Inthisdivisionoftherightsofsovereignty,theshareoftheUnionseemsatfirstsighttobemoreconsiderablethanthatoftheStates;butamoreattentiveinvestigationshowsittobelessso。TheundertakingsoftheGovernmentoftheUnionaremorevast,buttheirinfluenceismorerarelyfelt。Thoseoftheprovincialgovernmentsarecomparativelysmall,buttheyareincessant,andtheyservetokeepalivetheauthoritywhichtheyrepresent。TheGovernmentoftheUnionwatchesthegeneralinterestsofthecountry;butthegeneralinterestsofapeoplehaveaveryquestionableinfluenceuponindividualhappiness,whilstprovincialinterestsproduceamostimmediateeffectuponthewelfareoftheinhabitants。TheUnionsecurestheindependenceandthegreatnessofthenation,whichdonotimmediatelyaffectprivatecitizens;buttheseveralStatesmaintaintheliberty,regulatetherights,protectthefortune,andsecurethelifeandthewholefutureprosperityofeverycitizen。
TheFederalGovernmentisveryfarremovedfromitssubjects,whilsttheprovincialgovernmentsarewithinthereachofthemall,andarereadytoattendtothesmallestappeal。ThecentralGovernmenthasuponitssidethepassionsofafewsuperiormenwhoaspiretoconductit;butuponthesideoftheprovincialgovernmentsaretheinterestsofallthosesecond—rateindividualswhocanonlyhopetoobtainpowerwithintheirownState,andwhoneverthelessexercisethelargestshareofauthorityoverthepeoplebecausetheyareplacednearesttoitslevel。TheAmericanshavethereforemuchmoretohopeandtofearfromtheStatesthanfromtheUnion;and,inconformitywiththenaturaltendencyofthehumanmind,theyaremorelikelytoattachthemselvestotheformerthantothelatter。Inthisrespecttheirhabitsandfeelingsharmonizewiththeirinterests。
Whenacompactnationdividesitssovereignty,andadoptsaconfederateformofgovernment,thetraditions,thecustoms,andthemannersofthepeopleareforalongtimeatvariancewiththeirlegislation;andtheformertendtogiveadegreeofinfluencetothecentralgovernmentwhichthelatterforbids。
Whenanumberofconfederatestatesunitetoformasinglenation,thesamecausesoperateinanoppositedirection。IhavenodoubtthatifFranceweretobecomeaconfederaterepubliclikethatoftheUnitedStates,thegovernmentwouldatfirstdisplaymoreenergythanthatoftheUnion;andiftheUnionweretoalteritsconstitutiontoamonarchylikethatofFrance,I
thinkthattheAmericanGovernmentwouldbealongtimeinacquiringtheforcewhichnowrulesthelatternation。WhenthenationalexistenceoftheAnglo—Americansbegan,theirprovincialexistencewasalreadyoflongstanding;necessaryrelationswereestablishedbetweenthetownshipsandtheindividualcitizensofthesameStates;andtheywereaccustomedtoconsidersomeobjectsascommontothemall,andtoconductotheraffairsasexclusivelyrelatingtotheirownspecialinterests。
TheUnionisavastbodywhichpresentsnodefiniteobjecttopatrioticfeeling。TheformsandlimitsoftheStatearedistinctandcircumscribed;sinceitrepresentsacertainnumberofobjectswhicharefamiliartothecitizensandbelovedbyall。
Itisidentifiedwiththeverysoil,withtherightofpropertyandthedomesticaffections,withtherecollectionsofthepast,thelaborsofthepresent,andthehopesofthefuture。
Patriotism,then,whichisfrequentlyamereextensionofindividualegotism,isstilldirectedtotheState,andisnotexcitedbytheUnion。Thusthetendencyoftheinterests,thehabits,andthefeelingsofthepeopleistocentrepoliticalactivityintheStates,inpreferencetotheUnion。
Itiseasytoestimatethedifferentforcesofthetwogovernments,byremarkingthemannerinwhichtheyfulfiltheirrespectivefunctions。WheneverthegovernmentofaStatehasoccasiontoaddressanindividualoranassemblyofindividuals,itslanguageisclearandimperative;andsuchisalsothetoneoftheFederalGovernmentinitsintercoursewithindividuals,butnosoonerhasitanythingtodowithaStatethanitbeginstoparley,toexplainitsmotivesandtojustifyitsconduct,toargue,toadvise,and,inshort,anythingbuttocommand。Ifdoubtsareraisedastothelimitsoftheconstitutionalpowersofeachgovernment,theprovincialgovernmentprefersitsclaimwithboldness,andtakespromptandenergeticstepstosupportit。InthemeanwhiletheGovernmentoftheUnionreasons;itappealstotheinterests,tothegoodsense,tothegloryofthenation;ittemporizes,itnegotiates,anddoesnotconsenttoactuntilitisreducedtothelastextremity。Atfirstsightitmightreadilybeimaginedthatitistheprovincialgovernmentwhichisarmedwiththeauthorityofthenation,andthatCongressrepresentsasingleState。
TheFederalGovernmentis,therefore,notwithstandingtheprecautionsofthosewhofoundedit,naturallysoweakthatitmorepeculiarlyrequiresthefreeconsentofthegovernedtoenableittosubsist。ItiseasytoperceivethatitsobjectistoenabletheStatestorealizewithfacilitytheirdeterminationofremainingunited;and,aslongasthispreliminaryconditionexists,itsauthorityisgreat,temperate,andeffective。TheConstitutionfitstheGovernmenttocontrolindividuals,andeasilytosurmountsuchobstaclesastheymaybeinclinedtooffer;butitwasbynomeansestablishedwithaviewtothepossibleseparationofoneormoreoftheStatesfromtheUnion。
IfthesovereigntyoftheUnionweretoengageinastrugglewiththatoftheStatesatthepresentday,itsdefeatmaybeconfidentlypredicted;anditisnotprobablethatsuchastrugglewouldbeseriouslyundertaken。AsoftenasasteadyresistanceisofferedtotheFederalGovernmentitwillbefoundtoyield。ExperiencehashithertoshownthatwheneveraStatehasdemandedanythingwithperseveranceandresolution,ithasinvariablysucceeded;andthatifaseparategovernmenthasdistinctlyrefusedtoact,itwaslefttodoasitthoughtfit。
*z[Footnotez:SeetheconductoftheNorthernStatesinthewarof1812。"Duringthatwar,"saysJeffersoninalettertoGeneralLafayette,"fouroftheEasternStateswereonlyattachedtotheUnion,likesomanyinanimatebodiestolivingmen。"]
ButeveniftheGovernmentoftheUnionhadanystrengthinherentinitself,thephysicalsituationofthecountrywouldrendertheexerciseofthatstrengthverydifficult。*aTheUnitedStatescoveranimmenseterritory;theyareseparatedfromeachotherbygreatdistances;andthepopulationisdisseminatedoverthesurfaceofacountrywhichisstillhalfawilderness。
IftheUnionweretoundertaketoenforcetheallegianceoftheconfederateStatesbymilitarymeans,itwouldbeinapositionveryanalogoustothatofEnglandatthetimeoftheWarofIndependence。
[Footnotea:TheprofoundpeaceoftheUnionaffordsnopretextforastandingarmy;andwithoutastandingarmyagovernmentisnotpreparedtoprofitbyafavorableopportunitytoconquerresistance,andtakethesovereignpowerbysurprise。[Thisnote,andtheparagraphinthetextwhichprecedes,havebeenshownbytheresultsoftheCivilWartobeamisconceptionofthewriter。]]
Howeverstrongagovernmentmaybe,itcannoteasilyescapefromtheconsequencesofaprinciplewhichithasonceadmittedasthefoundationofitsconstitution。TheUnionwasformedbythevoluntaryagreementoftheStates;and,inunitingtogether,theyhavenotforfeitedtheirnationality,norhavetheybeenreducedtotheconditionofoneandthesamepeople。IfoneoftheStateschosetowithdrawitsnamefromthecontract,itwouldbedifficulttodisproveitsrightofdoingso;andtheFederalGovernmentwouldhavenomeansofmaintainingitsclaimsdirectly,eitherbyforceorbyright。InordertoenabletheFederalGovernmenteasilytoconquertheresistancewhichmaybeofferedtoitbyanyoneofitssubjects,itwouldbenecessarythatoneormoreofthemshouldbespeciallyinterestedintheexistenceoftheUnion,ashasfrequentlybeenthecaseinthehistoryofconfederations。
IfitbesupposedthatamongsttheStateswhichareunitedbythefederaltietherearesomewhichexclusivelyenjoytheprincipaladvantagesofunion,orwhoseprosperitydependsonthedurationofthatunion,itisunquestionablethattheywillalwaysbereadytosupportthecentralGovernmentinenforcingtheobedienceoftheothers。ButtheGovernmentwouldthenbeexertingaforcenotderivedfromitself,butfromaprinciplecontrarytoitsnature。Statesformconfederationsinordertoderiveequaladvantagesfromtheirunion;andinthecasejustalludedto,theFederalGovernmentwouldderiveitspowerfromtheunequaldistributionofthosebenefitsamongsttheStates。
IfoneoftheconfederateStateshaveacquiredapreponderancesufficientlygreattoenableittotakeexclusivepossessionofthecentralauthority,itwillconsidertheotherStatesassubjectprovinces,anditwillcauseitsownsupremacytoberespectedundertheborrowednameofthesovereigntyoftheUnion。GreatthingsmaythenbedoneinthenameoftheFederalGovernment,butinrealitythatGovernmentwillhaveceasedtoexist。*bInboththesecases,thepowerwhichactsinthenameoftheconfederationbecomesstrongerthemoreitabandonsthenaturalstateandtheacknowledgedprinciplesofconfederations。
[Footnoteb:ThustheprovinceofHollandintherepublicoftheLowCountries,andtheEmperorintheGermanicConfederation,havesometimesputthemselvesintheplaceoftheunion,andhaveemployedthefederalauthoritytotheirownadvantage。]
InAmericatheexistingUnionisadvantageoustoalltheStates,butitisnotindispensabletoanyoneofthem。Severalofthemmightbreakthefederaltiewithoutcompromisingthewelfareoftheothers,althoughtheirownprosperitywouldbelessened。AstheexistenceandthehappinessofnoneoftheStatesarewhollydependentonthepresentConstitution,theywouldnoneofthembedisposedtomakegreatpersonalsacrificestomaintainit。Ontheotherhand,thereisnoStatewhichseemshithertotohaveitsambitionmuchinterestedinthemaintenanceoftheexistingUnion。Theycertainlydonotallexercisethesameinfluenceinthefederalcouncils,butnooneofthemcanhopetodomineerovertherest,ortotreatthemasitsinferiorsorasitssubjects。
ItappearstomeunquestionablethatifanyportionoftheUnionseriouslydesiredtoseparateitselffromtheotherStates,theywouldnotbeable,norindeedwouldtheyattempt,topreventit;andthatthepresentUnionwillonly...完整阅读请扫描二维码下载丁香书院APP免费看:
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