　　R。19，29。
　　30。Martinv。Mott，12Wheat。
　　R。19，29；RawleonConstitution，ch。13，p。155，&；c。
　　31。Martinv。Mott，12WheatR。19，29，30。
　　32。SeeHoustonv。Moore，5Wheat。
　　R。37。
　　33。1Kent’sComm。Lect12，p。244to250；8Mass。R。Suppt。547etseq。；RawleontheConstitution，ch。
　　13，p。155。&；c。？AtalaterperiodthisdoctrineseemstohavebeenabandonedbyMassachusetts。SeeReportandResolvesofMassachusetts，June12，1818，andFebruary15，1830。SeealsoResolutionsofMaineLegislaturein1820。
　　34。SeePresidentMadison’sMessageof4thNovember，1812，andPresidentMonroe’sMessage，andotherdocumentsstatedinReportandResolvesofMassachusetts，15thFebruary，1830。
　　35。SeeVanderheydenv。Young，11JohnsR。150；RawleontheConstitution，ch。13，p。155to160；Duffieldv。Smith，3Sergeant&；Rawle，590。
　　36。TheFederalist，No。29。
　　37。Martinv。Mott，12Wheat。
　　R。30，31。
　　38。Martinv。Mott，12Wheat。
　　R。19，31，32。
　　39。SeeHoustonv。Moore，5Wheat。
　　R。1，15，16，andMr。J。Johnson’sOpinion，Id。36，37，40，46。
　　40。TheFederalist，No。9，29；Houstonv。Moore，5Wheat。R。1，17，53，54，55，56，61，62。
　　41。Houston。v。Moore，5Wheat。
　　R。1，17，18，20，53，60，61，63，64；RawleonConst。ch。13，p。159。
　　42。Houstonv。Moore，5Wheat。
　　R。1，2，3，24，28，44，69to75；RawleonConst。ch。13，p。158，159；Houstonv。Moore，3Serg。&；Rawle，169；Duffieldv。Smith，3Berg。&；R。590；1Kent’sComm。Lect12，p。248，249，250；Berg。onConst。ch。28，[ch。30]；Meade’scase，5Hall’sLawJourn。536；Bolten’scase，3Serg。&；Rawle，176，note。
　　43。8Mass。Rep。Supp。549，550；5Hall’sAmer。LawJourn。495；1Kent’sComm。Lect。12，p。244to247。
　　44。1Kent’sComm。Lect。12，p。244
　　to247。
　　JosephStory：CommentariesontheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates：
　　Book3Chapter23CHAPTERXXIII。POWEROVERSEATOFGOVERNMENTANDOTHERCEDEDPLACES。§；1211。THEnextpowerofcongressis，"toexerciseexclusivelegislationinallcaseswhatsoeveroversuchdistrict，notexceedingtenmilessquare，asmay，bycessionofparticularstatesandtheacceptanceofcongress，becometheSEAT
　　OFTHEGOVERNMENToftheUnitedStates；andtoexerciselikeauthorityoverallplacespurchasedbytheconsentofthelegislatureofthestate，inwhichthesameshallbe，fortheerectionofFORTS，MAGAZINES，ARSENALS，andotherneedfulBUILDINGS。"
　　§；1212。Thisclausewasnotintheoriginaldraftoftheconstitution；butwasreferredtoacommittee，whoreportedinitsfavour；anditwasadoptedintotheconstitutionwithaslightamendmentwithoutanyapparentobjection。1
　　§；1213。Theindispensablenecessityofcompleteandexclusivepower，onthepartofthecongress，attheseatofgovernment，carriesitsownevidencewithit。ItisapowerexercisedbyeverylegislatureoftheUnion，andonemightsayoftheWorld，byvirtueofitsgeneralsupremacy。Withoutitnotonlythepublicauthoritiesmightbeinsulted，andtheirproceedingsbeinterruptedwithimpunity；butthepublicarchivesmightbeindangerofviolation，anddestruction，andadependenceofthemembersofthenationalgovernmentonthestateauthoritiesforprotectioninthedischargeoftheirfunctionsbecreated，whichwouldbringonthenationalcouncilstheimputationofbeingsubjectedtoundueaweandinfluence，andmight，intimesofhighexcitement，exposetheirlivestojeopardy。Itnevercouldbesafetoleaveinpossessionofanystatetheexclusivepowertodecide，whetherthefunctionariesofthenationalgovernmentshouldhavethemoralorphysicalpowertoperformtheirduties。2Itmightsubjectthefavouredstatetothemostunrelentingjealousyoftheotherstates，andintroduceearnestcontroversiesfromtimetotimerespectingtheremovaloftheseatofgovernment。
　　§；1214。Norcanthecessionbejustlyanobjectofjealousytoanystate；orintheslightestdegreeimpairitssovereignty。Thecededdistrictisofaverynarrowextent；anditrestsintheoptionofthestate，whetheritshallbemadeornot。Therecanbelittledoubt，thattheinhabitantscomposingitwouldreceivewiththankfulnesssuchablessing，sincetheirownimportancewouldbetherebyincreased，theirinterestsbesubserved，andtheirrightsbeundertheimmediateprotectionoftherepresentativesofthewholeUnion。3Itisnotimprobable，thatanoccurrence，attheverycloseoftherevolutionarywar，hadagreateffectinintroducingthisprovisionintotheconstitution。
　　Attheperiodalludedto，thecongress，thensittingatPhiladelphia，wassurroundedandinsultedbyasmall，butinsolentbodyofmutineersofthecontinentalarmy。CongressappliedtotheexecutiveauthorityofPennsylvaniafordefence；but，undertheill—conceivedconstitutionofthestateatthattime，theexecutivepowerwasvestedinacouncilconsistingofthirteenmembers；andtheypossessed，orexhibitedsolittleenergy，andsuchapparentintimidation，thatcongressindignantlyremovedtoNew—Jersey，whoseinhabitantswelcomedthemwithpromisesofdefendingthem。CongressremainedforsometimeatPrincetonwithoutbeingagaininsulted，till，forthesakeofgreaterconvenience，theyadjournedtoAnnapolis。ThegeneraldissatisfactionwiththeproceedingsofPennsylvania，andthedegradingspectacleofafugitivecongress，weresufficientlystrikingtoproducethisremedy。4Indeed，ifsuchalessoncouldhavebeenlostuponthepeople，itwouldhavebeenashumiliatingtotheirintelligence，asitwouldhavebeenoffensivetotheirhonour。