Buttoappointagentsineachtownshipwouldhavebeentocentreinhispersonthemostformidableofpowers，thatofajudicialadministration。Moreover，lawsarethechildrenofhabit，andnothingofthekindexistsinthelegislationofEngland。TheAmericanshavethereforedividedtheofficesofinspectionandofprosecution，aswellasalltheotherfunctionsoftheadministration。Grandjurorsareboundbythelawtoapprisethecourttowhichtheybelongofallthemisdemeanorswhichmayhavebeencommittedintheircounty。*bTherearecertaingreatoffenceswhichareofficiallyprosecutedbytheStates;*cbutmorefrequentlythetaskofpunishingdelinquentsdevolvesuponthefiscalofficer，whoseprovinceitistoreceivethefine:
thusthetreasurerofthetownshipischargedwiththeprosecutionofsuchadministrativeoffencesasfallunderhisnotice。ButamorespecialappealismadebyAmericanlegislationtotheprivateinterestofthecitizen;*dandthisgreatprincipleisconstantlytobemetwithinstudyingthelawsoftheUnitedStates。Americanlegislatorsaremoreapttogivemencreditforintelligencethanforhonesty，andtheyrelynotalittleonpersonalcupidityfortheexecutionofthelaws。Whenanindividualisreallyandsensiblyinjuredbyanadministrativeabuse，itisnaturalthathispersonalinterestshouldinducehimtoprosecute。Butifalegalformalityberequired，which，howeveradvantageoustothecommunity，isofsmallimportancetoindividuals，plaintiffsmaybelesseasilyfound;andthus，byatacitagreement，thelawsmayfallintodisuse。Reducedbytheirsystemtothisextremity，theAmericansareobligedtoencourageinformersbybestowingonthemaportionofthepenaltyincertaincases，*eandtoinsuretheexecutionofthelawsbythedangerousexpedientofdegradingthemoralsofthepeople。Theonlyadministrativeauthorityabovethecountymagistratesis，properlyspeaking，thatoftheGovernment。
[Footnotea:IsaytheCourtofSessions，becauseincommoncourtsthereisamagistratewhoexercisessomeofthefunctionsofapublicprosecutor。]
[Footnoteb:Thegrand—jurorsare，forinstance，boundtoinformthecourtofthebadstateoftheroads。—LawsofMassachusetts，vol。i。p。308。]
[Footnotec:If，forinstance，thetreasurerofthecountyholdsbackhisaccounts。—LawsofMassachusetts，vol。i。p。406。]
[Footnoted:Thus，ifaprivateindividualbreaksdownoriswoundedinconsequenceofthebadnessofaroad，hecansuethetownshiporthecountyfordamagesatthesessions。—LawsofMassachusetts，vol。i。p。309。]
[Footnotee:Incasesofinvasionorinsurrection，ifthetown—
officersneglecttofurnishthenecessarystoresandammunitionforthemilitia，thetownshipmaybecondemnedtoafineoffrom$200to$500。Itmayreadilybeimaginedthatinsuchacaseitmighthappenthatnoonecaredtoprosecute;hencethelawaddsthatallthecitizensmayindictoffencesofthiskind，andthathalfofthefineshallbelongtotheplaintiff。SeeActofMarch6，1810，vol。ii。p。236。ThesameclauseisfrequentlytobemetwithinthelawofMassachusetts。Notonlyareprivateindividualsthusincitedtoprosecutethepublicofficers，butthepublicofficersareencouragedinthesamemannertobringthedisobedienceofprivateindividualstojustice。Ifacitizenrefusestoperformtheworkwhichhasbeenassignedtohimuponaroad，theroadsurveyormayprosecutehim，andhereceiveshalfthepenaltyforhimself。SeetheLawsabovequoted，vol。i。p。
308。]
GeneralRemarksOnTheAdministrationOfTheUnitedStatesDifferencesoftheStatesoftheUnionintheirsystemofadministration—ActivityandperfectionofthelocalauthoritiesdecreasetowardstheSouth—Powerofthemagistrateincreases;
thatoftheelectordiminishes—Administrationpassesfromthetownshiptothecounty—StatesofNewYork，Ohio，Pennsylvania—
PrinciplesofadministrationapplicabletothewholeUnion—
Electionofpublicofficers，andinalienabilityoftheirfunctions—Absenceofgradationofranks—Introductionofjudicialresourcesintotheadministration。
Ihavealreadypremisedthat，afterhavingexaminedtheconstitutionofthetownshipandthecountyofNewEnglandindetail，IshouldtakeageneralviewoftheremainderoftheUnion。TownshipsandalocalactivityexistineveryState;butinnopartoftheconfederationisatownshiptobemetwithpreciselysimilartothoseofNewEngland。ThemorewedescendtowardstheSouth，thelessactivedoesthebusinessofthetownshiporparishbecome;thenumberofmagistrates，offunctions，andofrightsdecreases;thepopulationexercisesalessimmediateinfluenceonaffairs;townmeetingsarelessfrequent，andthesubjectsofdebatelessnumerous。Thepoweroftheelectedmagistrateisaugmentedandthatoftheelectordiminished，whilstthepublicspiritofthelocalcommunitiesislessawakenedandlessinfluential。*fThesedifferencesmaybeperceivedtoacertainextentintheStateofNewYork;theyareverysensibleinPennsylvania;buttheybecomelessstrikingasweadvancetothenorthwest。ThemajorityoftheemigrantswhosettleinthenorthwesternStatesarenativesofNewEngland，andtheycarrythehabitsoftheirmothercountrywiththemintothatwhichtheyadopt。AtownshipinOhioisbynomeansdissimilarfromatownshipinMassachusetts。
[Footnotef:FordetailsseetheRevisedStatutesoftheStateofNewYork，parti。chap。xi。vol。i。pp。336—364，entitled，"OfthePowers，Duties，andPrivilegesofTowns。"
SeeintheDigestoftheLawsofPennsylvania，thewordsAssessors，Collector，Constables，OverseerofthePoor，SupervisorsofHighways;andintheActsofageneralnatureoftheStateofOhio，theActofFebruary25，1834，relatingtotownships，p。412;besidesthepeculiardispositionsrelatingtodiverstown—officers，suchasTownship’sClerk，Trustees，OverseersofthePoor，FenceViewers，AppraisersofProperty，Township’sTreasurer，Constables，SupervisorsofHighways。]
WehaveseenthatinMassachusettsthemainspringofpublicadministrationliesinthetownship。Itformsthecommoncentreoftheinterestsandaffectionsofthecitizens。ButthisceasestobethecaseaswedescendtoStatesinwhichknowledgeislessgenerallydiffused，andwherethetownshipconsequentlyoffersfewerguaranteesofawiseandactiveadministration。AsweleaveNewEngland，therefore，wefindthattheimportanceofthetownisgraduallytransferredtothecounty，whichbecomesthecentreofadministration，andtheintermediatepowerbetweentheGovernmentandthecitizen。InMassachusettsthebusinessofthecountyisconductedbytheCourtofSessions，whichiscomposedofaquorumnamedbytheGovernorandhiscouncil;butthecountyhasnorepresentativeassembly，anditsexpenditureisvotedbythenationallegislature。InthegreatStateofNewYork，onthecontrary，andinthoseofOhioandPennsylvania，theinhabitantsofeachcountychooseacertainnumberofrepresentatives，whoconstitutetheassemblyofthecounty。*gThecountyassemblyhastherightoftaxingtheinhabitantstoacertainextent;andinthisrespectitenjoystheprivilegesofareallegislativebody:
atthesametimeitexercisesanexecutivepowerinthecounty，frequentlydirectstheadministrationofthetownships，andrestrictstheirauthoritywithinmuchnarrowerboundsthaninMassachusetts。
[Footnoteg:SeetheRevisedStatutesoftheStateofNewYork，parti。chap。xi。vol。i。p。340。Id。chap。xii。p。366;alsointheActsoftheStateofOhio，anactrelatingtocountycommissioners，February25，1824，p。263。SeetheDigestoftheLawsofPennsylvania，atthewordsCounty—ratesandLevies，p。
170。
IntheStateofNewYorkeachtownshipelectsarepresentative，whohasashareintheadministrationofthecountyaswellasinthatofthetownship。]
SucharetheprincipaldifferenceswhichthesystemsofcountyandtownadministrationpresentintheFederalStates。
WereitmyintentiontoexaminetheprovisionsofAmericanlawminutely，Ishouldhavetopointoutstillfurtherdifferencesintheexecutivedetailsoftheseveralcommunities。ButwhatI
havealreadysaidmaysufficetoshowthegeneralprinciplesonwhichtheadministrationoftheUnitedStatesrests。Theseprinciplesaredifferentlyapplied;theirconsequencesaremoreorlessnumerousinvariouslocalities;buttheyarealwayssubstantiallythesame。Thelawsdiffer，andtheiroutwardfeatureschange，buttheircharacterdoesnotvary。Ifthetownshipandthecountyarenoteverywhereconstitutedinthesamemanner，itisatleasttruethatintheUnitedStatesthecountyandthetownshiparealwaysbaseduponthesameprinciple，namely，thateveryoneisthebestjudgeofwhatconcernshimselfalone，andthemostproperpersontosupplyhisprivatewants。
Thetownshipandthecountyarethereforeboundtotakecareoftheirspecialinterests:theStategoverns，butitdoesnotinterferewiththeiradministration。Exceptionstothisrulemaybemetwith，butnotacontraryprinciple。
Thefirstconsequenceofthisdoctrinehasbeentocauseallthemagistratestobechoseneitherbyoratleastfromamongstthecitizens。Astheofficersareeverywhereelectedorappointedforacertainperiod，ithasbeenimpossibletoestablishtherulesofadependentseriesofauthorities;therearealmostasmanyindependentfunctionariesastherearefunctions，andtheexecutivepowerisdisseminatedinamultitudeofhands。Hencearosetheindispensablenecessityofintroducingthecontrolofthecourtsofjusticeovertheadministration，andthesystemofpecuniarypenalties，bywhichthesecondarybodiesandtheirrepresentativesareconstrainedtoobeythelaws。ThissystemobtainsfromoneendoftheUniontotheother。Thepowerofpunishingthemisconductofpublicofficers，orofperformingthepartoftheexecutiveinurgentcases，hasnot，however，beenbestowedonthesamejudgesinalltheStates。TheAnglo—Americansderivedtheinstitutionofjusticesofthepeacefromacommonsource;butalthoughitexistsinalltheStates，itisnotalwaysturnedtothesameuse。Thejusticesofthepeaceeverywhereparticipateintheadministrationofthetownshipsandthecounties，*heitheraspublicofficersorasthejudgesofpublicmisdemeanors，butinmostoftheStatesthemoreimportantclassesofpublicoffencescomeunderthecognizanceoftheordinarytribunals。
[Footnoteh:InsomeoftheSouthernStatesthecountycourtsarechargedwithallthedetailsoftheadministration。SeetheStatutesoftheStateofTennessee，arts。Judiciary，Taxes，etc。]
Theelectionofpublicofficers，ortheinalienabilityoftheirfunctions，theabsenceofagradationofpowers，andtheintroductionofajudicialcontroloverthesecondarybranchesoftheadministration，aretheuniversalcharacteristicsoftheAmericansystemfromMainetotheFloridas。InsomeStates（andthatofNewYorkhasadvancedmostinthisdirection）tracesofacentralizedadministrationbegintobediscernible。IntheStateofNewYorktheofficersofthecentralgovernmentexercise，incertaincases，asortofinspectionorcontroloverthesecondarybodies。*i[Footnotei:Forinstance，thedirectionofpublicinstructioncentresinthehandsoftheGovernment。ThelegislaturenamesthemembersoftheUniversity，whoaredenominatedRegents;theGovernorandLieutentant—GovernoroftheStatearenecessarilyofthenumber。—RevisedStatutes，vol。i。p。455。TheRegentsoftheUniversityannuallyvisitthecollegesandacademies，andmaketheirreporttothelegislature。Theirsuperintendenceisnotinefficient，forseveralreasons:thecollegesinordertobecomecorporationsstandinneedofacharter，whichisonlygrantedontherecommendationoftheRegents;everyyearfundsaredistributedbytheStatefortheencouragementoflearning，andtheRegentsarethedistributorsofthismoney。Seechap。
xv。Instruction，"RevisedStatutes，vol。i。p。455。
Theschool—commissionersareobligedtosendanannualreporttotheSuperintendentoftheRepublic。—Id。p。488。
Asimilarreportisannuallymadetothesamepersononthenumberandconditionofthepoor。—Id。p。631。]
Atothertimestheyconstituteacourtofappealforthedecisionofaffairs。*jIntheStateofNewYorkjudicialpenaltiesarelessusedthaninotherpartsasameansofadministration，andtherightofprosecutingtheoffencesofpublicofficersisvestedinfewerhands。*kThesametendencyisfaintlyobservableinsomeotherStates;*lbutingeneraltheprominentfeatureoftheadministrationintheUnitedStatesisitsexcessivelocalindependence。
[Footnotej:Ifanyoneconceiveshimselftobewrongedbytheschool—commissioners（whoaretown—officers），hecanappealtothesuperintendentoftheprimaryschools，whosedecisionisfinal。—RevisedStatutes，vol。i。p。487。
ProvisionssimilartothoseabovecitedaretobemetwithfromtimetotimeinthelawsoftheStateofNewYork;butingeneraltheseattemptsatcentralizationareweakandunproductive。ThegreatauthoritiesoftheStatehavetherightofwatchingandcontrollingthesubordinateagents，withoutthatofrewardingorpunishingthem。Thesameindividualisneverempoweredtogiveanorderandtopunishdisobedience;hehasthereforetherightofcommanding，withoutthemeansofexactingcompliance。In1830theSuperintendentofSchoolscomplainedinhisAnnualReportaddressedtothelegislaturethatseveralschool—commissionershadneglected，notwithstandinghisapplication，tofurnishhimwiththeaccountswhichweredue。Headdedthatifthisomissioncontinuedheshouldbeobligedtoprosecutethem，asthelawdirects，beforethepropertribunals。]
[Footnotek:Thusthedistrict—attorneyisdirectedtorecoverallfinesbelowthesumoffiftydollars，unlesssucharighthasbeenspeciallyawardedtoanothermagistrate。—RevisedStatutes，vol。i。p。383。]
[Footnotel:SeveraltracesofcentralizationmaybediscoveredinMassachusetts;forinstance，thecommitteesofthetown—schoolsaredirectedtomakeanannualreporttotheSecretaryofState。SeeLawsofMassachusetts，vol。i。p。367。]
OfTheStateIhavedescribedthetownshipsandtheadministration;itnowremainsformetospeakoftheStateandtheGovernment。
ThisisgroundImaypassoverrapidly，withoutfearofbeingmisunderstood;forallIhavetosayistobefoundinwrittenformsofthevariousconstitutions，whichareeasilytobeprocured。Theseconstitutionsrestuponasimpleandrationaltheory;theirformshavebeenadoptedbyallconstitutionalnations，andarebecomefamiliartous。Inthisplace，therefore，itisonlynecessaryformetogiveashortanalysis;
IshallendeavorafterwardstopassjudgmentuponwhatInowdescribe。
ChapterV:NecessityOfExaminingTheConditionOfTheStates—
PartIII
LegislativePowerOfTheStateDivisionoftheLegislativeBodyintotwoHouses—Senate—HouseofRepresentatives—DifferentfunctionsofthesetwoBodies。
ThelegislativepoweroftheStateisvestedintwoassemblies，thefirstofwhichgenerallybearsthenameoftheSenate。TheSenateiscommonlyalegislativebody;butitsometimesbecomesanexecutiveandjudicialone。Ittakesapartinthegovernmentinseveralways，accordingtotheconstitutionofthedifferentStates;*mbutitisinthenominationofpublicfunctionariesthatitmostcommonlyassumesanexecutivepower。
Itpartakesofjudicialpowerinthetrialofcertainpoliticaloffences，andsometimesalsointhedecisionofcertaincivilcases。*nThenumberofitsmembersisalwayssmall。Theotherbranchofthelegislature，whichisusuallycalledtheHouseofRepresentatives，hasnosharewhateverintheadministration，andonlytakesapartinthejudicialpowerinasmuchasitimpeachespublicfunctionariesbeforetheSenate。ThemembersofthetwoHousesarenearlyeverywheresubjecttothesameconditionsofelection。Theyarechoseninthesamemanner，andbythesamecitizens。Theonlydifferencewhichexistsbetweenthemis，thatthetermforwhichtheSenateischosenisingenerallongerthanthatoftheHouseofRepresentatives。Thelatterseldomremaininofficelongerthanayear;theformerusuallysittwoorthreeyears。Bygrantingtothesenatorstheprivilegeofbeingchosenforseveralyears，andbeingrenewedseriatim，thelawtakescaretopreserveinthelegislativebodyanucleusofmenalreadyaccustomedtopublicbusiness，andcapableofexercisingasalutaryinfluenceuponthejuniormembers。
[Footnotem:InMassachusettstheSenateisnotinvestedwithanyadministrativefunctions。]
[Footnoten:AsintheStateofNewYork。]
TheAmericans，plainly，didnotdesire，bythisseparationofthelegislativebodyintotwobranches，tomakeonehousehereditaryandtheotherelective;onearistocraticandtheotherdemocratic。Itwasnottheirobjecttocreateintheoneabulwarktopower，whilsttheotherrepresentedtheinterestsandpassionsofthepeople。TheonlyadvantageswhichresultfromthepresentconstitutionoftheUnitedStatesarethedivisionofthelegislativepowerandtheconsequentcheckuponpoliticalassemblies;withthecreationofatribunalofappealfortherevisionofthelaws。
Timeandexperience，however，haveconvincedtheAmericansthatiftheseareitsonlyadvantages，thedivisionofthelegislativepowerisstillaprincipleofthegreatestnecessity。
PennsylvaniawastheonlyoneoftheUnitedStateswhichatfirstattemptedtoestablishasingleHouseofAssembly，andFranklinhimselfwassofarcarriedawaybythenecessaryconsequencesoftheprincipleofthesovereigntyofthepeopleastohaveconcurredinthemeasure;butthePennsylvaniansweresoonobligedtochangethelaw，andtocreatetwoHouses。Thustheprincipleofthedivisionofthelegislativepowerwasfinallyestablished，anditsnecessitymayhenceforwardberegardedasademonstratedtruth。Thistheory，whichwasnearlyunknowntotherepublicsofantiquity—whichwasintroducedintotheworldalmostbyaccident，likesomanyothergreattruths—andmisunderstoodbyseveralmodernnations，isatlengthbecomeanaxiominthepoliticalscienceofthepresentage。
[SeeBenjaminFranklin]
TheExecutivePowerOfTheStateOfficeofGovernorinanAmericanState—TheplaceheoccupiesinrelationtotheLegislature—Hisrightsandhisduties—Hisdependenceonthepeople。
TheexecutivepoweroftheStatemaywithtruthbesaidtoberepresentedbytheGovernor，althoughheenjoysbutaportionofitsrights。Thesuprememagistrate，underthetitleofGovernor，istheofficialmoderatorandcounsellorofthelegislature。Heisarmedwithavetoorsuspensivepower，whichallowshimtostop，oratleasttoretard，itsmovementsatpleasure。Helaysthewantsofthecountrybeforethelegislativebody，andpointsoutthemeanswhichhethinksmaybeusefullyemployedinprovidingforthem;heisthenaturalexecutorofitsdecreesinalltheundertakingswhichinterestthenationatlarge。*oIntheabsenceofthelegislature，theGovernorisboundtotakeallnecessarystepstoguardtheStateagainstviolentshocksandunforeseendangers。ThewholemilitarypoweroftheStateisatthedisposaloftheGovernor。Heisthecommanderofthemilitia，andheadofthearmedforce。Whentheauthority，whichisbygeneralconsentawardedtothelaws，isdisregarded，theGovernorputshimselfattheheadofthearmedforceoftheState，toquellresistance，andtorestoreorder。
Lastly，theGovernortakesnoshareintheadministrationoftownshipsandcounties，exceptitbeindirectlyinthenominationofJusticesofthePeace，whichnominationhehasnotthepowertocancel。*pTheGovernorisanelectedmagistrate，andisgenerallychosenforoneortwoyearsonly;sothathealwayscontinuestobestrictlydependentuponthemajoritywhoreturnedhim。
[Footnoteo:Practicallyspeaking，itisnotalwaystheGovernorwhoexecutestheplansoftheLegislature;itoftenhappensthatthelatter，invotingameasure，namesspecialagentstosuperintendtheexecutionofit。]
[Footnotep:InsomeoftheStatesthejusticesofthepeacearenotelectedbytheGovernor。]
PoliticalEffectsOfTheSystemOfLocalAdministrationInTheUnitedStatesNecessarydistinctionbetweenthegeneralcentralizationofGovernmentandthecentralizationofthelocaladministration—
LocaladministrationnotcentralizedintheUnitedStates:greatgeneralcentralizationoftheGovernment—SomebadconsequencesresultingtotheUnitedStatesfromthelocaladministration—
Administrativeadvantagesattendingthisorderofthings—ThepowerwhichconductstheGovernmentislessregular，lessenlightened，lesslearned，butmuchgreaterthaninEurope—
Politicaladvantagesofthisorderofthings—IntheUnitedStatestheinterestsofthecountryareeverywherekeptinview—
SupportgiventotheGovernmentbythecommunity—Provincialinstitutionsmorenecessaryinproportionasthesocialconditionbecomesmoredemocratic—Reasonofthis。
Centralizationisbecomeawordofgeneralanddailyuse，withoutanyprecisemeaningbeingattachedtoit。Nevertheless，thereexisttwodistinctkindsofcentralization，whichitisnecessarytodiscriminatewithaccuracy。Certaininterestsarecommontoallpartsofanation，suchastheenactmentofitsgenerallawsandthemaintenanceofitsforeignrelations。Otherinterestsarepeculiartocertainpartsofthenation;such，forinstance，asthebusinessofdifferenttownships。Whenthepowerwhichdirectsthegeneralinterestsiscentredinoneplace，orvestedinthesamepersons，itconstitutesacentralgovernment。
Inlikemannerthepowerofdirectingpartialorlocalinterests，whenbroughttogetherintooneplace，constituteswhatmaybetermedacentraladministration。
Uponsomepointsthesetwokindsofcentralizationcoalesce;
butbyclassifyingtheobjectswhichfallmoreparticularlywithintheprovinceofeachofthem，theymayeasilybedistinguished。Itisevidentthatacentralgovernmentacquiresimmensepowerwhenunitedtoadministrativecentralization。Thuscombined，itaccustomsmentosettheirownwillhabituallyandcompletelyaside;tosubmit，notonlyforonce，orupononepoint，butineveryrespect，andatalltimes。Notonly，therefore，doesthisunionofpowersubduethemcompulsorily，butitaffectsthemintheordinaryhabitsoflife，andinfluenceseachindividual，firstseparatelyandthencollectively。
Thesetwokindsofcentralizationmutuallyassistandattracteachother;buttheymustnotbesupposedtobeinseparable。ItisimpossibletoimagineamorecompletelycentralgovernmentthanthatwhichexistedinFranceunderLouisXIV。;whenthesameindividualwastheauthorandtheinterpreterofthelaws，andtherepresentativeofFranceathomeandabroad，hewasjustifiedinassertingthattheStatewasidentifiedwithhisperson。Nevertheless，theadministrationwasmuchlesscentralizedunderLouisXIV。thanitisatthepresentday。
InEnglandthecentralizationofthegovernmentiscarriedtogreatperfection;theStatehasthecompactvigorofaman，andbythesoleactofitswillitputsimmenseenginesinmotion，andwieldsorcollectstheeffortsofitsauthority。
Indeed，Icannotconceivethatanationcanenjoyasecureorprosperousexistencewithoutapowerfulcentralizationofgovernment。ButIamofopinionthatacentraladministrationenervatesthenationsinwhichitexistsbyincessantlydiminishingtheirpublicspirit。Ifsuchanadministrationsucceedsincondensingatagivenmoment，onagivenpoint，allthedisposableresourcesofapeople，itimpairsatleasttherenewalofthoseresources。Itmayensureavictoryinthehourofstrife，butitgraduallyrelaxesthesinewsofstrength。Itmaycontributeadmirablytothetransientgreatnessofaman，butitcannotensurethedurableprosperityofanation。
Ifwepayproperattention，weshallfindthatwheneveritissaidthataStatecannotactbecauseithasnocentralpoint，itisthecentralizationofthegovernmentinwhichitisdeficient。Itisfrequentlyasserted，andwearepreparedtoassenttotheproposition，thattheGermanempirewasneverabletobringallitspowersintoaction。Butthereasonwas，thattheStatewasneverabletoenforceobediencetoitsgenerallaws，becausetheseveralmembersofthatgreatbodyalwaysclaimedtheright，orfoundthemeans，ofrefusingtheirco—operationtotherepresentativesofthecommonauthority，evenintheaffairswhichconcernedthemassofthepeople;inotherwords，becausetherewasnocentralizationofgovernment。ThesameremarkisapplicabletotheMiddleAges;thecauseofalltheconfusionoffeudalsocietywasthatthecontrol，notonlyoflocalbutofgeneralinterests，wasdividedamongstathousandhands，andbrokenupinathousanddifferentways;theabsenceofacentralgovernmentpreventedthenationsofEuropefromadvancingwithenergyinanystraightforwardcourse。
WehaveshownthatintheUnitedStatesnocentraladministrationandnodependentseriesofpublicfunctionariesexist。LocalauthorityhasbeencarriedtolengthswhichnoEuropeannationcouldendurewithoutgreatinconvenience，andwhichhasevenproducedsomedisadvantageousconsequencesinAmerica。ButintheUnitedStatesthecentralizationoftheGovernmentiscomplete;anditwouldbeeasytoprovethatthenationalpowerismorecompactthanithaseverbeenintheoldnationsofEurope。NotonlyistherebutonelegislativebodyineachState;notonlydoesthereexistbutonesourceofpoliticalauthority;butdistrictassembliesandcountycourtshavenotingeneralbeenmultiplied，lesttheyshouldbetemptedtoexceedtheiradministrativeduties，andinterferewiththeGovernment。
InAmericathelegislatureofeachStateissupreme;nothingcanimpedeitsauthority;neitherprivileges，norlocalimmunities，norpersonalinfluence，noreventheempireofreason，sinceitrepresentsthatmajoritywhichclaimstobethesoleorganofreason。Itsowndeterminationis，therefore，theonlylimittothisaction。Injuxtapositiontoit，andunderitsimmediatecontrol，istherepresentativeoftheexecutivepower，whosedutyitistoconstraintherefractorytosubmitbysuperiorforce。
TheonlysymptomofweaknessliesincertaindetailsoftheactionoftheGovernment。TheAmericanrepublicshavenostandingarmiestointimidateadiscontentedminority;butasnominorityhasasyetbeenreducedtodeclareopenwar，thenecessityofanarmyhasnotbeenfelt。*qTheStateusuallyemploystheofficersofthetownshiporthecountytodealwiththecitizens。Thus，forinstance，inNewEngland，theassessorfixestherateoftaxes;thecollectorreceivesthem;thetown—treasurertransmitstheamounttothepublictreasury;andthedisputeswhichmayarisearebroughtbeforetheordinarycourtsofjustice。Thismethodofcollectingtaxesisslowaswellasinconvenient，anditwouldproveaperpetualhindrancetoaGovernmentwhosepecuniarydemandswerelarge。Itisdesirablethat，inwhatevermateriallyaffectsitsexistence，theGovernmentshouldbeservedbyofficersofitsown，appointedbyitself，removableatpleasure，andaccustomedtorapidmethodsofproceeding。Butitwillalwaysbeeasyforthecentralgovernment，organizedasitisinAmerica，tointroducenewandmoreefficaciousmodesofaction，proportionedtoitswants。
[Footnoteq:[TheCivilWarof1860—65cruellybeliedthisstatement，andinthecourseofthestruggletheNorthalonecalledtwomillionsandahalfofmentoarms;buttothehonoroftheUnitedStatesitmustbeaddedthat，withthecessationofthecontest，thisarmydisappearedasrapidlyasithadbeenraised。—Translator’sNote。]]
Theabsenceofacentralgovernmentwillnot，then，ashasoftenbeenasserted，provethedestructionoftherepublicsoftheNewWorld;farfromsupposingthattheAmericangovernmentsarenotsufficientlycentralized，Ishallprovehereafterthattheyaretoomuchso。ThelegislativebodiesdailyencroachupontheauthorityoftheGovernment，andtheirtendency，likethatoftheFrenchConvention，istoappropriateitentirelytothemselves。Underthesecircumstancesthesocialpowerisconstantlychanginghands，becauseitissubordinatetothepowerofthepeople，whichistooapttoforgetthemaximsofwisdomandofforesightintheconsciousnessofitsstrength:hencearisesitsdanger;andthusitsvigor，andnotitsimpotence，willprobablybethecauseofitsultimatedestruction。
ThesystemoflocaladministrationproducesseveraldifferenteffectsinAmerica。TheAmericansseemtometohaveoutsteppedthelimitsofsoundpolicyinisolatingtheadministrationoftheGovernment;fororder，eveninsecond—rateaffairs，isamatterofnationalimportance。*rAstheStatehasnoadministrativefunctionariesofitsown，stationedondifferentpointsofitsterritory，towhomitcangiveacommonimpulse，theconsequenceisthatitrarelyattemptstoissueanygeneralpoliceregulations。Thewantoftheseregulationsisseverelyfelt，andisfrequentlyobservedbyEuropeans。Theappearanceofdisorderwhichprevailsonthesurfaceleadshimatfirsttoimaginethatsocietyisinastateofanarchy;nordoesheperceivehismistaketillhehasgonedeeperintothesubject。
CertainundertakingsareofimportancetothewholeState;buttheycannotbeputinexecution，becausethereisnonationaladministrationtodirectthem。Abandonedtotheexertionsofthetownsorcounties，underthecareofelectedortemporaryagents，theyleadtonoresult，oratleasttonodurablebenefit。
[Footnoter:TheauthoritywhichrepresentstheStateoughtnot，Ithink，towaivetherightofinspectingthelocaladministration，evenwhenitdoesnotinterferemoreactively。
Suppose，forinstance，thatanagentoftheGovernmentwasstationedatsomeappointedspotinthecountry，toprosecutethemisdemeanorsofthetownandcountyofficers，wouldnotamoreuniformorderbetheresult，withoutinanywaycompromisingtheindependenceofthetownship？Nothingofthekind，however，existsinAmerica:thereisnothingabovethecounty—courts，whichhave，asitwere，onlyanincidentalcognizanceoftheoffencestheyaremeanttorepress。]