Inextensivecountriesandsocieties，suchasAmericaandFrance，thisrightintheindividualcanonlybeexercisedbydelegation，thatis，byelectionandrepresentation；andhenceitisthattheinstitutionofrepresentativegovernmentarises。
　　Hitherto，Ihaveconfinedmyselftomattersofprincipleonly。First，thathereditarygovernmenthasnotarighttoexist；thatitcannotbeestablishedonanyprincipleofright；andthatitisaviolationofallprinciple。Secondly，thatgovernmentbyelectionandrepresentationhasitsorigininthenaturalandeternalrightsofman；forwhetheramanbehisownlawgiver，ashewouldbeinastateofnature；orwhetherheexerciseshisportionoflegislativesovereigntyinhisownperson，asmightbethecaseinsmalldemocracieswhereallcouldassemblefortheformationofthelawsbywhichtheyweretobegoverned；orwhetherheexercisesitinthechoiceofpersonstorepresenthiminanationalassemblyofrepresentatives，theoriginoftherightisthesameinallcases。Thefirst，asisbeforeobserved，isdefectiveinpower；thesecond，ispracticableonlyindemocraciesofsmallextent；thethird，isthegreatestscaleuponwhichhumangovernmentcanbeinstituted。
　　Nexttomattersofprinciplearemattersofopinion，anditisnecessarytodistinguishbetweenthetwo。Whethertherightsofmenshallbeequalisnotamatterofopinionbutofright，andconsequentlyofprinciple；
　　formendonotholdtheirrightsasgrantsfromeachother，buteachoneinrightofhimself。Societyistheguardianbutnotthegiver。Andasinextensivesocieties，suchasAmericaandFrance，therightoftheindividualinmattersofgovernmentcannotbeexercisedbutbyelectionandrepresentation，itconsequentlyfollowsthattheonlysystemofgovernmentconsistentwithprinciple，wheresimpledemocracyisimpracticable，istherepresentativesystem。
　　Butastotheorganicalpart，orthemannerinwhichtheseveralpartsofgovernmentshallbearrangedandcomposed，itisaltogethermatterofopinion。Itisnecessarythatallthepartsbeconformablewiththeprincipleofequalrights；andsolongasthisprinciplebereligiouslyadheredto，noverymaterialerrorcantakeplace，neithercananyerrorcontinuelonginthatpartwhichfallswithintheprovinceofopinion。
　　Inallmattersofopinion，thesocialcompact，ortheprinciplebywhichsocietyisheldtogether，requiresthatthemajorityofopinionsbecomestheruleforthewhole，andthattheminorityyieldspracticalobediencethereto。Thisisperfectlyconformabletotheprincipleofequalrights:
　　for，inthefirstplace，everymanhasarighttogiveanopinionbutnomanhasarightthathisopinionshouldgoverntherest。Inthesecondplace，itisnotsupposedtobeknownbeforehandonwhichsideofanyquestion，whetherfororagainst，anyman'sopinionwillfall。Hemayhappentobeinamajorityuponsomequestions，andinaminorityuponothers；andbythesamerulethatheexpectsobedienceintheonecase，hemustyielditintheother。
　　AllthedisordersthathaveariseninFranceduringtheprogressoftheRevolutionhavehadtheirorigin，notintheprincipleofequalrights，butintheviolationofthatprinciple。Theprincipleofequalrightshasbeenrepeatedlyviolated，andthatnotbythemajoritybutbytheminority，andthatminorityhasbeencomposedofmenpossessingproperty，aswellasofmenwithoutproperty；property，therefore，evenupontheexperiencealreadyhad，isnomoreacriterionofcharacterthanitisofrights。
　　Itwillsometimeshappenthattheminorityareright，andthemajorityarewrong，butassoonasexperienceprovesthistobethecase，theminoritywillincreasetoamajority，andtheerrorwillreformitselfbythetranquiloperationoffreedomofopinionandequalityofrights。Nothing，therefore，canjustifyaninsurrection，neithercaniteverbenecessarywhererightsareequalandopinionsfree。
　　TakingthentheprincipleofequalrightsasthefoundationoftheRevolution，andconsequentlyoftheConstitution，theorganicalpart，orthemannerinwhichtheseveralpartsoftheGovernmentshallbearrangedintheConstitution，will，asisalreadysaid，fallwithintheprovinceofopinion。
　　Variousmethodswillpresentthemselvesuponaquestionofthiskind，andthoughexperienceisyetwantingtodeterminewhichisthebest，ithas，Ithink，sufficientlydecidedwhichistheworst。Thatistheworst，whichinitsdeliberationsanddecisionsissubjecttotheprecipitancyandpassionofanindividual；andwhenthewholelegislatureiscrowdedintoonebodyitisanindividualinmass。Inallcasesofdeliberationitisnecessarytohaveacorpsofreserve，anditwouldbebettertodividetherepresentationbylotintotwoparts，andletthemreviseandcorrecteachother，thanthatthewholeshouldsittogether，anddebateatonce。
　　Representativegovernmentisnotnecessarilyconfinedtoanyoneparticularform。Theprincipleisthesameinalltheformsunderwhichitcanbearranged。Theequalrightsofthepeopleistherootfromwhichthewholesprings，andthebranchesmaybearrangedaspresentopinionorfutureexperienceshallbestdirect。Astothathospitalofincurables（asChesterfieldcallsit），theBritishHouseofPeers，itisanexcrescencegrowingoutofcorruption；andthereisnomoreaffinityorresemblancebetweenanyofthebranchesofalegislativebodyoriginatingfromtherightofthepeople，andtheaforesaidHouseofPeers，thanbetweenaregularmemberofthehumanbodyandanulceratedwen。
　　Astothatpartofgovernmentthatiscalledtheexecutive，itisnecessaryinthefirstplacetofixaprecisemeaningtotheword。Therearebuttwodivisionsintowhichpowercanbearranged。First，thatofwillingordecreeingthelaws；secondly，thatofexecutingorputtingtheminpractise。
　　Theformercorrespondstotheintellectualfacultiesofthehumanmindwhichreasonsanddetermineswhatshallbedone；thesecond，tothemechanicalpowersofthehumanbodythatputsthatdeterminationintopractise。
　　Iftheformerdecides，andthelatterdoesnotperform，itisastateofimbecility；andifthelatteractswithoutthepredeterminationoftheformer，itisastateoflunacy。Theexecutivedepartmentthereforeisofficial，andissubordinatetothelegislative，asthebodyistothemindinastateofhealth；foritisimpossibletoconceivetheideaoftwosovereignties，asovereigntytowillandasovereigntytoact。
　　Theexecutiveisnotinvestedwiththepowerofdeliberatingwhetheritshallactornot；ithasnodiscretionaryauthorityinthecase；foritcanactnootherthingthanwhatthelawsdecree，anditisobligedtoactconformablythereto；andinthisviewofthecasetheexecutiveismadeupofalltheofficialdepartmentsthatexecutethelaws，ofwhichthatwhichiscalledthejudiciaryisthechief。
　　Butmankindhaveconceivedanideathatsomekindofauthorityisnecessarytosuperintendtheexecutionofthelawsandtoseethattheyarefaithfullyperformed；anditisbyconfoundingthissuperintendingauthoritywiththeofficialexecutionthatwegetembarrassedaboutthetermexecutivepower。AllthepartsinthegovernmentsoftheUnitedStatesofAmericathatarecalledtheexecutive，arenootherthanauthoritiestosuperintendtheexecutionofthelaws；andtheyaresofarindependentofthelegislativethattheyknowthelegislativeonlythroughthelaws，andcannotbecontrolledordirectedbyitthroughanyothermedium。
　　Inwhatmannerthissuperintendingauthorityshallbeappointed，orcomposed，isamatterthatfallswithintheprovinceofopinion。Somemaypreferonemethodandsomeanother；andinallcases，whereopiniononlyandnotprincipleisconcerned，themajorityofopinionsformstheruleforall。
　　Therearehoweversomethingsdeduciblefromreason，andevidencedbyexperience，thatservetoguideourdecisionuponthecase。Theoneisnevertoinvestanyindividualwithextraordinarypower；forbesideshisbeingtemptedtomisuseit，itwillexcitecontentionandcommotioninthenationfortheoffice。Secondly，nevertoinvestpowerlonginthehandsofanynumberofindividuals。Theinconveniencesthatmaybesupposedtoaccompanyfrequentchangesarelesstobefearedthanthedangerthatarisesfromlongcontinuance。
　　Ishallconcludethisdiscoursewithofferingsomeobservationsonthemeansofpreservingliberty；foritisnotonlynecessarythatweestablishit，butthatwepreserveit。
　　Itis，inthefirstplace，necessarythatwedistinguishbetweenthemeansmadeuseoftooverthrowdespotism，inordertopreparethewayfortheestablishmentofliberty，andthemeanstobeusedafterthedespotismisoverthrown。
　　Themeansmadeuseofinthefirstcasearejustifiedbynecessity。
　　Thosemeansare，ingeneral，insurrections；forwhiletheestablishedgovernmentofdespotismcontinuesinanycountryitisscarcelypossiblethatanyothermeanscanbeused。Itisalsocertainthatinthecommencementofarevolution，therevolutionarypartypermittothemselvesadiscretionaryexerciseofpowerregulatedmorebycircumstancesthanbyprinciple，which，werethepractisetocontinue，libertywouldneverbeestablished，orifestablishedwouldsoonbeoverthrown。Itisnevertobeexpectedinarevolutionthateverymanistochangehisopinionatthesamemoment。
　　Thereneveryetwasanytruthoranyprinciplesoirresistiblyobviousthatallmenbelieveditatonce。Timeandreasonmustcooperatewitheachothertothefinalestablishmentofanyprinciple；andthereforethosewhomayhappentobefirstconvincedhavenotarighttopersecuteothers，onwhomconvictionoperatesmoreslowly。Themoralprincipleofrevolutionsittoinstruct，nottodestroy。
　　Hadaconstitutionbeenestablishedtwoyearsago（asoughttohavebeendone），theviolencesthathavesincedesolatedFranceandinjuredthecharacteroftheRevolution，would，inmyopinion，havebeenprevented。
　　Thenationwouldthenhavehadabondofunion，andeveryindividualwouldhaveknownthelineofconducthewastofollow。But，insteadofthis，arevolutionarygovernment，athingwithouteitherprincipleorauthority，wassubstitutedinitsplace；virtueandcrimedependeduponaccident；
　　andthatwhichwaspatriotismonedaybecametreasonthenext。
　　Allthesethingshavefollowedfromthewantofaconstitution；foritisthenatureandintentionofaconstitutiontopreventgoverningbyparty，byestablishingacommonprinciplethatshalllimitandcontrolthepowerandimpulseofparty，andthatsaystoallparties，thusfarshaltthougoandnofurther。Butintheabsenceofaconstitution，menlookentirelytoparty；andinsteadofprinciplegoverningparty，partygovernsprinciple。
　　Anaviditytopunishisalwaysdangeroustoliberty。Itleadsmentostretch，tomisinterpret，andtomisapplyeventhebestoflaws。Hethatwouldmakehisownlibertysecuremustguardevenhisenemyfromoppression；
　　forifheviolatesthisdutyheestablishesaprecedentthatwillreachtohimself。
　　ThomasPaineParis:July，1795。