TheancientpolicyofEuropeendeavouredinthismannertoregulateagriculture，thegreattradeofthecountry，bymaximsquitedifferentfromthosewhichitestablishedwithregardtomanufactures，thegreattradeofthetowns。Byleavingthefarmernoothercustomersbuteithertheconsumersortheirimmediatefactors，thekiddersandcarriersofcorn，itendeavouredtoforcehimtoexercisethetrade，notonlyofafarmer，butofacornmerchantorcornretailer。Onthecontrary，itinmanycasesprohibitedthemanufacturerfromexercisingthetradeofashopkeeper，orfromsellinghisowngoodsbyretail。Itmeantbytheonelawtopromotethegeneralinterestofthecountry，ortorendercorncheap，without，perhaps，itsbeingwellunderstoodhowthiswastobedone。Bytheotheritmeanttopromotethatofaparticularorderofmen，theshopkeepers，whowouldbesomuchundersoldbythemanufacturer，itwassupposed，thattheirtradewouldberuinedifhewasallowedtoretailatall。
　　Themanufacturer，however，thoughhehadbeenallowedtokeepashop，andtosellhisowngoodsbyretail，couldnothaveundersoldthecommonshopkeeper。Whateverpartofhiscapitalhemighthaveplacedinhisshop，hemusthavewithdrawnitfromhismanufacture。Inordertocarryonhisbusinessonalevelwiththatofotherpeople，ashemusthavehadtheprofitofamanufacturerontheonepart，sohemusthavehadthatofashopkeeperupontheother。Letussuppose，forexample，thatintheparticulartownwherehelived，tenpercentwastheordinaryprofitbothofmanufacturingandshopkeepingstock;hemustinthiscasehavechargeduponeverypieceofhisowngoodswhichhesoldinhisshop，aprofitoftwentypercent。Whenhecarriedthemfromhisworkhousetohisshop，hemusthavevaluedthematthepriceforwhichhecouldhavesoldthemtoadealerorshopkeeper，whowouldhaveboughtthembywholesale。Ifhevaluedthemlower，helostapartoftheprofitofhismanufacturingcapital。Whenagainhesoldthemfromhisshop，unlesshegotthesamepriceatwhichashopkeeperwouldhavesoldthem，helostapartoftheprofitofhisshopkeepingcapital。Thoughhemightappear，therefore，tomakeadoubleprofituponthesamepieceofgoods，yetasthesegoodsmadesuccessivelyapartoftwodistinctcapitals，hemadebutasingleprofituponthewholecapitalemployedaboutthem;andifhemadelessthanhisprofit，hewasaloser，ordidnotemployhiswholecapitalwiththesameadvantageasthegreaterpartofhisneighbours。
　　Whatthemanufacturerwasprohibitedtodo，thefarmerwasinsomemeasureenjoinedtodo;todividehiscapitalbetweentwodifferentemployments;tokeeponepartofitinhisgranariesandstackyard，forsupplyingtheoccasionaldemandsofthemarket;andtoemploytheotherinthecultivationofhisland。
　　Butashecouldnotaffordtoemploythelatterforlessthantheordinaryprofitsoffarmingstock，sohecouldaslittleaffordtoemploytheformerforlessthantheordinaryprofitsofmercantilestock。Whetherthestockwhichreallycarriedonthebusinessofthecornmerchantbelongedtothepersonwhowascalledafarmer，ortothepersonwhowascalledacornmerchant，anequalprofitwasinbothcasesrequisiteinordertoindemnifyitsownerforemployingitinthismanner;inordertoputhisbusinessuponalevelwithothertrades，andinordertohinderhimfromhavinganinteresttochangeitassoonaspossibleforsomeother。Thefarmer，therefore，whowasthusforcedtoexercisethetradeofacornmerchant，couldnotaffordtosellhiscorncheaperthananyothercornmerchantwouldhavebeenobligedtodointhecaseofafreecompetition。
　　Thedealerwhocanemployhiswholestockinonesinglebranchofbusinesshasanadvantageofthesamekindwiththeworkmanwhocanemployhiswholelabourinonesingleoperation。
　　Asthelatteracquiresadexteritywhichenableshim，withthesametwohands，toperformamuchgreaterquantityofwork;sotheformeracquiressoeasyandreadyamethodoftransactinghisbusiness，ofbuyinganddisposingofhisgoods，thatwiththesamecapitalhecantransactamuchgreaterquantityofbusiness。
　　Astheonecancommonlyaffordhisworkagooddealcheaper，sotheothercancommonlyaffordhisgoodssomewhatcheaperthanifhisstockandattentionwerebothemployedaboutagreatervarietyofobjects。Thegreaterpartofmanufacturerscouldnotaffordtoretailtheirowngoodssocheapasavigilantandactiveshopkeeper，whosesolebusinessitwastobuythematwholesaleandtoretailthemagain。Thegreaterpartoffarmerscouldstilllessaffordtoretailtheirowncorn，tosupplytheinhabitantsofatown，atperhapsfourorfivemilesdistancefromthegreaterpartofthem，socheapasavigilantandactivecornmerchant，whosesolebusinessitwastopurchasecornbywholesale，tocollectitintoagreatmagazine，andtoretailitagain。
　　Thelawwhichprohibitedthemanufacturerfromexercisingthetradeofashopkeeperendeavouredtoforcethisdivisionintheemploymentofstocktogoonfasterthanitmightotherwisehavedone。Thelawwhichobligedthefarmertoexercisethetradeofacornmerchantendeavouredtohinderitfromgoingonsofast。Bothlawswereevidentviolationsofnaturalliberty，andthereforeunjust;andtheywereboth，too，asimpoliticastheywereunjust。Itistheinterestofeverysocietythatthingsofthiskindshouldnevereitherbeforcedorobstructed。Themanwhoemployseitherhislabourorhisstockinagreatervarietyofwaysthanhissituationrendersnecessarycanneverhurthisneighbourbyundersellinghim。Hemayhurthimself，andhegenerallydoesso。Jackofalltradeswillneverberich，saystheproverb。Butthelawoughtalwaystotrustpeoplewiththecareoftheirowninterest，asintheirlocalsituationstheymustgenerallybeabletojudgebetterofitthanthelegislatorcando。Thelaw，however，whichobligedthefarmertoexercisethetradeofacornmerchantwasbyfarthemostperniciousofthetwo。
　　Itobstructednotonlythatdivisionintheemploymentofstockwhichissoadvantageoustoeverysociety，butitobstructedlikewisetheimprovementandcultivationoftheland。
　　Byobligingthefarmertocarryontwotradesinsteadofone，itforcedhimtodividehiscapitalintotwoparts，ofwhichoneonlycouldbeemployedincultivation。Butifhehadbeenatlibertytosellhiswholecroptoacornmerchantasfastashecouldthreshitout，hiswholecapitalmighthavereturnedimmediatelytotheland，andhavebeenemployedinbuyingmorecattle，andhiringmoreservants，inordertoimproveandcultivateitbetter。Butbybeingobligedtosellhiscornbyretail，hewasobligedtokeepagreatpartofhiscapitalinhisgranariesandstackyardthroughtheyear，andcouldnot，therefore，cultivatesowellaswiththesamecapitalhemightotherwisehavedone。Thislaw，therefore，necessarilyobstructedtheimprovementoftheland，and，insteadoftendingtorendercorncheaper，musthavetendedtorenderitscarcer，andthereforedearer，thanitwouldotherwisehavebeen。
　　Afterthebusinessofthefarmer，thatofthecornmerchantisinrealitythetradewhich，ifproperlyprotectedandencouraged，wouldcontributethemosttotheraisingofcorn。Itwouldsupportthetradeofthefarmerinthesamemannerasthetradeofthewholesaledealersupportsthatofthemanufacturer。
　　Thewholesaledealer，byaffordingareadymarkettothemanufacturer，bytakinghisgoodsoffhishandasfastashecanmaketheirpricetohimbeforehehasmadethem，enableshimtokeephiswholecapital，andsometimesevenmorethanhiswholecapital，constantlyemployedinmanufacturing，andconsequentlytomanufactureamuchgreaterquantityofgoodsthanifhewasobligedtodisposeofthemhimselftotheimmediateconsumers，oreventotheretailers。Asthecapitalofthewholesalemerchant，too，isgenerallysufficienttoreplacethatofmanymanufacturers，thisintercoursebetweenhimandthemintereststheownerofalargecapitaltosupporttheownersofagreatnumberofsmallones，andtoassisttheminthoselossesandmisfortuneswhichmightotherwiseproveruinoustothem。
　　Anintercourseofthesamekinduniversallyestablishedbetweenthefarmersandthecornmerchantswouldbeattendedwitheffectsequallybeneficialtothefarmers。Theywouldbeenabledtokeeptheirwholecapitals，andevenmorethantheirwholecapitals，constantlyemployedincultivation。Incaseofanyofthoseaccidents，towhichnotradeismoreliablethantheirs，theywouldfindintheirordinarycustomer，thewealthycornmerchant，apersonwhohadbothaninteresttosupportthem，andtheabilitytodoit，andtheywouldnot，asatpresent，beentirelydependentupontheforbearanceoftheirlandlord，orthemercyofhissteward。Wereitpossible，asperhapsitisnot，toestablishthisintercourseuniversally，andallatonce，wereitpossibletoturnallatoncethewholefarmingstockofthekingdomtoitsproperbusiness，thecultivationofland，withdrawingitfromeveryotheremploymentintowhichanypartofitmaybeatpresentdiverted，andwereitpossible，inordertosupportandassistuponoccasiontheoperationsofthisgreatstock，toprovideallatonceanotherstockalmostequallygreat，itisnotperhapsveryeasytoimaginehowgreat，howextensive，andhowsuddenwouldbetheimprovementwhichthischangeofcircumstanceswouldaloneproduceuponthewholefaceofthecountry。
　　ThestatuteofEdwardVI，therefore，byprohibitingasmuchaspossibleanymiddlemanfromcomingbetweenthegrowerandtheconsumer，endeavouredtoannihilateatrade，ofwhichthefreeexerciseisnotonlythebestpalliativeoftheinconveniencesofadearthbutthebestpreventativeofthatcalamity:afterthetradeofthefarmer，notradecontributingsomuchtothegrowingofcornasthatofthecornmerchant。
　　Therigourofthislawwasafterwardssoftenedbyseveralsubsequentstatutes，whichsuccessivelypermittedtheengrossingofcornwhenthepriceofwheatshouldnotexceedtwenty，twenty—four，thirty—two，andfortyshillingsthequarter。Atlast，bythe15thofCharlesII，c。7，theengrossingorbuyingofcorninordertosellitagain，aslongasthepriceofwheatdidnotexceedforty—eightshillingsthequarter，andthatofothergraininproportion，wasdeclaredlawfultoallpersonsnotbeingforestallers，thatis，notsellingagaininthesamemarketwithinthreemonths。Allthefreedomwhichthetradeoftheinlandcorndealerhaseveryetenjoyedwasbestoweduponitbythisstatute。Thestatuteofthe12thofthepresentking，whichrepealsalmostalltheotherancientlawsagainstengrossersandforestallers，doesnotrepealtherestrictionsofthisparticularstatute，whichthereforestillcontinueinforce。
　　Thisstatute，however，authorizesinsomemeasuretwoveryabsurdpopularprejudices。
　　First，itsupposesthatwhenthepriceofwheathasrisensohighasforty—eightshillingsthequarter，andthatofothergrainsinproportion，cornislikelytobesoengrossedastohurtthepeople。Butfromwhathasbeenalreadysaid，itseemsevidentenoughthatcorncanatnopricebesoengrossedbytheinlanddealersastohurtthepeople:andforty—eightshillingsthequarter，besides，thoughitmaybeconsideredasaveryhighprice，yetinyearsofscarcityitisapricewhichfrequentlytakesplaceimmediatelyafterharvest，whenscarceanypartofthenewcropcanbesoldoff，andwhenitisimpossibleevenforignorancetosupposethatanypartofitcanbesoengrossedastohurtthepeople。
　　Secondly，itsupposesthatthereisacertainpriceatwhichcornislikelytobeforestalled，thatis，boughtupinordertobesoldagainsoonafterinthesamemarket，soastohurtthepeople。Butifamerchanteverbuysupcorn，eithergoingtoaparticularmarketorinaparticularmarket，inordertosellitagainsoonafterinthesamemarket，itmustbebecausehejudgesthatthemarketcannotbesoliberallysuppliedthroughthewholeseasonasuponthatparticularoccasion，andthattheprice，therefore，mustsoonrise。Ifhejudgeswronginthis，andifthepricedoesnotrise，henotonlylosesthewholeprofitofthestockwhichheemploysinthismanner，butapartofthestockitself，bytheexpenseandlosswhichnecessarilyattendthestoringandkeepingofcorn。Hehurtshimself，therefore，muchmoreessentiallythanhecanhurteventheparticularpeoplewhomhemayhinderfromsupplyingthemselvesuponthatparticularmarketday，becausetheymayafterwardssupplythemselvesjustascheapuponanyothermarketday。Ifhejudgesright，insteadofhurtingthegreatbodyofthepeople，herendersthemamostimportantservice。Bymakingthemfeeltheinconvenienciesofadearthsomewhatearlierthantheyotherwisemightdo，hepreventstheirfeelingthemafterwardssoseverelyastheycertainlywoulddo，ifthecheapnessofpriceencouragedthemtoconsumefasterthansuitedtherealscarcityoftheseason。Whenthescarcityisreal，thebestthingthatcanbedoneforthepeopleistodividetheinconvenienciesofitasequallyaspossiblethroughallthedifferentmonths，andweeks，anddaysoftheyear。Theinterestofthecornmerchantmakeshimstudytodothisasexactlyashecan:andasnootherpersoncanhaveeitherthesameinterest，orthesameknowledge，orthesameabilitiestodoitsoexactlyashe，thismostimportantoperationofcommerceoughttobetrustedentirelytohim;or，inotherwords，thecorntrade，sofaratleastasconcernsthesupplyofthehomemarket，oughttobeleftperfectlyfree。
　　Thepopularfearofengrossingandforestallingmaybecomparedtothepopularterrorsandsuspicionsofwitchcraft。Theunfortunatewretchesaccusedofthislattercrimewerenotmoreinnocentofthemisfortunesimputedtothemthanthosewhohavebeenaccusedoftheformer。Thelawwhichputanendtoallprosecutionsagainstwitchcraft，whichputitoutofanyman’spowertogratifyhisownmalicebyaccusinghisneighbourofthatimaginarycrime，seemseffectuallytohaveputanendtothosefearsandsuspicionsbytakingawaythegreatcausewhichencouragedandsupportedthem。Thelawwhichshouldrestoreentirefreedomtotheinlandtradeofcornwouldprobablyproveaseffectualtoputanendtothepopularfearsofengrossingandforestalling。
　　The15thofCharlesII，c。7，however，withallitsimperfections，hasperhapscontributedmorebothtotheplentifulsupplyofthehomemarket，andtotheincreaseoftillage，thananyotherlawinthestatutebook。Itisfromthislawthattheinlandcorntradehasderivedallthelibertyandprotectionwhichithaseveryetenjoyed;andboththesupplyofthehomemarket，andtheinterestoftillage，aremuchmoreeffectuallypromotedbytheinlandthaneitherbytheimportationorexportationtrade。
　　TheproportionoftheaveragequantityofallsortsofgrainimportedintoGreatBritaintothatofallsortsofgrainconsumed，ithasbeencomputedbytheauthorofthetractsuponthecorntrade，doesnotexceedthatofonetofivehundredandseventy。Forsupplyingthehomemarket，therefore，theimportanceoftheinlandtrademustbetothatoftheimportationtradeasfivehundredandseventytoone。
　　TheaveragequantityofallsortsofgrainexportedfromGreatBritaindoesnot，accordingtothesameauthor，exceedtheone—and—thirtiethpartoftheannualproduce。Fortheencouragementoftillage，therefore，byprovidingamarketforthehomeproduce，theimportanceoftheinlandtrademustbetothatoftheexportation。
　　Ihavenogreatfaithinpoliticalarithmetic，computations。
　　Imentionthemonlyinordertoshowofhowmuchlessconsequence，intheopinionofthemostjudiciousandexperiencedpersons，theforeigntradeofcornisthanthehometrade。Thegreatcheapnessofcornintheyearsimmediatelyprecedingtheestablishmentofthebountymayperhaps，withreason，beascribedinsomemeasuretotheoperationofthisstatuteofCharlesII，whichhadbeenenactedaboutfive—and—twentyyearsbefore，andwhichhadthereforefulltimetoproduceitseffect。
　　AveryfewwordswillsufficientlyexplainallthatIhavetosayconcerningtheotherthreebranchesofthecorntrade。
　　II。Thetradeofthemerchantimporterofforeigncornforhomeconsumptionevidentlycontributestotheimmediatesupplyofthehomemarket，andmustsofarbeimmediatelybeneficialtothegreatbodyofthepeople。Ittends，indeed，tolowersomewhattheaveragemoneypriceofcorn，butnottodiminishitsrealvalue，orthequantityoflabourwhichitiscapableofmaintaining。Ifimportationwasatalltimesfree，ourfarmersandcountrygentlemenwould，probably，oneyearwithanother，getlessmoneyfortheircornthantheydoatpresent，whenimportationisatmosttimesineffectprohibited;butthemoneywhichtheygotwouldbeofmorevalue，wouldbuymoregoodsofallotherkinds，andwouldemploymorelabour。Theirrealwealth，theirrealrevenue，therefore，wouldbethesameasatpresent，thoughitmightbeexpressedbyasmallerquantityofsilver;andtheywouldneitherbedisablednordiscouragedfromcultivatingcornasmuchastheydoatpresent。Onthecontrary，astheriseintherealvalueofsilver，inconsequenceofloweringthemoneypriceofcorn，lowerssomewhatthemoneypriceofallothercommodities，itgivestheindustryofthecountry，whereittakesplace，someadvantageinallforeignmarkets，andtherebytendstoencourageandincreasethatindustry。Buttheextentofthehomemarketforcornmustbeinproportiontothegeneralindustryofthecountrywhereitgrows，ortothenumberofthosewhoproducesomethingelse，andthereforehavesomethingelse，orwhatcomestothesamething，thepriceofsomethingelse，togiveinexchangeforcorn。Butineverycountrythehomemarket，asitisthenearestandmostconvenient，soisitlikewisethegreatestandmostimportantmarketforcorn。Thatriseintherealvalueofsilver，therefore，whichistheeffectofloweringtheaveragemoneypriceofcorn，tendstoenlargethegreatestandmostimportantmarketforcorn，andtherebytoencourage，insteadofdiscouraging，itsgrowth。
　　Bythe22ndofCharlesII，c。13，theimportationofwheat，wheneverthepriceinthehomemarketdidnotexceedfifty—threeshillingsandfourpencethequarter，wassubjectedtoadutyofsixteenshillingsthequarter，andtoadutyofeightshillingswheneverthepricedidnotexceedfourpounds。Theformerofthesetwopriceshas，formorethanacenturypast，takenplaceonlyintimesofverygreatscarcity;andthelatterhas，sofarasIknow，nottakenplaceatall。Yet，tillwheathadrisenabovethislatterprice，itwasbythisstatutesubjectedtoaveryhighduty;and，tinithadrisenabovetheformer，toadutywhichamountedtoaprohibition。Theimportationofothersortsofgrainwasrestrainedatrates，andbyduties，inproportiontothevalueofthegrain，almostequallyhigh。*Subsequentlawsstillfurtherincreasedthoseduties。
　　*Beforethe13thofthepresentking，thefollowingwerethedutiespayableupontheimportationofthedifferentsortsofgrain:—
　　GrainDutiesDutiesDutiesBeansto28s。perqr。19s。10d。aftertill40s。16s。8d。then12d。
　　Barleyto28s。19s。10d。32s。16s。12d。
　　MaltisprohibitedbytheannualMalt—taxBill。
　　Oatsto16s。5s。10d。after91/2d。
　　Peaseto40s。16s。10d。after93/4d。
　　Ryeto36s。19s。10d。till40s。16s。8d。then12d。
　　Wheatto44s。21s。10d。till53s。4d。17s。then8s。
　　till4l。andafterthatabout1s。4d。
　　Buckwheatto32s。perqr。topay16s。
　　Thesedifferentdutieswereimposed，partlybythe92ndofCharlesII，inplaceoftheOldSubsidy，partlybytheNewSubsidy，bytheOne—thirdandTwo—thirdsSubsidy，andbytheSubsidy，1747。
　　Thedistresswhich，inyearsofscarcity，thestrictexecutionofthoselawsmighthavebroughtuponthepeople，wouldprobablyhavebeenverygreat。But，uponsuchoccasions，itsexecutionwasgenerallysuspendedbytemporarystatutes，whichpermitted，foralimitedtime，theimportationofforeigncorn。
　　Thenecessityofthesetemporarystatutessufficientlydemonstratestheimproprietyofthisgeneralone。
　　Theserestraintsuponimportation，thoughpriortotheestablishmentofthebounty，weredictatedbythesamespirit，bythesameprinciples，whichafterwardsenactedthatregulation。
　　Howhurtfulsoeverinthemselves，theseorsomeotherrestraintsuponimportationbecamenecessaryinconsequenceofthatregulation。If，whenwheatwaseitherbelowforty—eightshillingsthequarter，ornotmuchaboveit，foreigncorncouldhavebeenimportedeitherdutyfree，oruponpayingonlyasmallduty，itmighthavebeenexportedagain，withthebenefitofthebounty，tothegreatlossofthepublicrevenue，andtotheentireperversionoftheinstitution，ofwhichtheobjectwastoextendthemarketforthehomegrowth，notthatforthegrowthofforeigncountries。
　　III。Thetradeofthemerchantexporterofcornforforeignconsumptioncertainlydoesnotcontributedirectlytotheplentifulsupplyofthehomemarket。Itdoesso，however，indirectly。Fromwhateversourcethissupplymaybeusuallydrawn，whetherfromhomegrowthorfromforeignimportation，unlessmorecorniseitherusuallygrown，orusuallyimportedintothecountry，thanwhatisusuallyconsumedinit，thesupplyofthehomemarketcanneverbeveryplentiful。Butunlessthesurpluscaninallordinarycasesbeexported，thegrowerswillbecarefulnevertogrowmore，andtheimportersnevertoimportmore，thanwhatthebareconsumptionofthehomemarketrequires。
　　Thatmarketwillveryseldombeoverstocked;butitwillgenerallybeunderstocked，thepeoplewhosebusinessitistosupplyitbeinggenerallyafraidlesttheirgoodsshouldbeleftupontheirhands。Theprohibitionofexportationlimitstheimprovementandcultivationofthecountrytowhatthesupplyofitsowninhabitantsrequires。Thefreedomofexportationenablesittoextendcultivationforthesupplyofforeignnations。
　　Bythe12thofCharlesII，c。4，theexportationofcornwaspermittedwheneverthepriceofwheatdidnotexceedfortyshillingsthequarter，andthatofothergraininproportion。Bythe15thofthesameprince，thislibertywasextendedtillthepriceofwheatexceededforty—eightshillingsthequarter;andbythe22nd，toallhigherprices。Apoundage，indeed，wastobepaidtothekinguponsuchexportation。Butallgrainwasratedsolowinthebookofratesthatthispoundageamountedonlyuponwheattoashilling，uponoatstofourpence，anduponallothergraintosixpencethequarter。Bythe1stofWilliamandMary，theactwhichestablishedthebounty，thissmalldutywasvirtuallytakenoffwheneverthepriceofwheatdidnotexceed，forty—eightshillingsthequarter;andbythe11thandl2thofWilliamIII，c。20，itwasexpresslytakenoffatallhigherprices。
　　Thetradeofthemerchantexporterwas，inthismanner，notonlyencouragedbyabounty，butrenderedmuchmorefreethanthatoftheinlanddealer。Bythelastofthesestatutes，corncouldbeengrossedatanypriceforexportation，butitcouldnotbeengrossedforinlandsaleexceptwhenthepricedidnotexceedforty—eightshillingsthequarter。Theinterestoftheinlanddealer，however，ithasalreadybeenshown，canneverbeoppositetothatofthegreatbodyofthepeople。Thatofthemerchantexportermay，andinfactsometimesis。If，whilehisowncountrylaboursunderadearth，aneighbouringcountryshouldbeafflictedwithafamine，itmightbehisinteresttocarrycorntothelattercountryinsuchquantitiesasmightverymuchaggravatethecalamitiesofthedearth。Theplentifulsupplyofthehomemarketwasnotthedirectobjectofthosestatutes;but，underthepretenceofencouragingagriculture，toraisethemoneypriceofcornashighaspossible，andtherebytooccasion，asmuchaspossible，aconstantdearthinthehomemarket。Bythediscouragementofimportation，thesupplyofthatmarket，evenintimesofgreatscarcity，wasconfinedtothehomegrowth;andbytheencouragementofexportation，whenthepricewassohighasforty—eightshillingsthequarter，thatmarketwasnot，evenintimesofconsiderablescarcity，allowedtoenjoythewholeofthatgrowth。Thetemporarylaws，prohibitingforalimitedtimetheexportationofcorn，andtakingoffforalimitedtimethedutiesuponitsimportation，expedientstowhichGreatBritainhasbeenobligedsofrequentlytohaverecourse，sufficientlydemonstratetheimproprietyofhergeneralsystem。Hadthatsystembeengood，shewouldnotsofrequentlyhavebeenreducedtothenecessityofdepartingfromit。
　　Wereallnationstofollowtheliberalsystemoffreeexportationandfreeimportation，thedifferentstatesintowhichagreatcontinentwasdividedwouldsofarresemblethedifferentprovincesofagreatempire。Asamongthedifferentprovincesofagreatempirethefreedomoftheinlandtradeappears，bothfromreasonandexperience，notonlythebestpalliativeofadearth，butthemosteffectualpreventativeofafamine;sowouldthefreedomoftheexportationandimportationtradebeamongthedifferentstatesintowhichagreatcontinentwasdivided。Thelargerthecontinent，theeasierthecommunicationthroughallthedifferentpartsofit，bothbylandandbywater，thelesswouldanyoneparticularpartofiteverbeexposedtoeitherofthesecalamities，thescarcityofanyonecountrybeingmorelikelytoberelievedbytheplentyofsomeother。Butveryfewcountrieshaveentirelyadoptedthisliberalsystem。Thefreedomofthecorntradeisalmosteverywheremoreorlessrestrained，and，inmanycountries，isconfinedbysuchabsurdregulationsasfrequentlyaggravatetheunavoidablemisfortuneofadearthintothedreadfulcalamityofafamine。Thedemandofsuchcountriesforcornmayfrequentlybecomesogreatandsourgentthatasmallstateintheirneighbourhood，whichhappenedatthesametimetobelabouringundersomedegreeofdearth，couldnotventuretosupplythemwithoutexposingitselftothelikedreadfulcalamity。Theverybadpolicyofonecountrymaythusrenderitinsomemeasuredangerousandimprudenttoestablishwhatwouldotherwisebethebestpolicyinanother。Theunlimitedfreedomofexportation，however，wouldbemuchlessdangerousingreatstates，inwhichthegrowthbeingmuchgreater，thesupplycouldseldombemuchaffectedbyanyquantityofcornthatwaslikelytobeexported。InaSwisscanton，orinsomeofthelittlestatesofItaly，itmayperhapssometimesbenecessarytorestraintheexportationofcorn。InsuchgreatcountriesasFranceorEnglanditscarceevercan。Tohinder，besides，thefarmerfromsendinghisgoodsatalltimestothebestmarketisevidentlytosacrificetheordinarylawsofjusticetoanideaofpublicutility，toasortofreasonsofstate;anactoflegislativeauthoritywhichoughttobeexercisedonly，whichcanbepardonedonlyincasesofthemosturgentnecessity。Thepriceatwhichtheexportationofcornisprohibited，ifitisevertobeprohibited，oughtalwaystobeaveryhighprice。
　　Thelawsconcerningcornmayeverywherebecomparedtothelawsconcerningreligion。Thepeoplefeelthemselvessomuchinterestedinwhatrelateseitheroftheirsubsistenceinthislife，ortotheirhappinessinalifetocome，thatgovernmentmustyieldtotheirprejudices，and，inordertopreservethepublictranquillity，establishthatsystemwhichtheyapproveof。
　　Itisuponthisaccount，perhaps，thatwesoseldomfindareasonablesystemestablishedwithregardtoeitherofthosetwocapitalobjects。
　　IV。Thetradeofthemerchantcarrier，oroftheimporterofforeigncorninordertoexportitagain，contributestotheplentifulsupplyofthehomemarket。Itisnotindeedthedirectpurposeofhistradetosellhiscornthere。Buthewillgenerallybewillingtodoso，andevenforagooddeallessmoneythanhemightexpectinaforeignmarket;becausehesavesinthismannertheexpenseofloadingandunloading，offreightandinsurance。Theinhabitantsofthecountrywhich，bymeansofthecarryingtrade，becomesthemagazineandstorehouseforthesupplyofothercountriescanveryseldombeinwantthemselves。
　　Thoughthecarryingtrademightthuscontributetoreducetheaveragemoneypriceofcorninthehomemarket，itwouldnottherebyloweritsrealvalue。Itwouldonlyraisesomewhattherealvalueofsilver。
　　ThecarryingtradewasineffectprohibitedinGreatBritain，uponallordinaryoccasions，bythehighdutiesupontheimportationofforeigncorn，ofthegreaterpartofwhichtherewasnodrawback;anduponextraordinaryoccasions，whenascarcitymadeitnecessarytosuspendthosedutiesbytemporarystatutes，exportationwasalwaysprohibited。Bythissystemoflaws，therefore，thecarryingtradewasineffectprohibiteduponalloccasions。
　　Thatsystemoflaws，therefore，whichisconnectedwiththeestablishmentofthebounty，seemstodeservenopartofthepraisewhichhasbeenbestoweduponit。TheimprovementandprosperityofGreatBritain，whichhasbeensooftenascribedtothoselaws，mayveryeasilybeaccountedforbyothercauses。
　　ThatsecuritywhichthelawsinGreatBritaingivetoeverymanthatheshallenjoythefruitsofhisownlabourisalonesufficienttomakeanycountryflourish，notwithstandingtheseandtwentyotherabsurdregulationsofcommerce;andthissecuritywasperfectedbytherevolutionmuchaboutthesametimethatthebountywasestablished。Thenaturaleffortofeveryindividualtobetterhisowncondition，whensufferedtoexertitselfwithfreedomandsecurityissopowerfulaprinciplethatitisalone，andwithoutanyassistance，notonlycapableofcarryingonthesocietytowealthandprosperity，butofsurmountingahundredimpertinentobstructionswithwhichthefollyofhumanlawstoooftenincumbersitsoperations;thoughtheeffectoftheseobstructionsisalwaysmoreorlesseithertoencroachuponitsfreedom，ortodiminishitssecurity。InGreatBritainindustryisperfectlysecure;andthoughitisfarfrombeingperfectlyfree，itisasfreeorfreerthaninanyotherpartofEurope。
　　ThoughtheperiodofthegreatestprosperityandimprovementofGreatBritainhasbeenposteriortothatsystemoflawswhichisconnectedwiththebounty，wemustnotuponthataccountimputeittothoselaws。Ithasbeenposteriorlikewisetothenationaldebt。Butthenationaldebthasmostassuredlynotbeenthecauseofit。
　　ThoughthesystemoflawswhichisconnectedwiththebountyhasexactlythesametendencyoftendencywiththepoliceofSpainandPortugal，tolowersomewhatthevalueofthepreciousmetalsinthecountrywhereittakesplace，yetGreatBritainiscertainlyoneoftherichestcountriesinEurope，whileSpainandPortugalareperhapsamongthemostbeggarly。Thisdifferenceofsituation，however，mayeasilybeaccountedforfromtwodifferentcauses。First，thetaxofSpain，theprohibitioninPortugalofexportinggoldandsilver，andthevigilantpolicewhichwatchesovertheexecutionofthoselaws，must，intwoverypoorcountries，whichbetweenthemimportannuallyupwardsofsixmillionssterling，operatenotonlymoredirectlybutmuchmoreforciblyinreducingthevalueofthosemetalstherethanthecornlawscandoinGreatBritain。And，secondly，thisbadpolicyisnotinthosecountriescounterbalancedbythegenerallibertyandsecurityofthepeople。Industryisthereneitherfreenorsecure，andthecivilandecclesiasticalgovernmentsofbothSpainandPortugalaresuchaswouldalonebesufficienttoperpetuatetheirpresentstateofpoverty，eventhoughtheirregulationsofcommercewereaswiseasthegreaterpartofthemareabsurdandfoolish。
　　The13thofthepresentking，c。43，seemstohaveestablishedanewsystemwithregardtothecornlawsinmanyrespectsbetterthantheancientone，butinoneortworespectsperhapsnotquitesogood。
　　Bythisstatutethehighdutiesuponimportationsforhomeconsumptionaretakenoffsosoonasthepriceofmiddlingwheatrisestoforty—eightshillingsthequarter;thatofmiddlingrye，peaseorbeans，tothirty—twoshillings;thatofbarleytotwenty—fourshillings;andthatofoatstosixteenshillings;andinsteadofthemasmalldutyisimposedofonlysixpenceuponthequarterofwheat，anduponthatofothergraininproportion。
　　Withregardtoallthesedifferentsortsofgrain，butparticularlywithregardtowheat，thehomemarketisthusopenedtoforeignsuppliesatpricesconsiderablylowerthanbefore。
　　Bythesamestatutetheoldbountyoffiveshillingsupontheexportationofwheatceasessosoonasthepricerisestoforty—fourshillingsthequarter，insteadofforty—eight，thepriceatwhichitceasedbefore;thatoftwoshillingsandsixpenceupontheexportationofbarleyceasessosoonasthepricerisestotwenty—twoshillings，insteadoftwenty—four，thepriceatwhichitceasedbefore;thatoftwoshillingsandsixpenceupontheexportationofoatmealceasessosoonasthepricerisestofourteenshillings，insteadoffifteen，thepriceatwhichitceasedbefore。Thebountyuponryeisreducedfromthreeshillingsandsixpencetothreeshillings，anditceasessosoonasthepricerisestotwenty—eightshillingsinsteadofthirty—two，thepriceatwhichitceasedbefore。IfbountiesareasimproperasIhaveendeavouredtoprovethemtobe，thesoonertheycease，andthelowertheyare，somuchthebetter。
　　Thesamestatutepermits，atthelowestprices，theimportationofcorn，inordertobeexportedagaindutyfree，provideditisinthemeantimelodgedinawarehouseunderthejointlocksofthekingandtheimporter。Thisliberty，indeed，extendstonomorethantwenty—fiveofthedifferentportsofGreatBritain。Theyare，however，theprincipalones，andtheremaynot，perhaps，bewarehousesproperforthispurposeinthegreaterpartoftheothers。
　　Sofarthislawseemsevidentlyanimprovementupontheancientsystem。
　　Butbythesamelawabountyoftwoshillingsthequarterisgivenfortheexportationofoatswheneverthepricedoesnotexceedfourteenshillings。Nobountyhadeverbeengivenbeforefortheexportationofthisgrain，nomorethanforthatofpeaseorbeans。
　　Bythesamelaw，too，theexportationofwheatisprohibitedsosoonasthepricerisestoforty—fourshillingsthequarter;
　　thatofryesosoonasitrisestotwenty—eightshillings;thatofbarleysosoonasitrisestotwenty—twoshillings;andthatofoatssosoonastheyrisetofourteenshillings。Thoseseveralpricesseemallofthemagooddealtoolow，andthereseemstobeanimpropriety，besides，inprohibitingexportationaltogetheratthoseprecisepricesatwhichthatbounty，whichwasgiveninordertoforceit，iswithdrawn。Thebountyoughtcertainlyeithertohavebeenwithdrawnatamuchlowerprice，orexportationoughttohavebeenallowedatamuchhigher。
　　Sofar，therefore，thislawseemstobeinferiortotheancientsystem。Withallitsimperfections，however，wemayperhapssayofitwhatwassaidofthelawsofSolon，that，thoughnotthebestinitself，itisthebestwhichtheinterests，prejudices，andtemperofthetimeswouldadmitof。Itmayperhapsinduetimepreparethewayforabetter。