BytheancientlawofFrance，aswellasbythatofmostotherpartsofEurope，thelabourofthecountrypeoplewasunderthedirectionofalocalorprovincialmagistracy，whichhadnoimmediatedependencyupontheking’scouncil。Butbythepresentpracticeboththelabourofthepeople，andwhateverotherfundthekingmaychoosetoassignforthereparationofthehighroadsinanyparticularprovinceorgenerality，areentirelyunderthemanagementoftheintendant;anofficerwhoisappointedandremovedbytheking’scouncil，andwhoreceiveshisordersfromit，andisinconstantcorrespondencewithit。Intheprogressofdespotismtheauthorityoftheexecutivepowergraduallyabsorbsthatofeveryotherpowerinthestate，andassumestoitselfthemanagementofeverybranchofrevenuewhichisdestinedforanypublicpurpose。InFrance，however，thegreatpost—roads，theroadswhichmakethecommunicationbetweentheprincipaltownsofthekingdom，areingeneralkeptingoodorder，andinsomeprovincesareevenagooddealsuperiortothegreaterpartoftheturnpikeroadsofEngland。Butwhatwecallthecross—roads，thatis，thefargreaterpartoftheroadsinthecountry，areentirelyneglected，andareinmanyplacesabsolutelyimpassableforanyheavycarriage。Insomeplacesitisevendangeroustotravelonhorseback，andmulesaretheonlyconveyanceswhichcansafelybetrusted。Theproudministerofanostentatiouscourtmayfrequentlytakepleasureinexecutingaworkofsplendourandmagnificence，suchasagreathighway，whichisfrequentlyseenbytheprincipalnobility，whoseapplausesnotonlyflatterhisvanity，butevencontributetosupporthisinterestatcourt。Buttoexecuteagreatnumberoflittleworks，inwhichnothingthatcanbedonecanmakeanygreatappearance，orexcitethesmallestdegreeofadmirationinanytraveller，andwhich，inshort，havenothingtorecommendthembuttheirextremeutility，isabusinesswhichappearsineveryrespecttoomeanandpaltrytomerittheattentionofsogreatamagistrate。Undersuchanadministration，therefore，suchworksarealmostalwaysentirelyneglected。
　　InChina，andinseveralothergovernmentsofAsia，theexecutivepowerchargesitselfbothwiththereparationofthehighroadsandwiththemaintenanceofthenavigablecanals。Intheinstructionswhicharegiventothegovernorofeachprovince，thoseobjects，itissaid，areconstantlyrecommendedtohim，andthejudgmentwhichthecourtformsofhisconductisverymuchregulatedbytheattentionwhichheappearstohavepaidtothispartofhisinstructions。Thisbranchofpublicpoliceaccordinglyissaidtobeverymuchattendedtoinallthosecountries，butparticularlyinChina，wherethehighroads，andstillmorethenavigablecanals，itispretended，exceedverymucheverythingofthesamekindwhichisknowninEurope。Theaccountsofthoseworks，however，whichhavebeentransmittedtoEurope，havegenerallybeendrawnupbyweakandwonderingtravellers;frequentlybystupidandlyingmissionaries。Iftheyhadbeenexaminedbymoreintelligenteyes，andiftheaccountsofthemhadbeenreportedbymorefaithfulwitnesses，theywouldnot，perhaps，appeartobesowonderful。TheaccountwhichBerniergivesofsomeworksofthiskindinIndostanfallsverymuchshortofwhathadbeenreportedofthembyothertravellers，moredisposedtothemarvellousthanhewas。Itmaytoo，perhaps，beinthosecountries，asinFrance，wherethegreatroads，thegreatcommunicationswhicharelikelytobethesubjectsofconversationatthecourtandinthecapital，areattendedto，andalltherestneglected。InChina，besides，inIndostan，andinseveralothergovernmentsofAsia，therevenueofthesovereignarisesalmostaltogetherfromalandtaxorlandrent，whichrisesorfallswiththeriseandfalloftheannualproduceoftheland。Thegreatinterestofthesovereign，therefore，hisrevenue，isinsuchcountriesnecessarilyandimmediatelyconnectedwiththecultivationoftheland，withthegreatnessofitsproduce，andwiththevalueofitsproduce。Butinordertorenderthatproducebothasgreatandasvaluableaspossible，itisnecessarytoprocuretoitasextensiveamarketaspossible，andconsequentlytoestablishthefreest，theeasiest，andtheleastexpensivecommunicationbetweenallthedifferentpartsofthecountry;whichcanbedoneonlybymeansofthebestroadsandthebestnavigablecanals。Buttherevenueofthesovereigndoesnot，inanypartofEurope，arisechieflyfromalandtaxorlandrent。InallthegreatkingdomsofEurope，perhaps，thegreaterpartofitmayultimatelydependupontheproduceoftheland:butthatdependencyisneithersoimmediate，norsoevident。InEurope，therefore，thesovereigndoesnotfeelhimselfsodirectlycalledupontopromotetheincrease，bothinquantityandvalue，oftheproduceoftheland，or，bymaintaininggoodroadsandcanals，toprovidethemostextensivemarketforthatproduce。Thoughitshouldbetrue，therefore，whatIapprehendisnotalittledoubtful，thatinsomepartsofAsiathisdepartmentofthepublicpoliceisveryproperlymanagedbytheexecutivepower，thereisnottheleastprobabilitythat，duringthepresentstateofthings，itcouldbetolerablymanagedbythatpowerinanypartofEurope。
　　Eventhosepublicworkswhichareofsuchanaturethattheycannotaffordanyrevenueformaintainingthemselves，butofwhichtheconveniencyisnearlyconfinedtosomeparticularplaceordistrict，arealwaysbettermaintainedbyalocalorprovincialrevenue，underthemanagementofalocalorprovincialadministration，thanbythegeneralrevenueofthestate，ofwhichtheexecutivepowermustalwayshavethemanagement。WerethestreetsofLondontobelightedandpavedattheexpenseofthetreasury，isthereanyprobabilitythattheywouldbesowelllightedandpavedastheyareatpresent，orevenatsosmallanexpense？Theexpense，besides，insteadofbeingraisedbyalocaltaxupontheinhabitantsofeachparticularstreet，parish，ordistrictinLondon，would，inthiscase，bedefrayedoutofthegeneralrevenueofthestate，andwouldconsequentlyberaisedbyataxuponalltheinhabitantsofthekingdom，ofwhomthegreaterpartderivenosortofbenefitfromthelightingandpavingofthestreetsofLondon。
　　Theabuseswhichsometimescreepintothelocalandprovincialadministrationofalocalandprovincialrevenue，howenormoussoevertheymayappear，areinreality，however，almostalwaysverytriflingincomparisonofthosewhichcommonlytakeplaceintheadministrationandexpenditureoftherevenueofagreatempire。Theyare，besides，muchmoreeasilycorrected。
　　UnderthelocalorprovincialadministrationofthejusticesofthepeaceinGreatBritain，thesixdays’labourwhichthecountrypeopleareobligedtogivetothereparationofthehighwaysisnotalwaysperhapsveryjudiciouslyapplied，butitisscarceeverexactedwithanycircumstancesofcrueltyoroppression。InFrance，undertheadministrationoftheintendants，theapplicationisnotalwaysmorejudicious，andtheexactionisfrequentlythemostcruelandoppressive。SuchCorvees，astheyarecalled，makeoneoftheprincipalinstrumentsoftyrannybywhichthoseofficerschastiseanyparishorcommunautewhichhashadthemisfortunetofallundertheirdispleasure。
　　OfthePublicWorksandInstitutionswhicharenecessaryforfacilitatingparticularBranchesofCommerce。
　　Theobjectofthepublicworksandinstitutionsabovementionedistofacilitatecommerceingeneral。Butinordertofacilitatesomeparticularbranchesofit，particularinstitutionsarenecessary，whichagainrequireaparticularandextraordinaryexpense。
　　Someparticularbranchesofcommerce，whicharecarriedonwithbarbarousanduncivilisednations，requireextraordinaryprotection。Anordinarystoreorcounting—housecouldgivelittlesecuritytothegoodsofthemerchantswhotradetothewesterncoastofAfrica。Todefendthemfromthebarbarousnatives，itisnecessarythattheplacewheretheyaredepositedshouldbe，insomemeasure，fortified。ThedisordersinthegovernmentofIndostanhavebeensupposedtorenderalikeprecautionnecessaryevenamongthatmildandgentlepeople;anditwasunderpretenceofsecuringtheirpersonsandpropertyfromviolencethatboththeEnglishandFrenchEastIndiaCompanieswereallowedtoerectthefirstfortswhichtheypossessedinthatcountry。Amongothernations，whosevigorousgovernmentwillsuffernostrangerstopossessanyfortifiedplacewithintheirterritory，itmaybenecessarytomaintainsomeambassador，minister，orcounsel，whomaybothdecide，accordingtotheirowncustoms，thedifferencesarisingamonghisowncountrymen，and，intheirdisputeswiththenatives，may，bymeansofhispubliccharacter，interferewithmoreauthority，andaffordthemamorepowerfulprotection，thantheycouldexpectfromanyprivateman。Theinterestsofcommercehavefrequentlymadeitnecessarytomaintainministersinforeigncountrieswherethepurposes，eitherofwaroralliance，wouldnothaverequiredany。ThecommerceoftheTurkeyCompanyfirstoccasionedtheestablishmentofanordinaryambassadoratConstantinople。ThefirstEnglishembassiestoRussiaarosealtogetherfromcommercialinterests。TheconstantinterferencewhichthoseinterestsnecessarilyoccasionedbetweenthesubjectsofthedifferentstatesofEurope，hasprobablyintroducedthecustomofkeeping，inallneighbouringcountries，ambassadorsorministersconstantlyresidenteveninthetimeofpeace。Thiscustom，unknowntoancienttimes，seemsnottobeolderthantheendofthefifteenthorbeginningofthesixteenthcentury;thatis，thanthetimewhencommercefirstbegantoextenditselftothegreaterpartofthenationsofEurope，andwhentheyfirstbegantoattendtoitsinterests。
　　Itseemsnotunreasonablethattheextraordinaryexpensewhichtheprotectionofanyparticularbranchofcommercemayoccasionshouldbedefrayedbyamoderatetaxuponthatparticularbranch;byamoderatefine，forexample，tobepaidbythetraderswhentheyfirstenterintoit，or，whatismoreequal，byaparticulardutyofsomuchpercentuponthegoodswhichtheyeitherimportinto，orexportoutof，theparticularcountrieswithwhichitiscarriedon。Theprotectionoftradeingeneral，frompiratesandfreebooters，issaidtohavegivenoccasiontothefirstinstitutionofthedutiesofcustoms。But，ifitwasthoughtreasonabletolayageneraltaxupontrade，inordertodefraytheexpenseofprotectingtradeingeneral，itshouldseemequallyreasonabletolayaparticulartaxuponaparticularbranchoftrade，inordertodefraytheextraordinaryexpenseofprotectingthatbranch。
　　Theprotectionoftradeingeneralhasalwaysbeenconsideredasessentialtothedefenceofthecommonwealth，and，uponthataccount，anecessarypartofthedutyoftheexecutivepower。Thecollectionandapplicationofthegeneraldutiesofcustoms，therefore，havealwaysbeenlefttothatpower。Buttheprotectionofanyparticularbranchoftradeisapartofthegeneralprotectionoftrade;apart，therefore，ofthedutyofthatpower;andifnationsalwaysactedconsistently，theparticulardutiesleviedforthepurposesofsuchparticularprotectionshouldalwayshavebeenleftequallytoitsdisposal。
　　Butinthisrespect，aswellasinmanyothers，nationshavenotalwaysactedconsistently;andinthegreaterpartofthecommercialstatesofEurope，particularcompaniesofmerchantshavehadtheaddresstopersuadethelegislaturetoentrusttothemtheperformanceofthispartofthedutyofthesovereign，togetherwithallthepowerswhicharenecessarilyconnectedwithit。
　　Thesecompanies，thoughtheymay，perhaps，havebeenusefulforthefirstintroductionofsomebranchesofcommerce，bymaking，attheirownexpense，anexperimentwhichthestatemightnotthinkitprudenttomake，haveinthelongrunproved，universally，eitherburdensomeoruseless，andhaveeithermismanagedorconfinedthetrade。
　　Whenthosecompaniesdonottradeuponajointstock，butareobligedtoadmitanyperson，properlyqualified，uponpayingacertainfine，andagreeingtosubmittotheregulationsofthecompany，eachmembertradinguponhisownstock，andathisownrisk，theyarecalledregulatedcompanies。Whentheytradeuponajointstock，eachmembersharinginthecommonprofitorlossinproportiontohisshareinthisstock，theyarecalledjointstockcompanies。Suchcompanies，whetherregulatedorjointstock，sometimeshave，andsometimeshavenot，exclusiveprivileges。
　　Regulatedcompaniesresemble，ineveryrespect，thecorporationsoftradessocommoninthecitiesandtownsofallthedifferentcountriesofEurope，andareasortofenlargedmonopoliesofthesamekind。Asnoinhabitantofatowncanexerciseanincorporatedtradewithoutfirstobtaininghisfreedominthecorporation，soinmostcasesnosubjectofthestatecanlawfullycarryonanybranchofforeigntrade，forwhicharegulatedcompanyisestablished，withoutfirstbecomingamemberofthatcompany。Themonopolyismoreorlessstrictaccordingasthetermsofadmissionaremoreorlessdifficult;
　　andaccordingasthedirectorsofthecompanyhavemoreorlessauthority，orhaveitmoreorlessintheirpowertomanageinsuchamannerastoconfinethegreaterpartofthetradetothemselvesandtheirparticularfriends。Inthemostancientregulatedcompaniestheprivilegesofapprenticeshipwerethesameasinothercorporations，andentitledthepersonwhohadservedhistimetoamemberofthecompanytobecomehimselfamember，eitherwithoutpayinganyfine，oruponpayingamuchsmalleronethanwhatwasexactedofotherpeople。Theusualcorporationspirit，whereverthelawdoesnotrestrainit，prevailsinallregulatedcompanies。Whentheyhavebeenallowedtoactaccordingtotheirnaturalgenius，theyhavealways，inordertoconfinethecompetitiontoassmallanumberofpersonsaspossible，endeavouredtosubjectthetradetomanyburdensomeregulations。Whenthelawhasrestrainedthemfromdoingthis，theyhavebecomealtogetheruselessandinsignificant。
　　TheregulatedcompaniesforforeigncommercewhichatpresentsubsistinGreatBritainaretheancientmerchantadventurers’company，nowcommonlycalledtheHamburgCompany，theRussiaCompany，theEastlandCompany，theTurkeyCompany，andtheAfricanCompany。
　　ThetermsofadmissionintotheHamburgCompanyarenowsaidtobequiteeasy，andthedirectorseitherhaveitnottheirpowertosubjectthetradetoanyburdensomerestraintorregulations，or，atleast，havenotoflateexercisedthatpower。
　　Ithasnotalwaysbeenso。Aboutthemiddleofthelastcentury，thefineforadmissionwasfifty，andatonetimeonehundredpounds，andtheconductofthecompanywassaidtobeextremelyoppressive。In1643，in1645，andin1661，theclothiersandfreetradersoftheWestofEnglandcomplainedofthemtoParliamentasofmonopolistswhoconfinedthetradeandoppressedthemanufacturesofthecountry。ThoughthosecomplaintsproducedanActofParliament，theyhadprobablyintimidatedthecompanysofarastoobligethemtoreformtheirconduct。Sincethattime，atleast，therehasbeennocomplaintsagainstthem。Bythe10thand11thofWilliamIII，c。6，thefineforadmissionintotheRussiaCompanywasreducedtofivepounds;andbythe25thofCharlesII，c。7，thatforadmissionintotheEastlandCompanytofortyshillings，while，atthesametime，Sweden，Denmark，andNorway，allthecountriesonthenorthsideoftheBaltic，wereexemptedfromtheirexclusivecharter。TheconductofthosecompanieshadprobablygivenoccasiontothosetwoActsofParliament。Beforethattime，SirJosiahChildhadrepresentedboththeseandtheHamburgCompanyasextremelyoppressive，andimputedtotheirbadmanagementthelowstateofthetradewhichweatthattimecarriedontothecountriescomprehendedwithintheirrespectivecharters。Butthoughsuchcompaniesmaynot，inthepresenttimes，beveryoppressive，theyarecertainlyaltogetheruseless。Tobemerelyuseless，indeed，isperhapsthehighesteulogywhichcaneverjustlybebestoweduponaregulatedcompany;andallthethreecompaniesabovementionedseem，intheirpresentstate，todeservethiseulogy。
　　ThefineforadmissionintotheTurkeyCompanywasformerlytwenty—fivepoundsforallpersonsundertwenty—sixyearsofage，andfiftypoundsforallpersonsabovethatage。Nobodybutmeremerchantscouldbeadmitted;arestrictionwhichexcludedallshopkeepersandretailers。Byabye—law，noBritishmanufacturescouldbeexportedtoTurkeybutinthegeneralshipsofthecompany;andasthoseshipssailedalwaysfromtheportofLondon，thisrestrictionconfinedthetradetothatexpensiveport，andthetraderstothosewholivedinLondonandinitsneighbourhood。Byanotherbye—law，nopersonlivingwithintwentymilesofLondon，andnotfreeofthecity，couldbeadmittedamember;anotherrestrictionwhich，joinedtotheforegoing，necessarilyexcludedallbutthefreemenofLondon。Asthetimefortheloadingandsailingofthosegeneralshipsdependedaltogetheruponthedirectors，theycouldeasilyfillthemwiththeirowngoodsandthoseoftheirparticularfriends，totheexclusionofothers，who，theymightpretend，hadmadetheirproposalstoolate。Inthisstateofthings，therefore，thiscompanywasineveryrespectastrictandoppressivemonopoly。
　　Thoseabusesgaveoccasiontotheactofthe26thofGeorgeII，c。18，reducingthefineforadmissiontotwentypoundsforallpersons，withoutanydistinctionofages，oranyrestriction，eithertomeremerchants，ortothefreemenofLondon;andgrantingtoallsuchpersonsthelibertyofexporting，fromalltheportsofGreatBritaintoanyportinTurkey，allBritishgoodsofwhichtheexportationwasnotprohibited;andofimportingfromthenceallTurkishgoodsofwhichtheimportationwasnotprohibited，uponpayingboththegeneraldutiesofcustoms，andtheparticulardutiesassessedfordefrayingthenecessaryexpensesofthecompany;andsubmitting，atthesametime，tothelawfulauthorityoftheBritishambassadorandconsulsresidentinTurkey，andtothebyelawsofthecompanydulyenacted。Topreventanyoppressionbythosebye—laws，itwasbythesameactordained，thatifanysevenmembersofthecompanyconceivedthemselvesaggrievedbyanybye—lawwhichshouldbeenactedafterthepassingofthisact，theymightappealtotheBoardofTradeandPlantations（totheauthorityofwhichacommitteeofthePrivyCouncilhasnowsucceeded），providedsuchappealwasbroughtwithintwelvemonthsafterthebye—lawwasenacted;andthatifanysevenmembersconceivedthemselvesaggrievedbyanybye—lawwhichhadbeenenactedbeforethepassingofthisact，theymightbringalikeappeal，provideditwaswithintwelvemonthsafterthedayonwhichthisactwastotakeplace。Theexperienceofoneyear，however，maynotalwaysbesufficienttodiscovertoallthemembersofagreatcompany，thepernicioustendencyofaparticularbye—law;andifseveralofthemshouldafterwardsdiscoverit，neithertheBoardofTrade，northecommitteeofcouncil，canaffordthemanyredress。Theobject，besides，ofthegreaterpartofthebye—lawsofallregulatedcompanies，aswellasofallothercorporations，isnotsomuchtooppressthosewhoarealreadymembers，astodiscourageothersfrombecomingso;whichmaybedone，notonlybyahighfine，butbymanyothercontrivances。Theconstantviewofsuchcompaniesisalwaystoraisetherateoftheirownprofitashighastheycan;tokeepthemarket，bothforthegoodswhichtheyexport，andforthosewhichtheyimport，asmuchunderstockedastheycan:whichcanbedoneonlybyrestrainingthecompetition，orbydiscouragingnewadventurersfromenteringintothetrade。Afineevenoftwentypounds，besides，thoughitmaynotperhapsbesufficienttodiscourageanymanfromenteringintotheTurkeytradewithanintentiontocontinueinit，maybeenoughtodiscourageaspeculativemerchantfromhazardingasingleadventureinit。Inalltrades，theregularestablishedtraders，eventhoughnotincorporated，naturallycombinetoraiseprofits，whicharenowaysolikelytobekept，atalltimes，downtotheirproperlevel，asbytheoccasionalcompetitionofspeculativeadventure。TheTurkeytrade，thoughinsomemeasurelaidopenbythisActofParliament，isstillconsideredbymanypeopleasveryfarfrombeingaltogetherfree。TheTurkeyCompanycontributetomaintainanambassadorandtwoorthreeconsuls，who，likeotherpublicministers，oughttobemaintainedaltogetherbythestate，andthetradelaidopentoallhisMajesty’ssubjects。Thedifferenttaxesleviedbythecompany，forthisandothercorporationpurposes，mightaffordavenuemuchmorethansufficienttoenablethestatetomaintainsuchministers。
　　Regulatedcompanies，itwasobservedbySirJosiahChild，thoughtheyhadfrequentlysupportedpublicministers，hadnevermaintainedanyfortsorgarrisonsinthecountriestowhichtheytraded;whereasjointstockcompaniesfrequentlyhad。Andinrealitytheformerseemtobemuchmoreunfitforthissortofservicethanthelatter。First，thedirectorsofaregulatedcompanyhavenoparticularinterestintheprosperityofthegeneraltradeofthecompanyforthesakeofwhichsuchfortsandgarrisonsaremaintained。Thedecayofthatgeneraltrademayevenfrequentlycontributetotheadvantageoftheirownprivatetrade;asbydiminishingthenumberoftheircompetitorsitmayenablethembothtobuycheaper，andtoselldearer。Thedirectorsofajointstockcompany，onthecontrary，havingonlytheirshareintheprofitswhicharemadeuponthecommonstockcommittedtotheirmanagement，havenoprivatetradeoftheirownofwhichtheinterestcanbeseparatedfromthatofthegeneraltradeofthecompany。Theirprivateinterestisconnectedwiththeprosperityofthegeneraltradeofthecompany，andwiththemaintenanceofthefortsandgarrisonswhicharenecessaryforitsdefence。Theyaremorelikely，therefore，tohavethatcontinualandcarefulattentionwhichthatmaintenancenecessarilyrequires。Secondly，thedirectorsofajointstockcompanyhavealwaysthemanagementofalargecapital，thejointstockofthecompany，apartofwhichtheymayfrequentlyemploy，withpropriety，inbuilding，repairing，andmaintainingsuchnecessaryfortsandgarrisons。Butthedirectorsofaregulatedcompany，havingthemanagementofnocommoncapital，havenootherfundtoemployinthiswaybutthecasualrevenuearisingfromtheadmissionfines，andfromthecorporationdutiesimposeduponthetradeofthecompany。Thoughtheyhadthesameinterest，therefore，toattendtothemaintenanceofsuchfortsandgarrisons，theycanseldomhavethesameabilitytorenderthatattentioneffectual。Themaintenanceofapublicministerrequiringscarceanyattention，andbutamoderateandlimitedexpense，isabusinessmuchmoresuitablebothtothetemperandabilitiesofaregulatedcompany。
　　LongafterthetimeofSirJosiahChild，however，in1750，aregulatedcompanywasestablished，thepresentcompanyofmerchantstradingtoAfrica，whichwasexpresslychargedatfirstwiththemaintenanceofalltheBritishfortsandgarrisonsthatliebetweenCapeBlancandtheCapeofGoodHope，andafterwardswiththatofthoseonlywhichliebetweenCapeRougeandtheCapeofGoodHope。Theactwhichestablishesthiscompany（the23rdofGeorgeII，c。3）seemstohavehadtwodistinctobjectsinview;
　　first，torestraineffectuallytheoppressiveandmonopolizingspiritwhichisnaturaltothedirectorsofaregulatedcompany;
　　andsecondly，toforcethem，asmuchaspossible，togiveanattention，whichisnotnaturaltothem，towardsthemaintenanceoffortsandgarrisons。
　　Forthefirstofthesepurposesthefineforadmissionislimitedtofortyshillings。Thecompanyisprohibitedfromtradingintheircorporatecapacity，oruponajointstock;fromborrowingmoneyuponcommonseal，orfromlayinganyrestraintsuponthetradewhichmaybecarriedonfreelyfromallplaces，andbyallpersonsbeingBritishsubjects，andpayingthefine。
　　ThegovernmentisinacommitteeofninepersonswhomeetatLondon，butwhoarechosenannuallybythefreemenofthecompanyatLondon，Bristol，andLiverpool;threefromeachplace。Nocommittee—mancanbecontinuedinofficeformorethanthreeyearstogether。Anycommittee—manmightberemovedbytheBoardofTradeandPlantations，nowbyacommitteecouncil，afterbeingheardinhisowndefence。ThecommitteeareforbidtoexportnegroesfromAfrica，ortoimportanyAfricangoodsintoGreatBritain。Butastheyarechargedwiththemaintenanceoffortsandgarrisons，theymay，forthatpurpose，exportfromGreatBritaintoAfricagoodsandstoresofdifferentkinds。Outofthemonieswhichtheyshallreceivefromthecompany，theyareallowedasumnotexceedingeighthundredpoundsforthesalariesoftheirclerksandagentsatLondon，Bristol，andLiverpool，thehouserentoftheirofficeatLondon，andallotherexpensesofmanagement，commission，andagencyinEngland。Whatremainsofthissum，afterdefrayingthesedifferentexpenses，theymaydivideamongthemselves，ascompensationfortheirtrouble，inwhatmannertheythinkproper。Bythisconstitution，itmighthavebeenexpectedthatthespiritofmonopolywouldhavebeeneffectuallyrestrained，andthefirstofthesepurposessufficientlyanswered。Itwouldseem，however，thatithadnot。
　　Thoughbythe4thofGeorgeIII，c。20，thefortofSenegal，withallitsdependencies，hadbeenvestedinthecompanyofmerchantstradingtoAfrica，yetintheyearfollowing（bythe5thofGeorgeIII，c。44）notonlySenegalanditsdependencies，butthewholecoastfromtheportofSallee，insouthBarbary，toCapeRouge，wasexemptedfromthejurisdictionofthatcompany，wasvestedinthecrown，andthetradetoitdeclaredfreetoallhisMajesty’ssubjects。Thecompanyhadbeensuspectedofrestrainingthetrade，andofestablishingsomesortofimpropermonopoly。Itisnot，however，veryeasytoconceivehow，undertheregulationsofthe23rdofGeorgeII，theycoulddoso。IntheprinteddebatesoftheHouseofCommons，notalwaysthemostauthenticrecordsoftruth，Iobserve，however，thattheyhavebeenaccusedofthis。Themembersofthecommitteeofnine，beingallmerchants，andthegovernorsandfactors，intheirdifferentfortsandsettlements，beingalldependentuponthem，itisnotunlikelythatthelattermighthavegivenpeculiarattentiontotheconsignmentsandcommissionsoftheformerwhichwouldestablisharealmonopoly。
　　Forthesecondofthese，purposes，themaintenanceofthefortsandgarrisons，anannualsumhasbeenallottedtothembyParliament，generallyaboutL13，000。Fortheproperapplicationofthissum，thecommitteeisobligedtoaccountannuallytotheCursitorBaronofExchequer;whichaccountisafterwardstobelaidbeforeParliament。ButParliament，whichgivessolittleattentiontotheapplicationofmillions，isnotlikelytogivemuchtothatofL13，000ayear;andtheCursitorBaronofExchequer，fromhisprofessionandeducation，isnotlikelytobeprofoundlyskilledintheproperexpenseoffortsandgarrisons。
　　ThecaptainsofhisMajesty’snavy，indeed，oranyothercommissionedofficersappointedbytheBoardofAdmiralty，mayinquireintotheconditionofthefortsandgarrisons，andreporttheirobservationstothatboard。Butthatboardseemstohavenodirectjurisdictionoverthecommittee，noranyauthoritytocorrectthosewhoseconductitmaythusinquireinto;andthecaptainsofhisMajesty’snavy，besides，arenotsupposedtobealwaysdeeplylearnedinthescienceoffortification。Removalfromanofficewhichcanbeenjoyedonlyforthetermofthreeyears，andofwhichthelawfulemoluments，evenduringthatterm，aresoverysmall，seemstobetheutmostpunishmenttowhichanycommittee—manisliableforanyfault，exceptdirectmalversation，orembezzlement，eitherofthepublicmoney，orofthatofthecompany;andthefearofthatpunishmentcanneverbeamotiveofsufficientweighttoforceacontinualandcarefulattentiontoabusinesstowhichhehasnootherinteresttoattend。ThecommitteeareaccusedofhavingsentoutbricksandstonesfromEnglandforthereparationofCapeCoastCastleonthecoastofGuinea，abusinessforwhichParliamenthadseveraltimesgrantedanextraordinarysumofmoney。Thesebricksandstonestoo，whichhadthusbeensentuponsolongavoyage，weresaidtohavebeenofsobadaqualitythatitwasnecessarytorebuildfromthefoundationthewallswhichhadbeenrepairedwiththem。ThefortsandgarrisonswhichlienorthofCapeRougearenotonlymaintainedattheexpenseofthestate，butareundertheimmediategovernmentoftheexecutivepower;andwhythosewhichliesouthofthatCape，andwhichare，inpartatleast，maintainedattheexpenseofthestate，shouldbeunderadifferentgovernment，itseemsnotveryeasyeventoimagineagoodreason。TheprotectionoftheMediterraneantradewastheoriginalpurposeofpretenceofthegarrisonsofGibraltarandMinorca，andthemaintenanceandgovernmentofthosegarrisonshasalwaysbeen，veryproperly，committed，nottotheTurkeyCompany，buttotheexecutivepower。Intheextentofitsdominionconsists，inagreatmeasure，theprideanddignityofthatpower;anditisnotverylikelytofailinattentiontowhatisnecessaryforthedefenceofthatdominion。ThegarrisonsatGibraltarandMinorca，accordingly，haveneverbeenneglected;
　　thoughMinorcahasbeentwicetaken，andisnowprobablylostforever，thatdisasterwasneverevenimputedtoanyneglectintheexecutivepower。Iwouldnot，however，beunderstoodtoinsinuatethateitherofthoseexpensivegarrisonswasever，eveninthesmallestdegree，necessaryforthepurposeforwhichtheywereoriginallydismemberedfromtheSpanishmonarchy。Thatdismemberment，perhaps，neverservedanyotherrealpurposethantoalienatefromEnglandhernaturalallytheKingofSpain，andtounitethetwoprincipalbranchesofthehouseofBourboninamuchstricterandmorepermanentalliancethanthetiesofbloodcouldeverhaveunitedthem。
　　Jointstockcompanies，establishedbyRoyalCharterorbyActofParliament，differinseveralrespects，notonlyfromregulatedcompanies，butfromprivatecopartneries。
　　First，inaprivatecopartnery，nopartner，withouttheconsentofthecompany，cantransferhissharetoanotherperson，orintroduceanewmemberintothecompany。Eachmember，however，may，uponproperwarning，withdrawfromthecopartnery，anddemandpaymentfromthemofhisshareofthecommonstock。Inajointstockcompany，onthecontrary，nomembercandemandpaymentofhissharefromthecompany;buteachmembercan，withouttheirconsent，transferhissharetoanotherperson，andtherebyintroduceanewmember。Thevalueofashareinajointstockisalwaysthepricewhichitwillbringinthemarket;andthismaybeeithergreaterorless，inanyproportion，thanthesumwhichitsownerstandscreditedforinthestockofthecompany。
　　Secondly，inaprivatecopartnery，eachpartnerisboundforthedebtscontractedbythecompanytothewholeextentofhisfortune。Inajointstockcompany，onthecontrary，eachpartnerisboundonlytotheextentofhisshare。
　　Thetradeofajointstockcompanyisalwaysmanagedbyacourtofdirectors。Thiscourt，indeed，isfrequentlysubject，inmanyrespects，tothecontrolofageneralcourtofproprietors。
　　Butthegreaterpartofthoseproprietorsseldompretendtounderstandanythingofthebusinessofthecompany，andwhenthespiritoffactionhappensnottoprevailamongthem，givethemselvesnotroubleaboutit，butreceivecontentedlysuchhalf—yearlyoryearlydividendasthedirectorsthinkpropertomaketothem。Thistotalexemptionfromtroubleandfromrisk，beyondalimitedsum，encouragesmanypeopletobecomeadventurersinjointstockcompanies，whowould，uponnoaccount，hazardtheirfortunesinanyprivatecopartnery。Suchcompanies，therefore，commonlydrawtothemselvesmuchgreaterstocksthananyprivatecopartnerycanboastof。ThetradingstockoftheSouthSeaCompany，atonetime，amountedtoupwardsofthirty—threemillionseighthundredthousandpounds。ThedividedcapitaloftheBankofEnglandamounts，atpresent，totenmillionssevenhundredandeightythousandpounds。Thedirectorsofsuchcompanies，however，beingthemanagersratherofotherpeople’smoneythanoftheirown，itcannotwellbeexpectedthattheyshouldwatchoveritwiththesameanxiousvigilancewithwhichthepartnersinaprivatecopartneryfrequentlywatchovertheirown。Likethestewardsofarichman，theyareapttoconsiderattentiontosmallmattersasnotfortheirmaster’shonour，andveryeasilygivethemselvesadispensationfromhavingit。Negligenceandprofusion，therefore，mustalwaysprevail，moreorless，inthemanagementoftheaffairsofsuchacompany。Itisuponthisaccountthatjointstockcompaniesforforeigntradehaveseldombeenabletomaintainthecompetitionagainstprivateadventurers。Theyhave，accordingly，veryseldomsucceededwithoutanexclusiveprivilege，andfrequentlyhavenotsucceededwithone。Withoutanexclusiveprivilegetheyhavecommonlymismanagedthetrade。Withanexclusiveprivilegetheyhavebothmismanagedandconfinedit。
　　TheRoyalAfricanCompany，thepredecessorsofthepresentAfricanCompany，hadanexclusiveprivilegebycharter，butasthatcharterhadnotbeenconfirmedbyActofParliament，thetrade，inconsequenceoftheDeclarationofRights，was，soonaftertherevolution，laidopentoallhisMajesty’ssubjects。
　　TheHudson’sBayCompanyare，astotheirlegalrights，inthesamesituationastheRoyalAfricanCompany。TheirexclusivecharterhasnotbeenconfirmedbyActofParliament。TheSouthSeaCompany，aslongastheycontinuedtobeatradingcompany，hadanexclusiveprivilegeconfirmedbyActofParliament;ashavelikewisethepresentUnitedCompanyofMerchantstradingtotheEastIndies。
　　TheRoyalAfricanCompanysoonfoundthattheycouldnotmaintainthecompetitionagainstprivateadventurers，whom，notwithstandingtheDeclarationofRights，theycontinuedforsometimetocallinterlopers，andtopersecuteassuch。In1698，however，theprivateadventurersweresubjectedtoadutyoftenpercentuponalmostallthedifferentbranchesoftheirtrade，tobeemployedbythecompanyinthemaintenanceoftheirfortsandgarrisonsBut，notwithstandingthisheavytax，thecompanywerestillunabletomaintainthecompetition。Theirstockandcreditgraduallydeclined。In1712，theirdebtshadbecomesogreatthataparticularActofParliamentwasthoughtnecessary，bothfortheirsecurityandforthatoftheircreditors。Itwasenactedthattheresolutionoftwo—thirdsofthesecreditorsinnumberandvalueshouldbindtherest，bothwithregardtothetimewhichshouldbeallowedtothecompanyforthepaymentoftheirdebts，andwithregardtoanyotheragreementwhichitmightbethoughtpropertomakewiththemconcerningthosedebts。
　　In1730，theiraffairswereinsogreatdisorderthattheywerealtogetherincapableofmaintainingtheirfortsandgarrisons，thesolepurposeandpretextoftheirinstitution。Fromthatyear，tilltheirfinaldissolution，theParliamentjudgeditnecessarytoallowtheannualsumoftenthousandpoundsforthatpurpose。In1732，afterhavingbeenformanyyearslosersbythetradeofcarryingnegroestotheWestIndies，theyatlastresolvedtogiveitupaltogether;toselltotheprivatetraderstoAmericathenegroeswhichtheypurchaseduponthecoast;andtoemploytheirservantsinatradetotheinlandpartsofAfricaforgolddust，elephants’teeth，dyeingdrugs，etc。Buttheirsuccessinthismoreconfinedtradewasnotgreaterthanintheirformerextensiveone。Theiraffairscontinuedtogograduallytodecline，tillatlast，beingineveryrespectabankruptcompany，theyweredissolvedbyActofParliament，andtheirfortsandgarrisonsvestedinthepresentregulatedcompanyofmerchantstradingtoAfrica。BeforetheerectionoftheRoyalAfricanCompany，therehadbeenthreeotherjointstockcompaniessuccessivelyestablished，oneafteranother，fortheAfricantrade。Theywereallequallyunsuccessful。Theyall，however，hadexclusivecharters，which，thoughnotconfirmedbyActofParliament，wereinthosedayssupposedtoconveyarealexclusiveprivilege。