Thereisnofarmerwhodoesnotcomputebeforehandwhatthechurchtithe，whichisaland—taxofthiskind，is，oneyearwithanother，likelytoamountto。
　　Thetithe，andeveryotherland—taxofthiskind，undertheappearanceofperfectequality，areveryunequaltaxes;acertainportionoftheproducebeing，indifferentsituations，equivalenttoaverydifferentportionoftherent。Insomeveryrichlandstheproduceissogreatthattheonehalfofitisfullysufficienttoreplacetothefarmerhiscapitalemployedincultivation，togetherwiththeordinaryprofitsoffarmingstockintheneighbourhood。Theotherhalf，or，whatcomestothesamething，thevalueoftheotherhalf，hecouldaffordtopayasrenttothelandlord，iftherewasnotithe。Butifatenthoftheproduceistakenfromhiminthewayoftithe，hemustrequireanabatementofthefifthpartofhisrent，otherwisehecannotgetbackhiscapitalwiththeordinaryprofit。Inthiscasetherentofthelandlord，insteadofamountingtoahalforfive—tenthsofthewholeproduce，willamountonlytofour—tenthsofit。Inpoorerlands，onthecontrary，theproduceissometimessosmall，andtheexpenseofcultivationsogreat，thatitrequiresfour—fifthsofthewholeproducetoreplacetothefarmerhiscapitalwiththeordinaryprofit。Inthiscase，thoughtherewasnotithe，therentofthelandlordcouldamounttonomorethanone—fifthortwo—tenthsofthewholeproduce。Butifthefarmerpaysone—tenthoftheproduceinthewayoftithe，hemustrequireanequalabatementoftherentofthelandlord，whichwillthusbereducedtoone—tenthonlyofthewholeproduce。Upontherentofrichlands，thetithemaysometimesbeataxofnomorethanone—fifthpart，orfourshillingsinthepound;whereasuponthatofpoorerlands，itmaysometimesbeataxofone—half，oroftenshillingsinthepound。
　　Thetithe，asitisfrequentlyaveryunequaltaxupontherent，soitisalwaysagreatdiscouragementbothtotheimprovementsofthelandlordandtothecultivationofthefarmer。Theonecannotventuretomakethemostimportant，whicharegenerallythemostexpensiveimprovements，northeothertoraisethemostvaluable，whicharegenerallytoothemostexpensivecrops，whenthechurch，whichlaysoutnopartoftheexpense，istosharesoverylargelyintheprofit。ThecultivationofmadderwasforalongtimeconfinedbythetithetotheUnitedProvinces，which，beingPresbyteriancountries，anduponthataccountexemptedfromthisdestructivetax，enjoyedasortofmonopolyofthatusefuldyeingdrugagainsttherestofEurope。ThelateattemptstointroducethecultureofthisplantintoEnglandhavebeenmadeonlyinconsequenceofthestatutewhichenactedthatfiveshillingsanacreshouldbereceivedinlieuofallmanneroftitheuponmadder。
　　AsthroughthegreaterpartofEuropethechurch，soinmanydifferentcountriesofAsiathestate，isprincipallysupportedbyaland—tax，proportioned，nottotherent，buttotheproduceoftheland。InChina，theprincipalrevenueofthesovereignconsistsinatenthpartoftheproduceofalllandsoftheempire。Thistenthpart，however，isestimatedsoverymoderatelythat，inmanyprovinces，itissaidnottoexceedathirtiethpartoftheordinaryproduce。Theland—taxorland—rentwhichusedtobepaidtotheMahometangovernmentofBengal，beforethatcountryfellintothehandsoftheEnglishEastIndiaCompany，issaidtohaveamountedtoaboutafifthpartoftheproduce。Theland—taxofancientEgyptissaidlikewisetohaveamountedtoafifthpart。
　　InAsia，thissortofland—taxissaidtointerestthesovereignintheimprovementandcultivationofland。ThesovereignsofChina，thoseofBengalwhileundertheMahometangovernment，andthoseofancientEgypt，aresaidaccordinglytohavebeenextremelyattentivetothemakingandmaintainingofgoodroadsandnavigablecanals，inordertoincrease，asmuchaspossible，boththequantityandvalueofeverypartoftheproduceoftheland，byprocuringtoeverypartofitthemostextensivemarketwhichtheirowndominionscouldafford。Thetitheofthechurchisdividedintosuchsmallportionsthatnooneofitsproprietorscanhaveanyinterestofthiskind。Theparsonofaparishcouldneverfindhisaccountinmakingaroadorcanaltoadistantpartofthecountry，inordertoextendthemarketfortheproduceofhisownparticularparish。Suchtaxes，whendestinedforthemaintenanceofthestate，havesomeadvantageswhichmayserveinsomemeasuretobalancetheirinconveniency。Whendestinedforthemaintenanceofthechurch，theyareattendedwithnothingbutinconveniency。
　　Taxesupontheproduceoflandmaybeleviedeitherinkind，or，accordingtoacertainvaluation，inmoney。
　　Theparsonofaparish，oragentlemanofsmallfortunewholivesuponhisestate，maysometimes，perhaps，findsomeadvantageinreceiving，theonehistithe，andtheotherhisrent，inkind。Thequantitytobecollected，andthedistrictwithinwhichitistobecollected，aresosmallthattheybothcanoversee，withtheirowneyes，thecollectionanddisposalofeverypartofwhatisduetothem。Agentlemanofgreatfortune，wholivedinthecapital，wouldbeindangerofsufferingmuchbytheneglect，andmorebythefraudofhisfactorsandagents，iftherentsofanestateinadistantprovinceweretobepaidtohiminthismanner。Thelossofthesovereignfromtheabuseanddepredationofhistax—gathererswouldnecessarilybemuchgreater。Theservantsofthemostcarelessprivatepersonare，perhaps，moreundertheeyeoftheirmasterthanthoseofthemostcarefulprince;andapublicrevenuewhichwaspaidinkindwouldsuffersomuchfromthemismanagementofthecollectorsthataverysmallpartofwhatwaslevieduponthepeoplewouldeverarriveatthetreasuryoftheprince。SomepartofthepublicrevenueofChina，however，issaidtobepaidinthismanner。Themandarinsandothertax—gathererswill，nodoubt，findtheiradvantageincontinuingthepracticeofapaymentwhichissomuchmoreliabletoabusethananypaymentinmoney。
　　Ataxupontheproduceoflandwhichisleviedinmoneymaybeleviedeitheraccordingtoavaluationwhichvarieswithallthevariationsofthemarketprice，oraccordingtoafixedvaluation，abushelofwheat，forexample，beingalwaysvaluedatoneandthesamemoneyprice，whatevermaybethestateofthemarket。Theproduceofataxleviedintheformerwaywillvaryonlyaccordingtothevariationsintherealproduceoftheland，accordingtotheimprovementorneglectofcultivation。Theproduceofataxleviedinthelatterwaywillvary，notonlyaccordingtothevariationsintheproduceoftheland，butaccordingtoboththoseinthevalueofthepreciousmetalsandthoseinthequantityofthosemetalswhichisatdifferenttimescontainedincoinofthesamedenomination。Theproduceoftheformerwillalwaysbearthesameproportiontothevalueoftherealproduceoftheland。Theproduceofthelattermay，atdifferenttimes，bearverydifferentproportionstothatvalue。
　　When，insteadeitherofacertainportionoftheproduceofland，orofthepriceofacertainportion，acertainsumofmoneyistobepaidinfullcompensationforalltaxortithe，thetaxbecomes，inthiscase，exactlyofthesamenaturewiththeland—taxofEngland。Itneitherrisesnorfallswiththerentoftheland。Itneitherencouragesnordiscouragesimprovement。
　　ThetitheinthegreaterpartofthoseparisheswhichpaywhatiscalledaModusinlieuofallothertitheisataxofthiskind。
　　DuringtheMahometangovernmentofBengal，insteadofthepaymentinkindofafifthpartoftheproduce，amodus，and，itissaid，averymoderateone，wasestablishedinthegreaterpartofthedistrictsorzemindariesofthecountry。SomeoftheservantsoftheEastIndiaCompany，underpretenceofrestoringthepublicrevenuetoitspropervalue，have，insomeprovinces，exchangedthismodusforapaymentinkind。Undertheirmanagementthischangeislikelybothtodiscouragecultivation，andtogivenewopportunitiesforabuseinthecollectionofthepublicrevenuewhichhasfallenverymuchbelowwhatitwassaidtohavebeenwhenitfirstfellunderthemanagementofthecompany。Theservantsofthecompanymay，perhaps，haveprofitedbythischange，butattheexpense，itisprobable，bothoftheirmastersandofthecountry。
　　TaxesupontheRentofHouse。
　　Therentofahousemaybedistinguishedintotwoparts，ofwhichtheonemayveryproperlybecalledtheBuilding—rent;theotheriscommonlycalledtheGround—rent。
　　Thebuilding—rentistheinterestorprofitofthecapitalexpendedinbuildingthehouse。Inordertoputthetradeofabuilderuponalevelwithothertrades，itisnecessarythatthisrentshouldbesufficient，first，topayhimthesameinterestwhichhewouldhavegotforhiscapitalifhehadlentitupongoodsecurity;and，secondly，tokeepthehouseinconstantrepair，or，whatcomestothesamething，toreplace，withinacertaintermofyears，thecapitalwhichhadbeenemployedinbuildingit。Thebuilding—rent，ortheordinaryprofitofbuilding，is，therefore，everywhereregulatedbytheordinaryinterestofmoney。Wherethemarketrateofinterestisfourpercenttherentofahousewhich，overandabovepayingtheground—rent，affordssixorsixandahalfpercentuponthewholeexpenseofbuilding，mayperhapsaffordasufficientprofittothebuilder。Wherethemarketrateofinterestisfivepercent，itmayperhapsrequiresevenorsevenandahalfpercent。
　　If，inproportiontotheinterestofmoney，thetradeofthebuilderaffordsatanytimeamuchgreaterprofitthanthis，itwillsoondrawsomuchcapitalfromothertradesaswillreducetheprofittoitsproperlevel。Ifitaffordsatanytimemuchlessthanthis，othertradeswillsoondrawsomuchcapitalfromitaswillagainraisethatprofit。
　　Whateverpartofthewholerentofahouseisoverandabovewhatissufficientforaffordingthisreasonableprofitnaturallygoestotheground—rent;andwheretheownerofthegroundandtheownerofthebuildingaretwodifferentpersons，is，inmostcases，completelypaidtotheformer。Thissurplusrentisthepricewhichtheinhabitantofthehousepaysforsomerealorsupposedadvantageofthesituation。Incountryhousesatadistancefromanygreattown，wherethereisplentyofgroundtochooseupon，theground—rentisscarceanything，ornomorethanwhatthegroundwhichthehousestandsuponwouldpayifemployedinagriculture。Incountryvillasintheneighborhoodofsomegreattown，itissometimesagooddealhigher，andthepeculiarconveniencyorbeautyofsituationistherefrequentlyverywellpaidfor。Ground—rentsaregenerallyhighestinthecapital，andinthoseparticularpartsofitwheretherehappenstobethegreatestdemandforhouses，whateverbethereasonofthatdemand，whetherfortradeandbusiness，forpleasureandsociety，orformerevanityandfashion。
　　Ataxuponhouse—rent，payablebythetenantandproportionedtothewholerentofeachhouse，couldnot，foranyconsiderabletimeatleast，affectthebuilding—rent。Ifthebuilderdidnotgethisreasonableprofit，hewouldbeobligedtoquitthetrade;which，byraisingthedemandforbuilding，wouldinashorttimebringbackhisprofittoitsproperlevelwiththatofothertrades。Neitherwouldsuchataxfallaltogetherupontheground—rent;butitwoulddivideitselfinsuchamannerastofallpartlyupontheinhabitantofthehouse，andpartlyupontheowneroftheground。
　　Letussuppose，forexample，thataparticularpersonjudgesthathecanaffordforhouse—rentanexpenseofsixtypoundsayear;andletussuppose，too，thatataxoffourshillingsinthepound，orofone—fifth，payablebytheinhabitant，islaiduponhouse—rent。Ahouseofsixtypoundsrentwillinthiscasecosthimseventy—twopoundsayear，whichistwelvepoundsmorethanhethinkshecanafford。Hewill，therefore，contenthimselfwithaworsehouse，orahouseoffiftypoundsrent，which，withtheadditionaltenpoundsthathemustpayforthetax，willmakeupthesumofsixtypoundsayear，theexpensewhichhejudgeshecanafford;andinordertopaythetaxhewillgiveupapartoftheadditionalconveniencywhichhemighthavehadfromahouseoftenpoundsayearmorerent。Hewillgiveup，Isay，apartofthisadditionalconveniency;forhewillseldombeobligedtogiveupthewhole，butwill，inconsequenceofthetax，getabetterhouseforfiftypoundsayearthanhecouldhavegotiftherehadbeennotax。Forasataxofthiskindbytakingawaythisparticularcompetitor，mustdiminishthecompetitionforhousesofsixtypoundsrent，soitmustlikewisediminishitforthoseoffiftypoundsrent，andinthesamemannerforthoseofallotherrents，exceptthelowestrent，forwhichitwouldforsometimeincreasethecompetition。Buttherentsofeveryclassofhousesforwhichthecompetitionwasdiminishedwouldnecessarilybemoreorlessreduced。Asnopartofthisreduction，however，could，foranyconsiderabletimeatleast，affectthebuilding—rent，thewholeofitmustinthelong—runnecessarilyfallupontheground—rent。Thefinalpaymentofthistax，therefore，wouldfallpartlyupontheinhabitantofthehouse，who，inordertopayhisshare，wouldbeobligedtogiveupapartofhisconveniency，andpartlyupontheowneroftheground，who，inordertopayhisshare，wouldbeobligedtogiveupapartofhisrevenue。Inwhatproportionthisfinalpaymentwouldbedividedbetweenthemitisnotperhapsveryeasytoascertain。Thedivisionwouldprobablybeverydifferentindifferentcircumstances，andataxofthiskindmight，accordingtothosedifferentcircumstances，affectveryunequallyboththeinhabitantofthehouseandtheowneroftheground。
　　Theinequalitywithwhichataxofthiskindmightfallupontheownersofdifferentground—rentswouldarisealtogetherfromtheaccidentalinequalityofthisdivision。Buttheinequalitywithwhichitmightfallupontheinhabitantsofdifferenthouseswouldarisenotonlyfromthis，butfromanothercause。Theproportionoftheexpenseofhouse—renttothewholeexpenseoflivingisdifferentinthedifferentdegreesoffortune。Itisperhapshighestinthehighestdegree，anditdiminishesgraduallythroughtheinferiordegrees，soasingeneraltobelowestinthelowestdegree。Thenecessariesoflifeoccasionthegreatexpenseofthepoor。Theyfinditdifficulttogetfood，andthegreaterpartoftheirlittlerevenueisspentingettingit。Theluxuriesandvanitiesoflifeoccasiontheprincipalexpenseoftherich，andamagnificenthouseembellishesandsetsofftothebestadvantagealltheotherluxuriesandvanitieswhichtheypossess。Ataxuponhouse—rents，therefore，wouldingeneralfallheaviestupontherich;andinthissortofinequalitytherewouldnot，perhaps，beanythingveryunreasonable。Itisnotveryunreasonablethattherichshouldcontributetothepublicexpense，notonlyinproportiontotheirrevenue，butsomethingmorethaninthatproportion。
　　Therentofhouses，thoughitinsomerespectsresemblestherentofland，isinonerespectessentiallydifferentfromit。
　　Therentoflandispaidfortheuseofaproductivesubject。Thelandwhichpaysitproducesit。Therentofhousesispaidfortheuseofanunproductivesubject。Neitherthehousenorthegroundwhichitstandsuponproduceanything。Thepersonwhopaystherent，therefore，mustdrawitfromsomeothersourceofrevenuedistinctfromtheindependentofthissubject。Ataxupontherentofhouses，sofarasitfallsupontheinhabitants，mustbedrawnfromthesamesourceastherentitself，andmustbepaidfromtheirrevenue，whetherderivedfromthewagesoflabour，theprofitsofstock，ortherentofland。Sofarasitfallsupontheinhabitants，itisoneofthosetaxeswhichfall，notupononeonly，butindifferentlyuponallthethreedifferentsourcesofrevenue，andisineveryrespectofthesamenatureasataxuponanyothersortofconsumablecommodities。Ingeneralthereisnot，perhaps，anyonearticleofexpenseorconsumptionbywhichtheliberalityornarrownessofaman’swholeexpensecanbebetterjudgedofthanbyhishouse—rent。Aproportionaltaxuponthisparticulararticleofexpensemight，perhaps，produceamoreconsiderablerevenuethananywhichhashithertobeendrawnfromitinanypartofEurope。Ifthetaxindeedwasveryhigh，thegreaterpartofpeoplewouldendeavourtoevadeit，asmuchastheycould，bycontentingthemselveswithsmallerhouses，andbyturningthegreaterpartoftheirexpenseintosomeotherchannel。
　　Therentofhousesmighteasilybeascertainedwithsufficientaccuracybyapolicyofthesamekindwiththatwhichwouldbenecessaryforascertainingtheordinaryrentofland。
　　Housesnotinhabitedoughttopaynotax。Ataxuponthemwouldfallaltogetherupontheproprietor，whowouldthusbetaxedforasubjectwhichaffordedhimneitherconveniencynorrevenue。
　　Housesinhabitedbytheproprietoroughttoberated，notaccordingtotheexpensewhichtheymighthavecostinbuilding，butaccordingtotherentwhichanequitablearbitrationmightjudgethemlikelytobringifleasedtoatenant。Ifratedaccordingtotheexpensewhichtheymayhavecostinbuilding，ataxofthreeorfourshillingsinthepound，joinedwithothertaxes，wouldruinalmostalltherichandgreatfamiliesofthis，and，Ibelieve，ofeveryothercivilisedcountry。Whoeverwillexamine，withattention，thedifferenttownandcountryhousesofsomeoftherichestandgreatestfamiliesinthiscountrywillfindthat，attherateofonlysixandahalforsevenpercentupontheoriginalexpenseofbuilding，theirhouse—rentisnearlyequaltothewholenetrentoftheirestates。Itistheaccumulatedexpenseofseveralsuccessivegenerations，laidoutuponobjectsofgreatbeautyandmagnificance，indeed;but，inproportiontowhattheycost，ofverysmallexchangeablevalue。
　　Ground—rentsareastillmorepropersubjectoftaxationthantherentofhouses。Ataxuponground—rentswouldnotraisetherentsofhouses。Itwouldfallaltogetherupontheowneroftheground—rent，whoactsalwaysasamonopolist，andexactsthegreatestrentwhichcanbegotfortheuseofhisground。Moreorlesscanbegotforitaccordingasthecompetitorshappentobericherorpoorer，orcanaffordtogratifytheirfancyforaparticularspotofgroundatagreaterorsmallerexpense。Ineverycountrythegreatestnumberofrichcompetitorsisinthecapital，anditisthereaccordinglythatthehighestground—rentsarealwaystobefound。Asthewealthofthosecompetitorswouldinnorespectbeincreasedbyataxuponground—rents，theywouldnotprobablybedisposedtopaymorefortheuseoftheground。Whetherthetaxwastobeadvancedbytheinhabitant，orbytheowneroftheground，wouldbeoflittleimportance。Themoretheinhabitantwasobligedtopayforthetax，thelesshewouldinclinetopayfortheground;sothatthefinalpaymentofthetaxwouldfallaltogetherupontheowneroftheground—rent。Theground—rentsofuninhabitedhousesoughttopaynotax。
　　Bothground—rentsandtheordinaryrentoflandareaspeciesofrevenuewhichtheowner，inmanycases，enjoyswithoutanycareorattentionofhisown。Thoughapartofthisrevenueshouldbetakenfromhiminordertodefraytheexpensesofthestate，nodiscouragementwilltherebybegiventoanysortofindustry。Theannualproduceofthelandandlabourofthesociety，therealwealthandrevenueofthegreatbodyofthepeople，mightbethesameaftersuchataxasbefore。
　　Ground—rentsandtheordinaryrentoflandare，therefore，perhaps，thespeciesofrevenuewhichcanbestbeartohaveapeculiartaximposeduponthem。
　　Ground—rentsseem，inthisrespect，amorepropersubjectofpeculiartaxationthaneventheordinaryrentofland。Theordinaryrentoflandis，inmanycases，owingpartlyatleasttotheattentionandgoodmanagementofthelandlord。Averyheavytaxmightdiscouragetoo，muchthisattentionandgoodmanagement。Ground—rents，sofarastheyexceedtheordinaryrentofland，arealtogetherowingtothegoodgovernmentofthesovereign，which，byprotectingtheindustryeitherofthewholepeople，oroftheinhabitantsofsomeparticularplace，enablesthemtopaysomuchmorethanitsrealvalueforthegroundwhichtheybuildtheirhousesupon;ortomaketoitsownersomuchmorethancompensationforthelosswhichhemightsustainbythisuseofit。Nothingcanbemorereasonablethanthatafundwhichowesitsexistencetothegoodgovernmentofthestateshouldbetaxedpeculiarly，orshouldcontributesomethingmorethanthegreaterpartofotherfunds，towardsthesupportofthatgovernment。
　　Though，inmanydifferentcountriesofEurope，taxeshavebeenimposedupontherentofhouses，Idonotknowofanyinwhichground—rentshavebeenconsideredasaseparatesubjectoftaxation。Thecontriversoftaxeshave，probably，foundsomedifficultyinascertainingwhatpartoftherentoughttobeconsideredasground—rent，andwhatpartoughttobeconsideredasbuilding—rent。Itshouldnot，however，seemverydifficulttodistinguishthosetwopartsoftherentfromoneanother。
　　InGreatBritaintherentofhousesissupposedtobetaxedinthesameproportionastherentoflandbywhatiscalledtheannualland—tax。Thevaluation，accordingtowhicheachdifferentparishanddistrictisassessedtothistax，isalwaysthesame。
　　Itwasoriginallyextremelyunequal，anditstillcontinuestobeso。Throughthegreaterpartofthekingdomthistaxfallsstillmorelightlyupontherentofhousesthanuponthatofland。Insomefewdistrictsonly，whichwereoriginallyratedhigh，andinwhichtherentsofhouseshavefallenconsiderably，theland—taxofthreeorfourshillingsinthepoundissaidtoamounttoanequalproportionoftherealrentofhouses。Untenantedhouses，thoughbylawsubjecttothetax，are，inmostdistricts，exemptedfromitbythefavouroftheassessors;andthisexemptionsometimesoccasionssomelittlevariationintherateofparticularhouses，thoughthatofthedistrictisalwaysthesame。Improvementsofrent，bynewbuildings，repairs，etc。，gotothedischargeofthedistrict，whichoccasionsstillfurthervariationsintherateofparticularhouses。
　　IntheprovinceofHollandeveryhouseistaxedattwoandahalfpercentofitsvalue，withoutanyregardeithertotherentwhichitactuallypays，ortothecircumstancesofitsbeingtenantedoruntenanted。Thereseemstobeahardshipinobligingtheproprietortopayataxforanuntenantedhouse，fromwhichhecanderivenorevenue，especiallysoveryheavyatax。InHolland，wherethemarketrateofinterestdoesnotexceedthreepercent，twoandahalfpercentuponthewholevalueofthehousemust，inmostcases，amounttomorethanathirdofthebuilding—rent，perhapsofthewholerent。Thevaluation，indeed，accordingtowhichthehousesarerated，thoughveryunequal，issaidtobealwaysbelowtherealvalue。Whenahouseisrebuilt，improved，orenlarged，thereisanewvaluation，andthetaxisratedaccordingly。
　　ThecontriversoftheseveraltaxeswhichinEnglandhave，atdifferenttimes，beenimposeduponhouses，seemtohaveimaginedthattherewassomegreatdifficultyinascertaining，withtolerableexactness，whatwastherealrentofeveryhouse。
　　Theyhaveregulatedtheirtaxes，therefore，accordingtosomemoreobviouscircumstances，suchastheyhadprobablyimaginedwould，inmostcases，bearsomeproportiontotherent。
　　Thefirsttaxofthiskindwashearth—money，orataxoftwoshillingsuponeveryhearth。Inordertoascertainhowmanyhearthswereinthehouse，itwasnecessarythatthetax—gatherershouldentereveryroominit。Thisodiousvisitrenderedthetaxodious。Soonaftertherevolution，therefore，itwasabolishedasabadgeofslavery。
　　Thenexttaxofthiskindwasataxoftwoshillingsuponeverydwelling—houseinhabited。Ahousewithtenwindowstopayfourshillingsmore。Ahousewithtwentywindowsandupwardstopayeightshillings。Thistaxwasafterwardssofaralteredthathouseswithtwentywindows，andwithlessthanthirty，wereorderedtopaytenshillings，andthosewiththirtywindowsandupwardstopaytwentyshillings。Thenumberofwindowscan，inmostcases，becountedfromtheoutside，and，inallcases，withoutenteringeveryroominthehouse。Thevisitofthetax—gatherer，therefore，waslessoffensiveinthistaxthaninthehearth—money。
　　Thistaxwasafterwardsrepealed，andintheroomofitwasestablishedthewindow—tax，whichhasundergone，too，severalalterationsandaugmentations。Thewindow—tax，asitstandsatpresent（January1775），overandabovethedutyofthreeshillingsuponeveryhouseinEngland，andofoneshillinguponeveryhouseinScotland，laysadutyuponeverywindow，which，inEngland，augmentsgraduallyfromtwopence，thelowestrate，uponhouseswithnotmorethansevenwindows，totwoshillings，thehighestrate，uponhouseswithtwenty—fivewindowsandupwards。
　　Theprincipalobjectiontoallsuchtaxesoftheworstistheirinequality，aninequalityoftheworstkind，astheymustfrequentlyfallmuchheavieruponthepoorthanupontherich。A
　　houseoftenpoundsrentinacountrytownmaysometimeshavemorewindowsthanahouseoffivehundredpoundsrentinLondon;
　　andthoughtheinhabitantoftheformerislikelytobeamuchpoorermanthanthatofthelatter，yetsofarashiscontributionisregulatedbythewindow—tax，hemustcontributemoretothesupportofthestate。Suchtaxesare，therefore，directlycontrarytothefirstofthefourmaximsabovementioned。Theydonotseemtooffendmuchagainstanyoftheotherthree。
　　Thenaturaltendencyofthewindow—tax，andofallothertaxesuponhouses，istolowerrents。Themoreamanpaysforthetax，theless，itisevident，hecanaffordtopayfortherent。
　　Sincetheimpositionofthewindow—tax，however，therentsofhouseshaveuponthewholerisen，moreorless，inalmosteverytownandvillageofGreatBritainwithwhichIamacquainted。
　　Suchhasbeenalmosteverywheretheincreaseofthedemandforhouses，thatithasraisedtherentsmorethanthewindow—taxcouldsinkthem;oneofthemanyproofsofthegreatprosperityofthecountry，andoftheincreasingrevenueofitsinhabitants。
　　Haditnotbeenforthetax，rentswouldprobablyhaverisenstillhigher。
　　ARTICLEII
　　TaxesonProfit，orupontheRevenuearisingfromStockTherevenueorprofitarisingfromstocknaturallydividesitselfintotwoparts;thatwhichpaystheinterest，andwhichbelongstotheownerofthestock，andthatsurpluspartwhichisoverandabovewhatisnecessaryforpayingtheinterest。
　　Thislatterpartofprofitisevidentlyasubjectnottaxabledirectly。Itisthecompensation，andinmostcasesitisnomorethanaverymoderatecompensation，fortheriskandtroubleofemployingthestock。Theemployermusthavethiscompensation，otherwisehecannot，consistentlywithhisowninterest，continuetheemployment。Ifhewastaxeddirectly，therefore，inproportiontothewholeprofit，hewouldbeobligedeithertoraisetherateofhisprofit，ortochargethetaxupontheinterestofmoney;thatis，topaylessinterest。Ifheraisedtherateofhisprofitinproportiontothetax，thewholetax，thoughitmightbeadvancedbyhim，wouldbefinallypaidbyoneorotheroftwodifferentsetsofpeople，accordingtothedifferentwaysinwhichhemightemploythestockofwhichhehadthemanagement。Ifheemployeditasafarmingstockinthecultivationofland，hecouldraisetherateofhisprofitonlybyretainingagreaterportion，or，whatcomestothesamething，thepriceofagreaterportionoftheproduceoftheland;andasthiscouldbedoneonlybyareductionofrent，thefinalpaymentofthetaxwouldfalluponthelandlord。Ifheemployeditasamercantileormanufacturingstock，hecouldraisetherateofhisprofitonlybyraisingthepriceofhisgoods;inwhichcasethefinalpaymentofthetaxwouldfallaltogetherupontheconsumersofthosegoods。Ifhedidnotraisetherateofhisprofit，hewouldbeobligedtochargethewholetaxuponthatpartofitwhichwasallottedfortheinterestofmoney。Hecouldaffordlessinterestforwhateverstockheborrowed，andthewholeweightofthetaxwouldinthiscasefallultimatelyupontheinterestofmoney。Sofarashecouldnotrelievehimselffromthetaxintheoneway，hewouldbeobligedtorelievehimselfintheother。
　　Theinterestofmoneyseemsatfirstsightasubjectequallycapableofbeingtaxeddirectlyastherentofland。Liketherentofland，itisanetproducewhichremainsaftercompletelycompensatingthewholeriskandtroubleofemployingthestock。
　　Asataxupontherentoflandcannotraiserents;becausethenetproducewhichremainsafterreplacingthestockofthefarmer，togetherwithhisreasonableprofit，cannotbegreaterafterthetaxthanbeforeit，so，forthesamereason，ataxupontheinterestofmoneycouldnotraisetherateofinterest;thequantityofstockormoneyinthecountry，likethequantityofland，beingsupposedtoremainthesameafterthetaxasbeforeit。Theordinaryrateofprofit，ithasbeenshowninthefirstbook，iseverywhereregulatedbythequantityofstocktobeemployedinproportiontothequantityoftheemployment，orofthebusinesswhichmustbedonebyit。Butthequantityoftheemployment，orofthebusinesstobedonebystock，couldneitherbeincreasednordiminishedbyanytaxupontheinterestofmoney。Ifthequantityofthestocktobeemployed，therefore，wasneitherincreasednordiminishedbyit，theordinaryrateofprofitwouldnecessarilyremainthesame。Buttheportionofthisprofitnecessaryforcompensatingtheriskandtroubleoftheemployerwouldlikewiseremainthesame，thatriskandtroublebeinginnorespectaltered。Theresidue，therefore，thatportionwhichbelongstotheownerofthestock，andwhichpaystheinterestofmoney，wouldnecessarilyremainthesametoo。Atfirstsight，therefore，theinterestofmoneyseemstobeasubjectasfittobetaxeddirectlyastherentofland。
　　Thereare，however，twodifferentcircumstanceswhichrendertheinterestofmoneyamuchlesspropersubjectofdirecttaxationthantherentofland。
　　First，thequantityandvalueofthelandwhichanymanpossessescanneverbeasecret，andcanalwaysbeascertainedwithgreatexactness。Butthewholeamountofthecapitalstockwhichhepossessesisalmostalwaysasecret，andcanscarceeverbeascertainedwithtolerableexactness。Itisliable，besides，toalmostcontinualvariations。Ayearseldompassesaway，frequentlynotamonth，sometimesscarceasingleday，inwhichitdoesnotriseorfallmoreorless。Aninquisitionintoeveryman’sprivatecircumstances，andaninquisitionwhich，inordertoaccommodatethetaxtothem，watchedoverallthefluctuationsofhisfortunes，wouldbeasourceofsuchcontinualandendlessvexationasnopeoplecouldsupport。
　　Secondly，landisasubjectwhichcannotberemoved;whereasstockeasilymay。Theproprietoroflandisnecessarilyacitizenoftheparticularcountryinwhichhisestatelies。Theproprietorofstockisproperlyacitizenoftheworld，andisnotnecessarilyattachedtoanyparticularcountry。Hewouldbeapttoabandonthecountryinwhichhewasexposedtoavexatiousinquisition，inordertobeassessedtoaburdensometax，andwouldremovehisstocktosomeothercountrywherehecouldeithercarryonhisbusiness，orenjoyhisfortunemoreathisease。Byremovinghisstockhewouldputanendtoalltheindustrywhichithadmaintainedinthecountrywhichheleft。
　　Stockcultivatesland;stockemployslabour。Ataxwhichtendedtodriveawaystockfromanyparticularcountrywouldsofartendtodryupeverysourceofrevenuebothtothesovereignandtothesociety。Notonlytheprofitsofstock，buttherentoflandandthewagesoflabourwouldnecessarilybemoreorlessdiminishedbyitsremoval。
　　Thenations，accordingly，whohaveattemptedtotaxtherevenuearisingfromstock，insteadofanysevereinquisitionofthiskind，havebeenobligedtocontentthemselveswithsomeveryloose，and，therefore，moreorlessarbitrary，estimation。Theextremeinequalityanduncertaintyofataxassessedinthismannercanbecompensatedonlybyitsextrememoderation，inconsequenceofwhicheverymanfindshimselfratedsoverymuchbelowhisrealrevenuethathegiveshimselflittledisturbancethoughhisneighbourshouldberatedsomewhatlower。
　　Bywhatiscalledtheland—taxinEngland，itwasintendedthatstockshouldbetaxedinthesameproportionasland。Whenthetaxuponlandwasatfourshillingsinthepound，oratone—fifthofthesupposedrent，itwasintendedthatstockshouldbetaxedatone—fifthofthesupposedinterest。Whenthepresentannualland—taxwasfirstimposed，thelegalrateofinterestwassixpercent。Everyhundredpoundsstock，accordingly，wassupposedtobetaxedattwenty—fourshillings，thefifthpartofsixpounds。Sincethelegalrateofinteresthasbeenreducedtofivepercenteveryhundredpoundsstockissupposedtobetaxedattwentyshillingsonly。Thesumtoberaisedbywhatiscalledtheland—taxwasdividedbetweenthecountryandtheprincipaltowns。Thegreaterpartofitwaslaiduponthecountry;andofwhatwaslaiduponthetowns，thegreaterpartwasassesseduponthehouses。Whatremainedtobeassesseduponthestockortradeofthetowns（forthestockuponthelandwasnotmeanttobetaxed）wasverymuchbelowtherealvalueofthatstockortrade。
　　Whateverinequalities，therefore，theremightbeintheoriginalassessmentgavelittledisturbance。Everyparishanddistrictstillcontinuestoberatedforitsland，itshouses，anditsstock，accordingtotheoriginalassessment;andthealmostuniversalprosperityofthecountry，whichinmostplaceshasraisedverymuchthevalueofallthese，hasrenderedthoseinequalitiesofstilllessimportancenow。Therate，too，uponeachdistrictcontinuingalwaysthesame，theuncertaintyofthistaxsofarasitmightbeassesseduponthestockofanyindividual，hasbeenverymuchdiminished，aswellasrenderedofmuchlessconsequence。IfthegreaterpartofthelandsofEnglandarenotratedtotheland—taxathalftheiractualvalue，thegreaterpartofthestockofEnglandis，perhaps，scarceratedatthefiftiethpartofitsactualvalue。Insometownsthewholeland—taxisassesseduponhouses，asinWestminster，wherestockandtradearefree。ItisotherwiseinLondon。
　　Inallcountriesasevereinquisitionintothecircumstancesofprivatepersonshasbeencarefullyavoided。
　　AtHamburgeveryinhabitantisobligedtopaytothestateone—fourthpercentofallthathepossesses;andasthewealthofthepeopleofHamburgconsistsprincipallyinstock，thistaxmaybeconsideredasataxuponstock。Everymanassesseshimself，and，inthepresenceofthemagistrate，putsannuallyintothepubliccofferacertainsumofmoneywhichhedeclaresuponoathtobeone—fourthpercentofallthathepossesses，butwithoutdeclaringwhatitamountsto，orbeingliabletoanyexaminationuponthatsubject。Thistaxisgenerallysupposedtobepaidwithgreatfidelity。Inasmallrepublic，wherethepeoplehaveentireconfidenceintheirmagistrates，areconvincedofthenecessityofthetaxforthesupportofthestate，andbelievethatitwillbefaithfullyappliedtothatpurpose，suchconscientiousandvoluntarypaymentmaysometimesbeexpected。ItisnotpeculiartothepeopleofHamburg。