perhapsnotaboveathirdorafourthofthecapitalwhichatpresentcarriesonthisgreatround—abouttrademighthavebeensufficienttocarryonallthosesmalldirectones，mighthavekeptinconstantemploymentanequalquantityofBritishindustry，andhaveequallysupportedtheannualproduceofthelandandlabourofGreatBritain。Allthepurposesofthistradebeing，inthismanner，answeredbyamuchsmallercapital，therewouldhavebeenalargesparecapitaltoapplytootherpurposes:toimprovethelands，toincreasethemanufactures，andtoextendthecommerceofGreatBritain;tocomeintocompetitionatleastwiththeotherBritishcapitalsemployedinallthosedifferentways，toreducetherateofprofitinthemall，andtherebytogivetoGreatBritain，inallofthem，asuperiorityoverothercountriesstillgreaterthanwhatsheatpresentenjoys。
　　Themonopolyofthecolonytrade，too，hasforcedsomepartofthecapitalofGreatBritainfromallforeigntradeofconsumptiontoacarryingtrade;andconsequently，fromsupportingmoreorlesstheindustryofGreatBritain，tobeemployedaltogetherinsupportingpartlythatofthecoloniesandpartlythatofsomeothercountries。
　　Thegoods，forexample，whichareannuallypurchasedwiththegreatsurplusofeighty—twothousandhogsheadsoftobaccoannuallyre—exportedfromGreatBritainarenotallconsumedinGreatBritain。Partofthem，linenfromGermanyandHolland，forexample，isreturnedtothecoloniesfortheirparticularconsumption。ButthatpartofthecapitalofGreatBritainwhichbuysthetobaccowithwhichthislinenisafterwardsboughtisnecessarilywithdrawnfromsupportingtheindustryofGreatBritain，tobeemployedaltogetherinsupporting，partlythatofthecolonies，andpartlythatoftheparticularcountrieswhopayforthistobaccowiththeproduceoftheirownindustry。
　　Themonopolyofthecolonytradebesides，byforcingtowardsitamuchgreaterproportionofthecapitalofGreatBritainthanwhatwouldnaturallyhavegonetoit，seemstohavebrokenaltogetherthatnaturalbalancewhichwouldotherwisehavetakenplaceamongallthedifferentbranchesofBritishindustry。TheindustryofGreatBritain，insteadofbeingaccommodatedtoagreatnumberofsmallmarkets，hasbeenprincipallysuitedtoonegreatmarket。Hercommerce，insteadofrunninginagreatnumberofsmallchannels，hasbeentaughttorunprincipallyinonegreatchannel。Butthewholesystemofherindustryandcommercehastherebybeenrenderedlesssecure，thewholestateofherbodypoliticlesshealthfulthanitotherwisewouldhavebeen。
　　Inherpresentcondition，GreatBritainresemblesoneofthoseunwholesomebodiesinwhichsomeofthevitalpartsareovergrown，andwhich，uponthataccount，areliabletomanydangerousdisordersscarceincidenttothoseinwhichallthepartsaremoreproperlyproportioned。Asmallstopinthatgreatblood—vessel，whichhasbeenartificiallyswelledbeyonditsnaturaldimensions，andthroughwhichanunnaturalproportionoftheindustryandcommerceofthecountryhasbeenforcedtocirculate，isverylikelytobringonthemostdangerousdisordersuponthewholebodypolitic。Theexpectationofarupturewiththecolonies，accordingly，hasstruckthepeopleofGreatBritainwithmoreterrorthantheyeverfeltforaSpanisharmada，oraFrenchinvasion。
　　Itwasthisterror，whetherwellorillgrounded，whichrenderedtherepealoftheStampAct，amongthemerchantsatleast，apopularmeasure。Inthetotalexclusionfromthecolonymarket，wasittolastonlyforafewyears，thegreaterpartofourmerchantsusedtofancythattheyforesawanentirestoptotheirtrade;thegreaterpartofourmastermanufacturers，theentireruinoftheirbusiness;andthegreaterpartofourworkmen，anendoftheiremployment。Arupturewithanyofourneighboursuponthecontinent，thoughlikely，too，tooccasionsomestoporinterruptionintheemploymentsofsomeofallthesedifferentordersofpeople，isforeseen，however，withoutanysuchgeneralemotion。Theblood，ofwhichthecirculationisstoppedinsomeofthesmallervessels，easilydisgorgesitselfintothegreaterwithoutoccasioninganydangerousdisorder;
　　but，whenitisstoppedinanyofthegreatervessels，convulsions，apoplexy，ordeath，aretheimmediateandunavoidableconsequences。Ifbutoneofthoseovergrownmanufactures，which，bymeanseitherofbountiesorofthemonopolyofthehomeandcolonymarkets，havebeenartificiallyraiseduptoanunnaturalheight，findssomesmallstoporinterruptioninitsemployment，itfrequentlyoccasionsamutinyanddisorderalarmingtogovernment，andembarrassingeventothedeliberationsofthelegislature。Howgreat，therefore，wouldbethedisorderandconfusion，itwasthought，whichmustnecessarilybeoccasionedbyasuddenandentirestopintheemploymentofsogreataproportionofourprincipalmanufacturers。
　　SomemoderateandgradualrelaxationofthelawswhichgivetoGreatBritaintheexclusivetradetothecolonies，tillitisrenderedinagreatmeasurefree，seemstobetheonlyexpedientwhichcan，inallfuturetimes，deliverherfromthisdanger，whichcanenableherorevenforcehertowithdrawsomepartofhercapitalfromthisovergrownemployment，andtoturnit，thoughwithlessprofit，towardsotheremployments;andwhich，bygraduallydiminishingonebranchofherindustryandgraduallyincreasingalltherest，canbydegreesrestoreallthedifferentbranchesofittothatnatural，healthful，andproperproportionwhichperfectlibertynecessarilyestablishes，andwhichperfectlibertycanalonepreserve。Toopenthecolonytradeallatoncetoallnationsmightnotonlyoccasionsometransitoryinconveniency，butagreatpermanentlosstothegreaterpartofthosewhoseindustryorcapitalisatpresentengagedinit。Thesuddenlossoftheemploymentevenoftheshipswhichimporttheeighty—twothousandhogsheadsoftobacco，whichareoverandabovetheconsumptionofGreatBritain，mightalonebefeltverysensibly。Sucharetheunfortunateeffectsofalltheregulationsofthemercantilesystem！Theynotonlyintroduceverydangerousdisordersintothestateofthebodypolitic，butdisorderswhichitisoftendifficulttoremedy，withoutoccasioningforatimeatleast，stillgreaterdisorders。Inwhatmanner，therefore，thecolonytradeoughtgraduallytobeopened;whataretherestraintswhichoughtfirst，andwhatarethosewhichoughtlasttobetakenaway;orinwhatmannerthenaturalsystemofperfectlibertyandjusticeoughtgraduallytoberestored，wemustleavetothewisdomoffuturestatesmenandlegislatorstodetermine。
　　Fivedifferentevents，unforeseenandunthoughtof，haveveryfortunatelyconcurredtohinderGreatBritainfromfeeling，sosensiblyasitwasgenerallyexpectedshewould，thetotalexclusionwhichhasnowtakenplaceformorethanayear（fromthefirstofDecember，1774）fromaveryimportantbranchofthecolonytrade，thatofthetwelveassociatedprovincesofNorthAmerica。First，thosecolonies，inpreparingthemselvesfortheirnon—importationagreement，drainedGreatBritaincompletelyofallthecommoditieswhichwerefitfortheirmarket;secondly，theextraordinarydemandoftheSpanishFlotahas，thisyear，drainedGermanyandtheNorthofmanycommodities，lineninparticular，whichusedtocomeintocompetition，evenintheBritishmarket，withthemanufacturesofGreatBritain;thirdly，thepeacebetweenRussiaandTurkeyhasoccasionedanextraordinarydemandfromtheTurkeymarket，which，duringthedistressofthecountry，andwhileaRussianfleetwascruisingintheArchipelago，hadbeenverypoorlysupplied;fourthly，thedemandoftheNorthofEuropeforthemanufacturesofGreatBritainhasbeenincreasingfromyeartoyearforsometimepast;
　　andfifthly，thelatepartitionandconsequentialpacificationofPoland，byopeningthemarketofthatgreatcountry，havethisyearaddedanextraordinarydemandfromthencetotheincreasingdemandoftheNorth。Theseeventsareall，exceptthefourth，intheirnaturetransitoryandaccidental，andtheexclusionfromsoimportantabranchofthecolonytrade，ifunfortunatelyitshouldcontinuemuchlonger，maystilloccasionsomedegreeofdistress。Thisdistress，however，asitwillcomeongradually，willbefeltmuchlessseverelythanifithadcomeonallatonce;and，inthemeantime，theindustryandcapitalofthecountrymayfindanewemploymentanddirection，soastopreventthisdistressfromeverrisingtoanyconsiderableheight。
　　Themonopolyofthecolonytrade，therefore，sofarasithasturnedtowardsthattradeagreaterproportionofthecapitalofGreatBritainthanwhatwouldotherwisehavegonetoit，hasinallcasesturnedit，fromaforeigntradeofconsumptionwithaneighbouringintoonewithamoredistantcountry;inmanycases，fromadirectforeigntradeofconsumptionintoaround—aboutone;andinsomecases，fromallforeigntradeofconsumptionintoacarryingtrade。Ithasinallcases，therefore，turneditfromadirectioninwhichitwouldhavemaintainedagreaterquantityofproductivelabourintooneinwhichitcanmaintainamuchsmallerquantity。Bysuiting，besides，tooneparticularmarketonlysogreatapartoftheindustryandcommerceofGreatBritain，ithasrenderedthewholestateofthatindustryandcommercemoreprecariousandlesssecurethaniftheirproducehadbeenaccommodatedtoagreatervarietyofmarkets。
　　Wemustcarefullydistinguishbetweentheeffectsofthecolonytradeandthoseofthemonopolyofthattrade。Theformerarealwaysandnecessarilybeneficial;thelatteralwaysandnecessarilyhurtful。Buttheformeraresobeneficialthatthecolonytrade，thoughsubjecttoamonopoly，andnotwithstandingthehurtfuleffectsofthatmonopoly，isstilluponthewholebeneficial，andgreatlybeneficial;thoughagooddeallesssothanitotherwisewouldbe。
　　Theeffectofthecolonytradeinitsnaturalandfreestateistoopenagreat，thoughdistant，marketforsuchpartsoftheproduceofBritishindustryasmayexceedthedemandofthemarketsnearerhome，ofthoseofEurope，andofthecountrieswhichlieroundtheMediterraneanSea。Initsnaturalandfreestate，thecolonytrade，withoutdrawingfromthosemarketsanypartoftheproducewhichhadeverbeensenttothem，encouragesGreatBritaintoincreasethesurpluscontinuallybycontinuallypresentingnewequivalentstobeexchangedforit。Initsnaturalandfreestate，thecolonytradetendstoincreasethequantityofproductivelabourinGreatBritain，butwithoutalteringinanyrespectthedirectionofthatwhichhadbeenemployedtherebefore。Inthenaturalandfreestateofthecolonytrade，thecompetitionofallothernationswouldhindertherateofprofitfromrisingabovethecommonleveleitherinthenewmarketorinthenewemployment。Thenewmarket，withoutdrawinganythingfromtheoldone，wouldcreate，ifonemaysayso，anewproduceforitsownsupply;andthatnewproducewouldconstituteanewcapitalforcarryingonthenewemployment，whichinthesamemannerwoulddrawnothingfromtheoldone。
　　Themonopolyofthecolonytrade，onthecontrary，byexcludingthecompetitionofothernations，andtherebyraisingtherateofprofitbothinthenewmarketandinthenewemployment，drawsproducefromtheoldmarketandcapitalfromtheoldemployment。Toaugmentourshareofthecolonytradebeyondwhatitotherwisewouldbeistheavowedpurposeofthemonopoly。Ifourshareofthattradeweretobenogreaterwiththanitwouldhavebeenwithoutthemonopoly，therecouldhavebeennoreasonforestablishingthemonopoly。Butwhateverforcesintoabranchoftradeofwhichthereturnsareslowerandmoredistantthanthoseofthegreaterpartofothertrades，agreaterproportionofthecapitalofanycountrythanwhatofitsownaccordwouldgotothatbranch，necessarilyrendersthewholequantityofproductivelabourannuallymaintainedthere，thewholeannualproduceofthelandandlabourofthatcountry，lessthantheyotherwisewouldbe。Itkeepsdowntherevenueoftheinhabitantsofthatcountrybelowwhatitwouldnaturallyriseto，andtherebydiminishestheirpowerofaccumulation。Itnotonlyhinders，atalltimes，theircapitalfrommaintainingsogreataquantityofproductivelabourasitwouldotherwisemaintain，butithindersitfromincreasingsofastasitwouldotherwiseincrease，andconsequentlyfrommaintainingastillgreaterquantityofproductivelabour。
　　Thenaturalgoodeffectsofthecolonytrade，however，morethancounterbalancetoGreatBritainthebadeffectsofthemonopoly，sothat，monopolyandalltogether，thattrade，evenasitcarriedonatpresent，isnotonlyadvantageous，butgreatlyadvantageous。Thenewmarketandthenewemploymentwhichareopenedbythecolonytradeareofmuchgreaterextentthanthatportionoftheoldmarketandoftheoldemploymentwhichislostbythemonopoly。Thenewproduceandthenewcapitalwhichhasbeencreated，ifonemaysayso，bythecolonytrade，maintaininGreatBritainagreaterquantityofproductivelabourthanwhatcanhavebeenthrownoutofemploymentbytherevulsionofcapitalfromothertradesofwhichthereturnsaremorefrequent。
　　Ifthecolonytrade，however，evenasitiscarriedonatpresent，isadvantageoustoGreatBritain，itisnotbymeansofthemonopoly，butinspiteofthemonopoly。
　　ItisratherforthemanufacturedthanfortherudeproduceofEuropethatthecolonytradeopensanewmarket。Agricultureistheproperbusinessofallnewcolonies;abusinesswhichthecheapnessoflandrendersmoreadvantageousthananyother。Theyabound，therefore，intherudeproduceofland，andinsteadofimportingitfromothercountries，theyhavegenerallyalargesurplustoexport。Innewcolonies，agricultureeitherdrawshandsfromallotheremployments，orkeepsthemfromgoingtoanyotheremployment。Therearefewhandstospareforthenecessary，andnonefortheornamentalmanufactures。Thegreaterpartofthemanufacturesofbothkindstheyfinditcheapertopurchaseofothercountriesthantomakeforthemselves。ItischieflybyencouragingthemanufacturesofEuropethatthecolonytradeindirectlyencouragesitsagriculture。ThemanufacturesofEurope，towhomthattradegivesemployment，constituteanewmarketfortheproduceoftheland;andthemostadvantageousofallmarkets，thehomemarketforthecornandcattle，forthebreadandbutcher’smeatofEurope，isthusgreatlyextendedbymeansofthetradetoAmerica。
　　Butthatthemonopolyofthetradeofpopulousandthrivingcoloniesisnotalonesufficienttoestablish，oreventomaintainmanufacturesinanycountry，theexamplesofSpainandPortugalsufficientlydemonstrate。SpainandPortugalweremanufacturingcountriesbeforetheyhadanyconsiderablecolonies。Sincetheyhadtherichestandmostfertileintheworld，theyhavebothceasedtobeso。
　　InSpainandPortugalthebadeffectsofthemonopoly，aggravatedbyothercauses，haveperhapsnearlyoverbalancedthenaturalgoodeffectsofthecolonytrade。Thesecausesseemtobeothermonopoliesofdifferentkinds;thedegradationofthevalueofgoldandsilverbelowwhatitisinmostothercountries;theexclusionfromforeignmarketsbyimpropertaxesuponexportation，andthenarrowingofthehomemarket，bystillmoreimpropertaxesuponthetransportationofgoodsfromonepartofthecountrytoanother;butaboveall，thatirregularandpartialadministrationofjustice，whichoftenprotectstherichandpowerfuldebtorfromthepursuitofhisinjuredcreditor，andwhichmakestheindustriouspartofthenationafraidtopreparegoodsfortheconsumptionofthosehaughtyandgreatmentowhomtheydarenotrefusetoselluponcredit，andfromtheyarealtogetheruncertainofrepayment。
　　InEngland，onthecontrary，thenaturalgoodeffectsofthecolonytrade，assistedbyothercauses，haveinagreatmeasureconqueredthebadeffectsofthemonopoly。Thesecausesseemtobe:thegenerallibertyoftrade，which，notwithstandingsomerestraints，isatleastequal，perhapssuperior，towhatitisinanyothercountry;thelibertyofexporting，dutyfree，almostallsortsofgoodswhicharetheproduceofdomesticindustrytoalmostanyforeigncountry;andwhatperhapsisofstillgreaterimportance，theunboundedlibertyoftransportingthemfromanyonepartofourowncountrytoanyotherwithoutbeingobligedtogiveanyaccounttoanypublicoffice，withoutbeingliabletoquestionorexaminationofanykind;butaboveall，thatequalandimpartialadministrationofjusticewhichrenderstherightsofthemeanestBritishsubjectrespectabletothegreatest，andwhich，bysecuringtoeverymanthefruitsofhisownindustry，givesthegreatestandmosteffectualencouragementtoeverysortofindustry。
　　IfthemanufacturesofGreatBritain，however，havebeenadvanced，astheycertainlyhave，bythecolonytrade，ithasnotbeenbymeansofthemonopolyofthattradebutinspiteofthemonopoly。Theeffectofthemonopolyhasbeen，nottoaugmentthequantity，buttoalterthequalityandshapeofapartofthemanufacturesofGreatBritain，andtoaccommodatetoamarket，fromwhichthereturnsareslowanddistant，whatwouldotherwisehavebeenaccommodatedtoonefromwhichthereturnsarefrequentandnear。ItseffecthasconsequentlybeentoturnapartofthecapitalofGreatBritainfromanemploymentinwhichitwouldhavemaintainedagreaterquantityofmanufacturingindustrytooneinwhichitmaintainsamuchsmaller，andtherebytodiminish，insteadofincreasing，thewholequantityofmanufacturingindustrymaintainedinGreatBritain。
　　Themonopolyofthecolonytrade，therefore，likealltheothermeanandmalignantexpedientsofthemercantilesystem，depressestheindustryofallothercountries，butchieflythatofthecolonies，withoutintheleastincreasing，butonthecontrarydiminishingthatofthecountryinwhosefavouritisestablished。
　　Themonopolyhindersthecapitalofthatcountry，whatevermayatanyparticulartimebetheextentofthatcapital，frommaintainingsogreataquantityofproductivelabourasitwouldotherwisemaintain，andfromaffordingsogreatarevenuetotheindustriousinhabitantsasitwouldotherwiseafford。Butascapitalcanbeincreasedonlybysavingsfromrevenue，themonopoly，byhinderingitfromaffordingsogreatarevenueasitwouldotherwiseafford，necessarilyhindersitfromincreasingsofastasitwouldotherwiseincrease，andconsequentlyfrommaintainingastillgreaterquantityofproductivelabour，andaffordingastillgreaterrevenuetotheindustriousinhabitantsofthatcountry。Onegreatoriginalsourceofrevenue，therefore，thewagesoflabour，themonopolymustnecessarilyhaverenderedatalltimeslessabundantthanitotherwisewouldhavebeen。
　　Byraisingtherateofmercantileprofit，themonopolydiscouragestheimprovementofland。Theprofitofimprovementdependsuponthedifferencebetweenwhatthelandactuallyproduces，andwhat，bytheapplicationofacertaincapital，itcanbemadetoproduce。Ifthisdifferenceaffordsagreaterprofitthanwhatcanbedrawnfromanequalcapitalinanymercantileemployment，theimprovementoflandwilldrawcapitalfromallmercantileemployments。Iftheprofitisless，mercantileemploymentswilldrawcapitalfromtheimprovementofland。Whatever，therefore，raisestherateofmercantileprofit，eitherlessensthesuperiorityorincreasestheinferiorityoftheprofitofimprovement;andintheonecasehinderscapitalfromgoingtoimprovement，andintheotherdrawscapitalfromit。Butbydiscouragingimprovement，themonopolynecessarilyretardsthenaturalincreaseofanothergreatoriginalsourceofrevenue，therentofland。Byraisingtherateofprofit，too，themonopolynecessarilykeepsupthemarketrateofinteresthigherthanitotherwisewouldbe。Butthepriceoflandinproportiontotherentwhichitaffords，thenumberofyearspurchasewhichiscommonlypaidforit，necessarilyfallsastherateofinterestrises，andrisesastherateofinterestfalls。
　　Themonopoly，therefore，hurtstheinterestofthelandlordtwodifferentways，byretardingthenaturalincrease，first，ofhisrent，andsecondly，ofthepricewhichhewouldgetforhislandinproportiontotherentwhichitaffords。
　　Themonopolyindeedraisestherateofmercantileprofit，andtherebyaugmentssomewhatthegainofourmerchants。Butasitobstructsthenaturalincreaseofcapital，ittendsrathertodiminishthantoincreasethesumtotaloftherevenuewhichtheinhabitantsofthecountryderivefromtheprofitsofstock;asmallprofituponagreatcapitalgenerallyaffordingagreaterrevenuethanagreatprofituponasmallone。Themonopolyraisestherateofprofit，butithindersthesumofprofitfromrisingsohighasitotherwisewoulddo。
　　Alltheoriginalsourcesofrevenue，thewagesoflabour，therentofland，andtheprofitsofstock，themonopolyrendersmuchlessabundantthantheyotherwisewouldbe。Topromotethelittleinterestofonelittleorderofmeninonecountry，ithurtstheinterestofallotherordersofmeninthatcountry，andofallmeninallothercountries。
　　Itissolelybyraisingtheordinaryrateofprofitthatthemonopolyeitherhasprovedorcouldproveadvantageoustoanyoneparticularorderofmen。Butbesidesallthebadeffectstothecountryingeneral，whichhavealreadybeenmentionedasnecessarilyresultingfromahighrateofprofit，thereisonemorefatal，perhaps，thanalltheseputtogether，butwhich，ifwemayjudgefromexperience，isinseparablyconnectedwithit。
　　Thehighrateofprofitseemseverywheretodestroythatparsimonywhichinothercircumstancesisnaturaltothecharacterofthemerchant。Whenprofitsarehighthatsobervirtueseemstobesuperfluousandexpensiveluxurytosuitbettertheaffluenceofhissituation。Buttheownersofthegreatmercantilecapitalsarenecessarilytheleadersandconductorsofthewholeindustryofeverynation，andtheirexamplehasamuchgreaterinfluenceuponthemannersofthewholeindustriouspartofitthanthatofanyotherorderofmen。
　　Ifhisemployerisattentiveandparsimonious，theworkmanisverylikelytobesotoo;butifthemasterisdissoluteanddisorderly，theservantwhoshapeshisworkaccordingtothepatternwhichhismasterprescribestohimwillshapehislifetooaccordingtotheexamplewhichhesetshim。Accumulationisthuspreventedinthehandsofallthosewhoarenaturallythemostdisposedtoaccumulate，andthefundsdestinedforthemaintenanceofproductivelabourreceivenoaugmentationfromtherevenueofthosewhooughtnaturallytoaugmentthemthemost。
　　Thecapitalofthecountry，insteadofincreasing，graduallydwindlesaway，andthequantityofproductivelabourmaintainedinitgrowseverydaylessandless。HavetheexorbitantprofitsofthemerchantsofCadizandLisbonaugmentedthecapitalofSpainandPortugal？Havetheyalleviatedthepoverty，havetheypromotedtheindustryofthosetwobeggarlycountries？Suchhasbeenthetoneofmercantileexpenseinthosetwotradingcitiesthatthoseexorbitantprofits，farfromaugmentingthegeneralcapitalofthecountry，seemscarcetohavebeensufficienttokeepupthecapitalsuponwhichtheyweremade。Foreigncapitalsareeverydayintrudingthemselves，ifImaysayso，moreandmoreintothetradeofCadizandLisbon。ItistoexpelthoseforeigncapitalsfromatradewhichtheirowngrowseverydaymoreandmoreinsufficientforcarryingonthattheSpaniardsandPortugueseendeavoureverydaytostraightenmoreandmorethegallingbandsoftheirabsurdmonopoly。ComparethemercantilemannersofCadizandLisbonwiththoseofAmsterdam，andyouwillbesensiblehowdifferentlytheconductandcharacterofmerchantsareaffectedbythehighandbythelowprofitsofstock。ThemerchantsofLondon，indeed，havenotyetgenerallybecomesuchmagnificentlordsasthoseofCadizandLisbon，butneitheraretheyingeneralsuchattentiveandparsimoniousburghersasthoseofAmsterdam。Theyaresupposed，however，manyofthem，tobeagooddealricherthanthegreaterpartoftheformer，andnotquitesorichasmanyofthelatter。Buttherateoftheirprofitiscommonlymuchlowerthanthatoftheformer，andagooddealhigherthanthatofthelatter。Lightcome，lightgo，saystheproverb;andtheordinarytoneofexpenseseemseverywheretoberegulated，notsomuchaccordingtotherealabilityofspending，astothesupposedfacilityofgettingmoneytospend。
　　Itisthusthatthesingleadvantagewhichthemonopolyprocurestoasingleorderofmenisinmanydifferentwayshurtfultothegeneralinterestofthecountry。
　　Tofoundagreatempireforthesolepurposeofraisingupapeopleofcustomersmayatfirstsightappearaprojectfitonlyforanationofshopkeepers。Itis，however，aprojectaltogetherunfitforanationofshopkeepers;butextremelyfitforanationwhosegovernmentisinfluencedbyshopkeepers。Suchstatesmen，andsuchstatesmenonly，arecapableoffancyingthattheywillfindsomeadvantageinemployingthebloodandtreasureoftheirfellow—citizenstofoundandmaintainsuchanempire。Saytoashopkeeper，"Buymeagoodestate，andIshallalwaysbuymyclothesatyourshop，eventhoughIshouldpaysomewhatdearerthanwhatIcanhavethemforatothershops";andyouwillnotfindhimveryforwardtoembraceyourproposal。Butshouldanyotherpersonbuyyousuchanestate，theshopkeeperwouldbemuchobligedtoyourbenefactorifhewouldenjoinyoutobuyallyourclothesathisshop。Englandpurchasedforsomeofhersubjects，whofoundthemselvesuneasyathome，agreatestateinadistantcountry。Theprice，indeed，wasverysmall，andinsteadofthirtyyears’purchase，theordinarypriceoflandinthepresenttimes，itamountedtolittlemorethantheexpenseofthedifferentequipmentswhichmadethefirstdiscovery，reconnoitredthecoast，andtookafictitiouspossessionofthecountry。Thelandwasgoodandofgreatextent，andthecultivatorshavingplentyofgoodgroundtoworkupon，andbeingforsometimeatlibertytoselltheirproducewheretheypleased，becameinthecourseoflittlemorethanthirtyorfortyyears（between1620and1660）sonumerousandthrivingapeoplethattheshopkeepersandothertradersofEnglandwishedtosecuretothemselvesthemonopolyoftheircustom。Withoutpretending，therefore，thattheyhadpaidanypart，eitheroftheoriginalpurchase—money，orofthesubsequentexpenseofimprovement，theypetitionedtheParliamentthatthecultivatorsofAmericamightforthefuturebeconfinedtotheirshop;first，forbuyingallthegoodswhichtheywantedfromEurope;and，secondly，forsellingallsuchpartsoftheirownproduceasthosetradersmightfinditconvenienttobuy。Fortheydidnotfinditconvenienttobuyeverypartofit。SomepartsofitimportedintoEnglandmighthaveinterferedwithsomeofthetradeswhichtheythemselvescarriedonathome。Thoseparticularpartsofit，therefore，theywerewillingthatthecolonistsshouldsellwheretheycould—thefartheroffthebetter;anduponthataccountpurposedthattheirmarketshouldbeconfinedtothecountriessouthofCapeFinisterre。AclauseinthefamousActofNavigationestablishedthistrulyshopkeeperproposalintoalaw。
　　Themaintenanceofthismonopolyhashithertobeentheprincipal，ormoreproperlyperhapsthesoleendandpurposeofthedominionwhichGreatBritainassumesoverhercolonies。Intheexclusivetrade，itissupposed，consiststhegreatadvantageofprovinces，whichhaveneveryetaffordedeitherrevenueormilitaryforceforthesupportofthecivilgovernment，orthedefenceofthemothercountry。Themonopolyistheprincipalbadgeoftheirdependency，anditisthesolefruitwhichhashithertobeengatheredfromthatdependency。WhateverexpenseGreatBritainhashithertolaidoutinmaintainingthisdependencyhasreallybeenlaidoutinordertosupportthismonopoly。Theexpenseoftheordinarypeaceestablishmentofthecoloniesamounted，beforethecommencementofthepresentdisturbances，tothepayoftwentyregimentsoffoot;totheexpenseoftheartillery，stores，andextraordinaryprovisionswithwhichitwasnecessarytosupplythem;andtotheexpenseofaveryconsiderablenavalforcewhichwasconstantlykeptup，inordertoguard，fromthesmugglingvesselsofothernations，theimmensecoastofNorthAmerica，andthatofourWestIndianislands。ThewholeexpenseofthispeaceestablishmentwasachargeupontherevenueofGreatBritain，andwas，atthesametime，thesmallestpartofwhatthedominionofthecolonieshascostthemothercountry。Ifwewouldknowtheamountofthewhole，wemustaddtotheannualexpenseofthispeaceestablishmenttheinterestofthesumswhich，inconsequenceofherconsideringhercoloniesasprovincessubjecttoherdominion，GreatBritainhasupondifferentoccasionslaidoutupontheirdefence。Wemustaddtoit，inparticular，thewholeexpenseofthelatewar，andagreatpartofthatofthewarwhichprecededit。Thelatewarwasaltogetheracolonyquarrel，andthewholeexpenseofit，inwhateverpartoftheworlditmayhavebeenlaidout，whetherinGermanyortheEastIndies，oughtjustlytobestatedtotheaccountofthecolonies。Itamountedtomorethanninetymillionssterling，includingnotonlythenewdebtwhichwascontracted，butthetwoshillingsinthepoundadditionallandtax，andthesumswhichwereeveryyearborrowedfromthesinkingfund。TheSpanishwar，whichbeganin1739，wasprincipallyacolonyquarrel。ItsprincipalobjectwastopreventthesearchofthecolonyshipswhichcarriedonacontrabandtradewiththeSpanishMain。Thiswholeexpenseis，inreality，abountywhichhasbeengiveninordertosupportamonopoly。Thepretendedpurposeofitwastoencouragethemanufactures，andtoincreasethecommerceofGreatBritain。Butitsrealeffecthasbeentoraisetherateofmercantileprofit，andtoenableourmerchantstoturnintoabranchoftrade，ofwhichthereturnsaremoreslowanddistantthanthoseofthegreaterpartofothertrades，agreaterproportionoftheircapitalthantheyotherwisewouldhavedone;twoeventswhich，ifabountycouldhaveprevented，itmightperhapshavebeenverywellworthwhiletogivesuchabounty。
　　Underthepresentsystemofmanagement，therefore，GreatBritainderivesnothingbutlossfromthedominionwhichsheassumesoverhercolonies。
　　ToproposethatGreatBritainshouldvoluntarilygiveupallauthorityoverhercolonies，andleavethemtoelecttheirownmagistrates，toenacttheirownlaws，andtomakepeaceandwarastheymightthinkproper，wouldbetoproposesuchameasureasneverwas，andneverwillbeadopted，byanynationintheworld。
　　Nonationevervoluntarilygaveupthedominionofanyprovince，howtroublesomesoeveritmightbetogovernit，andhowsmallsoevertherevenuewhichitaffordedmightbeinproportiontotheexpensewhichitoccasioned。Suchsacrifices，thoughtheymightfrequentlybeagreeabletotheinterest，arealwaysmortifyingtotheprideofeverynation，andwhatisperhapsofstillgreaterconsequence，theyarealwayscontrarytotheprivateinterestofthegoverningpartofit，whowouldtherebybedeprivedofthedisposalofmanyplacesoftrustandprofit，ofmanyopportunitiesofacquiringwealthanddistinction，whichthepossessionofthemostturbulent，and，tothegreatbodyofthepeople，themostunprofitableprovinceseldomfailstoafford。
　　Themostvisionaryenthusiastwouldscarcebecapableofproposingsuchameasurewithanyserioushopesatleastofitseverbeingadopted。Ifitwasadopted，however，GreatBritainwouldnotonlybeimmediatelyfreedfromthewholeannualexpenseofthepeaceestablishmentofthecolonies，butmightsettlewiththemsuchatreatyofcommerceaswouldeffectuallysecuretoherafreetrade，moreadvantageoustothegreatbodyofthepeople，thoughlesssotothemerchants，thanthemonopolywhichsheatpresentenjoys。Bythuspartinggoodfriends，thenaturalaffectionofthecoloniestothemothercountrywhich，perhaps，ourlatedissensionshavewellnighextinguished，wouldquicklyrevive。Itmightdisposethemnotonlytorespect，forwholecenturiestogether，thattreatyofcommercewhichtheyhadconcludedwithusatparting，buttofavourusinwaraswellasintrade，and，insteadofturbulentandfactioussubjects，tobecomeourmostfaithful，affectionate，andgenerousallies;andthesamesortofparentalaffectionontheoneside，andfilialrespectontheother，mightrevivebetweenGreatBritainandhercolonies，whichusedtosubsistbetweenthoseofancientGreeceandthemothercityfromwhichtheydescended。
　　Inordertorenderanyprovinceadvantageoustotheempiretowhichitbelongs，itoughttoafford，intimeofpeace，arevenuetothepublicsufficientnotonlyfordefrayingthewholeexpenseofitsownpeaceestablishment，butforcontributingitsproportiontothesupportofthegeneralgovernmentoftheempire。Everyprovincenecessarilycontributes，moreorless，toincreasetheexpenseofthatgeneralgovernment。Ifanyparticularprovince，therefore，doesnotcontributeitssharetowardsdefrayingthisexpense，anunequalburdenmustbethrownuponsomeotherpartoftheempire。Theextraordinaryrevenue，too，whicheveryprovinceaffordstothepublicintimeofwar，ought，fromparityofreason，tobearthesameproportiontotheextraordinaryrevenueofthewholeempirewhichitsordinaryrevenuedoesintimeofpeace。ThatneithertheordinarynorextraordinaryrevenuewhichGreatBritainderivesfromhercolonies，bearsthisproportiontothewholerevenueoftheBritishempire，willreadilybeallowed。
　　Themonopoly，ithasbeensupposed，indeed，byincreasingtheprivaterevenueofthepeopleofGreatBritain，andtherebyenablingthemtopaygreatertaxes，compensatesthedeficiencyofthepublicrevenueofthecolonies。Butthismonopoly，Ihaveendeavouredtoshow，thoughaverygrievoustaxuponthecolonies，andthoughitmayincreasetherevenueofaparticularorderofmeninGreatBritain，diminishesinsteadofincreasingthatofthegreatbodyofthepeople;andconsequentlydiminishesinsteadofincreasingtheabilityofthegreatbodyofthepeopletopaytaxes。Themen，too，whoserevenuethemonopolyincreases，constituteaparticularorder，whichitisbothabsolutelyimpossibletotaxbeyondtheproportionofotherorders，andextremelyimpoliticeventoattempttotaxbeyondthatproportion，asIshallendeavourtoshowinthefollowingbook。Noparticularresource，therefore，canbedrawnfromthisparticularorder。
　　Thecoloniesmaybetaxedeitherbytheirownassemblies，orbytheParliamentofGreatBritain。
　　Thatthecolonyassembliescaneverbesomanagedastolevyupontheirconstituentsapublicrevenuesufficientnotonlytomaintainatalltimestheirowncivilandmilitaryestablishment，buttopaytheirproperproportionoftheexpenseofthegeneralgovernmentoftheBritishempireseemsnotveryprobable。ItwasalongtimebeforeeventheParliamentofEngland，thoughplacedimmediatelyundertheeyeofthesovereign，couldbebroughtundersuchasystemofmanagement，orcouldberenderedsufficientlyliberalintheirgrantsforsupportingthecivilandmilitaryestablishmentsevenoftheirowncountry。ItwasonlybydistributingamongtheparticularMembersofParliamentagreatparteitheroftheoffices，orofthedisposaloftheofficesarisingfromthiscivilandmilitaryestablishment，thatsuchasystemofmanagementcouldbeestablishedevenwithregardtotheParliamentofEngland。Butthedistanceofthecolonyassembliesfromtheeyeofthesovereign，theirnumber，theirdispersedsituation，andtheirvariousconstitutions，wouldrenderitverydifficulttomanagetheminthesamemanner，eventhoughthesovereignhadthesamemeansofdoingit;andthosemeansarewanting。Itwouldbeabsolutelyimpossibletodistributeamongalltheleadingmembersofallthecolonyassembliessuchashare，eitheroftheofficesorofthedisposaloftheofficesarisingfromthegeneralgovernmentoftheBritishempire，astodisposethemtogiveuptheirpopularityathome，andtotaxtheirconstituentsforthesupportofthatgeneralgovernment，ofwhichalmostthewholeemolumentsweretobedividedamongpeoplewhowerestrangerstothem。Theunavoidableignoranceofadministration，besides，concerningtherelativeimportanceofthedifferentmembersofthosedifferentassemblies，theoffenceswhichmustfrequentlybegiven，theblunderswhichmustconstantlybecommittedinattemptingtomanagetheminthismanner，seemstorendersuchasystemofmanagementaltogetherimpracticablewithregardtothem。