首页 >出版文学> Theodore Roosevelt>第82章
  to“speaksoftlyandcarryabigstick。”
  Aprimeneedforournation,asofcourseforeveryothernation,istomakeupitsminddefinitelywhatitwishes,andnottotrytopursuepathsofconductincompatibleonewiththeother。IfthisnationiscontenttobetheChinaoftheNewWorld,thenandthenonlycanitaffordtodoawaywiththenavyandthearmy。IfitiscontenttoabandonHawaiiandthePanamaCanal,toceasetotalkoftheMonroeDoctrine,andtoadmittherightofanyEuropeanorAsiaticpowertodictatewhatimmigrantsshallbesenttoandreceivedinAmerica,andwhetherornottheyshallbeallowedtobecomecitizensandholdland——why,ofcourse,ifAmericaiscontenttohavenothingtosayonanyofthesemattersandtokeepsilentinthepresenceofarmedoutsiders,thenitcanabandonitsnavyandagreetoarbitrateallquestionsofallkindswitheveryforeignpower。Insucheventitcanaffordtopassitssparetimeinonecontinuousroundofuniversalpeacecelebrations,andofsmugself-satisfactioninhavingearnedthederisionofallthevirilepeoplesofmankind。Thosewhoadvocatesuchapolicydonotoccupyaloftyposition。Butatleasttheirpositionisunderstandable。
  Itisentirelyinexcusable,however,totrytocombinetheunreadyhandwiththeunbridledtongue。Itisfollytopermitfreedomofspeechaboutforeignersaswellasourselves——andthepeace-at-any-
  pricepersonsaremuchtoofeebleafolktotrytointerferewithfreedomofspeech——andyettotrytoshirktheconsequencesoffreedomofspeech。Itisfollytotrytoabolishournavy,andatthesametimetoinsistthatwehavearighttoenforcetheMonroeDoctrine,thatwehavearighttocontrolthePanamaCanalwhichweourselvesdug,thatwehavearighttoretainHawaiiandpreventforeignnationsfromtakingCuba,andarighttodeterminewhatimmigrants,AsiaticorEuropean,shallcometoourshores,andthetermsonwhichtheyshallbenaturalizedandshallholdlandandexerciseotherprivileges。Wearearichpeople,andanunmilitarypeople。Ininternationalaffairsweareashort-sightedpeople。ButIknowmycountrymen。Downatbottomtheirtemperissuchthattheywillnotpermanentlytolerateinjusticedonetothem。InthelongruntheywillnomorepermitaffrontstotheirNationalhonorthaninjuriestotheirnationalinterest。Suchbeingthecase,theywilldowelltorememberthatthesurestofallwaystoinvitedisasteristobeopulent,aggressiveandunarmed。
  ThroughoutthesevenandahalfyearsthatIwasPresident,Ipursuedwithoutfalteringoneconsistentforeignpolicy,apolicyofgenuineinternationalgoodwillandofconsiderationfortherightsofothers,andatthesametimeofsteadypreparedness。Theweakestnationsknewthatthey,nolessthanthestrongest,weresafefrominsultandinjuryatourhands;andthestrongandtheweakalikealsoknewthatwepossessedboththewillandtheabilitytoguardourselvesfromwrongorinsultatthehandsofanyone。
  ItwasundermyadministrationthattheHagueCourtwassavedfrombecominganemptyfarce。Ithadbeenestablishedbyjointinternationalagreement,butnoPowerhadbeenwillingtoresorttoit。Thoseestablishingithadgrowntorealizethatitwasindangerofbecomingamerepapercourt,sothatitwouldneverreallycomeintobeingatall。M。d’EstournellesdeConstanthadbeenespeciallyalivetothisdanger。Bycorrespondenceandinpersonalinterviewsheimpresseduponmetheneednotonlyofmakingadvancesbyactuallyapplyingarbitration——notmerelypromisingbytreatytoapplyit——toquestionsthatwereupforsettlement,butofusingtheHaguetribunalforthispurpose。Icordiallysympathizedwiththeseviews。OntherecommendationofJohnHay,IsucceededingettinganagreementwithMexicotolayamatterindisputebetweenthetworepublicsbeforetheHagueCourt。ThiswasthefirstcaseeverbroughtbeforetheHagueCourt。Itwasfollowedbynumerousothers;anditdefinitelyestablishedthatcourtasthegreatinternationalpeacetribunal。BymutualagreementwithGreatBritain,throughthedecisionofajointcommission,ofwhichtheAmericanmemberswereSenatorsLodgeandTurner,andSecretaryRoot,wewereablepeacefullytosettletheAlaskaBoundaryquestion,theonlyquestionremainingbetweenourselvesandtheBritishEmpirewhichitwasnotpossibletosettlebyfriendlyarbitration;thisthereforerepresentedtheremovalofthelastobstacletoabsoluteagreementbetweenthetwopeoples。WewereofsubstantialserviceinbringingtoasatisfactoryconclusionthenegotiationsatAlgecirasconcerningMorocco。WeconcludedwithGreatBritain,andwithmostoftheothergreatnations,arbitrationtreatiesspecificallyagreeingtoarbitrateallmatters,andespeciallytheinterpretationoftreaties,saveonlyasregardsquestionsaffectingterritorialintegrity,nationalhonorandvitalnationalinterest。WemadewithGreatBritainatreatyguaranteeingthefreeuseofthePanamaCanalonequaltermstotheshipsofallnations,whilereservingtoourselvestherighttopoliceandfortifythecanal,andthereforetocontrolitintimeofwar。UnderthistreatyweareinhonorboundtoarbitratethequestionofcanaltollsforcoastwisetrafficbetweentheWesternandEasterncoastsoftheUnitedStates。IbelievethattheAmericanpositionasregardsthismatterisright;butIalsobelievethatunderthearbitrationtreatyweareinhonorboundtosubmitthemattertoarbitrationinviewofGreatBritain’scontention——althoughIholdittobeanunwisecontention——thatourpositionisunsound。Iemphaticallydisbelieveinmakinguniversalarbitrationtreatieswhichneitherthemakersnoranyoneelsewouldforamomentdreamofkeeping。Inolessemphaticallyinsistthatitisourdutytokeepthelimitedandsensiblearbitrationtreatieswhichwehavealreadymade。Theimportanceofapromiseliesnotinmakingit,butinkeepingit;andthepoorestofallpositionsforanationtooccupyinsuchamatterisreadinesstomakeimpossiblepromisesatthesametimethatthereisfailuretokeeppromiseswhichhavebeenmade,whichcanbekept,andwhichitisdiscreditabletobreak。
  Duringtheearlypartoftheyear1905,thestrainonthecivilizedworldcausedbytheRusso-JapaneseWarbecameserious。Thelossesoflifeandoftreasurewerefrightful。Fromallthesourcesofinformationathand,IgrewmoststronglytobelievethatafurthercontinuationofthestrugglewouldbeaverybadthingforJapan,andanevenworsethingforRussia。Japanwasalreadysufferingterriblyfromthedrainuponhermen,andespeciallyuponherresources,andhadnothingfurthertogainfromcontinuanceofthestruggle;itscontinuancemeanttohermorelossthangain,evenifshewerevictorious。Russia,inspiteofhergiganticstrength,was,inmyjudgment,apttoloseevenmorethanshehadalreadylostifthestrugglecontinued。IdeemeditprobablethatshewouldnomorebeablesuccessfullytodefendEasternSiberiaandNorthernManchuriathanshehadbeenabletodefendSouthernManchuriaandKorea。Ifthewarwenton,Ithoughtit,onthewhole,likelythatRussiawouldbedrivenwestofLakeBaikal。Butitwasveryfarfromcertain。Thereisnocertaintyinsuchawar。Japanmighthavemetdefeat,anddefeattoherwouldhavespeltoverwhelmingdisaster;andevenifshehadcontinuedtowin,whatshethuswonwouldhavebeenofnovaluetoher,andthecostinbloodandmoneywouldhaveleftherdrainedwhite。Ibelieved,therefore,thatthetimehadcomewhenitwasgreatlytotheinterestofbothcombatantstohavepeace,andwhenthereforeitwaspossibletogetbothtoagreetopeace。
  Ifirstsatisfiedmyselfthateachsidewishedmetoact,butthat,naturallyandproperly,eachsidewasexceedinglyanxiousthattheothershouldnotbelievethattheactionwastakenonitsinitiative。
  Ithensentanidenticalnotetothetwopowersproposingthattheyshouldmeet,throughtheirrepresentatives,toseeifpeacecouldnotbemadedirectlybetweenthem,andofferedtoactasanintermediaryinbringingaboutsuchameeting,butnotforanyotherpurpose。Eachassentedtomyproposalinprinciple。Therewasdifficultyingettingthemtoagreeonacommonmeetingplace;buteachfinallyabandoneditsoriginalcontentioninthematter,andtherepresentativesofthetwonationsfinallymetatPortsmouth,inNewHampshire。IpreviouslyreceivedthetwodelegationsatOysterBayontheU。S。S。Mayflower,which,togetherwithanothernavalvessel,Iputattheirdisposal,onbehalfoftheUnitedStatesGovernment,totakethemfromOysterBaytoPortsmouth。
  Asiscustomary——butbothunwiseandundesirable——insuchcases,eachsideadvancedclaimswhichtheothercouldnotgrant。ThechiefdifficultycamebecauseofJapan’sdemandforamoneyindemnity。I
  feltthatitwouldbebetterforRussiatopaysomeindemnitythantogoonwiththewar,fortherewaslittlechance,inmyjudgment,ofthewarturningoutfavorablyforRussia,andtherevolutionarymovementalreadyunderwaybadefairtooverthrowthenegotiationsentirely。IadvisedtheRussianGovernmenttothiseffect,atthesametimeurgingthemtoabandontheirpretensionsoncertainotherpoints,notablyconcerningthesouthernhalfofSaghalien,whichtheJapanesehadtaken。Ialso,however,andequallystrongly,advisedtheJapanesethatinmyjudgmentitwouldbethegravestmistakeontheirparttoinsistoncontinuingthewarforthesakeofamoneyindemnity;forRussiawasabsolutelyfirminrefusingtogivethemanindemnity,andthelongerthewarcontinuedthelessableshewouldbetopay。I
  pointedoutthattherewasnopossibleanalogybetweentheircaseandthatofGermanyinthewarwithFrance,whichtheywerefondofquoting。TheGermansheldParisandhalfofFrance,andgaveupmuchterritoryinlieuoftheindemnity,whereastheJapanesewerestillmanythousandmilesfromMoscow,andhadnoterritorywhateverwhichtheywishedtogiveup。IalsopointedoutthatinmyjudgmentwhereastheJapanesehadenjoyedthesympathyofmostofthecivilizedpowersattheoutsetofandduringthecontinuanceofthewar,theywouldforfeititiftheyturnedthewarintoonemerelyforgettingmoney——
  and,moreover,theywouldalmostcertainlyfailtogetthemoney,andwouldsimplyfindthemselvesattheendofayear,evenifthingsprosperedwiththem,inpossessionofterritorytheydidnotwant,havingspentenormousadditionalsumsofmoney,andlostenormousadditionalnumbersofmen,andyetwithoutapennyofremuneration。
  Thetreatyofpeacewasfinallysigned。
  Asisinevitableundersuchcircumstances,eachsidefeltthatitoughttohavegotbetterterms;andwhenthedangerwaswellpasteachsidefeltthatithadbeenover-reachedbytheother,andthatifthewarhadgoneonitwouldhavegottenmorethanitactuallydidget。
  TheJapaneseGovernmenthadbeenwisethroughout,exceptinthematterofannouncingthatitwouldinsistonamoneyindemnity。Neitherinnationalnorinprivateaffairsisitordinarilyadvisabletomakeabluffwhichcannotbeputthrough——personally,Ineverbelieveindoingitunderanycircumstances。TheJapanesepeoplehadbeenmisledbythisbluffoftheirGovernment;andtheunwisdomoftheGovernment’sactioninthematterwasshownbythegreatresentmentthetreatyarousedinJapan,althoughitwassobeneficialtoJapan。
  Therewerevariousmoboutbreaks,especiallyintheJapanesecities;
  thepolicewereroughlyhandled,andseveralChristianchurcheswereburned,asreportedtomebytheAmericanMinister。InbothRussiaandJapanIbelievethatthenetresultasregardsmyselfwasafeelingofinjury,andofdislikeofme,amongthepeopleatlarge。Ihadexpectedthis;Iregardeditasentirelynatural;andIdidnotresentitintheleast。TheGovernmentsofbothnationsbehavedtowardmenotonlywithcorrectandentirepropriety,butwithmuchcourtesyandthefullestacknowledgmentofthegoodeffectofwhatIhaddone;andinJapan,atleast,IbelievethattheleadingmensincerelyfeltthatI
  hadbeentheirfriend。IhadcertainlytriedmybesttobethefriendnotonlyoftheJapanesepeoplebutoftheRussianpeople,andI
  believethatwhatIdidwasforthebestinterestsofbothandoftheworldatlarge。
  DuringthecourseofthenegotiationsItriedtoenlisttheaidoftheGovernmentsofonenationwhichwasfriendlytoRussia,andofanothernationwhichwasfriendlytoJapan,inhelpingbringaboutpeace。I
  gotnoaidfromeither。Idid,however,receiveaidfromtheEmperorofGermany。HisAmbassadoratSt。PetersburgwastheoneAmbassadorwhohelpedtheAmericanAmbassador,Mr。Meyer,atdelicateanddoubtfulpointsofthenegotiations。Mr。Meyer,whowas,withtheexceptionofMr。White,themostusefuldiplomatintheAmericanservice,renderedliterallyinvaluableaidbyinsistinguponhimselfseeingtheCzaratcriticalperiodsofthetransaction,whenitwasnolongerpossibleformetoactsuccessfullythroughtherepresentativesoftheCzar,whowereoftenatcrosspurposeswithoneanother。
  AsaresultofthePortsmouthpeace,IwasgiventheNobelPeacePrize。Thisconsistedofamedal,whichIkept,andasumof$40,000,whichIturnedoverasafoundationofindustrialpeacetoaboardoftrusteeswhichincludedOscarStraus,SethLowandJohnMitchell。Inthepresentstateoftheworld’sdevelopmentindustrialpeaceisevenmoreessentialthaninternationalpeace;anditwasfittingandappropriatetodevotethepeaceprizetosuchapurpose。In1910,whileinEurope,oneofmymostpleasantexperienceswasmyvisittoNorway,whereIaddressedtheNobelCommittee,andsetforthinfulltheprinciplesuponwhichIhadacted,notonlyinthisparticularcasebutthroughoutmyadministration。
  IreceivedanothergiftwhichIdeeplyappreciated,anoriginalcopyofSully’s“Memoires“of“HenryleGrand。”sentmewiththefollowinginscriptionItranslateitroughly:
  PARIS,January,1906。