10HarvardLawReview457(1897)
Whenwestudylawwearenotstudyingamysterybutawell—knownprofession。Wearestudyingwhatweshallwantinordertoappearbeforejudges,ortoadvisepeopleinsuchawayastokeepthemoutofcourt。Thereasonwhyitisaprofession,whypeoplewillpaylawyerstoargueforthemortoadvisethem,isthatinsocietieslikeoursthecommandofthepublicforceisintrustedtothejudgesincertaincases,andthewholepowerofthestatewillbeputforth,ifnecessary,tocarryouttheirjudgmentsanddecrees。Peoplewanttoknowunderwhatcircumstancesandhowfartheywillruntheriskofcomingagainstwhatissomuchstrongerthanthemselves,andhenceitbecomesabusinesstofindoutwhenthisdangeristobefeared。Theobjectofourstudy,then,isprediction,thepredictionoftheincidenceofthepublicforcethroughtheinstrumentalityofthecourts。
Themeansofthestudyareabodyofreports,oftreatises,andofstatutes,inthiscountryandinEngland,extendingbackforsixhundredyears,andnowincreasingannuallybyhundreds。Inthesesibyllineleavesaregatheredthescatteredpropheciesofthepastuponthecasesinwhichtheaxewillfall。Thesearewhatproperlyhavebeencalledtheoraclesofthelaw。Farthemostimportantandprettynearlythewholemeaningofeveryneweffortoflegalthoughtistomakethesepropheciesmoreprecise,andtogeneralizethemintoathoroughlyconnectedsystem。Theprocessisone,fromalawyer’sstatementofacase,eliminatingasitdoesallthedramaticelementswithwhichhisclient’sstoryhasclothedit,andretainingonlythefactsoflegalimport,uptothefinalanalysesandabstractuniversalsoftheoreticjurisprudence。Thereasonwhyalawyerdoesnotmentionthathisclientworeawhitehatwhenhemadeacontract,whileMrs。Quicklywouldbesuretodwelluponitalongwiththeparcelgiltgobletandthesea—coalfire,isthatheforeseesthatthepublicforcewillactinthesamewaywhateverhisclienthaduponhishead。Itistomaketheprophecieseasiertoberememberedandtobeunderstoodthattheteachingsofthedecisionsofthepastareputintogeneralpropositionsandgatheredintotextbooks,orthatstatutesarepassedinageneralform。Theprimaryrightsanddutieswithwhichjurisprudencebusiesitselfagainarenothingbutprophecies。Oneofthemanyevileffectsoftheconfusionbetweenlegalandmoralideas,aboutwhichIshallhavesomethingtosayinamoment,isthattheoryisapttogetthecartbeforethehorse,andconsidertherightorthedutyassomethingexistingapartfromandindependentoftheconsequencesofitsbreach,towhichcertainsanctionsareaddedafterward。But,asIshalltrytoshow,alegaldutysocalledisnothingbutapredictionthatifamandoesoromitscertainthingshewillbemadetosufferinthisorthatwaybyjudgmentofthecourt;andsoofalegalright。
Thenumberofourpredictionswhengeneralizedandreducedtoasystemisnotunmanageablylarge。Theypresentthemselvesasafinitebodyofdogmawhichmaybemasteredwithinareasonabletime。Itisagreatmistaketobefrightenedbytheever—increasingnumberofreports。Thereportsofagivenjurisdictioninthecourseofagenerationtakeupprettymuchthewholebodyofthelaw,andrestateitfromthepresentpointofview。Wecouldreconstructthecorpusfromthemifallthatwentbeforewereburned。Theuseoftheearlierreportsismainlyhistorical,auseaboutwhichIshallhavesomethingtosaybeforeI
havefinished。
Iwish,ifIcan,tolaydownsomefirstprinciplesforthestudyofthisbodyofdogmaorsystematizedpredictionwhichwecallthelaw,formenwhowanttouseitastheinstrumentoftheirbusinesstoenablethemtoprophesyintheirturn,and,asbearinguponthestudy,Iwishtopointoutanidealwhichasyetourlawhasnotattained。
Thefirstthingforabusinesslikeunderstandingofthematteristounderstanditslimits,andthereforeIthinkitdesirableatoncetopointoutanddispelaconfusionbetweenmoralityandlaw,whichsometimesrisestotheheightofconscioustheory,andmoreoftenandindeedconstantlyismakingtroubleindetailwithoutreachingthepointofconsciousness。Youcanseeveryplainlythatabadmanhasasmuchreasonasagoodoneforwishingtoavoidanencounterwiththepublicforce,andthereforeyoucanseethepracticalimportanceofthedistinctionbetweenmoralityandlaw。Amanwhocaresnothingforanethicalrulewhichisbelievedandpractisedbyhisneighborsislikelyneverthelesstocareagooddealtoavoidbeingmadetopaymoney,andwillwanttokeepoutofjailifhecan。
ItakeitforgrantedthatnohearerofminewillmisinterpretwhatI
havetosayasthelanguageofcynicism。Thelawisthewitnessandexternaldepositofourmorallife。Itshistoryisthehistoryofthemoraldevelopmentoftherace。Thepracticeofit,inspiteofpopularjests,tendstomakegoodcitizensandgoodmen。WhenIemphasizethedifferencebetweenlawandmoralsIdosowithreferencetoasingleend,thatoflearningandunderstandingthelaw。Forthatpurposeyoumustdefinitelymasteritsspecificmarks,anditisforthatthatIaskyouforthemomenttoimagineyourselvesindifferenttootherandgreaterthings。
Idonotsaythatthereisnotawiderpointofviewfromwhichthedistinctionbetweenlawandmoralsbecomesofsecondaryornoimportance,asallmathematicaldistinctionsvanishinpresenceoftheinfinite。ButIdosaythatthatdistinctionisofthefirstimportancefortheobjectwhichweareheretoconsider——arightstudyandmasteryofthelawasabusinesswithwellunderstoodlimits,abodyofdogmaenclosedwithindefinitelines。Ihavejustshownthepracticalreasonforsayingso。Ifyouwanttoknowthelawandnothingelse,youmustlookatitasabadman,whocaresonlyforthematerialconsequenceswhichsuchknowledgeenableshimtopredict,notasagoodone,whofindshisreasonsforconduct,whetherinsidethelaworoutsideofit,inthevaguersanctionsofconscience。Thetheoreticalimportanceofthedistinctionisnoless,ifyouwouldreasononyoursubjectaright。
Thelawisfullofphraseologydrawnfrommorals,andbythemereforceoflanguagecontinuallyinvitesustopassfromonedomaintotheotherwithoutperceivingit,aswearesuretodounlesswehavetheboundaryconstantlybeforeourminds。Thelawtalksaboutrights,andduties,andmalice,andintent,andnegligence,andsoforth,andnothingiseasier,or,Imaysay,morecommoninlegalreasoning,thantotakethesewordsintheirmoralsense,atsomestateoftheargument,andsotodropintofallacy。Forinstance,whenwespeakoftherightsofmaninamoralsense,wemeantomarkthelimitsofinterferencewithindividualfreedomwhichwethinkareprescribedbyconscience,orbyourideal,howeverreached。Yetitiscertainthatmanylawshavebeenenforcedinthepast,anditislikelythatsomeareenforcednow,whicharecondemnedbythemostenlightenedopinionofthetime,orwhichatalleventspassthelimitofinterference,asmanyconscienceswoulddrawit。Manifestly,therefore,nothingbutconfusionofthoughtcanresultfromassumingthattherightsofmaninamoralsenseareequallyrightsinthesenseoftheConstitutionandthelaw。Nodoubtsimpleandextremecasescanbeputofimaginablelawswhichthestatute—makingpowerwouldnotdaretoenact,evenintheabsenceofwrittenconstitutionalprohibitions,becausethecommunitywouldriseinrebellionandfight;andthisgivessomeplausibilitytothepropositionthatthelaw,ifnotapartofmorality,islimitedbyit。Butthislimitofpowerisnotcoextensivewithanysystemofmorals。Forthemostpartitfallsfarwithinthelinesofanysuchsystem,andinsomecasesmayextendbeyondthem,forreasonsdrawnfromthehabitsofaparticularpeopleataparticulartime。IonceheardthelateProfessorAgassizsaythataGermanpopulationwouldriseifyouaddedtwocentstothepriceofaglassofbeer。Astatuteinsuchacasewouldbeemptywords,notbecauseitwaswrong,butbecauseitcouldnotbeenforced。Noonewilldenythatwrongstatutescanbeandareenforced,andwewouldnotallagreeastowhichwerethewrongones。
TheconfusionwithwhichIamdealingbesetsconfessedlylegalconceptions。Takethefundamentalquestion,Whatconstitutesthelaw?
YouwillfindsometextwriterstellingyouthatitissomethingdifferentfromwhatisdecidedbythecourtsofMassachusettsorEngland,thatitisasystemofreason,thatitisadeductionfromprinciplesofethicsoradmittedaxiomsorwhatnot,whichmayormaynotcoincidewiththedecisions。Butifwetaketheviewofourfriendthebadmanweshallfindthathedoesnotcaretwostrawsfortheaxiomsordeductions,butthathedoeswanttoknowwhattheMassachusettsorEnglishcourtsarelikelytodoinfact。Iammuchofthismind。Thepropheciesofwhatthecourtswilldoinfact,andnothingmorepretentious,arewhatImeanbythelaw。
Takeagainanotionwhichaspopularlyunderstoodisthewidestconceptionwhichthelawcontains——thenotionoflegalduty,towhichalreadyIhavereferred。Wefillthewordwithallthecontentwhichwedrawfrommorals。Butwhatdoesitmeantoabadman?Mainly,andinthefirstplace,aprophecythatifhedoescertainthingshewillbesubjectedtodisagreeableconsequencesbywayofimprisonmentorcompulsorypaymentofmoney。Butfromhispointofview,whatisthedifferencebetweenbeingfinedandtaxedacertainsumfordoingacertainthing?Thathispointofviewisthetestoflegalprinciplesisprovenbythemanydiscussionswhichhaveariseninthecourtsontheveryquestionwhetheragivenstatutoryliabilityisapenaltyoratax。
Ontheanswertothisquestiondependsthedecisionwhetherconductislegallywrongorright,andalsowhetheramanisundercompulsionorfree。Leavingthecriminallawononeside,whatisthedifferencebetweentheliabilityunderthemillactsorstatutesauthorizingatakingbyeminentdomainandtheliabilityforwhatwecallawrongfulconversionofpropertywhererestorationisoutofthequestion。Inbothcasesthepartytakinganotherman’spropertyhastopayitsfairvalueasassessedbyajury,andnomore。Whatsignificanceisthereincallingonetakingrightandanotherwrongfromthepointofviewofthelaw?Itdoesnotmatter,sofarasthegivenconsequence,thecompulsorypayment,isconcerned,whethertheacttowhichitisattachedisdescribedintermsofpraiseorintermsofblame,orwhetherthelawpurportstoprohibititortoallowit。Ifitmattersatall,stillspeakingfromthebadman’spointofview,itmustbebecauseinonecaseandnotintheothersomefurtherdisadvantages,oratleastsomefurtherconsequences,areattachedtotheactbylaw。TheonlyotherdisadvantagesthusattachedtoitwhichIeverhavebeenabletothinkofaretobefoundintwosomewhatinsignificantlegaldoctrines,bothofwhichmightbeabolishedwithoutmuchdisturbance。
Oneis,thatacontracttodoaprohibitedactisunlawful,andtheother,that,ifoneoftwoormorejointwrongdoershastopayallthedamages,hecannotrecovercontributionfromhisfellows。AndthatI
believeisall。Youseehowthevaguecircumferenceofthenotionofdutyshrinksandatthesametimegrowsmoreprecisewhenwewashitwithcynicalacidandexpeleverythingexcepttheobjectofourstudy,theoperationsofthelaw。
Nowhereistheconfusionbetweenlegalandmoralideasmoremanifestthaninthelawofcontract。Amongotherthings,hereagaintheso—
calledprimaryrightsanddutiesareinvestedwithamysticsignificancebeyondwhatcanbeassignedandexplained。Thedutytokeepacontractatcommonlawmeansapredictionthatyoumustpaydamagesifyoudonotkeepit——andnothingelse。Ifyoucommitatort,youareliabletopayacompensatorysum。Ifyoucommitacontract,youareliabletopayacompensatorysumunlessthepromisedeventcomestopass,andthatisallthedifference。Butsuchamodeoflookingatthematterstinksinthenostrilsofthosewhothinkitadvantageoustogetasmuchethicsintothelawastheycan。ItwasgoodenoughforLordCoke,however,andhere,asinmanyotherscases,Iamcontenttoabidewithhim。InBromagev。Genning,aprohibitionwassoughtintheKings’BenchagainstasuitinthemarchesofWalesforthespecificperformanceofacovenanttograntalease,andCokesaidthatitwouldsubverttheintentionofthecovenantor,sinceheintendsittobeathiselectioneithertolosethedamagesortomakethelease。SergeantHarrafortheplaintiffconfessedthathemovedthematteragainsthisconscience,andaprohibitionwasgranted。Thisgoesfurtherthanweshouldgonow,butitshowswhatIventuretosayhasbeenthecommonlawpointofviewfromthebeginning,althoughMr。Harriman,inhisveryablelittlebookuponContractshasbeenmisled,asIhumblythink,toadifferentconclusion。
Ihavespokenonlyofthecommonlaw,becausetherearesomecasesinwhichalogicaljustificationcanbefoundforspeakingofcivilliabilitiesasimposingdutiesinanintelligiblesense。Thesearetherelativelyfewinwhichequitywillgrantaninjunction,andwillenforceitbyputtingthedefendantinprisonorotherwisepunishinghimunlesshecomplieswiththeorderofthecourt。ButIhardlythinkitadvisabletoshapegeneraltheoryfromtheexception,andIthinkitwouldbebettertoceasetroublingourselvesaboutprimaryrightsandsanctionsaltogether,thantodescribeourpropheciesconcerningtheliabilitiescommonlyimposedbythelawinthoseinappropriateterms。
Imentioned,asotherexamplesoftheusebythelawofwordsdrawnfrommorals,malice,intent,andnegligence。Itisenoughtotakemaliceasitisusedinthelawofcivilliabilityforwrongswhatwelawyerscallthelawoftorts——toshowthatitmeanssomethingdifferentinlawfromwhatitmeansinmorals,andalsotoshowhowthedifferencehasbeenobscuredbygivingtoprincipleswhichhavelittleornothingtodowitheachotherthesamename。ThreehundredyearsagoaparsonpreachedasermonandtoldastoryoutofFox’sBookofMartyrsofamanwhohadassistedatthetortureofoneofthesaints,andafterwarddied,sufferingcompensatoryinwardtorment。IthappenedthatFoxwaswrong。
Themanwasaliveandchancedtohearthesermon,andthereuponhesuedtheparson。ChiefJusticeWrayinstructedthejurythatthedefendantwasnotliable,becausethestorywastoldinnocently,withoutmalice。
Hetookmaliceinthemoralsense,asimportingamalevolentmotive。
Butnowadaysnoonedoubtsthatamanmaybeliable,withoutanymalevolentmotiveatall,forfalsestatementsmanifestlycalculatedtoinflicttemporaldamage。Instatingthecaseinpleading,westillshouldcallthedefendant’sconductmalicious;but,inmyopinionatleast,thewordmeansnothingaboutmotives,orevenaboutthedefendant’sattitudetowardthefuture,butonlysignifiesthatthetendencyofhisconductunderknowncircumstanceswasveryplainlytocausetheplaintifftemporalharm。
Inthelawofcontracttheuseofmoralphraseologyledtoequalconfusion,asIhaveshowninpartalready,butonlyinpart。Moralsdealwiththeactualinternalstateoftheindividual’smind,whatheactuallyintends。FromthetimeoftheRomansdowntonow,thismodeofdealinghasaffectedthelanguageofthelawastocontract,andthelanguageusedhasreacteduponthethought。Wetalkaboutacontractasameetingofthemindsoftheparties,andthenceitisinferredinvariouscasesthatthereisnocontractbecausetheirmindshavenotmet;thatis,becausetheyhaveintendeddifferentthingsorbecauseonepartyhasnotknownoftheassentoftheother。Yetnothingismorecertainthanthatpartiesmaybeboundbyacontracttothingswhichneitherofthemintended,andwhenonedoesnotknowoftheother’sassent。Supposeacontractisexecutedindueformandinwritingtodeliveralecture,mentioningnotime。Oneofthepartiesthinksthatthepromisewillbeconstruedtomeanatonce,withinaweek。Theotherthinksthatitmeanswhenheisready。Thecourtsaysthatitmeanswithinareasonabletime。Thepartiesareboundbythecontractasitisinterpretedbythecourt,yetneitherofthemmeantwhatthecourtdeclaresthattheyhavesaid。Inmyopinionnoonewillunderstandthetruetheoryofcontractorbeableeventodiscusssomefundamentalquestionsintelligentlyuntilhehasunderstoodthatallcontractsareformal,thatthemakingofacontractdependsnotontheagreementoftwomindsinoneintention,butontheagreementoftwosetsofexternalsigns——notontheparties’havingmeantthesamethingbutontheirhavingsaidthesamething。Furthermore,asthesignsmaybeaddressedtoonesenseoranother——tosightortohearing——onthenatureofthesignwilldependthemomentwhenthecontractismade。Ifthesignistangible,forinstance,aletter,thecontractismadewhentheletterofacceptanceisdelivered。Ifitisnecessarythatthemindsofthepartiesmeet,therewillbenocontractuntiltheacceptancecanberead;none,forexample,iftheacceptancebesnatchedfromthehandoftheoffererbyathirdperson。
Thisisnotthetimetoworkoutatheoryindetail,ortoanswermanyobviousdoubtsandquestionswhicharesuggestedbythesegeneralviews。
Iknowofnonewhicharenoteasytoanswer,butwhatIamtryingtodonowisonlybyaseriesofhintstothrowsomelightonthenarrowpathoflegaldoctrine,andupontwopitfallswhich,asitseemstome,lieperilouslyneartoit。OfthefirstoftheseIhavesaidenough。I
hopethatmyillustrationshaveshownthedanger,bothtospeculationandtopractice,ofconfoundingmoralitywithlaw,andthetrapwhichlegallanguagelaysforusonthatsideofourway。Formyownpart,I
oftendoubtwhetheritwouldnotbeagainifeverywordofmoralsignificancecouldbebanishedfromthelawaltogether,andotherwordsadoptedwhichshouldconveylegalideasuncoloredbyanythingoutsidethelaw。Weshouldlosethefossilrecordsofagooddealofhistoryandthemajestygotfromethicalassociations,butbyriddingourselvesofanunnecessaryconfusionweshouldgainverymuchintheclearnessofourthought。
Somuchforthelimitsofthelaw。ThenextthingwhichIwishtoconsideriswhataretheforceswhichdetermineitscontentanditsgrowth。Youmayassume,withHobbesandBenthamandAustin,thatalllawemanatesfromthesovereign,evenwhenthefirsthumanbeingstoenunciateitarethejudges,oryoumaythinkthatlawisthevoiceoftheZeitgeist,orwhatyoulike。Itisallonetomypresentpurpose。
Evenifeverydecisionrequiredthesanctionofanemperorwithdespoticpowerandawhimsicalturnofmind,weshouldbeinterestednonetheless,stillwithaviewtoprediction,indiscoveringsomeorder,somerationalexplanation,andsomeprincipleofgrowthfortheruleswhichhelaiddown。Ineverysystemtherearesuchexplanationsandprinciplestobefound。Itiswithregardtothemthatasecondfallacycomesin,whichIthinkitimportanttoexpose。
ThefallacytowhichIreferisthenotionthattheonlyforceatworkinthedevelopmentofthelawislogic。Inthebroadestsense,indeed,thatnotionwouldbetrue。Thepostulateonwhichwethinkabouttheuniverseisthatthereisafixedquantitativerelationbetweeneveryphenomenonanditsantecedentsandconsequents。Ifthereissuchathingasaphenomenonwithoutthesefixedquantitativerelations,itisamiracle。Itisoutsidethelawofcauseandeffect,andassuchtranscendsourpowerofthought,oratleastissomethingtoorfromwhichwecannotreason。Theconditionofourthinkingabouttheuniverseisthatitiscapableofbeingthoughtaboutrationally,or,inotherwords,thateverypartofitiseffectandcauseinthesamesenseinwhichthosepartsarewithwhichwearemostfamiliar。Sointhebroadestsenseitistruethatthelawisalogicaldevelopment,likeeverythingelse。ThedangerofwhichIspeakisnottheadmissionthattheprinciplesgoverningotherphenomenaalsogovernthelaw,butthenotionthatagivensystem,ours,forinstance,canbeworkedoutlikemathematicsfromsomegeneralaxiomsofconduct。Thisisthenaturalerroroftheschools,butitisnotconfinedtothem。Ionceheardaveryeminentjudgesaythatheneverletadecisiongountilhewasabsolutelysurethatitwasright。Sojudicialdissentoftenisblamed,asifitmeantsimplythatonesideortheotherwerenotdoingtheirsumsright,andiftheywouldtakemoretrouble,agreementinevitablywouldcome。
Thismodeofthinkingisentirelynatural。Thetrainingoflawyersisatraininginlogic。Theprocessesofanalogy,discrimination,anddeductionarethoseinwhichtheyaremostathome。Thelanguageofjudicialdecisionismainlythelanguageoflogic。Andthelogicalmethodandformflatterthatlongingforcertaintyandforreposewhichisineveryhumanmind。Butcertaintygenerallyisillusion,andreposeisnotthedestinyofman。Behindthelogicalformliesajudgmentastotherelativeworthandimportanceofcompetinglegislativegrounds,oftenaninarticulateandunconsciousjudgment,itistrue,andyettheveryrootandnerveofthewholeproceeding。Youcangiveanyconclusionalogicalform。Youalwayscanimplyaconditioninacontract。Butwhydoyouimplyit?Itisbecauseofsomebeliefastothepracticeofthecommunityorofaclass,orbecauseofsomeopinionastopolicy,or,inshort,becauseofsomeattitudeofyoursuponamatternotcapableofexactquantitativemeasurement,andthereforenotcapableoffoundingexactlogicalconclusions。Suchmattersreallyarebattlegroundswherethemeansdonotexistforthedeterminationsthatshallbegoodforalltime,andwherethedecisioncandonomorethanembodythepreferenceofagivenbodyinagiventimeandplace。Wedonotrealizehowlargeapartofourlawisopentoreconsiderationuponaslightchangeinthehabitofthepublicmind。Noconcretepropositionisselfevident,nomatterhowreadywemaybetoacceptit,notevenMr。HerbertSpencer’s"Everymanhasarighttodowhathewills,providedheinterferesnotwithalikerightonthepartofhisneighbors。"
Whyisafalseandinjuriousstatementprivileged,ifitismadehonestlyingivinginformationaboutaservant?Itisbecauseithasbeenthoughtmoreimportantthatinformationshouldbegivenfreely,thanthatamanshouldbeprotectedfromwhatunderothercircumstanceswouldbeanactionablewrong。Whyisamanatlibertytosetupabusinesswhichheknowswillruinhisneighborhood?Itisbecausethepublicgoodissupposedtobebestsubservedbyfreecompetition。
Obviouslysuchjudgmentsofrelativeimportancemayvaryindifferenttimesandplaces。Whydoesajudgeinstructajurythatanemployerisnotliabletoanemployeeforaninjuryreceivedinthecourseofhisemploymentunlessheisnegligent,andwhydothejurygenerallyfindfortheplaintiffifthecaseisallowedtogotothem?Itisbecausethetraditionalpolicyofourlawistoconfineliabilitytocaseswhereaprudentmanmighthaveforeseentheinjury,oratleastthedanger,whiletheinclinationofaverylargepartofthecommunityistomakecertainclassesofpersonsinsurethesafetyofthosewithwhomtheydeal。Sincethelastwordswerewritten,Ihaveseentherequirementofsuchinsuranceputforthaspartoftheprogrammeofoneofthebestknownlabororganizations。Thereisaconcealed,halfconsciousbattleonthequestionoflegislativepolicy,andifanyonethinksthatitcanbesettleddeductively,oronceforall,IonlycansaythatIthinkheistheoreticallywrong,andthatIamcertainthathisconclusionwillnotbeacceptedinpracticesemperubiqueetabomnibus。
Indeed,Ithinkthatevennowourtheoryuponthismatterisopentoreconsideration,althoughIamnotpreparedtosayhowIshoulddecideifareconsiderationwereproposed。Ourlawoftortscomesfromtheolddaysofisolated,ungeneralizedwrongs,assaults,slanders,andthelike,wherethedamagesmightbetakentoliewheretheyfellbylegaljudgment。Butthetortswithwhichourcourtsarekeptbusytodayaremainlytheincidentsofcertainwellknownbusinesses。Theyareinjuriestopersonorpropertybyrailroads,factories,andthelike。
Theliabilityforthemisestimated,andsoonerorlatergoesintothepricepaidbythepublic。Thepublicreallypaysthedamages,andthequestionofliability,ifpressedfarenough,isreallyaquestionhowfaritisdesirablethatthepublicshouldinsurethesafetyofonewhoseworkituses。Itmightbesaidthatinsuchcasesthechanceofajuryfindingforthedefendantismerelyachance,onceinawhileratherarbitrarilyinterruptingtheregularcourseofrecovery,mostlikelyinthecaseofanunusuallyconscientiousplaintiff,andthereforebetterdoneawaywith。Ontheotherhand,theeconomicvalueevenofalifetothecommunitycanbeestimated,andnorecovery,itmaybesaid,oughttogobeyondthatamount。Itisconceivablethatsomedayincertaincaseswemayfindourselvesimitating,onahigherplane,thetariffforlifeandlimbwhichweseeintheLegesBarbarorum。
Ithinkthatthejudgesthemselveshavefailedadequatelytorecognizetheirdutyofweighingconsiderationsofsocialadvantage。Thedutyisinevitable,andtheresultoftheoftenproclaimedjudicialaversiontodealwithsuchconsiderationsissimplytoleavetheverygroundandfoundationofjudgmentsinarticulate,andoftenunconscious,asIhavesaid。Whensocialismfirstbegantobetalkedabout,thecomfortableclassesofthecommunitywereagooddealfrightened。IsuspectthatthisfearhasinfluencedjudicialactionbothhereandinEngland,yetitiscertainthatitisnotaconsciousfactorinthedecisionstowhichIrefer。Ithinkthatsomethingsimilarhasledpeoplewhonolongerhopetocontrolthelegislaturestolooktothecourtsasexpoundersoftheconstitutions,andthatinsomecourtsnewprincipleshavebeendiscoveredoutsidethebodiesofthoseinstruments,whichmaybegeneralizedintoacceptanceoftheeconomicdoctrineswhichprevailedaboutfiftyyearsago,andawholesaleprohibitionofwhatatribunaloflawyersdoesnotthinkaboutright。Icannotbutbelievethatifthetrainingoflawyersledthemhabituallytoconsidermoredefinitelyandexplicitlythesocialadvantageonwhichtheruletheylaydownmustbejustified,theysometimeswouldhesitatewherenowtheyareconfident,andseethatreallytheyweretakingsidesupondebatableandoftenburningquestions。