An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Econom小说第24章

第24章

　　Chap。III
　　HowproportionalTaxesaredrawnbackbytheIndustriousandhowthatdrawingbackistheonlyreasonwhyTaxesraisethePricesofCommoditiesWhatperplexesournotionsinthetheoryofproportionaltaxation，is，thattheindustriousman，insteadofbringinghissurplusonly，tomarket，isobligedtobringthewholeofhiswork。
　　Letmethereforerepresenthimasbeingcreditorupononepartofhiswork，andproprietoroftheother。Thiswilldivideit，asitwere，intotwoparts，whichIshallcallAandB。
　　Arepresentsthatpartuponwhichheiscreditor，andanswerstoalltheexpencehehasalreadybeenat；thatis，tohisphysical-necessary，aswehavecalledit。Thiswehavesaidoughttobeconsideredasvirtuallyconsumedbytheworkman，andifanytaxberaiseduponit，itmustbedoneinsuchamannerasnottoaffecthim；thatis，hemustdrawittotallybackfromthepersontowhomhedisposesofit。Bontheotherhand，representsthatpartofwhichheisproprietor，towit，hisprofit；andthereforemayeitherbetaxedornot，asthestateshallthinkfit。
　　Ifthisbetaxedinthehandsoftheindustriousman，beforeitsufferanalienation，thetaxwillbeofacumulativenature。
　　Ifitbeleftfreetohim，andtaxedtothepersonwhobuysit，itwillbeoftheproportionalkind，asweshallseeafterwards。
　　Again，Inthefirstcase，itwillcheckthegrowingwealthoftheindustriousman；inthesecond，itwillacceleratethedissipationofthebuyer。
　　Taxes，therefore，ofthefirstkind，arepropertobeimposedincountrieswherethestateisjealousofgrowingwealth，aswehaveobservedinthe25thchapterofthesecondbook。Ifthetax，again，belaiduponthebuyer，thenthebalancewillturninfavouroftheindustriousman，inproportiontothefullamountofB，andwillproducenoothereffectthantoacceleratethedissipationofthebuyer。
　　Letusnowtakeinanewcombination。
　　If，whenthewholeworkisbroughttomarketandsold，thepriceshallnotexceedthevalueoftheindustriousman’sA，thenheisoftheclassofthosewecallphysical-necessarians，whoaccumulatenoprofits。IfthepriceofitbelessthanA，hebecomesaloaduponthestate，abankrupttothosewhohavefedhimuponcredit，andwilldieforwant，unlesshebesupportedbycharity。
　　Sofarwithregardtotheseller:nextastothebuyer。
　　Thebuyerappearsatmarketwithhismoney。Whenhecomestherehemustgive，first，anequivalentfortheprimecostofthemerchandize:thatis，hemustrefundeveryexpencenecessarilyincurredinproducingit；thatis，hemustrefundthevalueofA。Next，theindustriousmanhasaclaimuponhimforhisprofits，viz。hisB。Thencomesthestate，whoclaimsapartofhiswealth，inregardthatheisgoingtopurchasewhathisownindustryhasnotproduced。Thisisthetax；IshallcallitC。Thistaxwillbefoundoftheproportionalkind。Itwillnotaffectthegrowingwealthoftheseller，butitwillacceleratethedissipationofthebuyer；andwillpulldownthescaleagainsthim，infavouroftheindustrious。Thisisapropertax，incountrieswherethestateobservesthemaximofsharingthewealthofthosewhodissipate。
　　Letusnowtakeinanothercombination。Letussupposethisbuyertobeanindustriousperson，andthethingboughttobeanecessarymaterialforthemanufactureinwhichheisemployed。
　　Itisnotplain，thatwhenthesecondindustriousmancomestomarkettosellhiswork，whichIalsosupposetobecomposedofhisAandhisB，thathisAbecomesastillmorecompoundedbody？Itfirstincludeshisownphysical-necessary，asabove:
　　Secondly，theAandBofthemanfromwhomheboughtthematerials:and，Thirdly，theCwhichhepaidtothestateforthelibertYofacquiringwhathehimselfhadnotproduced。
　　Whoeverthereforebuysfromthesecondindustriousman，must，inlikemanner，refundtohimhisfullA；hemustalsopayhimhisB；andthenhewillfindthestateclaimingtheirC，asintheformeroperation。
　　Thisbeingdone，letusexaminetheinterestsofallparties。
　　Thefirstindustriousmanhasnoreasontocomplainofthetax；
　　becausehewaspaidhisnecessaryexpenceA，andalsohisB
　　forhisprofit；andthestaterealisedthetaxattheexpenceofthesecondindustriousman，whopaidit。NowwesaidthatthedissipationofhiswealthwasacceleratedinproportiontothevalueofwhathepaidforC；butasheisnoneoftheidle，andasthethingheboughtwasamaterialnecessaryforhismanufacture，thesecondbuyerfindshimselfobligedtorefundthewholeamountofthefirstA，B，andC；becausethesumofthemmakesapartofthesecondman’sA。NowitistherefundingofthisCtotheindustriousmanwhichistheonlycircumstance，fromwhichproceedstheriseinthepriceofcommodities，inconsequenceofproportionaltaxes。Moreover，thesecondbuyermustpaythesecondindustriousman’sB，infavourofthebalancewhichisgoingtoturnagainsthim；andlastofall，hemustpaythesecondC，whichisthesharethestaterequiresofhim，inordertoacceleratehisdissipation。
　　Nowletusobserve，thatifthecommodityboughtbythesecondindustriousman，benotnecessaryfortheexistenceofhismanufacture，itcannotenterintohisA，andthereforemustbediminisheduponhisB；andifhisBcannotpayit，thenhewilloweittosomebody，andforthefuturemusteitherabstainfromsuchexpences，orleaveoffworking，infavourofthosewhocanlivewithoutthem。
　　Letmeillustrateallthisbyanexample。
　　Atannersellshisleathertoashoemaker；theshoemakerinpayingthetannerforhisleather，paysthetanner’ssubsistenceandprofit，andthetaxuponleather。
　　Themanwhobuystheshoesforhisownconsumption，refundsallthistotheshoemaker，togetherwithhissubsistence，profit，andthetaxuponshoes；consequently，thepriceofshoesareraised，onlybyrefundingthetaxespaidbytheindustrious。
　　Butiftheshoemaker’ssubsistenceshallhappentoincludeeithertavernexpences，orhisconsumptiononidledays，hewillnotdrawtheseback；becauseothershoemakerswhodonotfrequentthetavern，andwhoarenotidle，willundersellhim；hemustthereforetakehisextraordinaryexpenceoutofhisprofits；andifhisprofitbenotsufficient，hemustrunindebttothetavern-keeper。
　　Theextravaganceandidleness，therefore，ofparticularworkmendoesnotcheckindustry，norraiseprices；forthesewillalwaysbeinproportiontodemand，andthereisnoreasonwhydemandshouldeitherriseorfall，becauseaparticularworkmanisextravagant，orconsumesacommoditynotnecessaryforhismanufactureorsubsistence。
　　Fromthisexampletherearisesanewcombination:thatinproportionastheindustriousdonotconsumeoftheproduceoftheirownindustry，butcometomarketwiththewhole，andthenpurchasetheworkofothers，theyareconsidered，astotaxes，inthelightofidleconsumers，whodonotwork，butwhopurchasewithmoneythefruitsoftheindustryofothers。Bythisoperation，thetaxablefundisaugmentedbeyondtheextentofthegeneralsurpluscalledB。Thereasonisplain。Whateverisbroughttomarketissupposedtobesurplus，asitmaytherebeboughtbytheidle，aswellastheindustrious。Theonlydifferenceis，thatthefirstdonotdrawbackthetax，andthattheseconddo，aswehavealreadyshewn。
　　Fromthisreasoningwemayconclude，thatthewaytocarryproportionaltaxestotheirutmostextent，istodrawallcommoditiestomarket，toengageeveryonetocarrythitherthewholeproduceofhisindustry，andtheretobuywhateverhestandsinneedof。
　　Butwhichwaywillyouengageeitherafarmertosellhiscrop，andbuysubsistencefromanother；orashoemakertosellhisown，andbuyhisneighbour’sshoes？Thethingisimpracticable；andwereitattempted，itwouldproveanarbitraryproceeding，andacumulativetaxlaidupontheirindustry:ataxwhich，bythenatureofit，theycannotdrawback，asweshallpresentlysee，andfromthiscircumstancealoneproceedsthewholeoppressionofit。
　　Letmenextanalizethepricepaidbythelastbuyer，whomwehavecalledtherichandidleconsumerofthemanufacture，whocandrawnothingbackfromanybody。
　　Isitnotcomposedofthewholevalueofthesubsistence，ofthework，oftheprofits，ofthetax？Thewholereimbursementofallformerpaymentsandrepaymentscomesuponhim。Thosewhohavebeenatalltheexpence，appearinthelightofhisservantsandagents，whohaveonlyadvancedmoneyuponhisaccount。
　　Howabsurd，therefore，isiteithertosay，thatalltaxesfallultimatelyuponland；orasothers，fornobetterreason，pretend，thattheyfallupontrade。Isay，thatthisclassoftaxeswhichIhavenowbeendescribing，andwhichIshallstillmorefullyexplaininasubsequentchapter，nevercanfalleitherupon，oraffectanypersonbuttheidle；thatistosay，thenotindustriousconsumer。Iftherebefoundapossibilityforanyconsumertodrawbackthetaxhehaspaid，Isayheisoftheclassoftheindustrious，inonewayorother:andfartherIsay，thatsuchataxraisesthepriceofthecommodity。Butbydrawingback，Iunderstand，thattherepaymentisaninseparableconsequenceofhishavingpaidthetax。Idonot，forexample，saythataplace-mandrawshistaxesbytheemolumentsofhisoffice:butIsayabrewerdrawsbackhisexcisebythesaleofhisbeer。
　　Letthisprinciplealsoberetained，thatwithrespecttotheconsumptionofsuperfluitiesbythemanufacturingclasses，theyalsomustbeconsideredasbeingoftheclassoftherichandidle，asmuchasthefirstDukeinEngland。Whenthereforetheextravaganceofthemanufacturingclassesbecomesgeneral，andwhentherateofthemarketcanaffordthemgreatwages，relativelytothepriceofnecessaries，suchprofitsconsolidateintothepriceofthemanufacture，accordingtotheprincipleslaiddowninthe10thchapterofthesecondbook。Thestatesmanthenmustendeavourtocreateacompetitionamongthem，byintroducingfreshanduntaintedhandsintosuchbranches。Thiswillbeasurecheckuponthedissipationoftheindustrious，and，ifrightlyapplied，willpreventallfrauds，allpretencesfortheriseofthepriceoflabouronaccountoftaxes:and，ifcarriedtoitsfullextent，willpreventanyindustriouspersonfromenjoyingeitheraday’sidleness，orthesmallestsuperfluity；exceptinconsequenceofhispeculiardexterity，orextrinsicadvantages。
　　Chap。IV
　　OfcumulativeTaxesIshallnothererepeatwhatIhavealreadysaidconcerningthecharacteristicsofthiskindofimposition；butaftercitingsomeexamples，Ishallexamineitmoreclosely，astoitsnatureandconsequences。
　　ThemostfamiliarexamplesofittoanEnglishman，aretithes，land-tax，window-tax，andpoors-rates。
　　ThemostfamiliarexamplestoaFrenchman，aretheTaille，Fourage，andUstencil，whichgocommonlytogether；alsotheCapitation，theDixieme，theVingtieme，andtheIndustrie。3*
　　Thenatureofallthesetaxes，is，toaffectthepossessions，income，andprofitsofeveryindividual，withoutputtingitintheirpowertodrawthembackinanywaywhatever；consequently，suchtaxestendverylittletowardsenhancingthepriceofcommodities。
　　Thosewhocomeundersuchtaxes，donotalwaysconsiderthattheirpastindustry，gains，oradvantagesoffortune，arehereintendedtosufferadiminution，infavourofthestate；forwhichout-goingtheyhave，perhaps，madenoprovision。
　　Whenpeopleofthelowerclasses，insteadofbeingsubjectedtoproportionaltaxes，arelaidundersuchimpositions，thereresultsagreatinconvenience。Theyareallowedtoreceivethewholeprofitoftheirindustry，whichintheformerchapterwecalledtheirB，thestatehoweverreservingtoitselfaclaimforapartofit:this，insteadofbeingpaidgradually，asinaproportionaltax，iscollectedattheendoftheyear，whentheyhavemadenoprovisionforit，andconsequently，theyareputtodistress。
　　Besides，howhardisittodeprivethemofthepowerofdrawingbackwhattheypay？Andhowilljudgedtotrustmoneywiththosewhoaresupposedtogainonlyaneasyphysical-necessary？Anequivalentforprocuringthearticlesofeaseandluxury，shouldnotbeleftinthehandsofthosewhoarenotpermittedtoenjoythem。
　　Fromthiswemayconclude，First，Thatthemoresuchtaxesareproportionaltothesubjecttaxed；Secondly，themoreevidentthisproportionappears；andThirdly，themorefrequentlyandregularlysuchtaxesarelevied；themoretheywillresembleproportionaltaxes，andthelessburdenwillbefoundinpayingthem。Letmeillustratethisbysomeexamples。
　　Thestoppageuponasoldier’spay，eitherfortheinvalids，orChelsea，isacumulativetax；butthemethodoflevyingitgivesitalltheadvantagesofoneoftheproportionalkind。
　　First，Itbearsanexactanddeterminateproportiontothevalueofhispay。Secondly，Thisproportionheknowsperfectly。AndThirdly，Insteadofreceivingthewholeintohisownpossession，andpayingthehospitalattheendoftheyear，itisregularlyandgraduallyretainedfromhimateverypayment。
　　Tithesareacumulativetax；buttheyareaccompaniedwithallthethreerequisitestomakethemlight；althoughinotherrespectstheyareexcessivelyburdensome。First，Theybearanexactproportiontothecrop。Secondly，Thisproportionisperfectlyknown。Thirdly，Nature，andnotthelabourer，makestheprovision。Buttheyfalluponanimproperobject:theyaffectthewholeproduceoftheland，andnotthesurplus；whichlastistheonlyfundthatoughttobetaxed，ashasbeensaid。
　　Theland-taxinScotlandbears，First，averydeterminateproportiontothevaluationoftheland；andhas，Secondly，theadvantageofbeingwellknowntoeverycontributor。，sothatprovisionmayeasilybemadeforit。Butthethirdrequisiteiswanting:theproprietorhavingthepublicmoneyinhishands，oftenappliesittoprivatepurposes；andwhenthedemandismadeuponhim，heisputtodistress。
　　Thetaille，inmanyprovincesofFrance，bears，first，averyexactproportiontothevalueoftheland。4*
　　Butinthesecondplace，theproportionisentirelyunknowntothemanwhopaysit；beingnowheretobeseenbutintheofficesoftheintendantandhisdeputies。
　　Andinthelastplace，thewholepaymentcomesatonce。
　　Whathides，andconsequentlydestroysthisproportionwithrespecttotheFrenchtailletariff閑，is，thatifafterthefirstdistributionislaidon，asinScotland，atsomanyshillingsinthepoundofvaluation，thefullsumintendedtoberaiseddonotcomein；eitherbecausetheintendanthasgivenexemptionstocertainparishes，onaccountoftheaccidentsofsterility，hail，mortalityamongthecattle，andthelike；orbecausethepropertyofapartoftheparishhasfallenintothehandsofpeopleexemptedfromthetaille；orlastlythatothers，whowerereallyboundtopayapartofit，arebecomeinsolvent。
　　Theintendantmustthenmakeasecond，andperhapsathirdgeneraldistributionofthedeficiencyuponalltheformercontributors，inthemostexactproportionindeedtothevaluationofthelands，butyetbythenatureofitimpossibletobeforeseen。Itisforthesereasonschieflythatthetailleinthatkingdomissogrievous。
　　Theseseconddistributionsofthetax，First，destroytheproportionbetweenthetaxandtherevenuetaxed。Secondly，Theymakeitimpossibletojudgeoftheamountofthem。Andlastly，thedemandcomesatonce，when，perhaps，themoneyhasbeenotherwiseapplied。
　　TheFrenchtaxuponindustryismoregrievousstill；becausenoneofthethreerequisitesabove-mentionedareallowedtooperate。
　　Thistaxissupposedtobeproportionaltotheprofitsmadeupontrade，andotherbranchesofindustry，nothavingthelandfortheirobject。Allmerchantsandtradesmen，incities，andinthecountry，paythetaxcalledIndustrie；andthereasongivenforestablishingthistax，asIhavesaidinanotherplace，isinordertomakeeveryindividualinthestatecontributetotheexpenceofit，inproportiontotheadvantageshereaps。Nothingwouldbemorejust，coulditbeputinexecution，withoutdoinggreaterhurttothestate，thantherevenuedrawnfromitcandogood。
　　Ishallnowshewhow，inthistax，allthethreerequisiteswehavementionedarewanting。
　　First，byitsnature，itcanbearnoexactproportiontotheprofitsoftheindustriousman；sincenobodybutthepersontaxedcansomuchasguessattheirextent。
　　Secondly，Itcannotpossiblybeprovidedfor，asnocheckcanbeputupontheimposer，unlessasfarasgeneralrulesarelaiddownforeachclassoftheindustrious；andfromtheseagainotherinconveniencesflow，asshallbeobserved。
　　Thirdly，Itcomesatonceuponpoorpeople，whohavebeenfrequentlyforcedtobegforwantofemploymentbeforethetax-gatherercouldmakehisdemand；andthosewhoremain，frequentlybecomebeggarsbeforetheycancomplywithit。
　　Isay，thatfromthegeneralruleslaiddownforregulatingthistax，astoeveryclass，aworkmanwhohasalargefamilytomaintain，isnolesstaxedthanonewhohasnochargebuthimself:anditwillbeallowed，Ibelieve，thattheprofitsofoneindustriouspersonofthelowerclasses，isinnocountrysufficienttopayanyconsiderabletax，andmaintainalargefamily，muchlessasicklyone。Ithereforeimagine，thatcumulativetaxesnevershouldberaiseduponsuchclassesofinhabitantsashavenoincomebuttheirpersonalindustry，whichissofrequentlyprecarious。
　　Merchantsalsooughtnottobesubjectedtoanytaxupontheirindustry。Theyoughttobeallowedtoaccumulaterichesasfastasthey，can:becausetheyemploythemfortheadvancementofindustry；andeverydeductionfromtheirprofitsisadiminutionuponthissousefulafund。
　　Whencumulativetaxesarelaiduponanyoftheindustriousclasses，theytendtocheckgrowingwealth；andaremostcommonlyimposedinmonarchicalstates，whererichesareapttoexcitejealousy，ashasbeenobserved。
　　Butastotheclassoflandproprietors，thatistosay，themorewealthyinhabitants，wholiveuponarevenuealreadymade，theimproprietyofcumulativetaxesismuchless。Theyarehoweverburdensome，anddisagreeableinallcases，andoughttobedispensedwith，whenthenecessarysuppliescanbemadeoutbyproportionaltaxes，withoutraisingthepricesoflabourtoohighfortheprosperityofforeigntrade。
　　FromtheexamplesIhavegivenofthisbranchoftaxation，I
　　hopethenatureofitmaybefullyunderstood，andthatforthefuturenoinconveniencewillarisefrommyemployingthetermofcumulativetax。
　　Ishallnowsubjoinitsdefinition。Acumulativetax，istheaccumulationofthatreturnwhicheveryindividual，whoenjoysanysuperfluity，owesdailytothestate，fortheadvantageshereceivesbylivinginthesociety。Asthisdefinitionwouldnothavebeenunderstoodatsettingout，Ithoughtitproper，first，toexplainthenatureofthethingtobedefined。
　　Chap。V
　　OftheInconvenienceswhichproceedfromproportionalTaxes，andoftheMethodsofremovingthemAproportionaltax，asIhavesaid，isthatwhichisleviedupontheidleconsumer，atthetimehebuysthecommodity。andwhile，byconsumingit，thebalanceofwealthisturningagainsthim，infavouroftheseller。Thistaxisconsolidatedasitwerewiththepriceofthecommodity，andmustofnecessityraisethepriceofit。
　　Isay，itisleviedatthetimeofbuying，andaffectsthebuyer，inconsequenceofhisconsumption；becausewehaveseen，thatwhenthecommodityisnotconsumedbythepurchaser，thenuponasubsequentalienationheisrefundedallhepaid。I
　　considerhimtherefore，inthiscase，notaspaying，butasadvancingtheamountofthetaxforanother；andwhileanypartofthecommodityremainsunconsumed，therestillremainstheequivalentforaproportionalpartofthetaxinthehandsofhimwhoadvancedit。
　　Ishallnowproceed，asintheformerchapter，bygivingsomeexamplesofsuchimpositions；andinexaminingthem，endeavourtoshewtheirnatureandconsequences。
　　ThemostfamiliartoanEnglishmanare，excises，customs，malt-tax，stamp-duties，andthelike。
　　ToaFrenchmanthegabelle，thetraittes，theaides，tobacco，etc。5*
　　Inallkindsofthisimpositionwefindthetaxregularlyreimbursedfromhandtohand；itadheressocloselytothecommodity，thatitbecomesasessentiallyapartofthevalue，ascarriage，packing，andthelikeincidentcharges，enterintothepricesofgoods。Itnevercanaffecttheindustriouspersonwhodoesnotconsume；andnevercanbeavoidedbyhimwhodoes。Suchtaxesthereforenecessarilyraisethepriceofthecommoditytaxed。
　　Havingalreadypointedouttheprincipaladvantagesofproportionaltaxes，whichistothrowthewholeoftheburdenupontherich，whomwehavecalledtheidleconsumers，thebettertodistinguishthemfromtheopulentclassoftheindustrious；I
　　mustnowenumeratetheprincipalinconveniencescomplainedof，fromthismodeoftaxation，andtraceouttheprinciplesfromwhichtheymaybeascertainedandremoved。
　　Theprincipalinconveniencesallegedagainstproportionaltaxesmaybereducedtothree:
　　First，Thattheyhavetheeffectofraisingthepriceoflabour，andtheproduceofindustry，andtherebyprovehurtfultotheprosperityofforeigntrade。
　　Secondly，Thattheydiscourageconsumption，bycarryingthepricesofmanythingstoohighforpeopleofamiddlingrankinlife。
　　Thirdly，Thattheyarebothexpensiveinthecollection，andoppressive，fromthemanyrestrictionsputuponliberty，inordertopreventfrauds。
　　Inanalyzingeveryoneoftheseinconveniences，itwillbepropertoinquire，howfartheconclusionsagainstthosetaxesaredrawnfrom，andsofarasmatteroffact；howfarfromplausibleappearancesonly；theyarereal，notimaginary，todiscoverthemethodsofremovingthem。
　　Asthefirstinconveniencearisesfromtherisingofthepriceofallkindsoflabour，andconsequentlyofmanufactures，I
　　mustdistinguishbetweentheconsequenceofraisingpricesathome，andofraisingthemuponarticlesofexportation；andI
　　mustconsidertheoneandtheotherrelativelytothecollectivebodyofastate，andnottosomefewindividualsinit。
　　Highpricesathomearenodiscouragementtotheindustrious，mostcertainly，howeverdisagreeabletheymayprovetoconsumers；
　　andwhiletheystandhigh，itisaproofthatthedemandoftheconsumersdoesnotdiminish。
　　Highpricesupongoodstobeexported，aretobejudgedofbytheproportiontheybeartothoseinothercountries。
　　Nowthepriceofamanufacturer’swagesisnotregulatedbythepriceofhissubsistence，butbythepriceatwhichhismanufacturesellsinthemarket。Couldaweaver，forexample，liveupontheair，hewouldstillsellhisday’sworkaccordingtothevalueofthemanufactureproducedbyit，whenbroughttomarket。Aslongashecanpreventtheeffectsofthecompetitionofhisneighbours，hewillcarrythepriceofhisworkashighasisconsistentwiththeprofitsofthemerchant，whobuysitfromhiminordertobringittomarket；andthishewillcontinuetodo，untiltherateofthemarketbebroughtdown。
　　Itisthereforetherateofthemarketforlabourandmanufactures，andnotthepriceofsubsistence，whichdeterminesthestandardofwages。Wereproportionaltaxestoraisethepriceofsubsistence，andbythatcircumstancetodiscouragemanufacturesweshouldseethegeneralityofworkmenlivingwithsobriety，deprivingthemselvesofsuperfluity，confiningthemselvestotheplainbutsufficientphysical-necessary，workingwithalltheassiduityamancansupport，andstillnotbeabletosupplythemarketattheordinaryrates。
　　Wheninanycountrytheworkofmanufacturers，wholiveluxuriously，andwhocanaffordtobeidlesomedaysoftheweek，findsareadymarket；thiscircumstancealoneprovesbeyondalldispute，thatsubsistenceinthatcountryisnottoodear，atleastinproportiontothemarketpricesofgoodsathome；andiftaxesonconsumptionhave，infactraisedthepriceofnecessaries，beyondtheformerstandard，thisrise，cannot，infact，discourageindustry:itmaydiscourageidleness；andidlenesswillnotbetotallyrootedout，untilpeoplebeforced，inonewayorother，togiveupbothsuperfluityanddaysofrecreation。
　　Peopleareveryapttodrawconclusionsfromwhattheythinkoughttobe，accordingtotheparticularcombinationstheyformtothemselves；andforthisreasonitisgenerallythought，becausetaxesarehigherinEnglandthaninsomeothercountries，thatforeigntradeshouldthereforebehurtbythem。Buttheslothandidlenessofman，andthewantofambitioninthelowerclassestoimprovetheircircumstances，tendsmore，Isuspect，tolessentheproductionsofindustry，andthustoraisetheirprice，thananytaxuponsubsistencewhichhasbeenhithertoimposedinthiskingdom。
　　Thewholeofthisdoctrineisprovedbyexperience，andisconfirmedbyournaturalfeelings。Manyhavebeenamazedtoseehowwellthemanufacturingclassesliveinyearsofscarcity，whichfrequentlyhavetheeffectofdoublingthepriceofthemostnecessaryarticlesofsubsistence。Aretheynotfound，inbadyears，moreassiduousintheirlabour？Dotheythenfrequentale-houses，asintheyearsofplenty？Aretheyfoundidleonehalfoftheweek？Whyshouldataxlaidonbythehandofnatureprovesuchaspurtoindustry；andanother，similartoitinitseffect，laidonbythehandofman，producesuchhurtfulconsequences？Wereacourseofbadyears，Idarenotsayanincreaseoftaxes，tocontinuelongenoughtobringmanufacturerstoahabitofsobrietyandapplication，areturnofplenty，andlowprices，wouldthrowintotheircoffers，whatmanyofthemdissipateinriotandprodigality。
　　Eventhisconclusionwillbetoogeneral，ifeverycircumstancebetakenin。Manufacturersthereare，whoworkhard，andlivesoberlysixdaysoftheweek，andwhoattheendfindlittlesuperfluity，notwithstandingthehighpriceoflabour。
　　Alas！theyhavemanymouthstofeed，andtwohandsonlytosupplythenecessaries。Thisisthefatalcompetitionsomuchinsistedoninthefirstbook，andbywhichadoorisopenedtogreatdistress。Eithertheunmarriedgainwhatthemarriedshoulddo，andbecomeextravagant，orthemarriedgainnomorethantheunmarriedcando，andbecomemiserable。
　　Theaveragebetweenthetwooughttodeterminetherateofwagesineverymodernsociety。
　　Theremediesforthisunequalcompetition，flowingfromthehappylibertyweenjoy，havebeenconsideredinanotherplace。
　　Theinconveniencehereunderexaminationwillnotberemovedbyanabolitionoftaxes；norwillitincreasebytheaugmentationofthem，aslongasmanufacturers，uponanaverage，enjoysuperfluityandidledays。
　　UnderthesecircumstancesIconclude，thatifforeigntradesufferbythehighpricesofcommoditiesinourmarkets，thevicedoesnotproceedfromourtaxes，butfromourdomesticluxury，whichswellsdemandathome。Werewelessluxurious，andmorefrugalinourmanagementingeneral，allclassesoftheindustrious，fromtheretailerdowntothelowestmanufacturer，wouldbesatisfiedwithmoremoderateprofits。Letnot，therefore，astatesmanregulatehisconductuponsuppositions，norconcludeanythingfromtheory，norfromarguments*priori，drawnfromthesupposedeffectsoftaxes；butlethimhaverecoursetoinformationandexperienceconcerningtherealstateofthematter。
　　Lethiminquirewhatarethepricesabroad；whatarethepricesathome；howthosewhoworkinexportablecommoditieslive；whatsuperfluitiestheyenjoy。andwhatdaysofidlenesstheyindulgein。
　　Ifhefindthatgoodsarenotexported，becauseofhighprices，whilemanufacturersareenjoyingsuperfluity，andindulgingthemselvesinidleness，lethimmultiplyhands，andhewillreducethemalltotheirphysical-necessary；andbythusaugmentingthesupply，hewillalsoreducethepricesinhismarketsathome。
　　Ifhewanttoreducepricesstilllower，infavourofexportation，butfindthathehasoccasionfortheamountofcertaintaxes，whichenhancethevalueofthisphysical-necessarytowhichhehasreducedhisindustriousclasses，thenlethimgrantabountyuponthequantityexported，morethanequivalenttocompensatetheriseofpricesoccasionedbythetaxespaidbythosewhoprovideit；andletthepeopleathomecontinuetopaydearerthanstrangers，infavourofthestate。Ifbyloweringpricesyouwishtopromoteexportationonly，therewillbenooccasiontolowerthemuniversally，anymorethanthereisoccasiontoputalargeplaisteroverthewholebody，tocureasmallwoundonaparticularpartofit。
　　Ihavesaid，thatwhiletherateofthemarketremainsthesame，sowillthepricesofeverypartoflabourandindustry，whichentersintothecompositionofthethingbroughttomarket。
　　Thisisconsistentwithreason，andexperienceprovesthetruthofit；becausewedonotseewagesfluctuatewiththepriceofliving。Iftheydonotfluctuateinthatproportion，howcanweconcludethatariseinthepriceofsubsistence，occasionedbytaxes，shouldraisewagesmorethanwhenthepriceisraisedbyanaturalscarcity。Itmaybeanswered，thattheimpositionofataxgivesageneralalarm；theeffectitmusthaveuponpricesisimmediatelyfelt；andmanufacturerstheninsistuponanaugmentationoftheirwages:whereas，whennatureeitherproducesthesame，orevenagreatereffect，peoplesubmittowhattheythinkcomesfromthehandofGod，andcontentthemselveswiththehopesofbettertimes。Ishallallowtothisargumentallitsforce。
　　ButImustobserve，thatwhenmanufacturerscanthuscapitulatewiththeiremployers，andcaninsistuponanaugmentationoftheirwages，thedemandofthemarketmustbegreaterthanthesupplyfromtheirwork。Thisisthecircumstancewhichraisesthepriceoflabour。Letthedemandofthemarketfall，thepricesoflabourwillfall，inspiteofallthereasonswhichoughtnaturallytomakethemrise。Theworkmenwillthenenterintoahurtfulcompetition，andstarveoneanother，ashasbeenoftenobserved。Letthedemandofthemarketrise，manufacturersmayraisetheirwagesinproportiontotheriseofthemarket；theymay，inthecheapestyears，enjoythehighestwages；drinkonehalfoftheweek，andlaughattheiremployer，whenheexpectstheyshouldworkforless，inordertoswellhisprofitsintherisingmarket。
　　Ihaveendeavouredtothrowthisquestionintodifferentshapes，thebettertoapplydifferentprinciplestoit；anduponthewhole，Imustdeterminethatproportionaltaxeswill，First，Undoubtedlyraisethepriceofeverycommodityuponwhichtheyareproperlyandimmediatelyimposed；andiftheybelaiduponbread，andotherarticlesofnourishment，theywilldirectlyraisethepriceofthesearticlesinproportion；butthepriceoflabourwillberaisedconsequentlyonly，andaccordingtocircumstances。
　　Thatiftaxesbelaidupontheday’slabourofaman，theywillraisethepriceofthatday’slabour。WhatImeanbythis，is，thatifeveryonewhoemploysamanforaday，wereobligedtopayapennytothestate，forapermissiontoemployhim，theemployerwouldchargeapennymoreatleastupontheday’sworkperformedbythelabourer。Wereataxequivalenttoitlaidonthelabourerbytheyear，itwouldbeofacumulativeandarbitrarynature，andwouldnotraisethepriceofhiswagesinproportion；butwereitlaidupontheworkmanatapennyaday，andlevieddaily，inthiscase，hemightraisehiswagesinproportion。Butthisisnotthepracticeanywhere。
　　Secondly，Thepriceofsubsistence，whetheritbeinfluencedornotbytheimpositionoftaxes，doesnotdeterminethepriceoflabour。Thisisregulatedbythedemandforthework，andthecompetitionamongtheworkmentobeemployedinproducingit。
　　Thirdly，Ifwagesrisebeyondthephysical-necessaryoftheworkman，theymaybebroughtdownbymultiplyinghands，butneverbyloweringthepriceofnecessaries；becauseeverymanwillmakeaprofitofthelowprice，butwillregulatehisgainbytherateofdemandforhislabour。
　　Fourthly，If，therefore，thepriceofhisphysical-necessaryberaiseduponhimbytheeffectoftaxes，hemustworkthehardertomakeitup。
　　Fifthly，Ifhandsincrease，afterheisreducedtohisphysical-necessary，thewholeclassofthemanufacturerswillbeforcedtostarve。
　　Sixthly，Theincreaseofhandsmeansnomorethantheaugmentationofthequantityofworkproduced。If，therefore，thesamehandsworkmorethanformerly，itisthesamethingasiftheirnumberswereincreased。
　　Fromthesepositionsitseemstoresult，thatwheneveritisfoundthatmanufacturersenjoywagesmorethaninproportiontotheirphysical-necessarythroughtheyear，reckoneduponthegeneralaverageofmarriedmenandbatchelors，themethodforreducingthemtotheproperstandard，iseithertomultiplyhands，ifyouwanttoreducepricesinyourownmarket，ortoaugmentthepriceoftheirphysical-necessary，ifyouwouldhavethemremainthesame。Whenthehandsemployedarereallydiligent，andpricesstilltoohigh，thenitmaybeexpedienttoincreasetheirnumbers，providedtheyenjoyconsiderableprofits。
　　Thiswillcutoffconsolidatedprofits，andlowerthepriceofcommodities；becauseitwillaugmentthesupply。
　　Whenthehandsemployedarenotdiligent，thebestexpedientistoraisethepriceoftheirsubsistence，bytaxingit。Bythisyouneverwillraisetheirwages，untilthemarketcanaffordtogiveabetterpricefortheirwork。If，whentheyarebroughttobefullyemployed，youwouldhavethepriceoflabourtosinkuniversally，youmusttakeoffsomeoftheimpositionswhichaffectsubsistence，andatthesametimegraduallythrowinfreshhands，inordertopromotecompetition，whichalonewillforcethemtolowertheirpricesinproportion。Thewholedelicacyofthisoperationistopreventcompetitionamongtheindustriousfromtakingplaceaftertheyarereducedtomoderateprofits；andtopromotecompetitionamongthem，ortoraisethepriceoftheirsubsistence，untiltheybebroughttotheproperstandard。Havinginsistedsofullyupontheseprinciplesinthexviiithchapterofthesecondbook，Ihererefertoit。
　　Ihavesaid，thatthepriceofworkisnotregulatedbythepriceofsubsistence，butbythepriceofthemarketforthework。NowIsay，thatthepriceofthemarketmayinagreatmeasurebeinfluencedbythepriceofsubsistence。Thisisanewcombination。
　　Thefirstpropositionisundeniable。Thepriceofthemarketatalltimesregulatesthepriceofwork；becauseitregularlymakesitfluctuate，inproportiontoitsownfluctuations。Theprice，again，ofsubsistenceinfluencesitonly；becausetwocircumstancesmaydestroyitseffect。Ahighdemandforworkwillraisethepriceofwagesinyearsofplenty；alowdemandwillsinkthepriceofwagesinyearsofscarcity。Whenthereforeitissaid，thatthepriceofsubsistenceinfluencestherateofmarkets，weonlymean，thattheaveragepriceofsubsistence，whengoodandbadyearsaretakentogether，haveacertaininfluenceinregulatingprices。Butthisaveragepriceofsubsistencecannoteverywhereregulatethevalueofwork，astheaveragepriceofaship’scargocanregulatethepriceofeverypartofit；becausethevariationsinthepriceofsubsistencehavenotefficacysufficienttooverbalancethevariationsinthestateofdemand。
　　Couldaplanbeconcerted，eithertopreservethepriceofgrainatoneuniformstandard，orwithinthelimitsof15orperhaps20percentatalltimes；andwerethistobeexecutedbytheassistanceofataxatonetime，andabountyasitwereatanother；itwouldcertainlyhaveanadmirableeffectineveryindustriousnation。Itwouldinamannertakeawaythedifferencebetweengoodandbadyears。Theindustriousfindingthemselvessubsistedatalltimesnearlyatthesameexpence，wouldnotfeelthosealternatemotivestobeidleandextravagantatonetime，anddiligentandsoberatanother。
　　Ihaveenlargedsomuchuponthenatureofthisfirstinconvenienceproceedingfromproportionaltaxes，thatIhaveleftmyselfverylittletosayastothesecond，whichis，Secondly，Thattheydiscourageconsumption，byraisingpricestoohighforpeopleofamiddlingrankinlife。
　　Inanswertothis，Imustobserve，thatalltheamountofproportionaltaxesisrefundedtotheindustriousconsumer，sofarastheyareraisedonarticlesnecessaryforhissubsistence；
　　andwhenheiseitheridle，orconsumesasuperfluity，heisclassedalongwiththeidleandrich。Nowiftherateofmarketpricesbehigh，relativelytotheincomeofcertainindividuals，itcanonlybebecausethesupplyofthethingstheywanttoconsumeisnotabovetheproportionofthedemandofthosewhoarericher。
　　If，therefore，therateofthemarketaffordsuchprofitstomanufacturersastorenderthemidleandluxurious，howcantheaugmentationoftheseprofits，bytheabolitionoftaxes，andconsequentdiminutionofthepriceofsubsistence，everdiminishthecompetitionoftherich，unlessthesupplybeaugmented？
　　Butifthehighpricesofourownmarketscutoffthedemandofstrangers，theneveryprinciplelaiddowninthe1othand18thchaptersofthesecondbook，mustbeappliedtobringthemdown:
　　andasfarastaxes，whichareimposedeithertosupplytheexigenciesofthestate，ortocutoffconsolidatedprofits，enjoyedbymanufacturersinconsequenceofourownextravagance，havecontributedeithertoraisethem，ortosupportthemwhenraised，abovetheforeignstandard，afullequivalent，inthewayofbounty，mustbegivenforthem，inordertobringtheexportationpriceofgoodsbelowthelevelofforeigncompetition。
　　Icomenowtothelastinconvenienceallegedagainstproportionaltaxes，towit，theexpenceofcollectingthem，andtheoppressionwhichisaconsequenceofthemanyrestrictionslaiduponliberty，inordertopreventfrauds。
　　Astotheexpenceofcollection，itisentirelyinproportiontothedispositionofthepeopletodefraudthepublic。
　　InFrance，thecollectingofthebranchesofcumulativetaxes，suchasthegeneralreceipts，comprehendingthetaille，poll-tax，&c。coststhestatenolessthan10percentortwosolsinthelivre，whichissuperaddedtothoseimpositions，inordertodefraythatexpence。WhereasinEnglandtheexpenceofcollectingtheexciseadministeredbycommissioners，whoactforthepublic，notbyfarmerswhoactforthemselves，doesnotcostabove5l。12s。6d。inthe100l。
　　Thismatteroffactissufficienttoprove，thatexcises，whenunderaproperadministration，arenotsoveryexpensiveinthecollectionasisgenerallyimagined；andtheywouldstillbeattendedwithlessexpence，weresomeproperalterationsmadeinthepresentmethodofimposingthem。Thiswillappearaswegoalong。
　　Theoppressionoflevyingexcisesdoesnot，inanyproportion，somuchaffectthosewhoreallypaythem，asthosewhoadvancethemonlyfortheconsumers。
　　Thisdistinctionwhichwehavealreadymade，willappearwellfounded，uponexaminingthecomplaintswhicharecommonlymadeagainstthecollectorsofthisduty。
　　WehaveseenhowinthetaxesuponsaltandtobaccoinFrance，therearenodutiescollecteduponthepeople；thefarmersofthesalthaveallthesaltmarshesandsaltpitsassignedtothembytheKing；noperson，notprivileged，isallowedtomakesaltfortheconsumptionofthoseprovinceswhicharesubjectedtotheGabelle。
　　Inlikemannerthedistributionandsaleoftobaccoisexclusivelyvestedinthehandsofthefarmers:theybuyiteitherfromGreatBritain，orfromtheDutchatsecondhand；theymanufactureitthemselves，andsellitoverallFrance，atthepricesetuponitbytheKing；andwesaw，thatduringthelastwar，theypaidthirtymillionsdown，forapermissiontoraisethepriceofit10percentduringtenyears。Thispricefixeduponthesaleoftobacco，answersexactlytowhatweknowunderthenameofassize，whichoughtconstantlytoattendallexcises:6*forwantofobservingexactlythisregulation，thepublicansandvictuallersinEnglandraisedthepriceoftheirstrongbeeronehalf-pennyperquart，inconsequenceofanadditionaldutyofthreeshillingsperbarrelimposedanno1761，whichisattherateonlyofonefarthingperquart。7*
　　Whenthesaleofanexciseablecommodityisvestedinacompanywhomanufactureit，byexclusiveprivilege，thewholeoppressionofcollectionisavoided；becausethecompanyitselfthenpaystheduty，andtheydrawtheirreimbursementfromproportionalprofitsonthesaleofthegoods。
　　Thisisthegreatestadvantageofthefarmabovethepublicmanagementofatax。
　　Whenexcisesarelevieduponthosewhomanufacturethecommodityexcised，theoppressionofthelawsfallsuponthemanufacturers，althoughtheyadvancethetaxonly，anddrawitbackfromtheconsumersuponthesaleofthecommodity。
　　Werepeopletoreflectalittle，theywouldsoondiscoverhowgreatlyitisfortheadvantageofeveryconsumerinthekingdom，thatnofraudinthecollectionsshouldpassunobserved；becausealltheprofitsarisingfromfraudsbelongtothemanufacturer，whoinrealityisthetax-gatherer，asmuchasthefarmersinFrancearetax-gatherers，whentheyselltheirsaltandtobacco。
　　ButasthefarmersappearinthelightofKing’sofficerswhentheyprosecuteoffenders，andourcollectorsseemtobearhardonthosewithwhomwelive，peoplefoolishlyimagine，thatwerebrewers，forexample，moregentlydealtwith，beerwouldcomethecheapertothemselves。Thisisameredelusion；becausenobrewerwhateverwillsellhisbeercheaperthaneitheranassize，ortheordinaryrateobligeshimtodo，lethisprofit，fromfrauds，beeversogreat，andhisaddressincommittingthemeversosuccessful；andthelessproductivethetaxturnsouttobeintheend，themoretheotherimpositionsuponthepeoplemustbeaugmented，inordertomakeupthedeficiency。
　　Ifwecomparethereforetheoppressionofexcise-lawsfeltbythosewhoadvancetheseimpositionsonly，withtheeasewhichtheconsumersfindwhoreallypaythem，wemayjudgeoftheadvantageswhichtheproportionaltaxeshaveoverthecumulative。
　　Theexcise，aspaidbythebrewer，isreallyofthecumulativekind。Theexcisemandemandsmoneyofhim，atatimewhennoalienationtakesplace，andperhapswhenheisnotpreparedtomaketheadvanceforhiscustomers，whomustrefundittohimwithprofit:besidesthehopesofbeingabletodefraudaredisappointed，anditisalwaysdisagreeabletobedisappointedinwhatweeitherwishorhopefor。
　　Wereallmankindhonest，theinconveniencesoflevyingsuchtaxeswouldbeless；butasthisisnotthecase，methodsmustbefallenupontodisappointtheintentionofcommittingfraud。Theonlywaytoaccomplishthis，is，torenderifdifficultanddangerous:butwhileeveryindividualhasalibertytomanufactureanexciseablecommodityinwhateverplacehethinksfittoenter，thatistodeclaretobesetapartforthatpurpose；wheneveryonehasalibertytosellliquors，which，uponretailonly，aresubjectedtoexciseasisthecaseinFrancemustnotcollectorsbemultipliedinproportiontotheoccupationwhichsuchpolicyimplies？Andwillnotthesecollectorsopposefraudstofrauds，inordertoprofitbythem，attheexpenceofthemerchantormanufacturer？Thiswillsowdiscordandhatredbetweentwoclassesofthesamesociety，andtherebythestateishurt。Alldiscordhurtsastate，asitdoesaprivatefamily。
　　Itisoutofmywaytolaydownplansforpreventingsuchinconveniences。Itwouldrequireanintimateknowledgeofeverycircumstancerelatingtothecountryforwhichtheremedyisintended。
　　Ishallthereforeendeavouronlytothrowoutsomeusefulhints，bymentioningtheimpositionswheretheinconveniencesinlevyingaretheleast；andbycomparingthesewithotherimpositions，wheretheoppressioninlevyingappearstobegreater，thecontrastofcircumstanceswillsuggesttheprinciplesuponwhichaplanmaybeformed。
　　Therearemanymorefraudsanddifficultiesincollectingexcisesinthecountrythanincities，fromthenumberofmanufacturersemployedinthem。ItisjustsowiththeaidesinFrance，fromthenumberofretailers。Thereareveryfewfraudsandlittledifficultyingatheringthemalt-tax；becausetheobjectisunwieldy，andtheplacesofmanufacturearefewer。
　　ThefraudsupontobaccoandsaltinFrance，donotproceedfromthosewhomanufacturethem，butfromthosewhointroduceforeigngoodstosupplytheplaceofthosemanufacturedbythecompany。Thisshewsthatexcisesshouldbemadeasgeneralaspossibleoveracountry；becauselocalexemptionsintroduce，asitwere，aforeigncountryintothecenterofastate。
　　Stamp-dutiesareseldomdefraudedbyforgingthestamp；butinFrance，wheretheyextendtoalmosteverydeedofalienation，thepublicisdefraudedbyprivatebargains。
　　Customsaredefraudedbythelibertygiventotradeineveryport；andfromthewantofconvenientpublicmagazines，toserveasaproperrepositoryforallgoodsbroughtbysea。
　　Itmayfurtherbesaid，ingeneral，thatfraudsaremostfrequentuponthenewestablishmentoftaxes；thatthosewhocomplainmostoftheoppressionofthem，arepreciselythosewhohavetheleastreasonforit；andthatthecauseoftheircomplaintproceedsratherfromtheinconvenienceinpayingtheirtaxeswhentheyarenotprepared，andthedisappointmentindefrauding，thanfromanyrealoppressionarisingfromthelawsofexcise:thehardshipsoftheselawsareowingtothenecessityofgeneralrulesforpreventingfrauds；andsuchruleswouldbeunnecessary，couldthelibertyofcommittingfraudsbecircumscribed。
　　Oneverygoodmethodofraisingproportionaltaxes，withoutgreatexpenceoroppression，whenthesituationofacountrywilladmitofit，istolevynosuchduties，butatthegatesoftownsandvillages，whichinthislightappeartobepoliticalinclosures。Atthesegateseveryproduceofthelands，andeverymanufacturenotmadeinthetown，mightpayataxuponcomingin；
　　everymanufacturemadeinthetown，mightpayataxongoingout:
　　allfruitsconsumedinthecountrymightbefree；allmanufacturesmadeandconsumedinthetownsmightbefreealso。
　　Ifweconsiderthequantityofexchangebetweentheinhabitantsoftownsandthoseofthecountry，andbetweentownandtown；
　　thisregulation，Ibelieve，willbefoundsufficienttoraisemoremoneybyproportionaltaxesthanwhatisraisedinanycountryinEurope。
　　Asecondmethodofdiminishingtheexpence，andalsotheburdenofproportionaltaxes，istoexactnothingofthemanufacturersofexciseablegoods，buttoprohibitthedeliveryofthemtoanyonewhodoesnotpresentapermitfromtheexciseoffice，signifyingthatthetaxhasbeenpaid。ThisisthemethodobservedintheAustrianlowcountries，whereexcisesarecarriedtoaverygreatheight。Therethetransportersorcarriersofexciseablegoods，areformedintoacorporation，andnoneelsedaretotransportthem。
　　Whoeverhasseentheexecutionoftheseregulationswillnotbeveryfondofthem；buttheinconvenienceswhichoccurproceedfromthepoliticalsituationofallthesetowns，thepublicdebtsofwhicharesoenormous，thattopaytheinterestofthemexciseshavebeencarriedsohighastobanishmanufacturersintothecountry，wherefewexcisesarelevied。Itisfromthecountryandmanyconsiderablevillages，whichhavenottheprivilegeofrunningindebt，thatthemanufacturesofthatcountryarecarriedon。NoindustriousmancanaffordtoliveinthetownsoftheAustrianNetherlands，excepthewhosuppliestheirconsumption；andinnoplace，Iknowof，isworksodearasthere。
　　Weregreatexcisesleviedthereuponthefurnishersoftheexciseablegoods，asisthecaseinGreatBritain，andwereaslittlerestraintlaidupontheirfrauds，thosedutieswouldnotproducewhattheydo；andtheoppressionwouldbeintolerable；
　　whereasbythepolicyestablished，nothingbutthehighpriceofgoodsiscomplainedof。Athirdmethodofavoidingbothexpenceandoppressioninlevyingproportionaltaxes，wouldbetoconfinethefabricationofallarticleschargedwiththemtocertainplacesproperlyenclosed。Werethoseundertakingsfewandlarge，werespaciousmagazinesofallsortsprepared，atthepublicexpence，inallsea-porttowns，andsurroundedwithwalls，anentirelibertymightbeallowedwithintheinclosures，andnoquestionswouldbeasked，butongoinginandcomingout。Undersuchregulationsastatewouldreapgreatbenefit。First，Therewouldbeconsiderablesavingsincollecting。Secondly，Therewouldbegreatsavingsonthenumberofhandsemployedinmanufacturing:fortymen，inalargebrew-house，makemorebeerthananhundreddisposedastheyareincountryvillages。Thisresemblestheintroductionofmachinesintomanufactures。
　　Theobjectionfromtheinfringementoflibertyismoreapretext，inordertofacilitatefraud，thananythingelse。Arenotthosewhomanufactureexciseablecommodities，theservantsofthestate？Aretheynoteventhecollectorsofthepublicrevenue？Withwhatfacethencantheypretendtobeindulgedinthemeansofdefraudingtheircustomersofthosetaxeswhichtheywishtoputintotheirownpockets，bywithholdingthemfromthepublic。Haslibertyanyothermeaning，butanentirepermissiontodowhateverisnotforbidbygeneralandwholesomelaws，calculatedfortheuniversalgoodofthesociety；andshallthisclassofmen，whoareenrichingthemselvesasmuchbytheprofitstheyhaveinadvancingthetaxes，asbytheirindustry，beconsideredinasfavourablealightasanotherwhoispayingacumulativetaxoutofhisincome，onefarthingofwhichhenevercandrawback？
　　Ifanyoneshouldmisinterpretthedoctrineofthischapter，Imustputtheminmindofmyoriginalplan，whichwastokeepconstantlyinviewthosevirtuousstatesmenwhothinkofnothingbutthegoodoftheirsubjects。Taxesandimpositionsintheirhands，arethewealthofthefatherofthefamily；whotherewithfeeds，clothes，providesfor，anddefendseveryonewithinhishouse。Theincreaseoftaxesonthissuppositionisnationaloeconomy，asshallbeafterwardsshewn；fraudsarethetheftsofservantsimpairingthepublicgood，andparticularlythemeansofself-defenceagainsttheincroachmentsofambitiousneighbours。
　　Asitisthedutyofeverystatesmantomakehispeoplehappyandflourishing，perhapsthespeculationsofonewhoseonlyinterestinthrowingthemuponpaperistofilluphisleisureagreeably，maysometimeorothertendtopromotesogloriousapurpose。
　　Chap。VI
　　CumulativeandproportionalTaxescomparedwithoneanother，andfartherexaminedAfterexaminingseparatelythenatureandeffectsofcumulativeandproportionaltaxes，itremains，forthemorefullunderstandingofthissubject，tocomparethemtogether；thebettertofindoutwhereintheyreallydiffer，andhowfarthedifferenceisapparentonly。
　　Ithasbeenobserved，thatasthepaymentoftaxesismadeinmoney，thispaymentcandiminishnopartoftheproduceofeitherland，orindustry；thewholeamountoftheseremainsentiretothesubjectsofthestate。
　　Taxesthenarepaideitheroutofthemoneywhichcirculatesinthepurchaseofproduceandmanufactures；oroutoftheincomearisingfromsolidproperty:fromwhichwehaveconcludedthatthoseoftheproportionalkindmustconstantlybeconfinedwithinacertainproportiontoalienation。Wehavealsoobserved，thattheimpositionoftaxesaugmentsthemassofcirculation，andmakesitrequisiteforastatesmantocontrivesomemethodforincreasingmoneyinproportiontotheirincrease。Ihopethesepropositionshaveacquiredanadditionalconfirmation，fromwhathasbeenalreadysaidintheprecedingchapters。
　　Wehavealsoseenhowtheamountofproportionaltaxesisultimatelytakenfromthesuperfluityoftherich，whomwehavecalledtheidleconsumers:andhowtheyareadvancedbyonesetoftheindustrious，andrefundedbyanother，untilatlasttheyfalluponthosewhocannotdrawthembackfromanybody。Theselasthavebeensaidtopaythetaxes，theotherstoadvancethemonly。
　　Werewethereforetosupposealldesireofdefraudingoutoftheway，weshouldfindthewholeburdenofproportionaltaxesconfinedtotheinconvenienceofadvancingtheiramountbytheindustrious，andtothepaymentofthembytherich，whichproportionallydiminishestheirincome。Wherecreditthereforeiswellestablished，wherepaymentsareregularlymadebybuyerstosellers，andwherepeopleproportiontheirexpencetotheirfreeincome，theweightofproportionaltaxeswillbeverysmall。I
　　appealtoexperienceforthetruthofthis。
　　Letusnextexaminethenatureofcumulativetaxes，aswehavecalledthem，inordertodistinguishthemfromtheothers。
　　Inthese，alienationisnotnecessaryatthetimetheyarepaid；fromwhichitfollows，that，inmanycases，theycannotbedrawnback。Whenamanpayshisland-taxoutofhisrent，whatremainstohimwillnotbuymoreofanythingthanifhehadpaidnothing。Nay，werethestatetoindulgehimandtakehistaxincorn，thecornwhichremainstohimwouldnotbearanadvancedprice，unlessthestateshouldexportthequantityhehadgiven；
　　andthenindeed，bydiminishingthesupply，itmightraisethepriceofgrainingeneral；buteveryonehavinggraintosellwouldprofitoftheriseupontheprice，aswellasthelandlord，whosesharedoesnotcommonlyamounttoonethirdofthecrop。
　　Butwereacumulativetaxsoleviedastopreventtheproprietorfromspendingwhatthestateintendstomakehimpayoutofhisincome，hewhopaysitwouldtherebyacquireonegreatalleviationofhisburden。
　　Ihavesaidthatwhenabrewerpaystheexcise，thetax，astohim，isofthecumulativenature。Itissoinacertaindegree，nodoubt，asmaybeseenwithoutfartherexplanation；butitstillsofarretainsitsownnatureastobeeasilydrawnbackfromtheconsumer。ButhowcanasoldierdrawbackthetaxhepaystoChelsea？
　　Fromthismaterialdistinctionbetweenthetwoimpositions，I
　　conclude，thatnoobjectioncanlieagainstproportionaltaxes，sofarastheyaffecttheindustrious；becausetheydrawthemcompletelyback:andthatgreatobjectionslieagainstcumulativetaxes，whentheyaffecttheindustrious，becausetheycannotdrawthembackatall；andconsequently，theymayaffectthephysical-necessaryofthecontributor，incasenoprofitshouldremaintohimuponhislabour。Ontheotherhand，Ithinklittleobjectioncanbemadetocumulativetaxes，whentheyareimposeduponpossessions，whichproduceavisibleannualrevenue，cleartotheproprietor。ThisisthenatureofthedixiemesandvingtiemesinFrance；wherethewholeamountoftheperson’sincomeistakenuponproperproof，andtaxedinproportiontoit，withoutanysubsidiaryorsecondlevy’stakingplace，tomakeupadeterminatesum。
　　Cumulativetaxeswouldalsobefarlessburdensometothelowerclass，couldtheybelevied，soas，first，topreservetheproportionofthemtotheactualprofitsonindustry:secondly，tomakethatproportionsensibletothepeople:andinthelastplace，toretainthetax，insteadofallowingthemfirsttoreceiveit，andafterwardsobligingthemtorefundit。
　　Inproportionasthesethreerequisitesdonottakeplace，suchtaxesbecomegrievoustoallwhohavenofixedincome。
　　Toputataxuponaman’sdwellinghouse，inproportiontoitswindows，orhearths，whenthehouseproducesnofixedincometohim，andwhenhehasnoneindependentofit，maytakeawayapartofhisphysical-necessary。Toputataxuponhishead，ismoregrievousthantoputataxuponhishands，inproportiontowhattheydailygain。
　　Ifcumulativeandproportionaltaxesbecompared，withrespecttotheinfluencewhichtheyseverallyhaveuponouropinionsastotaxesingeneral，wefindthatbothofthemdeceivethecontributors，butindifferentways。
　　Inthecumulativetaxes，thepersonwhopaysdoesnotalwaysperceivethereasonofhispaying。Heimaginesthatheistaxedmerelybecauseitisknownthatheisabletopayacertainsum。
　　Intheproportional，thedeceitisofanothernature。Whenapersonbuysaconsumablecommodity，whichhaspaidanexcise，hedoesnotperceivethatthepricehepaysforitcomprehendsataxuponhispastgains，infavourofthepublic；butheconcludesthewholetobenecessary，inordertoprocurewhathehasaninclinationtoconsume。Anexamplewillmakethisplain。
　　Supposeataxlaiduponwheelcarriages，andthateverypersoninthestatewereliabletopayacertainsuminproportiontothenumberofcarriageshehasforhisconvenience。
　　Thetax-gatherercomesattheendoftheyearanddemandsthesum。Thepersoncomplainsthatheisnotatlibertytohaveacoachorachaisewithoutpayingdutyforit；andthatwhilehehasoccasionforonecarriageonly，andhasbutonepairofhorses，heisobligedtopayforseveralsetsofwheels。
　　Nowsupposethiscumulativetaxwereturnedintoaproportionalone，andthatwheelsweretopayastamp-duty，orthelike，inthehandsofthewheelwright。Thepriceofthemwouldimmediatelyrise。butthisrisewouldsoonbecomefamiliartothemanwhohasthecarriage；andhewouldthenbenomorehurtbythisadditionalexpence，thanifithadproceededfromsomenewandexpensivefashionofwheels；inshort，wheelswouldgenerallybegintobearanadvancedprice，andverysoonnobodywouldenquirehowitcameabout，noroncecomplainofthetax。
　　Tosetthisinanotherlight，thedifferencebetweenthetwoimpositionsresemblesthatbetweenlongandshortaccounts，whichtopoorpeopleisverygreat。Whentheexpenceoflivingisinsensiblyanduniversallyaugmented，bytheeffectofproportionaltaxes，thentheindustriousman，whoenjoysneithersuperfluityoridleness，mayandcanaugmentthepriceofhisworkinproportion。ThisaugmentationformsthenapartofwhathasbeencalledhisA，whichhedrawsfullybackwhenhecomestomarket。Butifthesame，orevenalesssumberaiseduponhimbyacumulativetax，itcomesuponhimattheendoftheyear，orattheendofthequarter，andlethimbeeversoprovident，hecannotdrawitback，orraisethepriceofhiswork，becauseoftheunequalcompetitionofotherpeopleofhisownclass，whofromavarietyofcircumstances，cannotallbesoequallyloadedbythecumulativeasbytheproportionaltaxes。Besides，theymaynotbesoprovidentashimselfandmayworkforsubsistence，withoutmakinganyallowanceforwhattheyaretopaythestateattheendoftheyear。Thusadoubleinconvenienceensues。Theindustriouspoorareoppressedbythetax-gatherers，andthetaxisilllevied。Intheothercase，thefirstneverseeatax-gatherer，andthemoneyispaid。Besidestheseadvantagesinfavourofproportionaltaxes，thereisstillanother，thatifthistaxbeimproperlylaidon，thedefectwillmanifestitselfbycheckingconsumptiononly；whereasintheothercase，itwillbeknownbythedistressalsooftheindividuals。
　　Ifthelibertynottoconsumebetakenaway，asinthegabelleinsomeprovincesinFrance，thentheimpositionchangesitsnatureandbecomesacumulativetax，asmaybeeasilyperceived。8*
　　Ithasbeensaid，thatsofarasthethreeinconveniencesofthecumulativetaxescanbeprevented，theyceasetobeoppressive。Fromwhichweseethereasonwhyexcisesaresoeasilypaidwhenthosewhomanufacturethecommoditieschargedwiththem，arecontentedtocompoundforthem。Thischangesthetaxintooneofthecumulativekind；butgivesiteveryrequisitetomakeiteasy。Letmetakeanexample。
　　Abrewerwhopaysexciseforallhebrews，isexposedtothedailyvisitoftheexcise-man，towhomhepaystheduty。Herethebrewer’simpositionparticipatesofseveraloftheinconveniencesattendingcumulativetaxes。Butletmesupposethatafteracertaintimehefindsthat100l。istheannualamountofhisexcise。Ifhemakeacompositionforitatthisrate，hecomesunderaregularcumulativecomposition，witheveryadvantage。Hethinksnomoreoffrauds；henomoregrudgeswhathepays；andbecomesinamannercollectorofthatimperceptibledutyadvancedbyhim，andpaidbyallhiscustomers。
　　Theeasymethodoftransformingthosetaxesintooneanother，shewstheirresemblancesufficiently，andthedifferenceswhichwehavepointedout，shewtheprincipleswhichregulatethepropermannerofimposingthem。
　　Chap。VII
　　ConsequencesofTaxeswhentheAmountofthemisproperlyappliedWehavenowseentheobjectsaffectedbytaxes，andtheinconvenienceswhichresulttothosewhoareobligedtopaythem。
　　Itcomesnexttobeexamined，whethertaxesofallkindsbenotagreatloaduponapeople，agrievousinfringementoftheirliberty，themeansofbringingmanyhonestandindustriouspeopletogreatdistress，andagreatdiscouragementtomarriage。I
　　answerwithouthesitation，thattaxesmaybe，andmostcommonlyareaccompaniedwithalltheseandmanymoreinconveniences；butImustadd，thattheyproceedfromtheabuse，andnotfromthenatureoftaxes。
　　Inmyinquiries，Ihaveconstantlyinmyeye，howmanmaybegoverned，andneverhowheisgoverned。Howarighteousandintelligentstatesmanmayrestrainthelibertyofindividuals，inordertopromotethecommongood；neverhowanignorantandunrighteousstatesmanmaydestroypublicliberty，forthesakeofindividuals。
　　Raisingmoneybytaxesmustalwaysbeburdensome，lessormore，tothosewhopayit；andtheadvantagesresultingfromtaxescanproceedonlyfromtherightapplicationofthemoneywhenitisraised。
　　Whenindividualsonlydrawaprofitfromtheinconvenienceoftaxes，thepublicloses，nodoubt；becausetaxesarepaidfortheadvantageofthepublic，notforthatofprivatepeople。Ifthemoneyraisedbemorebeneficiallyemployedbythestate，thanitwouldhavebeenbythosewhohavecontributedit，thenIsaythepublichasgained，inconsequenceoftheburdenlaiduponindividuals；consequently，thestatesmanhasdonehisduty，bothinimposingthetaxes，andinrightlyexpendingthem。
　　Taxes，inthislastview，maybeconsideredasasavingoutofeveryprivatefortune，inordertoprocureapublicfundtobeexpendedforthepublicbenefit。
　　Ihavefrequentlyrecoursetothefamiliarexamplesofprivateoeconomy，inordertomakeapplicationsfromittothepolitical；which，howeverdifferentitmayappear，willbefoundeasilydeduciblefromthesameprinciples。
　　Letmesupposetwopersons，AandB，livinginthesameneighbourhood，ofthesamerankandfortune，enjoyinggreatsuperfluity，butspendingyearlythewholeoftheirincomeindifferentways。
　　Lettheincomeofbothbesupposedtobe2100l。sterling；
　　andletthebranchesoftheirexpenceberangedundersixdifferentheads。LetAbesupposedtospenduponthefirst100
　　l。onthesecond200l。onthethird300l。onthefourth400l。
　　onthefifth500l。onthesixth600l。inall2100l。
　　LetussupposeAtoenjoyineveryoneanamplesufficiency。
　　B，ontheotherhand，spendsuponhisfirstarticle1600l。
　　anduponeachoftheotherfive，nomorethan100l。HerethefirstarticleofB’sexpenceissixteentimesgreaterthananyoftherest；andbythesupposition，100l。issupposedtodenoteanamplesufficiencyuponeacharticle。
　　IcometoA，andIsaytohim，youdisapproveoftheextravaganceofyourneighbourBuponhisfirstarticleofexpence，wherehespendssixteenpartsofhisincome，andwhereyouspendbutone；andyetyoumustallowthatuponeveryotherarticleofhisexpence，heisabetteroeconomistthanyou。Woulditnotbeforyourinteresttobringtheotherarticlesofyourexpencedowntohisstandard，withoutincreasinganythinguponyourfirstarticle，whichisalreadywithinthecompassofwhatmaybecalledsufficient。
　　Towhatpurpose，saysA，wouldyouadvisemetosostrictanoeconomy？AndwhatshouldIdowithsogreatasavingonmyannualincome？Beinnopainaboutthat。Ishalllayitoutforyouindischargingyourdebts；inprovidingforyourchildren，andgivingthemagoodeducation；inimprovingyourestate；
　　repairingyourhouse；makingupyourinclosures；allshallbeusefullyspent；andoutof600l。ayear，youshallhaveeverythingnecessaryforyourfamily。
　　Hereistherepresentationofaschemebetweenagoodstatesmanandapeoplewhoseinterestheconsults。
　　Aftertheimpositionoftaxes，theindividualsofastate，whohavealreadyadeterminateincome，begintopaygreatlymorethantheyusedtodoforeverythingtheyconsume。Agreatpartofthisadditionalpricegoestothepublic，andistherebylaidoutfornationalpurposes。Thewholeofsuchexpencesisthrownintocirculation，asmuchasiftherichproprietorshadlaiditoutthemselvesuponarticlesentirelyadaptedtotheirowntaste。
　　Isitnotevident，thatinthiswayofappropriatingtheincomeofacountry，itmustproduceamoreextensiveencouragementtoindustryofallkinds，thaniftheproprietorsonlyhadspentit？Theyneverwouldhavethoughtofbecomingmerchants，orofsettingupmanufacturesforthesupplyofforeignmarkets:theirwholeexpencewouldhavebeencalculatedtosupplytheirownwantsrealorimaginary；anditwouldhavebeenindifferenttothemwhethertheseweresuppliedbynativesorbystrangers。
　　Letusapplythisdoctrinetocommonexperience。Letuscomparethenatureofcirculationinatradingtown，withthatofacountryplace，wheremanygentlemenoflargefortunesreside。
　　Howextensivetheobjectsofthefirst！howcontractedthoseofthelatter！
　　Letuscompareagaintheexigenciesofgovernment，withthoseofatradingcity，whatavarietyofnewwantshereoccurtobesupplied，whichthecitynevercouldhaveoccasionfor？