Thereforethegoodmanshouldbealoverofselfforhewillbothhimselfprofitbydoingnobleacts，andwillbenefithisfellows，butthewickedmanshouldnot；forhewillhurtbothhimselfandhisneighbours，followingashedoesevilpassions。Forthewickedman，whathedoesclasheswithwhatheoughttodo，butwhatthegoodmanoughttodohedoes；forreasonineachofitspossessorschooseswhatisbestforitself，andthegoodmanobeyshisreason。Itistrueofthegoodmantoothathedoesmanyactsforthesakeofhisfriendsandhiscountry，andifnecessarydiesforthem；forhewillthrowawaybothwealthandhonoursandingeneralthegoodsthatareobjectsofcompetition，gainingforhimselfnobility；sincehewouldpreferashortperiodofintensepleasuretoalongoneofmildenjoyment，atwelvemonthofnoblelifetomanyyearsofhumdrumexistence，andonegreatandnobleactiontomanytrivialones。Nowthosewhodieforothersdoubtlessattainthisresult；itisthereforeagreatprizethattheychooseforthemselves。Theywillthrowawaywealthtooonconditionthattheirfriendswillgainmore；forwhileaman'sfriendgainswealthhehimselfachievesnobility；heisthereforeassigningthegreatergoodtohimself。Thesametooistrueofhonourandoffice；allthesethingshewillsacrificetohisfriend；
　　forthisisnobleandlaudableforhimself。Rightlythenishethoughttobegood，sincehechoosesnobilitybeforeallelse。Buthemayevengiveupactionstohisfriend；itmaybenoblertobecomethecauseofhisfriend'sactingthantoacthimself。Inalltheactions，therefore，thatmenarepraisedfor，thegoodmanisseentoassigntohimselfthegreatershareinwhatisnoble。Inthissense，then，ashasbeensaid，amanshouldbealoverofself；butinthesenseinwhichmostmenareso，heoughtnot。
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　　Itisalsodisputedwhetherthehappymanwillneedfriendsornot。Itissaidthatthosewhoaresupremelyhappyandself-sufficienthavenoneedoffriends；fortheyhavethethingsthataregood，andthereforebeingself-sufficienttheyneednothingfurther，whileafriend，beinganotherself，furnisheswhatamancannotprovidebyhisowneffort；whencethesaying'whenfortuneiskind，whatneedoffriends？'Butitseemsstrange，whenoneassignsallgoodthingstothehappyman，nottoassignfriends，whoarethoughtthegreatestofexternalgoods。Andifitismorecharacteristicofafriendtodowellbyanotherthantobewelldoneby，andtoconferbenefitsischaracteristicofthegoodmanandofvirtue，anditisnoblertodowellbyfriendsthanbystrangers，thegoodmanwillneedpeopletodowellby。Thisiswhythequestionisaskedwhetherweneedfriendsmoreinprosperityorinadversity，ontheassumptionthatnotonlydoesamaninadversityneedpeopletoconferbenefitsonhim，butalsothosewhoareprosperingneedpeopletodowellby。Surelyitisstrange，too，tomakethesupremelyhappymanasolitary；fornoonewouldchoosethewholeworldonconditionofbeingalone，sincemanisapoliticalcreatureandonewhosenatureistolivewithothers。Thereforeeventhehappymanliveswithothers；forhehasthethingsthatarebynaturegood。Andplainlyitisbettertospendhisdayswithfriendsandgoodmenthanwithstrangersoranychancepersons。Thereforethehappymanneedsfriends。
　　Whatthenisitthatthefirstschoolmeans，andinwhatrespectisitright？Isitthatmostidentifyfriendswithusefulpeople？Ofsuchfriendsindeedthesupremelyhappymanwillhavenoneed，sincehealreadyhasthethingsthataregood；norwillheneedthosewhomonemakesone'sfriendsbecauseoftheirpleasantness，orhewillneedthemonlytoasmallextentforhislife，beingpleasant，hasnoneedofadventitiouspleasure；andbecausehedoesnotneedsuchfriendsheisthoughtnottoneedfriends。
　　Butthatissurelynottrue。Forwehavesaidattheoutsetthathappinessisanactivity；andactivityplainlycomesintobeingandisnotpresentatthestartlikeapieceofproperty。If1happinessliesinlivingandbeingactive，andthegoodman'sactivityisvirtuousandpleasantinitself，aswehavesaidattheoutset，and2athing'sbeingone'sownisoneoftheattributesthatmakeitpleasant，and3wecancontemplateourneighboursbetterthanourselvesandtheiractionsbetterthanourown，andiftheactionsofvirtuousmenwhoaretheirfriendsarepleasanttogoodmensincethesehaveboththeattributesthatarenaturallypleasant，-ifthisbeso，thesupremelyhappymanwillneedfriendsofthissort，sincehispurposeistocontemplateworthyactionsandactionsthatarehisown，andtheactionsofagoodmanwhoishisfriendhaveboththesequalities。
　　Further，menthinkthatthehappymanoughttolivepleasantly。
　　Nowifhewereasolitary，lifewouldbehardforhim；forbyoneselfitisnoteasytobecontinuouslyactive；butwithothersandtowardsothersitiseasier。Withothersthereforehisactivitywillbemorecontinuous，anditisinitselfpleasant，asitoughttobeforthemanwhoissupremelyhappy；foragoodmanquagooddelightsinvirtuousactionsandisvexedatviciousones，asamusicalmanenjoysbeautifultunesbutispainedatbadones。A
　　certaintraininginvirtuearisesalsofromthecompanyofthegood，asTheognishassaidbeforeus。
　　Ifwelookdeeperintothenatureofthings，avirtuousfriendseemstobenaturallydesirableforavirtuousman。Forthatwhichisgoodbynature，wehavesaid，isforthevirtuousmangoodandpleasantinitself。Nowlifeisdefinedinthecaseofanimalsbythepowerofperceptioninthatofmanbythepowerofperceptionorthought；
　　andapowerisdefinedbyreferencetothecorrespondingactivity，whichistheessentialthing；thereforelifeseemstobeessentiallytheactofperceivingorthinking。Andlifeisamongthethingsthataregoodandpleasantinthemselves，sinceitisdeterminateandthedeterminateisofthenatureofthegood；andthatwhichisgoodbynatureisalsogoodforthevirtuousmanwhichisthereasonwhylifeseemspleasanttoallmen；butwemustnotapplythistoawickedandcorruptlifenortoalifespentinpain；forsuchalifeisindeterminate，asareitsattributes。Thenatureofpainwillbecomeplainerinwhatfollows。Butiflifeitselfisgoodandpleasantwhichitseemstobe，fromtheveryfactthatallmendesireit，andparticularlythosewhoaregoodandsupremelyhappy；fortosuchmenlifeismostdesirable，andtheirexistenceisthemostsupremelyhappyandifhewhoseesperceivesthathesees，andhewhohears，thathehears，andhewhowalks，thathewalks，andinthecaseofallotheractivitiessimilarlythereissomethingwhichperceivesthatweareactive，sothatifweperceive，weperceivethatweperceive，andifwethink，thatwethink；andiftoperceivethatweperceiveorthinkistoperceivethatweexistforexistencewasdefinedasperceivingorthinking；andifperceivingthatonelivesisinitselfoneofthethingsthatarepleasantforlifeisbynaturegood，andtoperceivewhatisgoodpresentinoneselfispleasant；andiflifeisdesirable，andparticularlysoforgoodmen，becausetothemexistenceisgoodandpleasantfortheyarepleasedattheconsciousnessofthepresenceinthemofwhatisinitselfgood；andifasthevirtuousmanistohimself，heistohisfriendalsoforhisfriendisanotherself:-ifallthisbetrue，ashisownbeingisdesirableforeachman，so，oralmostso，isthatofhisfriend。Nowhisbeingwasseentobedesirablebecauseheperceivedhisowngoodness，andsuchperceptionispleasantinitself。Heneeds，therefore，tobeconsciousoftheexistenceofhisfriendaswell，andthiswillberealizedintheirlivingtogetherandsharingindiscussionandthought；forthisiswhatlivingtogetherwouldseemtomeaninthecaseofman，andnot，asinthecaseofcattle，feedinginthesameplace。
　　If，then，beingisinitselfdesirableforthesupremelyhappymansinceitisbyitsnaturegoodandpleasant，andthatofhisfriendisverymuchthesame，afriendwillbeoneofthethingsthataredesirable。Nowthatwhichisdesirableforhimhemusthave，orhewillbedeficientinthisrespect。Themanwhoistobehappywillthereforeneedvirtuousfriends。
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　　Shouldwe，then，makeasmanyfriendsaspossible，or-asinthecaseofhospitalityitisthoughttobesuitableadvice，thatoneshouldbe'neitheramanofmanyguestsnoramanwithnone'-willthatapplytofriendshipaswell；shouldamanneitherbefriendlessnorhaveanexcessivenumberoffriends？
　　Tofriendsmadewithaviewtoutilitythissayingwouldseemthoroughlyapplicable；fortodoservicestomanypeopleinreturnisalaborioustaskandlifeisnotlongenoughforitsperformance。
　　Thereforefriendsinexcessofthosewhoaresufficientforourownlifearesuperfluous，andhindrancestothenoblelife；sothatwehavenoneedofthem。Offriendsmadewithaviewtopleasure，also，fewareenough，asalittleseasoninginfoodisenough。
　　Butasregardsgoodfriends，shouldwehaveasmanyaspossible，oristherealimittothenumberofone'sfriends，asthereistothesizeofacity？Youcannotmakeacityoftenmen，andifthereareahundredthousanditisacitynolonger。Butthepropernumberispresumablynotasinglenumber，butanythingthatfallsbetweencertainfixedpoints。Soforfriendstoothereisafixednumberperhapsthelargestnumberwithwhomonecanlivetogetherforthat，wefound，thoughttobeverycharacteristicoffriendship；
　　andthatonecannotlivewithmanypeopleanddivideoneselfupamongthemisplain。Further，theytoomustbefriendsofoneanother，iftheyarealltospendtheirdaystogether；anditisahardbusinessforthisconditiontobefulfilledwithalargenumber。Itisfounddifficult，too，torejoiceandtogrieveinanintimatewaywithmanypeople，foritmaylikelyhappenthatonehasatoncetobehappywithonefriendandtomournwithanother。Presumably，then，itiswellnottoseektohaveasmanyfriendsaspossible，butasmanyasareenoughforthepurposeoflivingtogether；foritwouldseemactuallyimpossibletobeagreatfriendtomanypeople。Thisiswhyonecannotloveseveralpeople；loveisideallyasortofexcessoffriendship，andthatcanonlybefelttowardsoneperson；thereforegreatfriendshiptoocanonlybefelttowardsafewpeople。Thisseemstobeconfirmedinpractice；forwedonotfindmanypeoplewhoarefriendsinthecomradelywayoffriendship，andthefamousfriendshipsofthissortarealwaysbetweentwopeople。Thosewhohavemanyfriendsandmixintimatelywiththemallarethoughttobenoone'sfriend，exceptinthewaypropertofellow-citizens，andsuchpeoplearealsocalledobsequious。Inthewaypropertofellow-citizens，indeed，itispossibletobethefriendofmanyandyetnotbeobsequiousbutagenuinelygoodman；butonecannothavewithmanypeoplethefriendshipbasedonvirtueandonthecharacterofourfriendsthemselves，andwemustbecontentifwefindevenafewsuch。
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　　Doweneedfriendsmoreingoodfortuneorinbad？Theyaresoughtafterinboth；forwhilemeninadversityneedhelp，inprosperitytheyneedpeopletolivewithandtomaketheobjectsoftheirbeneficence；fortheywishtodowellbyothers。Friendship，then，ismorenecessaryinbadfortune，andsoitisusefulfriendsthatonewantsinthiscase；butitismorenobleingoodfortune，andsowealsoseekforgoodmenasourfriends，sinceitismoredesirabletoconferbenefitsontheseandtolivewiththese。Fortheverypresenceoffriendsispleasantbothingoodfortuneandalsoinbad，sincegriefislightenedwhenfriendssorrowwithus。Henceonemightaskwhethertheyshareasitwereourburden，or-withoutthathappening-theirpresencebyitspleasantness，andthethoughtoftheirgrievingwithus，makeourpainless。Whetheritisforthesereasonsorforsomeotherthatourgriefislightened，isaquestionthatmaybedismissed；atalleventswhatwehavedescribedappearstotakeplace。
　　Buttheirpresenceseemstocontainamixtureofvariousfactors。
　　Theveryseeingofone'sfriendsispleasant，especiallyifoneisinadversity，andbecomesasafeguardagainstgriefforafriendtendstocomfortusbothbythesightofhimandbyhiswords，ifheistactful，sinceheknowsourcharacterandthethingsthatpleaseorpainus；buttoseehimpainedatourmisfortunesispainful；foreveryoneshunsbeingacauseofpaintohisfriends。Forthisreasonpeopleofamanlynatureguardagainstmakingtheirfriendsgrievewiththem，and，unlesshebeexceptionallyinsensibletopain，suchamancannotstandthepainthatensuesforhisfriends，andingeneraldoesnotadmitfellow-mournersbecauseheisnothimselfgiventomourning；butwomenandwomanlymenenjoysympathisersintheirgrief，andlovethemasfriendsandcompanionsinsorrow。Butinallthingsoneobviouslyoughttoimitatethebettertypeofperson。
　　Ontheotherhand，thepresenceoffriendsinourprosperityimpliesbothapleasantpassingofourtimeandthepleasantthoughtoftheirpleasureatourowngoodfortune。Forthiscauseitwouldseemthatweoughttosummonourfriendsreadilytoshareourgoodfortunesforthebeneficentcharacterisanobleone，butsummonthemtoourbadfortuneswithhesitation；forweoughttogivethemaslittleashareaspossibleinourevilswhencethesaying'enoughismymisfortune'。Weshouldsummonfriendstousmostofallwhentheyarelikelybysufferingafewinconveniencestodousagreatservice。
　　Conversely，itisfittingtogounaskedandreadilytotheaidofthoseinadversityforitischaracteristicofafriendtorenderservices，andespeciallytothosewhoareinneedandhavenotdemandedthem；suchactionisnoblerandpleasanterforbothpersons；
　　butwhenourfriendsareprosperousweshouldjoinreadilyintheiractivitiesfortheyneedfriendsforthesetoo，butbetardyincomingforwardtobetheobjectsoftheirkindness；foritisnotnobletobekeentoreceivebenefits。Still，wemustnodoubtavoidgettingthereputationofkill-joysbyrepulsingthem；forthatsometimeshappens。
　　Thepresenceoffriends，then，seemsdesirableinallcircumstances。
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　　Doesitnotfollow，then，that，asforloversthesightofthebelovedisthethingtheylovemost，andtheypreferthissensetotheothersbecauseonitlovedependsmostforitsbeingandforitsorigin，soforfriendsthemostdesirablethingislivingtogether？
　　Forfriendshipisapartnership，andasamanistohimself，soishetohisfriend；nowinhisowncasetheconsciousnessofhisbeingisdesirable，andsothereforeistheconsciousnessofhisfriend'sbeing，andtheactivityofthisconsciousnessisproducedwhentheylivetogether，sothatitisnaturalthattheyaimatthis。Andwhateverexistencemeansforeachclassofmen，whateveritisforwhosesaketheyvaluelife，inthattheywishtooccupythemselveswiththeirfriends；andsosomedrinktogether，othersdicetogether，othersjoininathleticexercisesandhunting，orinthestudyofphilosophy，eachclassspendingtheirdaystogetherinwhatevertheylovemostinlife；forsincetheywishtolivewiththeirfriends，theydoandshareinthosethingswhichgivethemthesenseoflivingtogether。Thusthefriendshipofbadmenturnsoutanevilthingforbecauseoftheirinstabilitytheyuniteinbadpursuits，andbesidestheybecomeevilbybecominglikeeachother，whilethefriendshipofgoodmenisgood，beingaugmentedbytheircompanionship；andtheyarethoughttobecomebettertoobytheiractivitiesandbyimprovingeachother；forfromeachothertheytakethemouldofthecharacteristicstheyapprove-whencethesaying'nobledeedsfromnoblemen'-Somuch，then，forfriendship；ournexttaskmustbetodiscusspleasure。
　　BOOKX
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　　AFTERthesemattersweoughtperhapsnexttodiscusspleasure。Foritisthoughttobemostintimatelyconnectedwithourhumannature，whichisthereasonwhyineducatingtheyoungwesteerthembytheruddersofpleasureandpain；itisthought，too，thattoenjoythethingsweoughtandtohatethethingsweoughthasthegreatestbearingonvirtueofcharacter。Forthesethingsextendrightthroughlife，withaweightandpoweroftheirowninrespectbothtovirtueandtothehappylife，sincemenchoosewhatispleasantandavoidwhatispainful；andsuchthings，itwillbethought，weshouldleastofallomittodiscuss，especiallysincetheyadmitofmuchdispute。Forsomesaypleasureisthegood，whileothers，onthecontrary，sayitisthoroughlybad-somenodoubtbeingpersuadedthatthefactsareso，andothersthinkingithasabettereffectonourlifetoexhibitpleasureasabadthingevenifitisnot；formostpeopletheythinkinclinetowardsitandaretheslavesoftheirpleasures，forwhichreasontheyoughttoleadthemintheoppositedirection，sincethustheywillreachthemiddlestate。Butsurelythisisnotcorrect。Forargumentsaboutmattersconcernedwithfeelingsandactionsarelessreliablethanfacts:andsowhentheyclashwiththefactsofperceptiontheyaredespised，anddiscreditthetruthaswell；ifamanwhorunsdownpleasureisonceseentobealmingatit，hisincliningtowardsitisthoughttoimplythatitisallworthyofbeingaimedat；formostpeoplearenotgoodatdrawingdistinctions。Trueargumentsseem，then，mostuseful，notonlywithaviewtoknowledge，butwithaviewtolifealso；forsincetheyharmonizewiththefactstheyarebelieved，andsotheystimulatethosewhounderstandthemtoliveaccordingtothem-Enoughofsuchquestions；letusproceedtoreviewtheopinionsthathavebeenexpressedaboutpleasure。
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　　Eudoxusthoughtpleasurewasthegoodbecausehesawallthings，bothrationalandirrational，aimingatit，andbecauseinallthingsthatwhichistheobjectofchoiceiswhatisexcellent，andthatwhichismosttheobjectofchoicethegreatestgood；thusthefactthatallthingsmovedtowardsthesameobjectindicatedthatthiswasforallthingsthechiefgoodforeachthing，heargued，findsitsowngood，asitfindsitsownnourishment；andthatwhichisgoodforallthingsandatwhichallaimwasthegood。Hisargumentswerecreditedmorebecauseoftheexcellenceofhischaracterthanfortheirownsake；hewasthoughttoberemarkablyself-controlled，andthereforeitwasthoughtthathewasnotsayingwhathedidsayasafriendofpleasure，butthatthefactsreallywereso。Hebelievedthatthesameconclusionfollowednolessplainlyfromastudyofthecontraryofpleasure；painwasinitselfanobjectofaversiontoallthings，andthereforeitscontrarymustbesimilarlyanobjectofchoice。Andagainthatismostanobjectofchoicewhichwechoosenotbecauseorforthesakeofsomethingelse，andpleasureisadmittedlyofthisnature；fornooneaskstowhatendheispleased，thusimplyingthatpleasureisinitselfanobjectofchoice。Further，hearguedthatpleasurewhenaddedtoanygood，e。g。tojustortemperateaction，makesitmoreworthyofchoice，andthatitisonlybyitselfthatthegoodcanbeincreased。
　　Thisargumentseemstoshowittobeoneofthegoods，andnomoreagoodthananyother；foreverygoodismoreworthyofchoicealongwithanothergoodthantakenalone。AndsoitisbyanargumentofthiskindthatPlatoprovesthegoodnottobepleasure；hearguesthatthepleasantlifeismoredesirablewithwisdomthanwithout，andthatifthemixtureisbetter，pleasureisnotthegood；forthegoodcannotbecomemoredesirablebytheadditionofanythingtoit。
　　Nowitisclearthatnothingelse，anymorethanpleasure，canbethegoodifitismademoredesirablebytheadditionofanyofthethingsthataregoodinthemselves。What，then，istherethatsatisfiesthiscriterion，whichatthesametimewecanparticipatein？Itissomethingofthissortthatwearelookingfor。Thosewhoobjectthatthatatwhichallthingsaimisnotnecessarilygoodare，wemaysurmise，talkingnonsense。Forwesaythatthatwhicheveryonethinksreallyisso；andthemanwhoattacksthisbeliefwillhardlyhaveanythingmorecredibletomaintaininstead。Ifitissenselesscreaturesthatdesirethethingsinquestion，theremightbesomethinginwhattheysay；butifintelligentcreaturesdosoaswell，whatsensecantherebeinthisview？Butperhapsevenininferiorcreaturesthereissomenaturalgoodstrongerthanthemselveswhichaimsattheirpropergood。
　　Nordoestheargumentaboutthecontraryofpleasureseemtobecorrect。Theysaythatifpainisanevilitdoesnotfollowthatpleasureisagood；forevilisopposedtoevilandatthesametimebothareopposedtotheneutralstate-whichiscorrectenoughbutdoesnotapplytothethingsinquestion。Forifbothpleasureandpainbelongedtotheclassofevilstheyoughtbothtobeobjectsofaversion，whileiftheybelongedtotheclassofneutralsneithershouldbeanobjectofaversionortheyshouldbothbeequallyso；butinfactpeopleevidentlyavoidtheoneasevilandchoosetheotherasgood；thatthenmustbethenatureoftheoppositionbetweenthem。
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　　Noragain，ifpleasureisnotaquality，doesitfollowthatitisnotagood；fortheactivitiesofvirtuearenotqualitieseither，norishappiness。Theysay，however，thatthegoodisdeterminate，whilepleasureisindeterminate，becauseitadmitsofdegrees。Nowifitisfromthefeelingofpleasurethattheyjudgethus，thesamewillbetrueofjusticeandtheothervirtues，inrespectofwhichweplainlysaythatpeopleofacertaincharacteraresomoreorless，andactmoreorlessinaccordancewiththesevirtues；forpeoplemaybemorejustorbrave，anditispossiblealsotoactjustlyortemperatelymoreorless。Butiftheirjudgementisbasedonthevariouspleasures，surelytheyarenotstatingtherealcause，ifinfactsomepleasuresareunmixedandothersmixed。Again，justashealthadmitsofdegreeswithoutbeingindeterminate，whyshouldnotpleasure？Thesameproportionisnotfoundinallthings，norasingleproportionalwaysinthesamething，butitmayberelaxedandyetpersistuptoapoint，anditmaydifferindegree。Thecaseofpleasurealsomaythereforebeofthiskind。
　　Again，theyassumethatthegoodisperfectwhilemovementsandcomingsintobeingareimperfect，andtrytoexhibitpleasureasbeingamovementandacomingintobeing。Buttheydonotseemtoberighteveninsayingthatitisamovement。Forspeedandslownessarethoughttobepropertoeverymovement，andifamovement，e。g。thatoftheheavens，hasnotspeedorslownessinitself，ithasitinrelationtosomethingelse；butofpleasureneitherofthesethingsistrue。Forwhilewemaybecomepleasedquicklyaswemaybecomeangryquickly，wecannotbepleasedquickly，noteveninrelationtosomeoneelse，whilewecanwalk，orgrow，orthelike，quickly。While，then，wecanchangequicklyorslowlyintoastateofpleasure，wecannotquicklyexhibittheactivityofpleasure，i。e。bepleased。
　　Again，howcanitbeacomingintobeing？Itisnotthoughtthatanychancethingcancomeoutofanychancething，butthatathingisdissolvedintothatoutofwhichitcomesintobeing；andpainwouldbethedestructionofthatofwhichpleasureisthecomingintobeing。
　　Theysay，too，thatpainisthelackofthatwhichisaccordingtonature，andpleasureisreplenishment。Buttheseexperiencesarebodily。Ifthenpleasureisreplenishmentwiththatwhichisaccordingtonature，thatwhichfeelspleasurewillbethatinwhichthereplenishmenttakesplace，i。e。thebody；butthatisnotthoughttobethecase；thereforethereplenishmentisnotpleasure，thoughonewouldbepleasedwhenreplenishmentwastakingplace，justasonewouldbepainedifonewasbeingoperatedon。Thisopinionseemstobebasedonthepainsandpleasuresconnectedwithnutrition；onthefactthatwhenpeoplehavebeenshortoffoodandhavefeltpainbeforehandtheyarepleasedbythereplenishment。Butthisdoesnothappenwithallpleasures；forthepleasuresoflearningand，amongthesensuouspleasures，thoseofsmell，andalsomanysoundsandsights，andmemoriesandhopes，donotpresupposepain。Ofwhatthenwillthesebethecomingintobeing？Therehasnotbeenlackofanythingofwhichtheycouldbethesupplyinganew。
　　Inreplytothosewhobringforwardthedisgracefulpleasuresonemaysaythatthesearenotpleasant；ifthingsarepleasanttopeopleofviciousconstitution，wemustnotsupposethattheyarealsopleasanttoothersthanthese，justaswedonotreasonsoaboutthethingsthatarewholesomeorsweetorbittertosickpeople，orascribewhitenesstothethingsthatseemwhitetothosesufferingfromadiseaseoftheeye。Oronemightanswerthus-thatthepleasuresaredesirable，butnotfromthesesources，aswealthisdesirable，butnotastherewardofbetrayal，andhealth，butnotatthecostofeatinganythingandeverything。Orperhapspleasuresdifferinkind；
　　forthosederivedfromnoblesourcesaredifferentfromthosederivedfrombasesources，andonecannotthepleasureofthejustmanwithoutbeingjust，northatofthemusicalmanwithoutbeingmusical，andsoon。
　　Thefact，too，thatafriendisdifferentfromaflattererseemstomakeitplainthatpleasureisnotagoodorthatpleasuresaredifferentinkind；fortheoneisthoughttoconsortwithuswithaviewtothegood，theotherwithaviewtoourpleasure，andtheoneisreproachedforhisconductwhiletheotherispraisedonthegroundthatheconsortswithusfordifferentends。Andnoonewouldchoosetolivewiththeintellectofachildthroughouthislife，howevermuchheweretobepleasedatthethingsthatchildrenarepleasedat，nortogetenjoymentbydoingsomemostdisgracefuldeed，thoughhewerenevertofeelanypaininconsequence。Andtherearemanythingsweshouldbekeenabouteveniftheybroughtnopleasure，e。g。seeing，remembering，knowing，possessingthevirtues。Ifpleasuresnecessarilydoaccompanythese，thatmakesnoodds；weshouldchoosetheseevenifnopleasureresulted。Itseemstobeclear，then，thatneitherispleasurethegoodnorisallpleasuredesirable，andthatsomepleasuresaredesirableinthemselves，differinginkindorintheirsourcesfromtheothers。Somuchforthethingsthataresaidaboutpleasureandpain。
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　　Whatpleasureis，orwhatkindofthingitis，willbecomeplainerifwetakeupthequestionagafromthebeginning。Seeingseemstobeatanymomentcomplete，foritdoesnotlackanythingwhichcomingintobeinglaterwillcompleteitsform；andpleasurealsoseemstobeofthisnature。Foritisawhole，andatnotimecanonefindapleasurewhoseformwillbecompletedifthepleasurelastslonger。Forthisreason，too，itisnotamovement。Foreverymovemente。g。thatofbuildingtakestimeandisforthesakeofanend，andiscompletewhenithasmadewhatitaimsat。Itiscomplete，therefore，onlyinthewholetimeoratthatfinalmoment。Intheirpartsandduringthetimetheyoccupy，allmovementsareincomplete，andaredifferentinkindfromthewholemovementandfromeachother。
　　Forthefittingtogetherofthestonesisdifferentfromtheflutingofthecolumn，andthesearebothdifferentfromthemakingofthetemple；andthemakingofthetempleiscompleteforitlacksnothingwithaviewtotheendproposed，butthemakingofthebaseorofthetriglyphisincomplete；foreachisthemakingofonlyapart。Theydifferinkind，then，anditisnotpossibletofindatanyandeverytimeamovementcompleteinform，butifatall，onlyinthewholetime。So，too，inthecaseofwalkingandallothermovements。
　　Foriflocomotionisamovementfromtothere，it，too，hasdifferencesinkind-flying，walking，leaping，andsoon。Andnotonlyso，butinwalkingitselftherearesuchdifferences；forthewhenceandwhitherarenotthesameinthewholeracecourseandinapartofit，norinonepartandinanother，norisitthesamethingtotraversethislineandthat；foronetraversesnotonlyalinebutonewhichisinaplace，andthisoneisinadifferentplacefromthat。Wehavediscussedmovementwithprecisioninanotherwork，butitseemsthatitisnotcompleteatanyandeverytime，butthatthemanymovementsareincompleteanddifferentinkind，sincethewhenceandwhithergivethemtheirform。Butofpleasuretheformiscompleteatanyandeverytime。Plainly，then，pleasureandmovementmustbedifferentfromeachother，andpleasuremustbeoneofthethingsthatarewholeandcomplete。Thiswouldseemtobethecase，too，fromthefactthatitisnotpossibletomoveotherwisethanintime，butitispossibletobepleased；forthatwhichtakesplaceinamomentisawhole。
　　Fromtheseconsiderationsitisclear，too，thatthesethinkersarenotrightinsayingthereisamovementoracomingintobeingofpleasure。Forthesecannotbeascribedtoallthings，butonlytothosethataredivisibleandnotwholes；thereisnocomingintobeingofseeingnorofapointnorofaunit，norisanyoftheseamovementorcomingintobeing；thereforethereisnomovementorcomingintobeingofpleasureeither；foritisawhole。
　　Sinceeverysenseisactiveinrelationtoitsobject，andasensewhichisingoodconditionactsperfectlyinrelationtothemostbeautifulofitsobjectsforperfectactivityseemstobeideallyofthisnature；whetherwesaythatitisactive，ortheorganinwhichitresides，maybeassumedtobeimmaterial，itfollowsthatinthecaseofeachsensethebestactivityisthatofthebest-conditionedorganinrelationtothefinestofitsobjects。Andthisactivitywillbethemostcompleteandpleasant。For，whilethereispleasureinrespectofanysense，andinrespectofthoughtandcontemplationnoless，themostcompleteispleasantest，andthatofawell-conditionedorganinrelationtotheworthiestofitsobjectsisthemostcomplete；andthepleasurecompletestheactivity。Butthepleasuredoesnotcompleteitinthesamewayasthecombinationofobjectandsense，bothgood，justashealthandthedoctorarenotinthesamewaythecauseofaman'sbeinghealthy。Thatpleasureisproducedinrespecttoeachsenseisplain；forwespeakofsightsandsoundsaspleasant。Itisalsoplainthatitarisesmostofallwhenboththesenseisatitsbestanditisactiveinreferencetoanobjectwhichcorresponds；whenbothobjectandperceiverareofthebesttherewillalwaysbepleasure，sincetherequisiteagentandpatientarebothpresent。Pleasurecompletestheactivitynotasthecorrespondingpermanentstatedoes，byitsimmanence，butasanendwhichsupervenesasthebloomofyouthdoesonthoseinthefloweroftheirage。Solong，then，asboththeintelligibleorsensibleobjectandthediscriminatingorcontemplativefacultyareastheyshouldbe，thepleasurewillbeinvolvedintheactivity；forwhenboththepassiveandtheactivefactorareunchangedandarerelatedtoeachotherinthesameway，thesameresultnaturallyfollows。
　　How，then，isitthatnooneiscontinuouslypleased？Isitthatwegrowweary？Certainlyallhumanbeingsareincapableofcontinuousactivity。Thereforepleasurealsoisnotcontinuous；foritaccompaniesactivity。Somethingsdelightuswhentheyarenew，butlaterdosoless，forthesamereason；foratfirstthemindisinastateofstimulationandintenselyactiveaboutthem，aspeoplearewithrespecttotheirvisionwhentheylookhardatathing，butafterwardsouractivityisnotofthiskind，buthasgrownrelaxed；
　　forwhichreasonthepleasurealsoisdulled。
　　Onemightthinkthatallmendesirepleasurebecausetheyallaimatlife；lifeisanactivity，andeachmanisactiveaboutthosethingsandwiththosefacultiesthathelovesmost；e。g。themusicianisactivewithhishearinginreferencetotunes，thestudentwithhismindinreferencetotheoreticalquestions，andsoonineachcase；
　　nowpleasurecompletestheactivities，andthereforelife，whichtheydesire。Itiswithgoodreason，then，thattheyaimatpleasuretoo，sinceforeveryoneitcompleteslife，whichisdesirable。Butwhetherwechooselifeforthesakeofpleasureorpleasureforthesakeoflifeisaquestionwemaydismissforthepresent。Fortheyseemtobebounduptogetherandnottoadmitofseparation，sincewithoutactivitypleasuredoesnotarise，andeveryactivityiscompletedbytheattendantpleasure。
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　　Forthisreasonpleasuresseem，too，todifferinkind。Forthingsdifferentinkindare，wethink，completedbydifferentthingsweseethistobetruebothofnaturalobjectsandofthingsproducedbyart，e。g。animals，trees，apainting，asculpture，ahouse，animplement；and，similarly，wethinkthatactivitiesdifferinginkindarecompletedbythingsdifferinginkind。Nowtheactivitiesofthoughtdifferfromthoseofthesenses，andbothdifferamongthemselves，inkind；so，therefore，dothepleasuresthatcompletethem。
　　Thismaybeseen，too，fromthefactthateachofthepleasuresisboundupwiththeactivityitcompletes。Foranactivityisintensifiedbyitsproperpleasure，sinceeachclassofthingsisbetterjudgedofandbroughttoprecisionbythosewhoengageintheactivitywithpleasure；e。g。itisthosewhoenjoygeometricalthinkingthatbecomegeometersandgraspthevariouspropositionsbetter，and，similarly，thosewhoarefondofmusicorofbuilding，andsoon，makeprogressintheirproperfunctionbyenjoyingit；sothepleasuresintensifytheactivities，andwhatintensifiesathingispropertoit，butthingsdifferentinkindhavepropertiesdifferentinkind。
　　Thiswillbeevenmoreapparentfromthefactthatactivitiesarehinderedbypleasuresarisingfromothersources。Forpeoplewhoarefondofplayingthefluteareincapableofattendingtoargumentsiftheyoverhearsomeoneplayingtheflute，sincetheyenjoyflute-playingmorethantheactivityinhand；sothepleasureconnectedwithfluteplayingdestroystheactivityconcernedwithargument。Thishappens，similarly，inallothercases，whenoneisactiveabouttwothingsatonce；themorepleasantactivitydrivesouttheother，andifitismuchmorepleasantdoessoallthemore，sothatoneevenceasesfromtheother。Thisiswhywhenweenjoyanythingverymuchwedonotthrowourselvesintoanythingelse，anddoonethingonlywhenwearenotmuchpleasedbyanother；e。g。inthetheatrethepeoplewhoeatsweetsdosomostwhentheactorsarepoor。
　　Nowsinceactivitiesaremadepreciseandmoreenduringandbetterbytheirproperpleasure，andinjuredbyalienpleasures，evidentlythetwokindsofpleasurearefarapart。Foralienpleasuresdoprettymuchwhatproperpainsdo，sinceactivitiesaredestroyedbytheirproperpains；e。g。ifamanfindswritingordoingsumsunpleasantandpainful，hedoesnotwrite，ordoesnotdosums，becausetheactivityispainful。Soanactivitysufferscontraryeffectsfromitsproperpleasuresandpains，i。e。fromthosethatsuperveneonitinvirtueofitsownnature。Andalienpleasureshavebeenstatedtodomuchthesameaspain；theydestroytheactivity，onlynottothesamedegree。
　　Nowsinceactivitiesdifferinrespectofgoodnessandbadness，andsomeareworthytobechosen，otherstobeavoided，andothersneutral，so，too，arethepleasures；fortoeachactivitythereisaproperpleasure。Thepleasurepropertoaworthyactivityisgoodandthatpropertoanunworthyactivitybad；justastheappetitesfornobleobjectsarelaudable，thoseforbaseobjectsculpable。Butthepleasuresinvolvedinactivitiesaremorepropertothemthanthedesires；forthelatterareseparatedbothintimeandinnature，whiletheformerareclosetotheactivities，andsohardtodistinguishfromthemthatitadmitsofdisputewhethertheactivityisnotthesameasthepleasure。Still，pleasuredoesnotseemtobethoughtorperception-thatwouldbestrange；butbecausetheyarenotfoundaparttheyappeartosomepeoplethesame。Asactivitiesaredifferent，then，soarethecorrespondingpleasures。Nowsightissuperiortotouchinpurity，andhearingandsmelltotaste；thepleasures，therefore，aresimilarlysuperior，andthoseofthoughtsuperiortothese，andwithineachofthetwokindssomearesuperiortoothers。
　　Eachanimalisthoughttohaveaproperpleasure，asithasaproperfunction；viz。thatwhichcorrespondstoitsactivity。Ifwesurveythemspeciesbyspecies，too，thiswillbeevident；horse，dog，andmanhavedifferentpleasures，asHeraclitussays'asseswouldprefersweepingstogold'；forfoodispleasanterthangoldtoasses。Sothepleasuresofcreaturesdifferentinkinddifferinkind，anditisplausibletosupposethatthoseofasinglespeciesdonotdiffer。Buttheyvarytonosmallextent，inthecaseofmenatleast；thesamethingsdelightsomepeopleandpainothers，andarepainfulandodioustosome，andpleasanttoandlikedbyothers。Thishappens，too，inthecaseofsweetthings；thesamethingsdonotseemsweettoamaninafeverandahealthyman-norhottoaweakmanandoneingoodcondition。Thesamehappensinothercases。Butinallsuchmattersthatwhichappearstothegoodmanisthoughttobereallyso。Ifthisiscorrect，asitseemstobe，andvirtueandthegoodmanassucharethemeasureofeachthing，thosealsowillbepleasureswhichappearsotohim，andthosethingspleasantwhichheenjoys。Ifthethingshefindstiresomeseempleasanttosomeone，thatisnothingsurprising；formenmayberuinedandspoiltinmanyways；butthethingsarenotpleasant，butonlypleasanttothesepeopleandtopeopleinthiscondition。Thosewhichareadmittedlydisgracefulplainlyshouldnotbesaidtobepleasures，excepttoapervertedtaste；butofthosethatarethoughttobegoodwhatkindofpleasureorwhatpleasureshouldbesaidtobethatpropertoman？
　　Isitnotplainfromthecorrespondingactivities？Thepleasuresfollowthese。Whether，then，theperfectandsupremelyhappymanhasoneormoreactivities，thepleasuresthatperfectthesewillbesaidinthestrictsensetobepleasurespropertoman，andtherestwillbesoinasecondaryandfractionalway，asaretheactivities。
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　　Nowthatwehavespokenofthevirtues，theformsoffriendship，andthevarietiesofpleasure，whatremainsistodiscussinoutlinethenatureofhappiness，sincethisiswhatwestatetheendofhumannaturetobe。Ourdiscussionwillbethemoreconciseifwefirstsumupwhatwehavesaidalready。Wesaid，then，thatitisnotadisposition；forifitwereitmightbelongtosomeonewhowasasleepthroughouthislife，livingthelifeofaplant，or，again，tosomeonewhowassufferingthegreatestmisfortunes。Iftheseimplicationsareunacceptable，andwemustratherclasshappinessasanactivity，aswehavesaidbefore，andifsomeactivitiesarenecessary，anddesirableforthesakeofsomethingelse，whileothersaresointhemselves，evidentlyhappinessmustbeplacedamongthosedesirableinthemselves，notamongthosedesirableforthesakeofsomethingelse；forhappinessdoesnotlackanything，butisself-sufficient。Nowthoseactivitiesaredesirableinthemselvesfromwhichnothingissoughtbeyondtheactivity。Andofthisnaturevirtuousactionsarethoughttobe；fortodonobleandgooddeedsisathingdesirableforitsownsake。
　　Pleasantamusementsalsoarethoughttobeofthisnature；wechoosethemnotforthesakeofotherthings；forweareinjuredratherthanbenefitedbythem，sinceweareledtoneglectourbodiesandourproperty。Butmostofthepeoplewhoaredeemedhappytakerefugeinsuchpastimes，whichisthereasonwhythosewhoareready-wittedatthemarehighlyesteemedatthecourtsoftyrants；theymakethemselvespleasantcompanionsinthetyrants'favouritepursuits，andthatisthesortofmantheywant。Nowthesethingsarethoughttobeofthenatureofhappinessbecausepeopleindespoticpositionsspendtheirleisureinthem，butperhapssuchpeopleprovenothing；
　　forvirtueandreason，fromwhichgoodactivitiesflow，donotdependondespoticposition；nor，ifthesepeople，whohavenevertastedpureandgenerouspleasure，takerefugeinthebodilypleasures，shouldtheseforthatreasonbethoughtmoredesirable；forboys，too，thinkthethingsthatarevaluedamongthemselvesarethebest。Itistobeexpected，then，that，asdifferentthingsseemvaluabletoboysandtomen，sotheyshouldtobadmenandtogood。
　　Now，aswehaveoftenmaintained，thosethingsarebothvaluableandpleasantwhicharesuchtothegoodman；andtoeachmantheactivityinaccordancewithhisowndispositionismostdesirable，and，therefore，tothegoodmanthatwhichisinaccordancewithvirtue。Happiness，therefore，doesnotlieinamusement；itwould，indeed，bestrangeiftheendwereamusement，andoneweretotaketroubleandsufferhardshipallone'slifeinordertoamuseoneself。For，inaword，everythingthatwechoosewechooseforthesakeofsomethingelse-excepthappiness，whichisanend。Nowtoexertoneselfandworkforthesakeofamusementseemssillyandutterlychildish。Buttoamuseoneselfinorderthatonemayexertoneself，asAnacharsisputsit，seemsright；foramusementisasortofrelaxation，andweneedrelaxationbecausewecannotworkcontinuously。Relaxation，then，isnotanend；foritistakenforthesakeofactivity。
　　Thehappylifeisthoughttobevirtuous；nowavirtuousliferequiresexertion，anddoesnotconsistinamusement。Andwesaythatseriousthingsarebetterthanlaughablethingsandthoseconnectedwithamusement，andthattheactivityofthebetterofanytwothings-whetheritbetwoelementsofourbeingortwomen-isthemoreserious；buttheactivityofthebetterisipsofactosuperiorandmoreofthenatureofhappiness。Andanychanceperson-evenaslave-canenjoythebodilypleasuresnolessthanthebestman；butnooneassignstoaslaveashareinhappiness-unlessheassignstohimalsoashareinhumanlife。Forhappinessdoesnotlieinsuchoccupations，but，aswehavesaidbefore，invirtuousactivities。
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　　Ifhappinessisactivityinaccordancewithvirtue，itisreasonablethatitshouldbeinaccordancewiththehighestvirtue；andthiswillbethatofthebestthinginus。Whetheritbereasonorsomethingelsethatisthiselementwhichisthoughttobeournaturalrulerandguideandtotakethoughtofthingsnobleanddivine，whetheritbeitselfalsodivineoronlythemostdivineelementinus，theactivityofthisinaccordancewithitspropervirtuewillbeperfecthappiness。Thatthisactivityiscontemplativewehavealreadysaid。
　　Nowthiswouldseemtobeinagreementbothwithwhatwesaidbeforeandwiththetruth。For，firstly，thisactivityisthebestsincenotonlyisreasonthebestthinginus，buttheobjectsofreasonarethebestofknowableobjects；andsecondly，itisthemostcontinuous，sincewecancontemplatetruthmorecontinuouslythanwecandoanything。Andwethinkhappinesshaspleasuremingledwithit，buttheactivityofphilosophicwisdomisadmittedlythepleasantestofvirtuousactivities；atalleventsthepursuitofitisthoughttoofferpleasuresmarvellousfortheirpurityandtheirenduringness，anditistobeexpectedthatthosewhoknowwillpasstheirtimemorepleasantlythanthosewhoinquire。Andtheself-sufficiencythatisspokenofmustbelongmosttothecontemplativeactivity。Forwhileaphilosopher，aswellasajustmanoronepossessinganyothervirtue，needsthenecessariesoflife，whentheyaresufficientlyequippedwiththingsofthatsortthejustmanneedspeopletowardswhomandwithwhomheshallactjustly，andthetemperateman，thebraveman，andeachoftheothersisinthesamecase，butthephilosopher，evenwhenbyhimself，cancontemplatetruth，andthebetterthewiserheis；hecanperhapsdosobetterifhehasfellow-workers，butstillheisthemostself-sufficient。Andthisactivityalonewouldseemtobelovedforitsownsake；fornothingarisesfromitapartfromthecontemplating，whilefrompracticalactivitieswegainmoreorlessapartfromtheaction。Andhappinessisthoughttodependonleisure；forwearebusythatwemayhaveleisure，andmakewarthatwemayliveinpeace。Nowtheactivityofthepracticalvirtuesisexhibitedinpoliticalormilitaryaffairs，buttheactionsconcernedwiththeseseemtobeunleisurely。Warlikeactionsarecompletelysofornoonechoosestobeatwar，orprovokeswar，forthesakeofbeingatwar；anyonewouldseemabsolutelymurderousifheweretomakeenemiesofhisfriendsinordertobringaboutbattleandslaughter；buttheactionofthestatesmanisalsounleisurely，and-apartfromthepoliticalactionitself-aimsatdespoticpowerandhonours，oratalleventshappiness，forhimandhisfellowcitizens-ahappinessdifferentfrompoliticalaction，andevidentlysoughtasbeingdifferent。Soifamongvirtuousactionspoliticalandmilitaryactionsaredistinguishedbynobilityandgreatness，andtheseareunleisurelyandaimatanendandarenotdesirablefortheirownsake，buttheactivityofreason，whichiscontemplative，seemsbothtobesuperiorinseriousworthandtoaimatnoendbeyonditself，andtohaveitspleasurepropertoitselfandthisaugmentstheactivity，andtheself-sufficiency，leisureliness，unweariednesssofarasthisispossibleforman，andalltheotherattributesascribedtothesupremelyhappymanareevidentlythoseconnectedwiththisactivity，itfollowsthatthiswillbethecompletehappinessofman，ifitbeallowedacompletetermoflifefornoneoftheattributesofhappinessisincomplete。
　　Butsuchalifewouldbetoohighforman；foritisnotinsofarasheismanthathewillliveso，butinsofarassomethingdivineispresentinhim；andbysomuchasthisissuperiortoourcompositenatureisitsactivitysuperiortothatwhichistheexerciseoftheotherkindofvirtue。Ifreasonisdivine，then，incomparisonwithman，thelifeaccordingtoitisdivineincomparisonwithhumanlife。
　　Butwemustnotfollowthosewhoadviseus，beingmen，tothinkofhumanthings，and，beingmortal，ofmortalthings，butmust，sofaraswecan，makeourselvesimmortal，andstraineverynervetoliveinaccordancewiththebestthinginus；forevenifitbesmallinbulk，muchmoredoesitinpowerandworthsurpasseverything。Thiswouldseem，too，tobeeachmanhimself，sinceitistheauthoritativeandbetterpartofhim。Itwouldbestrange，then，ifheweretochoosenotthelifeofhisselfbutthatofsomethingelse。Andwhatwesaidbefore'willapplynow；thatwhichispropertoeachthingisbynaturebestandmostpleasantforeachthing；forman，therefore，thelifeaccordingtoreasonisbestandpleasantest，sincereasonmorethananythingelseisman。Thislifethereforeisalsothehappiest。
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　　Butinasecondarydegreethelifeinaccordancewiththeotherkindofvirtueishappy；fortheactivitiesinaccordancewiththisbefitourhumanestate。Justandbraveacts，andothervirtuousacts，wedoinrelationtoeachother，observingourrespectivedutieswithregardtocontractsandservicesandallmannerofactionsandwithregardtopassions；andalloftheseseemtobetypicallyhuman。
　　Someofthemseemeventoarisefromthebody，andvirtueofcharactertobeinmanywaysboundupwiththepassions。Practicalwisdom，too，islinkedtovirtueofcharacter，andthistopracticalwisdom，sincetheprinciplesofpracticalwisdomareinaccordancewiththemoralvirtuesandrightnessinmoralsisinaccordancewithpracticalwisdom。Beingconnectedwiththepassionsalso，themoralvirtuesmustbelongtoourcompositenature；andthevirtuesofourcompositenaturearehuman；so，therefore，arethelifeandthehappinesswhichcorrespondtothese。Theexcellenceofthereasonisathingapart；wemustbecontenttosaythismuchaboutit，fortodescribeitpreciselyisataskgreaterthanourpurposerequires。
　　Itwouldseem，however，alsotoneedexternalequipmentbutlittle，orlessthanmoralvirtuedoes。Grantthatbothneedthenecessaries，anddosoequally，evenifthestatesman'sworkisthemoreconcernedwiththebodyandthingsofthatsort；fortherewillbelittledifferencethere；butinwhattheyneedfortheexerciseoftheiractivitiestherewillbemuchdifference。Theliberalmanwillneedmoneyforthedoingofhisliberaldeeds，andthejustmantoowillneeditforthereturningofservicesforwishesarehardtodiscern，andevenpeoplewhoarenotjustpretendtowishtoactjustly；andthebravemanwillneedpowerifheistoaccomplishanyoftheactsthatcorrespondtohisvirtue，andthetemperatemanwillneedopportunity；forhowelseiseitherheoranyoftheotherstoberecognized？Itisdebated，too，whetherthewillorthedeedismoreessentialtovirtue，whichisassumedtoinvolveboth；itissurelyclearthatitsperfectioninvolvesboth；butfordeedsmanythingsareneeded，andmore，thegreaterandnoblerthedeedsare。Butthemanwhoiscontemplatingthetruthneedsnosuchthing，atleastwithaviewtotheexerciseofhisactivity；indeedtheyare，onemaysay，evenhindrances，atalleventstohiscontemplation；butinsofarasheisamanandliveswithanumberofpeople，hechoosestodovirtuousacts；hewillthereforeneedsuchaidstolivingahumanlife。
　　Butthatperfecthappinessisacontemplativeactivitywillappearfromthefollowingconsiderationaswell。Weassumethegodstobeaboveallotherbeingsblessedandhappy；butwhatsortofactionsmustweassigntothem？Actsofjustice？Willnotthegodsseemabsurdiftheymakecontractsandreturndeposits，andsoon？Actsofabraveman，then，confrontingdangersandrunningrisksbecauseitisnobletodoso？Orliberalacts？Towhomwilltheygive？Itwillbestrangeiftheyarereallytohavemoneyoranythingofthekind。
　　Andwhatwouldtheirtemperateactsbe？Isnotsuchpraisetasteless，sincetheyhavenobadappetites？Ifweweretorunthroughthemall，thecircumstancesofactionwouldbefoundtrivialandunworthyofgods。Still，everyonesupposesthattheyliveandthereforethattheyareactive；wecannotsupposethemtosleeplikeEndymion。Nowifyoutakeawayfromalivingbeingaction，andstillmoreproduction，whatisleftbutcontemplation？ThereforetheactivityofGod，whichsurpassesallothersinblessedness，mustbecontemplative；andofhumanactivities，therefore，thatwhichismostakintothismustbemostofthenatureofhappiness。
　　Thisisindicated，too，bythefactthattheotheranimalshavenoshareinhappiness，beingcompletelydeprivedofsuchactivity。Forwhilethewholelifeofthegodsisblessed，andthatofmentooinsofarassomelikenessofsuchactivitybelongstothem，noneoftheotheranimalsishappy，sincetheyinnowayshareincontemplation。
　　Happinessextends，then，justsofarascontemplationdoes，andthosetowhomcontemplationmorefullybelongsaremoretrulyhappy，notasamereconcomitantbutinvirtueofthecontemplation；forthisisinitselfprecious。Happiness，therefore，mustbesomeformofcontemplation。
　　But，beingaman，onewillalsoneedexternalprosperity；forournatureisnotself-sufficientforthepurposeofcontemplation，butourbodyalsomustbehealthyandmusthavefoodandotherattention。Still，wemustnotthinkthatthemanwhoistobehappywillneedmanythingsorgreatthings，merelybecausehecannotbesupremelyhappywithoutexternalgoods；forself-sufficiencyandactiondonotinvolveexcess，andwecandonobleactswithoutrulingearthandsea；forevenwithmoderateadvantagesonecanactvirtuouslythisismanifestenough；forprivatepersonsarethoughttodoworthyactsnolessthandespots-indeedevenmore；anditisenoughthatweshouldhavesomuchasthat；forthelifeofthemanwhoisactiveinaccordancewithvirtuewillbehappy。Solon，too，wasperhapssketchingwellthehappymanwhenhedescribedhimasmoderatelyfurnishedwithexternalsbutashavingdoneasSolonthoughtthenoblestacts，andlivedtemperately；foronecanwithbutmoderatepossessionsdowhatoneought。Anaxagorasalsoseemstohavesupposedthehappymannottoberichnoradespot，whenhesaidthathewouldnotbesurprisedifthehappymanweretoseemtomostpeopleastrangeperson；fortheyjudgebyexternals，sincethesearealltheyperceive。Theopinionsofthewiseseem，then，toharmonizewithourarguments。Butwhileevensuchthingscarrysomeconviction，thetruthinpracticalmattersisdiscernedfromthefactsoflife；forthesearethedecisivefactor。Wemustthereforesurveywhatwehavealreadysaid，bringingittothetestofthefactsoflife，andifitharmonizeswiththefactswemustacceptit，butifitclasheswiththemwemustsupposeittobemeretheory。Nowhewhoexerciseshisreasonandcultivatesitseemstobebothinthebeststateofmindandmostdeartothegods。Forifthegodshaveanycareforhumanaffairs，astheyarethoughttohave，itwouldbereasonableboththattheyshoulddelightinthatwhichwasbestandmostakintothemi。e。reasonandthattheyshouldrewardthosewholoveandhonourthismost，ascaringforthethingsthataredeartothemandactingbothrightlyandnobly。Andthatalltheseattributesbelongmostofalltothephilosopherismanifest。He，therefore，isthedearesttothegods。Andhewhoisthatwillpresumablybealsothehappiest；sothatinthiswaytoothephilosopherwillmorethananyotherbehappy。
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　　Ifthesemattersandthevirtues，andalsofriendshipandpleasure，havebeendealtwithsufficientlyinoutline，arewetosupposethatourprogrammehasreacheditsend？Surely，asthesayinggoes，wheretherearethingstobedonetheendisnottosurveyandrecognizethevariousthings，butrathertodothem；withregardtovirtue，then，itisnotenoughtoknow，butwemusttrytohaveanduseit，ortryanyotherwaytheremaybeofbecominggood。
　　Nowifargumentswereinthemselvesenoughtomakemengood，theywouldjustly，asTheognissays，havewonverygreatrewards，andsuchrewardsshouldhavebeenprovided；butasthingsare，whiletheyseemtohavepowertoencourageandstimulatethegenerous-mindedamongouryouth，andtomakeacharacterwhichisgentlyborn，andatrueloverofwhatisnoble，readytobepossessedbyvirtue，theyarenotabletoencouragethemanytonobilityandgoodness。Forthesedonotbynatureobeythesenseofshame，butonlyfear，anddonotabstainfrombadactsbecauseoftheirbasenessbutthroughfearofpunishment；livingbypassiontheypursuetheirownpleasuresandthemeanstothem，andandtheoppositepains，andhavenotevenaconceptionofwhatisnobleandtrulypleasant，sincetheyhavenevertastedit。Whatargumentwouldremouldsuchpeople？Itishard，ifnotimpossible，toremovebyargumentthetraitsthathavelongsincebeenincorporatedinthecharacter；andperhapswemustbecontentif，whenalltheinfluencesbywhichwearethoughttobecomegoodarepresent，wegetsometinctureofvirtue。
　　Nowsomethinkthatwearemadegoodbynature，othersbyhabituation，othersbyteaching。Nature'spartevidentlydoesnotdependonus，butasaresultofsomedivinecausesispresentinthosewhoaretrulyfortunate；whileargumentandteaching，wemaysuspect，arenotpowerfulwithallmen，butthesoulofthestudentmustfirsthavebeencultivatedbymeansofhabitsfornoblejoyandnoblehatred，likeearthwhichistonourishtheseed。Forhewholivesaspassiondirectswillnothearargumentthatdissuadeshim，norunderstanditifhedoes；andhowcanwepersuadeoneinsuchastatetochangehisways？Andingeneralpassionseemstoyieldnottoargumentbuttoforce。Thecharacter，then，mustsomehowbetherealreadywithakinshiptovirtue，lovingwhatisnobleandhatingwhatisbase。
　　Butitisdifficulttogetfromyouthuparighttrainingforvirtueifonehasnotbeenbroughtupunderrightlaws；fortolivetemperatelyandhardilyisnotpleasanttomostpeople，especiallywhentheyareyoung。Forthisreasontheirnurtureandoccupationsshouldbefixedbylaw；fortheywillnotbepainfulwhentheyhavebecomecustomary。Butitissurelynotenoughthatwhentheyareyoungtheyshouldgettherightnurtureandattention；sincetheymust，evenwhentheyaregrownup，practiseandbehabituatedtothem，weshallneedlawsforthisaswell，andgenerallyspeakingtocoverthewholeoflife；formostpeopleobeynecessityratherthanargument，andpunishmentsratherthanthesenseofwhatisnoble。
　　Thisiswhysomethinkthatlegislatorsoughttostimulatementovirtueandurgethemforwardbythemotiveofthenoble，ontheassumptionthatthosewhohavebeenwelladvancedbytheformationofhabitswillattendtosuchinfluences；andthatpunishmentsandpenaltiesshouldbeimposedonthosewhodisobeyandareofinferiornature，whiletheincurablybadshouldbecompletelybanished。A
　　goodmantheythink，sinceheliveswithhismindfixedonwhatisnoble，willsubmittoargument，whileabadman，whosedesireisforpleasure，iscorrectedbypainlikeabeastofburden。Thisis，too，whytheysaythepainsinflictedshouldbethosethataremostopposedtothepleasuressuchmenlove。
　　Howeverthatmaybe，ifaswehavesaidthemanwhoistobegoodmustbewelltrainedandhabituated，andgoontospendhistimeinworthyoccupationsandneitherwillinglynorunwillinglydobadactions，andifthiscanbebroughtaboutifmenliveinaccordancewithasortofreasonandrightorder，providedthishasforce，-ifthisbeso，thepaternalcommandindeedhasnottherequiredforceorcompulsivepowernoringeneralhasthecommandofoneman，unlesshebeakingorsomethingsimilar，butthelawhascompulsivepower，whileitisatthesametimearuleproceedingfromasortofpracticalwisdomandreason。Andwhilepeoplehatemenwhoopposetheirimpulses，eveniftheyopposethemrightly，thelawinitsordainingofwhatisgoodisnotburdensome。
　　IntheSpartanstatealone，oralmostalone，thelegislatorseemstohavepaidattentiontoquestionsofnurtureandoccupations；inmoststatessuchmattershavebeenneglected，andeachmanlivesashepleases，Cyclops-fashion，'tohisownwifeandchildrendealinglaw'。Nowitisbestthatthereshouldbeapublicandpropercareforsuchmatters；butiftheyareneglectedbythecommunityitwouldseemrightforeachmantohelphischildrenandfriendstowardsvirtue，andthattheyshouldhavethepower，oratleastthewill，todothis。
　　Itwouldseemfromwhathasbeensaidthathecandothisbetterifhemakeshimselfcapableoflegislating。Forpubliccontrolisplainlyeffectedbylaws，andgoodcontrolbygoodlaws；whetherwrittenorunwrittenwouldseemtomakenodifference，norwhethertheyarelawsprovidingfortheeducationofindividualsorofgroups-anymorethanitdoesinthecaseofmusicorgymnasticsandothersuchpursuits。Forasincitieslawsandprevailingtypesofcharacterhaveforce，soinhouseholdsdotheinjunctionsandthehabitsofthefather，andthesehaveevenmorebecauseofthetieofbloodandthebenefitsheconfers；forthechildrenstartwithanaturalaffectionanddispositiontoobey。Further，privateeducationhasanadvantageoverpublic，asprivatemedicaltreatmenthas；forwhileingeneralrestandabstinencefromfoodaregoodforamaninafever，foraparticularmantheymaynotbe；andaboxerpresumablydoesnotprescribethesamestyleoffightingtoallhispupils。Itwouldseem，then，thatthedetailisworkedoutwithmoreprecisionifthecontrolisprivate；foreachpersonismorelikelytogetwhatsuitshiscase。
　　Butthedetailscanbebestlookedafter，onebyone，byadoctororgymnasticinstructororanyoneelsewhohasthegeneralknowledgeofwhatisgoodforeveryoneorforpeopleofacertainkindforthesciencesbotharesaidtobe，andare，concernedwithwhatisuniversal；notbutwhatsomeparticulardetailmayperhapsbewelllookedafterbyanunscientificperson，ifhehasstudiedaccuratelyinthelightofexperiencewhathappensineachcase，justassomepeopleseemtobetheirownbestdoctors，thoughtheycouldgivenohelptoanyoneelse。Nonetheless，itwillperhapsbeagreedthatifamandoeswishtobecomemasterofanartorsciencehemustgototheuniversal，andcometoknowitaswellaspossible；for，aswehavesaid，itiswiththisthatthesciencesareconcerned。
　　Andsurelyhewhowantstomakemen，whethermanyorfew，betterbyhiscaremusttrytobecomecapableoflegislating，ifitisthroughlawsthatwecanbecomegood。Fortogetanyonewhatever-anyonewhoisputbeforeus-intotherightconditionisnotforthefirstchancecomer；ifanyonecandoit，itisthemanwhoknows，justasinmedicineandallothermatterswhichgivescopeforcareandprudence。
　　Mustwenot，then，nextexaminewhenceorhowonecanlearnhowtolegislate？Isit，asinallothercases，fromstatesmen？Certainlyitwasthoughttobeapartofstatesmanship。Orisadifferenceapparentbetweenstatesmanshipandtheothersciencesandarts？Intheothersthesamepeoplearefoundofferingtoteachtheartsandpractisingthem，e。g。doctorsorpainters；butwhilethesophistsprofesstoteachpolitics，itispractisednotbyanyofthembutbythepoliticians，whowouldseemtodosobydintofacertainskillandexperienceratherthanofthought；fortheyarenotfoundeitherwritingorspeakingaboutsuchmattersthoughitwereanobleroccupationperhapsthancomposingspeechesforthelaw-courtsandtheassembly，noragainaretheyfoundtohavemadestatesmenoftheirownsonsoranyotheroftheirfriends。Butitwastobeexpectedthattheyshouldiftheycould；forthereisnothingbetterthansuchaskillthattheycouldhavelefttotheircities，orcouldprefertohaveforthemselves，or，therefore，forthosedearesttothem。Still，experienceseemstocontributenotalittle；
　　elsetheycouldnothavebecomepoliticiansbyfamiliaritywithpolitics；andsoitseemsthatthosewhoaimatknowingabouttheartofpoliticsneedexperienceaswell。
　　Butthoseofthesophistswhoprofesstheartseemtobeveryfarfromteachingit。For，toputthemattergenerally，theydonotevenknowwhatkindofthingitisnorwhatkindsofthingsitisabout；
　　otherwisetheywouldnothaveclasseditasidenticalwithrhetoricoreveninferiortoit，norhavethoughtiteasytolegislatebycollectingthelawsthatarethoughtwellof；theysayitispossibletoselectthebestlaws，asthougheventheselectiondidnotdemandintelligenceandasthoughrightjudgementwerenotthegreatestthing，asinmattersofmusic。Forwhilepeopleexperiencedinanydepartmentjudgerightlytheworksproducedinit，andunderstandbywhatmeansorhowtheyareachieved，andwhatharmonizeswithwhat，theinexperiencedmustbecontentiftheydonotfailtoseewhethertheworkhasbeenwellorillmade-asinthecaseofpainting。Nowlawsareasitwerethe'works'ofthepoliticalart；
　　howthencanonelearnfromthemtobealegislator，orjudgewhicharebest？Evenmedicalmendonotseemtobemadebyastudyoftext-books。Yetpeopletry，atanyrate，tostatenotonlythetreatments，butalsohowparticularclassesofpeoplecanbecuredandshouldbetreated-distinguishingthevarioushabitsofbody；butwhilethisseemsusefultoexperiencedpeople，totheinexperienceditisvalueless。Surely，then，whilecollectionsoflaws，andofconstitutionsalso，maybeserviceabletothosewhocanstudythemandjudgewhatisgoodorbadandwhatenactmentssuitwhatcircumstances，thosewhogothroughsuchcollectionswithoutapractisedfacultywillnothaverightjudgementunlessitbeasaspontaneousgiftofnature，thoughtheymayperhapsbecomemoreintelligentinsuchmatters。
　　Nowourpredecessorshaveleftthesubjectoflegislationtousunexamined；itisperhapsbest，therefore，thatweshouldourselvesstudyit，andingeneralstudythequestionoftheconstitution，inordertocompletetothebestofourabilityourphilosophyofhumannature。First，then，ifanythinghasbeensaidwellindetailbyearlierthinkers，letustrytoreviewit；theninthelightoftheconstitutionswehavecollectedletusstudywhatsortsofinfluencepreserveanddestroystates，andwhatsortspreserveordestroytheparticularkindsofconstitution，andtowhatcausesitisduethatsomearewellandothersilladministered。Whenthesehavebeenstudiedweshallperhapsbemorelikelytoseewithacomprehensiveview，whichconstitutionisbest，andhoweachmustbeordered，andwhatlawsandcustomsitmustuse，ifitistobeatitsbest。Letusmakeabeginningofourdiscussion。
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