Iftheaboveresult——thesatisfactionofthedemandwithAexcluded——hadbeenaccomplished,perchance,bytheinvestmentofmorethandoublethecapitalinCorD,orinboth,thenthematterwouldassumeadifferentaspect。Forexample,ifthethirdinvestmentofcapitalweremadeinC:
TABLEIVaTypeofsoilAcresCapital£;Profit£;PriceofProd。£;OutputQrsSellingprice£;Proceeds£;RentRateofSurplusProfitInGrainQrsInMoney£;
B1516411/26000%
C171/211/29911/2131/2341/260%
D1516811/21246120%*
Total3171/231/22121311/27101/2Inthiscase,comparedwithTableIV,theoutputfromChasrisenfrom6to9qrs,thesurplus-productfrom2to3qrs,andthemoney-rentfrom£;3to£;41/2。ComparedwithTableII,wherethelatterwas£;12,andTableI,whereitwas£;6,themoney-renthas,ontheotherhand,decreased。Thetotalrentalingrain=7qrsandhasfallencomparedwithTableII12qrsandrisencomparedwithTableI6qrs;inmoney£;101/2ithasfallencomparedwithboth£;18and£;36。
Ifthethirdinvestmentofcapitalof£;21/2hadbeenemployedonsoilB,itwouldindeedhavealteredthequantityofproduction,butwouldnothaveaffectedtherent,since,accordingtoourassumption,thesuccessiveinvestmentsdonotproduceanydifferencesuponthesamesoilandsoilBdoesnotyieldanyrent。
Ifweassume,ontheotherhand,thatthethirdinvestmentofcapitaltakesplaceuponDinsteadofC,wehavethefollowing,TableIVb:
TypeofsoilAcresCapital£;Profit£;PriceofProd。£;OutputQrsSellingprice£;Proceeds£;RentRateofSurplusProfitInGrainQrInMoney£;
B1516411/26000%
C1516611/292360%
D171/211/291211/21869120%*
Total3171/231/2212233812Herethetotalproductis22qrs,morethandoublethatofTableI,althoughtheinvestedcapitalisonly£;171/2asagainst£;10,thatis,nottwicetheamount。Thetotalproductisalsolargerby2qrsthanthatofTableII,althoughtheinvestedcapitalinthelatterislarger——namely,£;20。
ComparedwithTableI,therentingrainfromsoilDhasincreasedfrom3[IntheGerman1894editionthisreads:2。朎d。]to6qrs,whereasthemoney-rent,£;9,hasremainedthesame。ComparedwithTableII,thegrain-rentfromDisthesame,namely,6qrs,butthemoney-renthasfallenfrom£;18to£;9。
Comparingthetotalrents,thegrain-rentfromTableIVb=8qrsislargerthanthatfromTableI=6qrsandthanthatfromTableIVa=7
qrs;butitissmallerthanthatfromTable11=12qrs。Themoney-rentfromTableIVb=£;12islargerthanthatfromTableIVa=£;101/2andsmallerthanthatfromTable1=£;18andthatfromTableII=
£;36。
Inorderthatthetotalrentalmay,undertheconditionsofTableIVbwiththeeliminationofrentfromB,beequaltothatofTableI,weneed£;6moreofsurplus-product,thatis,4qrsat£;11/2,whichisthenewpriceofproduction。Wethenhaveatotalrentalof£;18
againasinTableI。ThemagnitudeoftherequiredadditionalcapitalwillvaryaccordingtowhetherweinvestitinCorD,ordivideitbetweenthetwo。
OnC,£;5capitalyields2qrsofsurplus-product;consequently,£;10additionalcapitalyields4qrsofadditionalsurplus-product。
OnD,£;5additionalcapitalwouldsufficetoproduce4qrsofadditionalgrain-rentundertheconditionsassumedhere,namelythattheproductivityoftheadditionalinvestmentsofcapitalremainsthesame。Weshouldthenobtainthefollowingresults:
TABLEIVcTypeofsoilAcresCapital£;Proft£;PriceofProd。£;OutputQrsSellingprice£;Proceeds£;RentRateofSurplusProfitQrs£;
B1516411/26000%
C1153181811/2276960%
D171/211/291211/21869120%*
Total3271/251/23334511218TABLEIVdTypeofsoilAcresCapital£;Proft£;PriceofProd。£;OutputQrsSellingprice£;Proceeds£;RentRateofSurplusProfitQrs£;
B1516411/26000%
C1516611/292360%
D1121/221/2152011/2301015120%*
Total3221/241/22730451218Thetotalmoneyrentalwouldbeexactlyone-halfofwhatitwasinTableII,wheretheadditionalcapitalswereinvestedatconstantpricesofproduction。
ThemostimportantthingistocomparetheabovetableswithTableI。
Wefindthatwhilethepriceofproductionhasfallenbyone-half,i。e。,from60shillingsto30shillingsperquarter,thetotalmoneyrentalhasremainedthesame,namely=£;18,andthegrain-renthascorrespondinglydoubledfrom6to12qrs。UponBtherenthasdisappeared;uponCthemoney-renthasrisenbyone-halfinlVc,buthasfallenbyone-halfinIVd;uponD
inIVc,ithasremainedthesame,=£;9,andhasrisenfrom£;9
to£;15inIVd。Theproductionhasrisenfrom10to34qrsinIVe,andto30qrsinIVd;theprofitfrom£;2to£;51/2inIVcandto£;4inIVd。Thetotalinvestmentofcapitalhasrisenintheonecasefrom£;10to£;271/2,andintheotherfrom£;10to£;221/2;i。e。,inbothcasesithasmorethandoubled。Therateofrent,thatis,therentcalculatedontheinvestedcapital,isinalltablesfromIVtoIVdeverywherethesameforeachkindofsoil——whichwasalreadyimpliedintheassumptionthattherateofproductivityforthetwosuccessiveinvestmentsofcapitalremainsthesameforeachsoiltype。ButcomparedwithTableIthisratehasfallen,bothfortheaverageofallkindsofsoilandforeachoneofthemindividually。InTableIitwas=180%onanaverage,whereasinIVcit=18/271/2x100=
655/11%andinIVdit=18/221/2
x100=80%。Theaveragemoney-rentperacrehasrisen。Formerly,inTableI,itsaveragewas£;41/2peracrefromallfouracres,whereasinIVcandIVditis£;6peracreuponthethreeacres。
Itsaverageupontherent-bearinglandwasformerly£;6,whereasnowitis£;9peracre。Hencethemoney-valueoftherentperacrehasrisenandnowrepresentstwiceasmuchgrainasitdidformerly;butthe12qrsofgrain-rentarenowlessthanone-halfofthetotaloutputof34and30[IntheGerman1894editionthisreads:33and27。?Ed。]
qrsrespectively,whereasinTableIthe6qrsrepresent3/5ofthetotaloutputof10qrs。Consequently,althoughtherentasanaliquotpartofthetotaloutputhasfallen,andhasalsofallenwhencalculatedontheinvestedcapital,itsmoney-valuecalculatedperacrehasrisen,andstillmoreitsvalueasaproduct。IfwetakesoilDinTablelVd,wefindthatthepriceofproductioncorrespondingtothecapitaloutlayhere=£;15,ofwhich£;121/2isinvestedcapital。Themoney-rent=£;15。InTableI,forthesamesoilD,thepriceofproductionwas=£;3,theinvestedcapital=
£;21/2,andthemoney-rent=£;9;thatis,thelatterwasthreetimesthepriceofproductionandalmostfourtimesthecapital。InTablelVd,themoney-rentforD,£;15,isexactlyequaltothepriceofproductionandlargerthanthecapitalbyonly1/5。Nevertheless,themoney-rentperacreis2/3larger,namely,£;15insteadof£;9。InTableI,thegrain-rentof3qrs=3/4ofthetotalproductof4qrs;inTableIVditis10qrs,orone-halfthetotalproduct20qrsperacreofD。
Thisshowsthatthemoney-valueandgrainvalueoftherentperacremayrise,althoughitconstitutesasmalleraliquotpartofthetotalyieldandhasfalleninproportiontotheinvestedcapital。
ThevalueofthetotalproductinTable1=£;30;therent=£;18,ormorethanone-halfofit。ThevalueofthetotalproductinIVd=£;45,ofwhichtherent=£;18,orlessthanone-half。
Now,thereasonwhyinspiteofthefallinpriceby£;11/2perquarter,i。e。,afallof50%,andinspiteofthereductionincompetingsoilfrom4to3acres,thetotalmoney-rentremainsthesameandthetotalgrain-rentisdoubled,while,calculatedperacre,boththegrain-rentandmoney-rentrise,isthatmorequartersofsurplus-productareproduced。Thepriceofgrainfallsby50%,andthesurplus-productincreasesby100%。Butinordertoobtainthisresult,thetotalproductionundertheconditionsassumedbyusmustbetrebled,andtheinvestmentofcapitalinthesuperiorsoilsmustbemorethandoubled。Atwhatratethelattermustincreasedependsinthefirstplaceuponthedistributionofadditionalcapitalinvestmentsamongthebetterandbestsoils,alwaysassumingthattheproductivityofthecapitalinvestedineachsoiltypeincreasesproportionatelytoitsmagnitude。
Ifthefallinpriceofproductionweresmaller,lessadditionalcapitalwouldberequiredtoproducethesamemoney-rent。IfthesupplyrequiredtothrowsoilAoutofcultivation-andthisdependsnotmerelyupontheoutputperacreofA,butalsoupontheshareheldbyAintheentirecultivatedarea——thus,ifthesupplyrequiredforthispurposewerelarger,andtherebyalsotheamountofadditionalinvestedcapitalrequiredinsoilsbetterthanA,then,othercircumstancesremainingthesame,themoneyandgrainrentswouldhaveincreasedstillmore,althoughsoilBwouldhaveceasedyieldingmoneyandgrainrents。IfthecapitaleliminatedfromAhadbeen=£;5,thetablestobecomparedforthiscasewouldbetablesIIandIVd。Thetotalproductwouldhaveincreasedfrom20to30
qrs。Themoney-rentwouldbeonlyhalfaslarge,or£;48insteadof£;36;thegrain-rentwouldbethesame,namely=12qrs。
Ifatotalproductof44qrs=£;66couldbeproduceduponDwithacapital=£;271/2——correspondingtotheoldrateforD,4qrsper£;21/2capital——thenthetotalrentalwouldoncemorereachthelevelattainedinTableII,andthetablewouldappearasfollows:
TypeofSoilCapital£;OutputQrsGrain-RentQrsMoney-Rent£;
B5400
C5623
D271/2442233
Total371/2542436Thetotalproductionwouldbe54qrsasagainst20qrsinTableII,andthemoney-rentwouldbethesame,=£;36。Butthetotalcapitalwouldbe£;371/2,whereasinTableIIitwas=20。
Thetotalinvestedcapitalwouldbedoublealmost,whileproductionwouldbenearlytreble;thegrain-rentwouldbedoubleandthemoney-rentwouldremainthesame。Hence,ifthepricefalls-whileproductivityremainsthesame——asaresultoftheinvestmentofadditionalmoney-capitalinthebettersoilswhichyieldrent,thatis,allsoilsbetterthanA,thenthetotalcapitalhasatendencynottoincreaseatthesamerateasproductionandgrain-rent;thustheincreaseingrain-rentmaycompensateforthelossinmoney-rentduetothefallingprice。ThesamelawalsomanifestsitselfinthattheinvestedcapitalmustbeproportionatelylargerasmoreisinvestedinCthanD,i。e。,insoilsyieldinglessrentratherthaninsoilsyieldingmorerent。Thepointissimplythis:inorderthatthemoney-rentmayremainthesameorrise,adefiniteadditionalquantityofsurplus-productmustbeproduced,andthegreaterthefertilityofthesoilsyieldingsurplus-product,thelesscapitalthisrequires。IfthedifferencebetweenBandC,andCandD,werestillgreater,stilllessadditionalcapitalwouldberequired。Thespecificproportionisdeterminedby1theratiooffallinprice,inotherwords,bythedifferencebetweensoilB,whichdoesnotyieldrentnow,andsoilA,whichformerlywasthesoilnotyieldingrent;2theratioofthedifferencesbetweenthesoilsbetterthanBupwards;3theamountofnewlyinvestedadditionalcapital,and4itsdistributionamongthesoilsofvaryingquality。
Infact,weseethatthislawmerelyexpresseswhatwasalreadyascertainedinthefirstcase:Whenthepriceofproductionisgiven,nomatterwhatitsmagnitude,therentmayincreaseasaresultofadditionalcapitalinvestment。ForowingtotheeliminationofA,wenowhaveanewdifferentialrentIwithBastheworstSoiland£;11/2perquarterasthenewpriceofproduction。ThisappliestoTableIVaswellastoTableII。Itisthesamelaw,exceptthatourpointofdepartureissoilBinsteadofA,andourpriceofproductionistakenas£;11/2insteadof£;3。
Theimportantthinghereisthis:TotheextentthatsomuchandsomuchadditionalcapitalwasnecessaryinordertowithdrawthecapitalfromsoilAandcreatethesupplywithoutit,wefindthatthismaybeaccompaniedbyanunaltered,rising,orfallingrentperacre,ifnotfromallplotsoflandthenatleastfromsome,andsofarastheaverageofthecultivatedplotsisconcerned。Wehaveseenthatgrain-rentandmoney-rentdonotmaintainauniformrelationtooneanother。Itismerelyduetotraditionthatgrain-rentisstillofanyimportanceineconomics。Onemightdemonstrateequallywellthat,e。g。,amanufacturercanbuymuchmoreofhisyarnwithhisprofitof£;5thanhecouldformerlywithaprofitof£;10。Itshowsatanyrate,thatmessieurslandlords,whentheyaresimultaneouslyownersorshareholdersinmanufacturingestablishments,sugar-refineries,distilleries,etc。,mayintheircapacityasproducersoftheirownrawmaterialsstillmakeaconsiderableprofitwhenthemoney-rentisfalling。[1]
II。Decreasingrateofproductivityoftheadditionalcapital。
Thisintroducesnothingnewintotheproblem,insofarasthepriceofproductionmayalsofallinthiscase,asinthecasejustconsidered,onlywhenadditionalinvestmentsofcapitalinbettersoilsthanArendertheoutputfromAsuperfluousandthecapitalisthereforewithdrawnfromA,orAisemployedfortheproductionofotherproducts。Thiscasehasbeenexhaustivelydiscussedabove。Itwasshownthattherentingrainandmoneyperacremayincrease,decrease,orremainunchanged。
Forconvenienceinmakingcomparisonswereproducethefollowingtable:
TABLEIV
TypeofSoilAcresCapital£;Profit£;PriceofProduction。perQrOutputQrsGrain-RentQrsMoney-RentQrsRateofSurplusProfitA121/21/231000
B121/21/211/2213120%
C121/21/21326240%
D121/21/23/4439360%
Total41010618180%averageNowletusassumethataquantityof16qrssuppliedbyB,C,andDatadecreasingrateofproductivitysufficestoexcludeAfromcultivation。
Insuchcase,TableIIIistransformedintothefollowing:
TABLEV
TypeofSoilAcresInvestmentofCapital£;Profit£;OutputQrsSellingprice£;Proceeds£;Grain-RentQrsMoney-Rent£;RateofSurplusProfitB121/221/21211/2=31/215/76000
C121/221/2132=515/784/711/224/7513/7%
D121/221/21431/2=71/215/7126/7466/71371/7%**
Total3***1516273/751/293/7942/7%average****[*IntheGerman1894editionthisreads512/5——Ed。]
[**Ibid。1371/5——Ed。]
[***Ibid。:4——Ed。]
[****Here,aswellasintablesVI,VII,VIII,IXandXthelandwhichyieldsnorentisleftoutofconsideration——Ed。]
Here,atadecreasingrateof;productivityoftheadditionalcapital,andavaryingdecreaseforthevarioussoiltypes,theregulatingpriceofproductionhasfallenfrom£;3to£;15/7。
Theinvestmentofcapitalhasrisenbyone-half-from£;10to£;15。
Themoney-renthasfallenbyalmostone-half-from£;18to£;93/7,butthegrain-renthasfallenbyonly1/12——from6qrsto51/2qrs。Thetotaloutputhasrisenfrom10to16,orby60%。Thegrain-rentconstitutesalittlemorethanone-thirdofthetotalproduct。Theadvancedcapitalistothemoney-rentas15:93/7,whereasformerlythisratiowas10
:18。
III。Risingrateofproductivityoftheadditionalcapital。
ThisdiffersfromVariantIatthebeginningofthischapter,wherethepriceofproductionfallswhiletherateofproductivityremainsthesame,merelyinthatwhenagivenamountofadditionalproduceisrequiredtoexcludesoilAthisoccursheremorequickly。
Theeffectmayvaryinaccordancewiththedistributionofinvestmentsamongthevarioussoilsforafalling,aswellasanincreasing,productivityoftheadditionalcapitalinvestments。Insofarasthisvaryingeffectbalancesoutthedifferences,oraccentuatesthem,thedifferentialrentofthebettersoils,andtherebythetotalrentaltoo,willfallorrise,aswasalreadythecaseindifferentialrentI。Inotherrespects,everythingdependsuponthemagnitudeofthelandareaandcapitalexcludedtogetherwithA,andupontherelativemagnitudeofadvancedcapitalrequiredwitharisingproductivityinordertoproducetheadditionaloutputtomeetthedemand。
Theonlypointworthwhileanalysinghere,andwhichreallytakesusbacktotheinvestigationofthewayinwhichthisdifferentialprofitistransformedintodifferentialrent,isthefollowing:
Inthefirstcase,wherethepriceofproductionremainsthesametheadditionalcapitalwhichmaybeinvestedinsoilAdoesnotaffectthedifferentialrentassuch,sincesoilA,asbefore,doesnotyieldanyrent,thepriceofitsproduceremainsthesame,anditcontinuestoregulatethemarket。
Inthesecondcase,VariantI,wherethepriceofproductionfallswhiletherateofproductivityremainsthesame,soilAwillnecessarilybeexcluded,andstillmoresoinVariantIIfallingpriceofproductionwithfallingrateofproductivity,sinceotherwisetheadditionalcapitalinvestedinsoilAwouldhavehadtoraisethepriceofproduction。Buthere,inVariantIIIofthesecondcase,wherethepriceofproductionfallsbecausetheproductivityoftheadditionalcapitalrises,thisadditionalcapitalmayundercertaincircumstancesbeinvestedinsoilAaswellasinthebettersoils。
LetusassumethatwheninvestedinsoilAanadditionalcapitalof£;21/2produces11/5qrsinsteadof1qr。
TABLEVI
TypeofSoilAcresCapital£;Profit£;PriceofProduction£;OutputQrsSellingprice£;Proceeds£;RentRateofSurplusProfitQrs£;
A121/221/216111/5=21/528/116000%
B121/221/216222/5=42/528/111221/56120%
C121/221/216333/5=63/528/111842/512240%
D121/221/216444/5=84/528/112463/518360%
4204242260131/536240%AsidefrombeingcomparedwiththebasicTableI,thistableshouldbecomparedwithTableII,whereatwo-foldinvestmentofcapitalisassociatedwithaconstantproductivity,proportionaltotheinvestmentofcapital。
Inaccordancewithourassumption,theregulatingpriceofproductionfalls。Ifitweretoremainconstant,=£;3,thentheworstsoilA,whichusedtoyieldnorentwithaninvestmentofonly£;21/2,wouldnowyieldrentwithoutworsesoilbeingbroughtundercultivation。
Thiswouldhaveoccurredduetoanincreaseintheproductivityofthissoil,butonlyforapartofthecapital,notfortheoriginalcapitalinvested。Thefirst£;3ofproductionpriceyield1qr;thesecondyield11/5qrs;buttheentireoutputof21/5qrsisnowsoldatitsaverageprice。Sincetherateofproductivityincreaseswiththeadditionalinvestmentofcapital,thispresupposesanimprovement。
Thelattermayconsistofageneralincreaseincapitalinvestedperacremorefertiliser,moremechanisedlabour,etc。,oritmaybethatonlythroughthisadditionalcapitalitisatallpossibletobringaboutaqualitativelydifferentmoreproductiveinvestmentofthecapital。Inbothcases,theinvestmentof£;5ofcapitalperacreyieldsanoutputof21/5qrs,whereastheinvestmentofone-halfofthiscapital,i。e。,£;21/5,yieldsonly1qrofproduce。TheproducefromsoilAcould,regardlessoftransientmarketconditions,onlycontinuetobesoldatahigherpriceofproductioninsteadofatthenewaverageprice,aslongasaconsiderableareaoftypeAsoilcontinuedtobecultivatedwithacapitalofonly£;21/2peracre。Butassoonasthenewrelationof£;5ofcapitalperacre,andtherebytheimprovedmanagement,becomesuniversal,theregulatingpriceofproductionwouldhavetofallto£;28/11。Thedifferencebetweenthetwoportionsofcapitalwoulddisappear,andthen,infact,thecultivationofanacreofsoilAwithacapitalofonly£;21/2wouldbeabnormal,i。e。,wouldnotcorrespondtothenewconditionsofproduction。Itwouldthennolongerbeadifferencebetweentheyieldsfromdifferentportionsofcapitalinvestedinthesameacre,butbetweenasufficientandaninsufficienttotalinvestmentofcapitalperacre。Thisshows,firstofall,thatinsufficientcapitalinthehandsofalargenumberoftenantfarmersitmustbealargenumber,forasmallnumberwouldsimplybecompelledtosellbelowtheirpriceofproductionproducesthesameeffectasadifferentiationofthesoilsthemselvesinadescendingline。Theinferiorcultivationofinferiorsoilincreasestherentfromsuperiorsoils;itmayevenleadtorentbeingyieldedfrombettercultivatedsoilofequallypoorquality,whichwouldotherwisenotbeyielded。Itshows,secondly,thatdifferentialrent,insofarasitarisesfromsuccessiveinvestmentsofcapitalinthesametotalarea,resolvesitselfinrealityintoanaverage,inwhichtheeffectsofthevariousinvestmentsofcapitalarenolongerrecognisableanddistinguishable,andthereforedonotresultinrentbeingyieldedfromtheworstsoil,butrather:1maketheaveragepriceofthetotalyieldfor,say,anacreofA,thenewregulatingpriceand2appearasalterationinthetotalquantityofcapitalperacrerequiredunderthenewconditionsfortheadequatecultivationofthesoil;andinwhichtheindividualsuccessiveinvestmentsofcapital,aswellastheirrespectiveeffects,willappearindistinguishablyblendedtogether。Itisexactlythesamewiththeindividualdifferentialrentsfromthesuperiorsoils。
Ineachcase,theyaredeterminedbythedifferencebetweentheaverageoutputfromthesoilinquestionandtheoutputfromtheworstsoilattheincreasedcapitalinvestment——whichhasnowbecomenormal。
Nosoilyieldsanyproducewithoutaninvestmentofcapital。Thisisthecaseevenforsimpledifferentialrent,differentialrentI;whenitissaidthatoneacreofsoilA,whichregulatesthepriceofproduction,yieldssomuchandsomuchproduceatsuchandsuchaprice,andthatsuperiorsoilsB,CandDyieldsomuchdifferentialproduce,andthereforesomuchandsomuchmoney-rentattheregulatingpriceofproduction,itisalwaysassumedthatadefiniteamountofcapitalisinvestedwhich,undertheprevailingconditionsofproduction,isconsiderednormal。Inthesameway,acertainminimumcapitalisrequiredforeveryindividualbranchofindustryinorderthatthecommoditiesmaybeproducedattheirpriceofproduction。
Ifthisminimumisalteredasaresultofsuccessiveinvestmentsofcapitalassociatedwithimprovementsonthesamesoil,itoccursgradually。
Solongasacertainnumberofacres,say,ofA,donotreceivethisadditionalworkingcapital,arentisproduceduponthebettercultivatedacresofAduetotheunalteredpriceofproduction,andtherentfromallsuperiorsoils,B,CandD,isincreased。Butassoonasthenewmethodofcultivationhasbecomegeneralenoughtobethenormalone,thepriceofproductionfalls;therentfromthesuperiorplotsdeclinesagain,andthatportionofsoilAthatdoesnotpossesstheworkingcapital,whichhasnowbecometheaverage,mustsellitsproducebelowitsindividualpriceofproduction,i。e。,belowtheaverageprofit。
Inthecaseofafallingpriceofproduction,thisalsooccursevenwithdecreasingproductivityoftheadditionalcapital——assoonastherequiredtotalproductissupplied,inconsequenceofincreasedinvestmentofcapital,bythesuperiorsoils,andthus,e。g。,theworkingcapitaliswithdrawnfromA,i。e。,Anolongercompetesintheproductionofthisparticularproduct,e。g。,wheat。Thequantityofcapitalwhichisnowrequired,onanaverage,tobeinvestedinthebettersoilB,thenewregulator,nowbecomesnormal:andwhenonespeaksofthevaryingfertilityofplotsofland,itisassumedthatthisnewnormalquantityofcapitalperacreisemployed。
Ontheotherhand,itisevidentthatthisaverageinvestmentofcapital,say,inEngland,of£;8peracrepriorto1848,and£;12subsequenttothatyear,willconstitutethestandardinconcludingleases。Forthefarmerexpendingmorethanthis,thesurplus-profitisnottransformedintorentforthedurationofthecontract。Whetherthistakesplaceafterexpirationofthecontractornotwilldependuponthecompetitionamongthefarmerswhoareinapositiontomakethesameextracapitaladvance。
Wearenotreferringheretosuchpermanentsoilimprovementsthatcontinuetoprovidetheincreasedoutputwiththesameorevenwithadecreasingoutlayofcapital。Suchimprovements,althoughproductsofcapital,havethesameeffectasnaturaldifferencesinthequalityoftheland。
Wesee,then,thatafactorcomesintoconsiderationinthecaseofdifferentialrentIIwhichdoesnotappearinthecaseofdifferentialrentIassuch,sincethelattercancontinuetoexistindependentlyofanychangeinthenormalinvestmentofcapitalperacre。Itis,ontheonehand,theblurringofresultsfromvariousinvestments,ofcapitalinregulatingsoilA,whoseoutputflowsimplyappearsasanormalaverageoutputperacre。Itis,ontheotherhand,thechangeinthenormalminimum,orintheaveragemagnitudeofinvestedcapitalperacre,sothatthischangeappearsasapropertyofthesoil。Itis,finally,thedifferenceinthemanneroftransformingsurplus-profitintotheformofrent。
TableVIshows,furthermore,comparedwithtablesIandII,thatthegrain-renthasmorethandoubledinrelationtoI,andhasincreasedby11/5qrsinrelationtoII;whilethemoney-renthasdoubledinrelationtoI,buthasnotchangedinrelationtoII。Itwouldhaveincreasedconsiderablyifotherconditionsremainingthesame
moreoftheadditionalcapitalhadbeenallocatedtothesuperiorsoils,orifontheotherbandtheeffectoftheadditionalcapitalonAhadbeenlessappreciable,andthustheregulatingaveragepriceperquarterfromAhadbeenhigher。
Iftheincreaseinproductivenessbymeansofadditionalcapitalshouldproducevaryingresultsforthevarioussoils,thiswouldproduceachangeintheirdifferentialrents。
Inanycase,ithasbeenshownthattherentperacre,forinstancewithadoubledinvestmentofcapital,maynotonlydouble,butmaymorethandouble——whilethepriceofproductionfallsinconsequenceofanincreasedrateofproductivityoftheadditionalcapitalinvested,i。e。,whenthisproductivitygrowsatahigherratethantheadvancedcapital。
ButitmayalsofallifthepriceofproductionshouldfallmuchlowerasaresultofamorerapidincreaseinproductivenessofsoilA。
Letusassumethattheadditionalinvestmentsofcapital,forinstanceinBandC,donotincreasetheproductivityatthesamerateastheydoforA,sothattheproportionaldifferencesdecreaseforBandCandtheincreaseinoutputdoesnotmakeupforthefallinprice。Then,comparedwithTableII,the[money]rentfromDwouldremainunchanged,andthatfromBandCwouldfall。
TABLEVIaTypeofSoilAcresCapital£;Profit£;OutputPerAcreQrsSellingpriceProceeds£;Grain-RentQrsMoney-RentQrsA121/221/2113=411/2600
B121/221/21221/2=41/211/263/41/23/4
C121/221/2135=811/21246
D121/221/21412=1611/2241218
Total420321/2161/2243/4Finally,themoney-rentwouldriseifmoreadditionalcapitalwereinvestedinthesuperiorsoilswiththesameproportionalincreaseinproductivenessthaninA,oriftheadditionalinvestmentsofcapitalinthesuperiorsoilswereeffectiveatanincreasingrateofproductivity。Inbothcasesthedifferenceswouldincrease。
Themoney-rentfallswhentheimprovementduetoadditionalinvestmentofcapitalreducesthedifferencescompletely,orinpart,andaffectsAmorethanBandC。Thesmallertheincreaseinproductivityofthesuperiorsoils,themoreitfalls。Itdependsupontheextentofinequalityproduced,whetherthegrain-rentshallrise,fallorremainstationary。
Themoney-rentrises,andsimilarlythegrain-rent,eitherwhen——theproportionaldifferenceinadditionalfertilityofthevarioussoilsremainingunaltered——morecapitalisinvestedintherent-bearingsoilsthaninrentlesssoilA,andmoreinsoilsyieldinghigherrentthaninthoseyieldinglowerrents;orwhenthefertility——theadditionalcapitalremainingequal——increasesmoreonthebetterandbestsoilsthanonA,i。e。,themoneyandgrainrentsriseinproportiontothisincreaseinfertilityofthebettersoilsabovethatofthepoorerones。
Butunderallcircumstances,thereisarelativeriseinrentwhenincreasedproductivepoweristheresultofanadditionofcapital,andnotmerelytheresultofincreasedfertilitywithunalteredinvestmentofcapital。
Thisistheabsolutepointofview,whichshowsthathere,asinallformercases,therentandincreasedrentperacreasinthecaseofdifferentialrentIontheentirecultivatedarea——themagnitudeoftheaveragerental
aretheresultofanincreasedinvestmentofCapitalinland,nomatterwhetherthiscapitalfunctionswithaconstantrateofproductivityatconstantordecreasingpricesorwithadecreasingrateofproductivityatconstantorfallingprices,orwithanincreasingrateofproductivityatfallingprices。Forourassumption:constantpriceswithaconstant,falling,orrisingrateofproductivityoftheadditionalcapital,andfallingpriceswithaconstant,falling,orrisingrateofproductivity,resolvesitselfinto:aconstantrateofproductivityoftheadditionalcapitalatconstantorfallingprices,afallingrateofproductivityatconstantorfallingprices,andarisingrateofproductivityatconstantandfallingprices。Althoughtherentmayremainstationary,ormayfall,inallthesecases,itwouldfallmoreiftheadditionalinvestmentofcapital,othercircumstancesremainingthesame,werenotaprerequisitefortheincreasedproductiveness。Theadditionalcapital,then,isalwaysthecausefortherelativelyhighrent,althoughabsolutelyitmayhavedecreased。
Footnotes[1]TheabovetablesIVatoIVdhadtoberecalculatedduetoanerrorincomputationwhichranthroughallofthem。Whilethisdidnotaffectthetheoreticalconclusionsdrawnfromthesetables,itintroduced,inpart,quitemonstrousnumericalvaluesforproductionperacre。Eventhesearenotobjectionableinprinciple。Forallreliefandtopographicalmapsitiscustomarytochooseamuchlargerscalefortheverticalthanforthehorizontal。Nevertheless,shouldanyonefeelthathisagrarianfeelingshavebeeninjuredthereby,heisatlibertytomultiplythenumberofacresbyanynumericalvaluethatwillsatisfyhim。Onemightalsochoose10,12,14,16bushels8
bushels=1quarterperacreinTable1insteadof1,2,3,4quarters,andthederivednumericalvaluesintheothertableswouldremainwithinthelimitsofprobability;itwillbefoundthattheresult,i。e。,theratioofrentincreasetocapitalincrease,isexactlythesame。Thishasbeendoneinthetablesincludedbytheeditorinthenextchapter。?F。
E。
Capital,Vol。3,Chapter47KarlMarxCAPITALVol。III
THEPROCESSOF
CAPITALISTPRODUCTIONASAWHOLEPartVI
TRANSFORMATIONOFSURPLUS-PROFIT
INTOGROUNDRENTCHAPTER47
GenesisofCapitalistGround-RentI。INTRODUCTORYREMARKS
Wemustclarifyinourmindswhereinliestherealdifficultyinanalysingground-rentfromtheviewpointofmoderneconomics,asthetheoreticalexpressionofthecapitalistmodeofproduction。Evenmanyofthemoremodernwritershavenotasyetgraspedthis,asevidencedbyeachrenewedattemptto”newly”explainground-rent。Thenoveltyalmostinvariablyconsistsinarelapseintolongout-of-dateviews。Thedifficultyisnottoexplainthesurplus-productproducedbyagriculturalcapitalanditscorrespondingsurplus-valueingeneral。Thisquestionissolvedintheanalysisofthesurplus-valueproducedbyallproductivecapital,inwhateversphereitmaybeinvested。Thedifficultyconsistsratherinshowingthesourceoftheexcessofsurplus-valuepaidthelandlordbycapitalinvestedinlandintheformofrent,afterequalisationofthesurplus-valuetotheaverageprofitamongthevariouscapitals,afterthevariouscapitalshavesharedinthetotalsurplus-valueproducedbythesocialcapitalinallspheresofproductioninproportiontotheirrelativesize;inotherwords,thesourcesubsequenttothisequalisationandtheapparentlyalreadycompleteddistributionofallsurplus-valuewhich,ingeneral,istobedistributed。
Quiteapartfromthepracticalmotives,whichproddedmoderneconomistsasspokesmenofindustrialcapitalagainstlandedpropertytoinvestigatethisquestion——motiveswhichweshallpointoutmoreclearlyinthechapteronhistoryofground-rent——thequestionwasofparamountinteresttothemastheorists。Toadmitthattheappearanceofrentforcapitalinvestedinagricultureisduetosomeparticulareffectproducedbythesphereofinvestmentitself,duetosingularqualitiesoftheearth抯crustitself,istantamounttogivinguptheconceptionofvalueassuch,thustantamounttoabandoningallattemptsatascientificunderstandingofthisfield。
Eventhesimpleobservationthatrentispaidoutofthepriceofagriculturalproduce——whichtakesplaceevenwhererentispaidinkindifthefarmeristorecoverhispriceofproduction——showedtheabsurdityofattemptingtoexplaintheexcessofthispriceovertheordinarypriceofproduction;
inotherwords,toexplaintherelativedearnessofagriculturalproductsonthebasisoftheexcessofnaturalproductivityofagriculturalproductionovertheproductivityofotherlinesofproduction。Forthereverseistrue:themoreproductivelabouris,thecheaperiseveryaliquotpartofitsproduct,becausesomuchgreateristhemassofuse-valuesincorporatingthesamequantityoflabour,i。e。,thesamevalue。
Thewholedifficultyinanalysingrent,therefore,consistsinexplainingtheexcessofagriculturalprofitovertheaverageprofit,notthesurplus-value,buttheexcessofsurplus-valuecharacteristicofthissphereofproduction;
inotherwords,notthe”netproduct”,buttheexcessofthisnetproductoverthenetproductofotherbranchesofindustry。Theaverageprofititselfisaproductformedunderverydefinitehistoricalproductionrelationsbythemovementofsocialprocesses,aproductwhich,aswehaveseen,requiresverycomplexadjustment。Tobeabletospeakatallofasurplusovertheaverageprofit,thisaverageprofititselfmustalreadybeestablishedasastandardandasaregulatorofproductioningeneralasisthecaseundercapitalistproduction。Forthisreasontherecanbenotalkofrentinthemodernsense,arentconsistingofasurplusovertheaverageprofit,i。e。,overandabovetheproportionalshareofeachindividualcapitalinthesurplus-valueproducedbythetotalsocialcapital,insocialformationswhereitisnotcapitalwhichperformsthefunctionofenforcingallsurplus-labourandappropriatingdirectlyallsurplus-value。Andwherethereforecapitalhasnotyetcompletely,oronlysporadically,broughtsociallabourunderitscontrol。Itreflectsnaï;veté;,e。g。,ofapersonlikePassyseebelow,whenhespeaksofrentinprimitivesocietyasasurplusoverprofit[Passy,Rentedusol。In:Dictionnairedel?eacute;conomiepolitique,TomeII。Paris,1854,p。511——Ed。]——
ahistoricallydefinedsocialformofsurplus-value,butwhich,accordingtoPassy,mightalmostaswellexistwithoutanysociety。
Fortheoldereconomists,whoingeneralmerelybeginanalysingthecapitalistmodeofproduction,stillundevelopedintheirday,theanalysisofrentofferseithernodifficultyatall,oronlyadifficultyofacompletelydifferentkind。Petty,Cantillon,andingeneralthosewriterswhoareclosertofeudaltimes,assumeground-renttobethenormalformofsurplus-valueingeneral,[[Petty]ATreatiseonTaxesandContributions,London,1667,pp。23-24;[RichardCantillon]Essaisurlanatureducommerceengé;neral,Amsterdam,1756——Ed。]whereasprofittothemisstillamorphouslycombinedwithwages,oratbestappearstobeaportionofsurplus-valueextortedbythecapitalistfromthelandlord。
Thesewritersthustakeastheirpointofdepartureasituationwhere,inthefirstplace,theagriculturalpopulationstillconstitutestheoverwhelmingmajorityofthenation,and,secondly,thelandlordstillappearsasthepersonappropriatingatfirsthandthesurplus-labourofthedirectproducersbyvirtueofhismonopolyoflandedproperty,wherelandedproperty,therefore;
stillappearsasthemainconditionofproduction。Forthesewritersthequestioncouldnotyetbeposed,which,inversely,seekstoinvestigatefromtheviewpointofcapitalistproductionhowlandedpropertymanagestowrestbackagainfromcapitalaportionofthesurplus-valueproducedbyitthatis,filchedbyitfromthedirectproducersandalreadyappropriateddirectly。
Thephysiocratsaretroubledbydifficultiesofanothernature。
Astheactuallyfirstsystematicspokesmenofcapital,theyattempttoanalysethenatureofsurplus-valueingeneral。Forthem,thisanalysiscoincideswiththeanalysisofrent,theonlyformofsurplus-valuewhichtheyrecognise。Therefore,theyconsiderrent-yielding,oragricultural,capitaltobetheonlycapitalproducingsurplus-value,andtheagriculturallaboursetinmotionbyit,theonlylabourproducingsurplus-value,whichfromacapitalistviewpointisquiteproperlyconsideredtheonlyproductivelabour。Theyarequiterightinconsideringthecreationofsurplus-valueasdecisive。ApartfromothermeritstobesetforthinBookIV,theydeservecreditprimarilyforgoingbackfrommerchant抯capital,whichfunctionssolelyinthesphereofcirculation,toproductivecapital,inoppositiontothemercantilesystem,which,withitscruderealism,constitutestheactualvulgareconomyofthatperiod,pushingintothebackgroundinfavourofitsownpracticalintereststhebeginningsofscientificanalysismadebyPettyandhissuccessors。Inthiscritiqueofthemercantilesystem,incidentally,onlyitsconceptionsofcapitalandsurplus-valuearedealtwith。Ithasalreadybeenindicatedpreviouslythatthemonetarysystemcorrectlyproclaimsproductionfortheworld-marketandthetransformationoftheoutputintocommodities,andthusintomoney,astheprerequisiteandconditionofcapitalistproduction。Inthissystem抯furtherdevelopmentintothemercantilesystem,itisnolongerthetransformationofcommodity-valueintomoney,butthecreationofsurplus-valuewhichisdecisive——butfromthemeaninglessviewpointofthecirculationsphereand,atthesametime,insuchmannerthatthissurplusvalueisrepresentedassurplusmoney,asthebalanceoftradesurplus。Atthesametime,however,thecharacteristicfeatureoftheinterestedmerchantsandmanufacturersofthatperiod,whichisinkeepingwiththestageofcapitalistdevelopmentrepresentedbythem,isthatthetransformationoffeudalagriculturalsocietiesintoindustrialonesandthecorrespondingindustrialstruggleofnationsontheworld-marketdependsonanaccelerateddevelopmentofcapital,whichisnottobearrivedatalongtheso-callednaturalpath,butratherbymeansofcoercivemeasures。Itmakesatremendousdifferencewhethernationalcapitalisgraduallyandslowlytransformedintoindustrialcapital,orwhetherthisdevelopmentisacceleratedbymeansofataxwhichtheyimposethroughprotectivedutiesmainlyuponlandowners,middleandsmallpeasants,andhandicraftsmen,bywayofacceleratedexpropriationoftheindependentdirectproducers,andthroughtheviolentlyacceleratedaccumulationandconcentrationofcapital,inshortbymeansoftheacceleratedestablishmentofconditionsofcapitalistproduction。Itsimultaneouslymakesanenormousdifferenceinthecapitalistandindustrialexploitationofthenaturalnationalproductivepower。Hencethenationalcharacterofthemercantilesystemisnotmerelyaphraseonthelipsofitsspokesmen。
Underthepretextofconcernsolelyforthewealthofthenationandtheresourcesofthestate,they,infact,pronouncetheinterestsofthecapitalistclassandtheamassingofrichesingeneraltobetheultimateaimofthestate,andthusproclaimbourgeoissocietyinplaceoftheolddivinestate。
Butatthesametimetheyareconsciouslyawarethatthedevelopmentoftheinterestsofcapitalandofthecapitalistclass,ofcapitalistproduction,formsthefoundationofnationalpowerandnationalascendancyinmodernsociety。
Thephysiocrats,furthermore,arecorrectinstatingthatinfactallproductionofsurplus-value,andthusalldevelopmentofcapital,hasforitsnaturalbasistheproductivenessofagriculturallabour。Ifmanwerenotcapableofproducinginoneworking-daymoremeansofsubsistence,whichsignifiesinthestrictestsensemoreagriculturalproductsthaneverylabourerneedsforhisownreproduction,ifthedailyexpenditureofhisentirelabourpowersufficedmerelytoproducethemeansofsubsistenceindispensableforhisownindividualrequirements,thenonecouldnotspeakatalleitherofsurplus-productorsurplus-value。Anagriculturallabourproductivityexceedingtheindividualrequirementsofthelaboureristhebasisofallsocieties,andisaboveallthebasisofcapitalistproduction,whichdisengagesaconstantlyincreasingportionofsocietyfromtheproductionofbasicfoodstuffsandtransformstheminto”freeheads,”asSteuart[Steuart,AnInquiryIntothePrinciplesofPoliticalEconomy,Vol。I,Dublin,1770,p。396——Ed。]hasit,makingthemavailableforexploitationinotherspheres。
Butwhatcanbesaidofmorerecentwritersoneconomics,suchasDaire,Passy,etc。,whoparrotthemostprimitiveconceptionsconcerningthenaturalconditionsofsurplus-labourandtherebysurplus-valueingeneral,inthetwilightofclassicaleconomy,indeedonitsverydeath-bed,andwhoimaginethattheyarethuspropoundingsomethingnewandstrikingonground-rent[Daire,Introduction。In:Physiocrats,1。Teil,Paris,1846;Passy,Rentedusol。In:Dictionnairedel?eacute;conomiepolitique,TomeII,Paris,1854,p。511——Ed。]longafterthisground-renthasbeeninvestigatedasaspecialformandbecomeaspecificportionofsurplus-value?
Itisparticularlycharacteristicofvulgareconomythatitechoeswhatwasnew,original,profoundandjustifiedduringaspecificoutgrownstageofdevelopment,inaperiodwhenithasturnedplatitudinous,stale,andfalse。Itthusconfessesitscompleteignoranceoftheproblemswhichconcernedclassicaleconomy。Itconfoundsthemwithquestionsthatcouldonlyhavebeenposedonalowerlevelofdevelopmentofbourgeoissociety。Thesameholdstrueofitsincessantandself-complacentruminationofthephysiocraticphrasesconcerningfreetrade。Thesephraseshavelongsincelostalltheoreticalinterest,nomatterhowmuchtheymayengagethepracticalattentionofthisorthatstate。
Innaturaleconomyproper,whennopartoftheagriculturalproduct,orbutaveryinsignificantportion,entersintotheprocessofcirculation,andthenonlyarelativelysmallportionofthatpartoftheproductwhichrepresentsthelandlord抯revenue,as,e。g。,inmanyRomanlatifundia,oruponthevillasofCharlemagne,ormoreorlessduringtheentireMiddleAgesseeVinç;ard,Histoiredutravail,theproductandsurplus-productofthelargeestatesconsistsbynomeanspurelyofproductsofagriculturallabour。Itencompassesequallywelltheproductsofindustriallabour。Domestichandicraftsandmanufacturinglabourassecondaryoccupationsofagriculture,whichformsthebasis,aretheprerequisiteofthatmodeofproductionuponwhichnaturaleconomyrests——inEuropeanantiquityandtheMiddleAgesaswellasinthepresent-dayIndiancommunity,inwhichthetraditionalorganisationhasnotyetbeendestroyed。Thecapitalistmodeofproductioncompletelyabolishesthisrelationship;aprocesswhichmaybestudiedonalargescaleparticularlyinEnglandduringthelastthirdofthe18thcentury。ThinkerslikeHerrenschwand,whohadgrownupinmoreorlesssemi-feudalsocieties,stillconsider,e。g。,aslateasthecloseofthe18thcentury,thisseparationofmanufacturefromagricultureasafoolhardysocialadventure,asanunthinkablyriskymodeofexistence。Andevenintheagriculturaleconomiesofantiquityshowingthegreatestanalogytocapitalistagriculture,namelyCarthageandRome,thesimilaritytoaplantationeconomyisgreaterthantoaformcorrespondingtothereallycapitalistmodeofexploitation。[42a]Aformalanalogy,which,simultaneously,however,turnsouttobecompletelyillusoryinallessentialpointstoapersonfamiliarwiththecapitalistmodeofproduction,whodoesnot,likeHerrMommsen,[43]discoveracapitalistmodeofproductionineverymonetaryeconomy,isnottobefoundatallincontinentalItalyduringantiquity,butatbestonlyinSicily,sincethisislandservedRomeasanagriculturaltributarysothatitsagriculturewasaimedchieflyatexport。Farmersinthemodernsenseexistedthere。
Anerroneousconceptionofthenatureofrentisbaseduponthefactthatrentinkind,partlyastithestothechurchandpartlyasacuriosityperpetuatedbylong-establishedcontracts,hasbeendraggedoverintomoderntimesfromthenaturaleconomyoftheMiddleAges,completelyincontradictiontotheconditionsofthecapitalistmodeofproduction。Ittherebycreatestheimpressionthatrentdoesnotarisefromthepriceoftheagriculturalproduct,butfromitsmass,thusnotfromsocialconditions,butfromtheearth。Wehavepreviouslyshownthatalthoughsurplus-valueismanifestedinasurplus-producttheconversedoesnotholdthatasurplus-product,representingamereincreaseinthemassofproduct,constitutessurplus-value。
Itmayrepresentaminusquantityinvalue。Otherwisethecottonindustryof1860,comparedwiththatof1840,wouldshowanenormoussurplus-value,whereasonthecontrarythepriceoftheyarnhasfallen。Rentmayincreaseenormouslyasaresultofasuccessionofcropfailures,becausethepriceofgrainrises,althoughthissurplus-valueappearsasanabsolutelydecreasingmassofdearerwheat。Conversely,therentmayfallinconsequenceofasuccessionofbountifulyears,becausethepricefalls,althoughthereducedrentappearsasagreatermassofcheaperwheat。Asregardsrentinkind,itshouldbenotednowthat,inthefirstplace,itisameretraditioncarriedoverfromanobsoletemodeofproductionandmanagingtoprolongitsexistenceasasurvival。Itscontradictiontothecapitalistmodeofproductionisshownbyitsdisappearanceofitselffromprivatecontracts,anditsbeingforciblyshakenoffasananachronism,whereverlegislationwasabletointerveneasinthecaseofchurchtithesinEngland。Secondly,however,whererentinkindpersistedonthebasisofcapitalistproduction,itwasnomore,andcouldbenomore,thananexpressionofmoney-rentinmedievalgarb。Wheat,forinstance,isquotedat40shillingsperquarter。
Oneportionofthiswheatmustreplacethewagescontainedtherein,andmustbesoldtobecomeavailableforrenewedexpenditure。Anotherportionmustbesoldtopayitsproportionateshareoftaxes。Seedandevenaportionoffertiliserenterascommoditiesintotheprocessofreproduction,whereverthecapitalistmodeofproductionandwithitdivisionofsociallabouraredeveloped,i。e。,theymustbepurchasedforreplacementpurposes;
andthereforeanotherportionofthisquartermustbesoldtoobtainmoneyforthis。Insofarastheyneednotbeboughtasactualcommodities,butaretakenoutoftheproductitselfinkind,inordertoenterintoitsreproductionanewasconditionsofproduction——asoccursnotonlyinagriculture,butinmanyotherlinesofproductionproducingconstantcapital——theyfigureinthebooksasmoneyofaccountandaredeductedaselementsofthecost-price。Thewearandtearofmachinery,andoffixedcapitalingeneral,mustbemadegoodinmoney。Andfinallycomesprofit,whichiscalculatedonthissum,expressedascostseitherinactualmoneyorinmoneyofaccount。Thisprofitisrepresentedbyadefiniteportionofthegrossproduct,whichisdeterminedbyitsprice。Andtheexcessportionwhichthenremainsformsrent。Iftherentinkindstipulatedbycontractisgreaterthanthisremainderdeterminedbytheprice,thenitdoesnotconstituterent,butadeductionfromprofit。Owingtothispossibilityalone,rentinkindisanobsoleteform,insofarasitdoesnotreflectthepriceoftheproduct,butmaybegreaterorsmallerthantherealrent,andthusmaycomprisenotonlyadeductionfromprofit,butalsofromthoseelementsrequiredforcapitalreplacement。Infact,thisrentinkind,sofarasitisrentnotmerelyinnamebutalsoinessence,isexclusivelydeterminedbytheexcessofthepriceoftheproductoveritspriceofproduction。Onlyitpresupposesthatthisvariableisaconstantmagnitude。
Butitissuchacomfortingreflectionthattheproductinkindshouldsuffice,first,tomaintainthelabourersecondly,toleavethecapitalisttenantfarmermorefoodthanheneeds,andfinally,thattheremaindershouldconstitutethenaturalrent。Quitelikeamanufacturerproducing200,000yardsofcottongoods。Theseyardsofgoodsnotonlysufficetoclothehislabourers;toclothehiswife,allhisoffspringandhimselfabundantly;butalsoleaveoverenoughcottonforsale,inadditiontopayinganenormousrentintermsofcottongoods。Itisallsosimple!
Deductthepriceofproductionfrom200,000yardsofcottongoods,andasurplusofcottongoodsmustremainforrent。Butitisindeedanaiveconceptiontodeductthepriceofproductionof,say,£;10,000from200,000yardsofcottongoods,withoutknowingthesellingprice,todeductmoneyfromcottongoods,todeductanexchange-valuefromause-valueassuch,andthustodeterminethesurplusofyardsofcottongoodsoverpoundssterling。Itisworsethansquaringthecircle,whichisatleastbasedupontheconceptionthatthereisalimitatwhichstraightlinesandcurvesimperceptiblyflowtogether。ButsuchistheprescriptionofM。Passy。
Deductmoneyfromcottongoods,beforethecottongoodshavebeenconvertedintomoney,eitherinone抯mindorinreality!Whatremainsistherent,which,however,istobegraspednaturalitersee,forinstance,KarlArnd[K。Arnd,Dienaturgemä;sseVolkswirtschaft,gegenü;berdemMonopoliengeisteunddemCommunismus,Hanau,1845,S。461-62——Ed。]andnotbydeviltriesofsophistry。Theentirerestorationofrentinkindisfinallyreducedtothisfoolishness,thedeductionofthepriceofproductionfromsomanyandsomanybushelsofwheat,andthesubtractionofasumofmoneyfromacubicmeasure。
II。LABOURRENT
Ifweconsiderground-rentinitssimplestform,thatoflabourrent,wherethedirectproducer,usinginstrumentsoflabourplough,cattle,etc。whichactuallyorlegallybelongtohim,cultivatessoilactuallyownedbyhimduringpartoftheweek,andworksduringtheremainingdaysupontheestateofthefeudallordwithoutanycompensationfromthefeudallord,thesituationhereisstillquiteclear,forinthiscaserentandsurplus-valueareidentical。Rent,notprofit,istheformherethroughwhichunpaidsurplus-labourexpressesitself。Towhatextentthelaboureraself-sustainingserfcansecureinthiscaseasurplusabovehisindispensablenecessitiesoflife,i。e。,asurplusabovethatwhichwewouldcallwagesunderthecapitalistmodeofproduction,depends,othercircumstancesremainingunchanged,upontheproportioninwhichhislabour-timeisdividedintolabour-timeforhimselfandenforcedlabour-timeforhisfeudallord。
Thissurplusabovetheindispensablerequirementsoflife,thegermofwhatappearsasprofitunderthecapitalistmodeofproduction,isthereforewhollydeterminedbytheamountofground-rent,whichinthiscaseisnotonlydirectlyunpaidsurplus-labour,butalsoappearsassuch。Itisunpaidsurplus-labourforthe”owner”ofthemeansofproduction,whichherecoincidewiththeland,andsofarastheydifferfromit,aremereaccessoriestoit。Thattheproductoftheserfmustheresufficetoreproducehisconditionsoflabour,inadditiontohissubsistence,isacircumstancewhichremainsthesameunderallmodesofproduction。Foritisnottheresultoftheirspecificform,butanaturalrequisiteofallcontinuousandreproductivelabouringeneral,ofanycontinuingproduction,whichisalwayssimultaneouslyreproduction,i。e。,includingreproductionofitsownoperatingconditions。Itisfurthermoreevidentthatinallformsinwhichthedirectlabourerremainsthe”possessor”ofthemeansofproductionandlabourconditionsnecessaryfortheproductionofhisownmeansofsubsistence,thepropertyrelationshipmustsimultaneouslyappearasadirectrelationoflordshipandservitude,sothatthedirectproducerisnotfree;alackoffreedomwhichmaybereducedfromserfdomwithenforcedlabourtoameretributaryrelationship。Thedirectproducer,accordingtoourassumption,istobefoundhereinpossessionofhisownmeansofproduction,thenecessarymateriallabourconditionsrequiredfortherealisationofhislabourandtheproductionofhismeansofsubsistence。
Heconductshisagriculturalactivityandtheruralhomeindustriesconnectedwithitindependently。Thisindependenceisnotunderminedbythecircumstancethatthesmallpeasantsmayformamongthemselvesamoreorlessnaturalproductioncommunity,astheydoinIndia,sinceitisheremerelyaquestionofindependencefromthenominallordofthemanor。Undersuchconditionsthesurplus-labourforthenominalownerofthelandcanonlybeextortedfromthembyotherthaneconomicpressure,whatevertheformassumedmaybe。[44]Thisdiffersfromslaveorplantationeconomyinthattheslaveworksunderalienconditionsofproductionandnotindependently。Thus,conditionsofpersonaldependencearerequisite,alackofpersonalfreedom,nomattertowhatextent,andbeingtiedtothesoilasitsaccessory,bondageinthetruesenseoftheword。Shouldthedirectproducersnotbeconfrontedbyaprivatelandowner,butrather,asinAsia,underdirectsubordinationtoastatewhichstandsoverthemastheirlandlordandsimultaneouslyassovereign,thenrentandtaxescoincide,orrather,thereexistsnotaxwhichdiffersfromthisformofground-rent。Undersuchcircumstances,thereneedexistnostrongerpoliticaloreconomicpressurethanthatcommontoallsubjectiontothatstate。Thestateisthenthesupremelord。Sovereigntyhereconsistsintheownershipoflandconcentratedonanationalscale。But,ontheotherhand,noprivateownershipoflandexists,althoughthereisbothprivateandcommonpossessionanduseofland。
Thespecificeconomicform,inwhichunpaidsurplus-labourispumpedoutofdirectproducers,determinestherelationshipofrulersandruled,asitgrowsdirectlyoutofproductionitselfand,inturn,reactsuponitasadeterminingelement。Uponthis,however,isfoundedtheentireformationoftheeconomiccommunitywhichgrowsupoutoftheproductionrelationsthemselves,therebysimultaneouslyitsspecificpoliticalform。
Itisalwaysthedirectrelationshipoftheownersoftheconditionsofproductiontothedirectproducers——arelationalwaysnaturallycorrespondingtoadefinitestageinthedevelopmentofthemethodsoflabourandtherebyitssocialproductivity——whichrevealstheinnermostsecret,thehiddenbasisoftheentiresocialstructureandwithitthepoliticalformoftherelationofsovereigntyanddependence,inshort,thecorrespondingspecificformofthestate。Thisdoesnotpreventthesameeconomicbasis——thesamefromthestandpointofitsmainconditions——duetoinnumerabledifferentempiricalcircumstances,naturalenvironment,racialrelations,externalhistoricalinfluences,etc。fromshowinginfinitevariationsandgradationsinappearance,whichcanbeascertainedonlybyanalysisoftheempiricallygivencircumstances。
Somuchisevidentwithrespecttolabourrent,thesimplestandmostprimitiveformofrent:Rentisheretheprimevalformofsurplus-labourandcoincideswithit。Butthisidentityofsurplus-valuewithunpaidlabourofothersneednotbeanalysedherebecauseitstillexistsinitsvisible,palpableform,sincethelabourofthedirectproducerforhimselfisstillseparatedinspaceandtimefromhislabourforthelandlordandthelatterappearsdirectlyinthebrutalformofenforcedlabourforathirdperson。
Inthesamewaythe”attribute”possessedbythesoiltoproducerentisherereducedtoatangiblyopensecret,forthedispositiontofurnishrentherealsoincludeshumanlabour-powerboundtothesoil,andthepropertyrelationwhichcompelstheowneroflabour-powertodriveitonandactivateitbeyondsuchmeasureasisrequiredtosatisfyhisownindispensableneeds。Rentconsistsdirectlyintheappropriationofthissurplusexpenditureoflabour-powerbythelandlord;forthedirectproducerpayshimnoadditionalrent。Here,wheresurplus-valueandrentarenotonlyidenticalbutwheresurplus-valuehasthetangibleformofsurplus-labour,thenaturalconditionsorlimitsofrent,beingthoseofsurplus-valueingeneral,areplainlyclear。Thedirectproducermust1possessenoughlabour-power,and2
thenaturalconditionsofhislabour,aboveallthesoilcultivatedbyhim,mustheproductiveenough,inaword,thenaturalproductivityofhislabourmustbebigenoughtogivehimthepossibilityofretainingsomesurplus-labouroverandabovethatrequiredforthesatisfactionofhisownindispensableneeds。Itisnotthispossibilitywhichcreatestherent,butrathercompulsionwhichturnsthispossibilityintoreality。
第23章