Astotheauthorityofourmoralfaculties，ofourperception，howsoeverderived，ofdifferentqualitiesinconduct，itis，inAdamSmith'ssystem，anultimatefact，asindisputableastheauthorityofotherfacultiesovertheirrespectiveobjects；forexample，astheauthorityoftheeyeaboutbeautyofcolour，orasthatoftheearaboutharmonyofsounds。"Ourmoralfaculties，ournaturalsenseofmeritandpropriety，"approveordisapproveofactionsinstantaneously，andthisapprovalorjudgmentistheirpeculiarfunction。Theyjudgeoftheotherfacultiesandprinciplesofournature；
　　howfar，forexample，loveorresentmentoughteithertobeindulgedorrestrained，andwhenthevarioussensesoughttobegratified。Hencetheycannotbesaidtobeonalevelwithourothernaturalfacultiesandappetites，andendowedwithnomorerighttorestrainthelatterthanthelatteraretorestrainthem。Therecanbenomoreappealfromthemabouttheirobjectsthanthereisfromtheeye，ortheear，orthetastewithregardtotheobjectsoftheirseveraljurisdictions。Accordingasanythingisagreeableornottothem，isitfit，right，andproper，orunfit，wrong，andimproper。
　　"Thesentimentswhichtheyapproveofaregracefulandbecoming；thecontrary，ungracefulandunbecoming。Theverywords，right，wrong，fit，proper，graceful，orbecoming，meanonlywhatpleasesordispleasesthosefaculties。"
　　Hencethequestionoftheauthorityofourmoralfacultiesisasfutileasthequestionoftheauthorityofthespecialsensesovertheirseveralobjects。For"theycarryalongwiththemthemostevidentbadgesofthisauthority，whichdenotethattheyweresetupwithinustobethesupremearbiterofallouractions，tosuperintendalloursenses，passions，andappetites，andtojudgehowfareitherofthemwaseithertobeindulgedorrestrained。"Thatistosay，itisimpossibleforourmoralfacultiestoapproveofonecourseofconductandtodisapproveofanother，andatthesametimetofeelthatthereisnoauthorityinthesentimentwhichpassesjudgmenteitherway。
　　PerhapsthepartofAdamSmith'stheorywhichhasgivenleastsatisfactionishisaccountoftheethicalstandard，ormeasureofmoralactions。This，itwillberemembered，isnoneotherthanthesympatheticemotionoftheimpartialspectatorwhichseemsagaintoresolveitselfintothevoiceofpublicopinion。Itwillbeofinteresttofollowsomeofthecriticismthathasbeendevotedtothispoint，mostofwhichturnsonthemeaningofthewordimpartial。
　　Ifimpartialitymeans，arguesJouffroy，asaloneitcanmeanimpartialityofjudgment，theimpartialityofaspectatormustbetheimpartialityofhisreason，whichrisessuperiortothesuggestionsofhisinstinctsorpassions；butifso，amoraljudgmentnolongerarisesfromamereinstinctofsympathy，butfromanoperationofreason。Ifinstinctisadoptedasourruleofmoralconduct，theremustbesomehigherrulebywhichwemakechoiceofsomeimpulsesagainsttheinfluenceofothers；andtheimpartialityrequisiteinsympathyisitselfarecognitionoftheinsufficiencyofinstinctivefeelingstosupplymoralrules。
　　Itmaybesaid，inreplytothis，thatbyimpartialityAdamSmithmeantneitheranimpartialityofreasonnorofinstinct，butsimplytheindifferenceorcoolnessofamindthatfeelsnotthefullstrengthoftheoriginalpassion，whichitshares，andwhichitsharesinadueandjustdegreepreciselybecauseitfeelsitnotdirectlybutbyreflection。IftheresentmentofA。canonlyfairlybeestimatedbythepowerofB。tosympathizewithit，thelatterisonlyimpartialinsofarashisfeelingofresentmentisreflectedandnotoriginal。HisfeelingofapprobationordisapprobationofA'sresentmentneedbenonethelessafeeling，nonethelessinstinctiveandemotional，becauseheisexemptfromthevividnessofthepassionasitaffectshisfriend。Itissimplythatexemption，AdamSmithwouldsay，whichenableshimtojudge；andwhetherhisjudgmentisforthatreasontobeconsideredfinalandrightornot，itis，asamatteroffact，theonlywayinwhichamoraljudgmentispossibleatall。
　　ThenextobjectionofJouffroy，thatthesympathyofanimpartialspectatoraffordsonlyvariablerulesofmorality，AdamSmithwouldhavemetbytheanswer，thattherulesofmoralityaretoacertainextentvariable，anddependentoncustom。Jouffroysupposeshimselfplacedasanentirestrangerinthepresenceofaquantityofpersonsofdifferentages，sexes，andprofessions，andthenasks，howshouldhejudgeoftheproprietyofanyemotiononhispartbyreferencetotheverydifferentsympathieswhichsuchanemotionwouldarouse。Livelysensibilitieswouldpartakeofhisemotionsvividly，coldonesbutfeebly。Thesympathiesofthemenwouldbedifferentfromthoseofthewomen，thoseoftheyoungfromthoseoftheold，thoseofthemerchantfromthoseofthesoldier，andsoforth。
　　Tothisitmightfairlybereplied，thatasamatteroffactthereareveryfewemotionswithwhichdifferentpeopledonotsympathizeinverydifferentdegrees，andofwhichaccordinglytheydonotentertainverydifferentfeelingsofmoralapprobationorthereverse。Eachman'ssympathyisinfacthisonlymeasureoftheproprietyofothermen'ssentiments，andforthatreasonitisthatthereisscarcelyanysinglemoralactionofwhichanytwomenadoptthesamemoralsentiment。Thatmoralityisrelativeandnotabsolute，AdamSmithnowheredenies。Nevertheless，hewouldsay，thereissufficientuniformityinthelawsofsympathy，directedandcontrolledastheyarebycustom，tomaketheruleofgeneralsympathyoroftheabstractspectatorasufficientlypermanentstandardofconduct。
　　Itismoreoverafact，whichnoonehasexplainedbetterthanAdamSmith，inhisaccountofthegrowthineveryindividualofthevirtueofself-command，thatthoughourmoralestimateofourownconductbeginsbyreferencetothesympathyofparticularindividuals，ourparents，schoolfellows，orothers，weyetendbyjudgingourselves，notbyreferencetoanyoneinparticularsomuchasfromanabstractideaofgeneralapprobationorthecontrary，derivedfromourexperienceofparticularjudgmentsinthecourseofourlife。Thisisallthatismeantby"theabstractspectator，"referencetowhomissimplythesameasreferencetothesupposedverdictofpublicopinion。Ifwehavedoneanythingwrong，toldalie，forexample，theself-condemnationwepassonourselvesisthecondemnationofpublicopinion，withwhichweidentifyourselvesbylongforceofhabit；andhadweneverheardaliecondemned，norknownitpunished，weshouldfeelnoself-condemnationwhateverintellingone。Wecondemnit，notbyreference，asJouffroyputsit，tothefeelingsofJohnorPeter，butbyreferencetothefeelingsofthegeneralworld，whichweknowtobemadeupofpeoplelikeJohnandPeter。Thereisnothinginconsistentthereforeinthenotionofanabstractspectator，"whohasneithertheprejudicesoftheonenortheweaknessesoftheother，andwhoseescorrectlyandsoundlypreciselybecauseheisabstract。"Theidentificationofthisabstractspectatorwithconscience，issofarfrombeing，asJouffroysaysitis，adeparturefrom，andanabandonmentoftheruleofsympathy，thatitisitslogicalandmostsatisfactorydevelopment。Thereisnoreasontorepeattheprocessbywhichtheperceptionofparticularapprovingsympathiespassesintoidentificationwiththehighestrulesofmoralityandthemostsacreddictatesofreligion。Byreferencetohisownexperience，everyreadermayeasilytestforhimselfthetruthorfalsityofAdamSmith'sargumentuponthissubject。
　　Itissaidwithtruth，thattomakethejudgmentofanimpartialorabstractspectatorthestandardofmoralityistomakenosecurityagainstfallibilityofjudgment；andthatsuchajudgmentisonlyefficaciouswherethereistolerableunanimity，butthatitfailsinthefaceofpossibledifferencesofopinion。Butthisobjectionisequallytrueofanyethicalstandardeveryetpropoundedintheworld，whetherself-interest，thegreatestpossiblehappiness，thewillofthesovereign，thefitnessofthings，oranyotherprincipleissuggestedastheultimatetestofrectitudeofconduct。Thispartofthetheorymayclaim，therefore，notonlytobeasgoodasanyothertheory，buttobeinstrictkeepingwiththevastamountofvariablemoralsentimentwhichactuallyexistsintheworld。
　　InfurtherdisproofofAdamSmith'stheory，Jouffroyappealstoconsciousness。
　　Wearenotconscious，hesays，injudgingoftheactsofothers，thatwemeasurethembyreferencetoourabilitytosympathizewiththem。Sofararewefromdoingthis，thatweconsideritourfirstdutytostifleouremotionsofsympathyorantipathy，inordertoarriveatanimpartialjudgment。
　　Asregardsourownemotions，also，thereisnosuchrecoursetothesympathiesofothers；andevenwhenthereis，weoftenpreferourownjudgmentafteralltothatwhichweknowtobethejudgmentofothers。Consciousnessthereforeatteststhefalsityofthetheorythatweseekinourownsensibilitythejudgmentswepassuponothers，orthatweseekintheopinionsofotherstheprincipleofestimationforourownsentimentsandconduct。
　　Thetruthofthefactstatedinthisobjectionmayevidentlybeconceded，andyetthevalidityofthemaintheorybeleftuntouched。Thelatterisatheorymainlyoftheoriginofmoralfeelings，andoftheirgrowth；andemotionsofsympathywhichoriginallygiverisetomoralfeelingsmaywelldisappearandbeabsentwhenlonghabithasoncefixedtheminthemind。
　　Itisquiteconceivable，forinstance，thatifweoriginallyderivedourmoralnotionsofourownconductfromconstantobservationoftheconductofothers，wemightyetcometojudgeourselvesbyastandardapparentlyunconnectedwithanyreferencetootherpeople，andyetreallymadeupofanumberofforgottenjudgmentspassedbyusuponthem。Childrenarealwaystaughttojudgethem-selvesbyappealstothesentimentsoftheirparentsorotherrelationsabouttheirconduct；andthoughthestandardofmorality，thusexternalatfirst，mayintimecometobeinternal，andeventobemorepotentthanwhenitwasexternal，itnonethemorefollowsthatrecoursetosuchsympathynevertookplacebecauseitceasestotakeplaceortobenoticedwhenthemoralsentimentsarefullyformed。Inlearningtoreadandwrite，anexactlyanalogousprocessmaybetraced。Theletterswhichsopainfullyaffectedourconsciousnessatfirst，whenwehadtomakeconstantreferencetothealphabet，ceaseatlasttoaffectitatall；yettheprocessofspellingreallygoesoninthemindineverywordwereadorwrite，howeverunconsciouswemaybeofitsoperation。Habitandexperience，saysAdamSmith，teachussoeasilyandsoreadilytoviewourowninterestsandthoseofothersfromthestandpointofathirdperson，that"wearescarcesensible"ofsuchaprocessatall。
　　Thenagain，thequestionhasbeenraised，Isittruethatsympathywithanagentorwiththeobjectofhisactionisanecessaryantecedenttoallmoralapprobationorthecontrary？
　　Itisobjected，forinstance，byBrown，thatsympathyisnotaperpetualaccompanimentofourobservationofalltheactionsthattakeplaceinlife，andthatmanycasesoccurinwhichwefeelapprovalordisapproval，inwhichconsequentlymoralestimatesaremade，andyetwithoutanyprecedingsympathyorantipathy。"Inthenumberofpettyaffairswhicharehourlybeforeoureyes，whatsympathyisfelt，"heasks，"eitherwiththosewhoareactivelyorwiththosewhoarepassivelyconcerned，whentheagenthimselfperformshislittleofficeswithemotionsasslightasthosewhichtheobjectsofhisactionsreciprocallyfeel？Yetinthesecasesweareascapableofjudging，andapproveordisapprovenotwiththesamelivelinessofemotionindeed，butwithasaccurateestimationofmeritordemeritaswhenweconsiderthemostheroicsacrificeswhichthevirtuouscanmake，orthemostatrociouscrimesofwhichthesordidandthecruelcanbeguilty。"
　　Theremustbethesamesympathyinthecaseofthehumblestactionwedenominaterightasinthatofthemostgloriousaction；yetsuchactionsoftenexcitenosympathywhatever。Unlessthereforethecommontransactionsoflifearetobeexcludedaltogetherfrommorality，fromthefieldofrightandwrong，itisimpossibletoascribesuchmoralqualitiestothem，ifsympathyisthesourceofourapprovalofthem。
　　Tothisobjection，foundedonthenon-universalityofsympathy，andonitsnotbeingcoextensivewithfeelingsofmoralapprobation，AdamSmithmighthavereplied，thattherewasnoaction，howsoeverhumble，denominatedright，inwhichtherewasnotorhadnotbeentostartwithareferencetosentimentsofsympathy。Itisimpossibletoconceiveanycaseinthemosttrivialdepartmentoflifeinwhichapprobationonthegroundofgoodnessmaynotbeexplainedbyreferencetosuchfeelings。Brownhimselflaysindeedlessstressonthisargumentthanonanotherwhichhas，itmustbeconfessed，muchgreaterforce。
　　Thatis，thatthetheoryofsympathyassumesasalreadyexistingthosemoralfeelingswhichitprofessestoexplain。If，hesays，nomoralsentimentsprecededafeelingofsym-pathy，thelattercouldnomoreproducethemthanamirror，withoutpre-existenceandpre-suppositionoflight，couldreflectthebeautifulcoloursofalandscape。
　　Ifwehadnoprincipleofmoralapprobationprevioustosympathy，themostperfectsympathyoraccordanceofpassionswouldprovenothingmorethanamereagreementoffeeling；norshouldwebeawareofanythingmorethaninanycaseofcoincidenceoffeelingwithregardtomereobjectsoftaste，suchasapictureoranairofmusic。Itisnotbecausewesympathizewiththesentimentsofanagentthatweaccountthemmoral，butitisbecausehismoralsentimentsagreewithourownthatwesympathizewiththem。Themoralityistherebeforethesympathy。Ifweregardsentimentswhichdifferfromourown，notmerelyasunlikeourown，butasmorallyimproperandwrong，wemustfirsthaveconceivedourowntobemorallyproperandright，bywhichwemeasurethoseofothers。Withoutthispreviousbeliefinthemoralproprietyofourownsentiments，wecouldneverjudgeoftheproprietyorimproprietyofothers，norregardthemasmorallyunsuitabletothecircumstancesoutofwhichtheyarose。Hencethesympathyfromwhichwearesaidtoderiveournotionsofproprietyorthecontraryassumesindependentlyofsympathytheveryfeelingsitissaidtooccasion。
　　AsimilarcriticismBrownalsoappliestothatsympathywiththegratitudeofpersonswhohavereceivedbenefitsorinjurieswhichissaidtobethesourceoffeelingsofmeritanddemerit。Ifitistruethatoursenseofthemeritofanagentisduetooursympathywiththegratitudeofthosehehasbenefitedifthesympathyonlytransfusesintoourownbreaststhegratitudeorresentmentofpersonssoaffected，itisevidentthatourreflectedgratitudeorresentmentcanonlygiverisetothesamesenseofmeritordemeritthathasbeenalreadyinvolvedintheprimaryanddirectgratitudeorresentment。"Ifourreflexgratitudeandresentmentinvolvenotionsofmeritanddemerit，theoriginalgratitudeandresentmentwhichwefeelbyreflexionmustinlikemannerhaveinvolvedthem……Butiftheactualgratitudeorresentmentofthosewhohaveprofitedorsufferedimplynofeelingsofmeritordemerit，wemaybecertain，atleast，thatinwhateversourcewearetostrivetodiscoverthosefeelings，itisnotinthemerereflexionofafaintergratitudeorresentmentthatwecanhopetofindthem……Thefeelingswithwhichwesympathizearethemselvesmoralfeelingsorsentiments；oriftheyarenotmoralfeelings，thereflexionofthemfromathousandbreastscannotaltertheirnature。"
　　Unlessthereforewealreadypossessedmoralfeelingsofourown，themostexactsympathyoffeelingscoulddonomorethantellusofthesimilarityofourownfeelingstothoseofsomeotherperson，whichtheymightequallydowhethertheywereviciousorvirtuous；andinthesameway，themostcompletedissonanceoffeelingcouldsupplyuswithnomorethanaconsciousnessofthedissimilarityofouremotions。Asacoincidenceoftastewithregardtoaworkofartpre-supposesinanytwomindssimilarlyaffectedbyitanindependentsusceptibilityofemotions，distinguishingwhatisbeautifulfromwhatisugly，irrespectivelyofothersbeingpresenttosharethem；
　　soacoincidenceoffeelingwithregardtoanymoralactionpre-supposesanindependentcapacityinthetwomindssimilarlyaffectedbythemofdistinguishingwhatisrightfromwhatiswrong，acapacitywhicheachwouldhavesingly，irrespectivelyofallreferencetothefeelingsoftheother。Thereissomethingmorethatwerecognizeinourmoralsentimentsthanthemerecoincidenceoffeelingrecognizedinanagreementoftasteoropinion。Wefeelthatapersonhasactednotmerelyasweshouldhavedone，andthathismotiveshavebeensimilartothoseweshouldhavefelt，butthatliehasactedrightlyandproperly。
　　ItisperhapsbesttostateBrown'scriticisminhisownwords:"Allwhichispeculiartothesympathyis，thatinsteadofonemindonlyaffectedwithcertainfeelings，therearetwomindsaffectedwithcertainfeelings，andarecognitionofthesimilarityofthesefeelings；asimilaritywhichfarfrombeingconfinedtoourmoralemotions，mayoccurasreadilyandasfrequentlyineveryotherfeelingofwhichthemindissusceptible。
　　Whatproducesthemoralnotionsthere-foremustevidentlybesomethingmorethanarecognitionofsimilarityoffeelingwhichisthuscommontofeelingsofeveryclass。Theremustbeanindependentcapacityofmoralemotion，inconsequenceofwhichwejudgethosesentimentsofconducttoberightwhichcoincidewithsentimentsofconductpreviouslyrecognizedasrightorthesentimentsofotherstobeimproper，becausetheyarenotinunisonwiththosewhichwepreviouslyrecognizedasproper。Sympathythenmaybethediffuserofmoralsentiments，asofvariousotherfeelings；
　　butifnomoralsentimentsexistpreviouslytooursympathy，oursympathyitselfcannotgiverisetothem。
　　ThesameinconsistencyBrowndetectsinAdamSmith'stheoryofmoralsentimentsrelatingtoourownconduct，accordingtowhichitwouldbeimpossibleforustodistinguishwithoutreferencetothefeelingsofarealorimaginaryspectatoranydifferenceofproprietyorimpropriety，meritordemerit，inourownactionsorcharacter。Ifanimpartialspectatorcanthusdiscovermeritordemeritinusbymakingourcasehisownandassumingourfeelings，thosefeelingswhichhethusmakeshisownmustsurelyspeaktoustothesamepurpose，andwithevengreatereffectthantheyspeaktohim。Innocasethencansympathygiveanyadditionalknowledge:
　　itcanonlygiveawiderdiffusiontofeelingswhichalreadyexist。
　　Itistherefore，accordingtoBrown，aserroneousinethicstoascribemoralfeelingstosympathy，orthementalreflectionbywhichfeelingsarediffused，asitwouldbe，inatheoryofthesourceoflight，toascribelightitselftothereflectionwhichinvolvesitsexistence。"Amirrorpresentstousafaintercopyofexternalthings；butitisacopywhichitpresents。Weareinlikemannertoeachothermirrorsthatreflectfrombreasttobreast，joy，sorrow，indignation，andallthevividemotionsofwhichtheindividualmindissusceptible；butthough，asmirrors，wemutuallygiveandreceiveemotions，theseemotionsmusthavebeenfeltbeforetheycouldbecommunicated。"
　　TheobjectioncontainedinthisanalogyofthemirrorisperhapsmorefataltothetruthofAdamSmith'stheorythananyother。Ifapassionarisesineveryoneanalogousto，thoughweakerthan，theoriginalpassionofthepersonprimarilyaffectedbyit；if，forinstance，bythisforceoffellow-feelingweenterintoorapproveofanotherperson'sresentmentorgratitude；itseemsclearthattheoriginalgratitudeorresentmentmustitselfinvolve，irrespectiveofallsympathy，thosefeelingsofmoralapprobation，orthecontrary，whichitisassertedcanonlyarisebysympathy。
　　ItisimpossibletostatethisobjectionmoreclearlythaninthewordsalreadyquotedfromBrown。Butwhenthelatterinsistsontheirregularnatureofsympathyasthebasisofmoralityonitstendencytovaryeveninthesameindividualmanytimesintheday，sothatwhatwasvirtuousinthemorningmightseemviciousatnoon，itisimpossibletorecognizethejusticeofthecriticism。AdamSmithmightfairlyhavereplied，thattheeducationalforcesoflife，whicharecomprisedinordinarycircumstancesandsurroundings，andwhichconditionallsympathy，weresufficientlyuniformincharactertoensuretolerableuniformityintheresult，andtogivetoournotionsofmoralityallthatappearanceofcertaintyandsamenesswhichundoubtedlybelongstothem。
　　AdamSmithseemshimselftohaveanticipatedoneofthedifficultiesraisedinBrown'scriticism，namely，therelationofmoralapprobationtotheapprobationofanotherperson'stasteoropinions。Whyshouldthefeelingofapprobationbeofadifferentkindwhenwesympathizewithaperson'ssentimentsoractionsthanwhenwesympathizewithhisintellectualjudgments？Thefeelingofsympathybeingthesameineithercase，whyshouldthefeelingofresultantapprobationbedifferent？
　　NoonecouldstatemoreclearlythandoesAdamSmiththeanalogythereisbetweencoincidenceofmoralsentimentandcoincidenceofintellectualopinion；norisanythingmoredefiniteinhistheorythanthatapprovalofthemoralsentimentsofothers，likeapprovaloftheiropinions，meansnothingmorethantheiragreementwithourown。Thefollowingarehiswords:
　　"Toapproveofanotherman'sopinionsistoadoptthoseopinions，andtoadoptthemistoapproveofthem。Ifthesameargumentswhichconvinceyouconvincemelikewise，Inecessarilyapproveofyourconviction；andiftheydonot，Inecessarilydisapproveofit；neithercanIpossiblyconceivethatIshoulddotheonewithouttheother。Toapproveordisapprove，therefore，oftheopinionsisacknowledgedbyeverybodytomeannomorethantoobservetheiragreementordisagreementwithourown。Butthisisequallythecasewithregardtoourapprobationordisapprobationofthesentimentsorpassionsofothers。"
　　Whence，then，comesthestrongerfeelingofapprobationinthecaseofagreementofsentimentsthaninthatofagreementofopinion？Whydoweesteemamanwhosemoralsentimentsseemtoaccordwithourown，whilstwedonotnecessarilyesteemhimsimplyfortheaccordanceofhisopinionswithourown？Whyintheonecasedoweascribetohimthequalityofrightnessorrectitude，andintheotheronlythequalitiesofgoodtasteorgoodjudgment？ToquoteBrownoncemore:"Ifmereaccordanceofemotionimplythefeelingofmoralexcellenceofanysort，weshouldcertainlyfeelamoralregardforallwhosetastecoincideswithours；yet，howevergratifyingthesympathyinsuchacasemaybe，wedonotfeel，inconsequenceofthissympathy，anymoralityinthetastewhichismostexactlyaccordantwithourown。"
　　AdamSmith'sansweris，thatmattersofintellectualagreementtouchusmuchlessnearlythancircumstancesofbehaviourwhichaffectourselvesorthepersonwejudgeof；thatwelookatsuchthingsasthesizeofamountainortheexpressionofapicturefromthesamepointofview，andthereforethatweagreeordisagreewithoutthatimaginarychangeofsituationwhichisthefoundationofmoralsympathy。Thestrongerfeelingofapprobationintheonecasethanintheotherarisesfromthepersonalelement，whichinfluencesourjudgmentofanotherperson'sconduct，andwhichisabsentinourjudgmentofhisopinionsaboutthings。ItwillbebestagaintoletAdamSmithspeakforhimself。
　　"Though，"hesays，"youdespisethatpicture，orthatpoem，oreventhatsystemofphilosophywhichIadmire，thereislittledangerofourquarrellinguponthataccount。Neitherofuscanreasonablybemuchinterestedaboutthem。Theyoughtallofthemtobemattersofgreatindifferencetousboth；sothat，thoughouropinionsmaybeopposite，ouraffectionsmaystillbeverynearlythesame。ButitisquiteotherwisewithregardtothoseobjectsbywhicheitheryouorIareparticularlyaffected。Thoughyourjudgmentsinmattersofspeculation，thoughyoursentimentsinmattersoftaste，arequiteoppositetomine，Icaneasilyoverlookthisopposition；
　　and，ifIhaveanydegreeoftemper，Imaystillfindsomeentertainmentinyourconversation，evenuponthoseverysubjects。Butifyouhaveeithernofellow-feelingforthemisfortunesIhavemetwith，ornonewhichbearsanyproportiontothegriefwhichdistractsme；orifyouhaveeithernoindignationattheinjuriesIhavesuffered，ornonethatbearsanyproportiontotheresentmentwhichtransportsme，wecannolongerconverseuponthesesubjects。Webecomeintolerabletooneanother。Icanneithersupportyourcompany，noryoumine。Youareconfoundedatmyviolenceandpassion，andIamenragedatyourcoldinsensibilityandwantoffeeling。"
　　Accordingly，weonlyregardthesentimentswhichweshareasmoral，orthecontrary，whentheyaffectanotherpersonorourselvesinapeculiarmanner；whentheybearnorelationtoeitherofus，nomoralproprietyisrecognizedinamereagreementoffeeling。Itisobviousthatthisexplanation，towhichBrownpaysnoattentionwhatever，issatisfactorytoacertainpoint。Aplain，oramountain，orapicture，aremattersaboutwhichitisintelligiblethatagreementordifferenceshouldgiverisetoverydifferentfeelingsfromthoseproducedbyacaseofdishonesty，excessiveanger，oruntruthfulness。Beingobjectssodifferentintheirnature，itisonlynaturalthattheyshouldgiverisetoverydifferentsentiments。Independentlyofallsympathy，admirationofapictureoramountainisaverydifferentthingfromadmirationofagenerousactionoradisplayofcourage。Thelanguageofallmenhasobservedthedifference，andtheadmirationintheonecaseiswithperfectreasoncalledmoral，todistinguishitfromtheadmirationwhicharisesintheother。ButwhenAdamSmithclasses"theconductofathirdperson"amongthingswhich，likethebeautyofaplainorthesizeofamountain，neednoimaginarychangeofsituationonthepartofobserverstobeapprovedofbythem，heinadvertentlydesertshisownprinciple，which，ifthisweretrue，wouldfailtoaccountfortheapprobationofactionsdonelongago，intimesorplacesunrelatedtotheapprover。
　　But，evenifAdamSmith'sexplanationwithregardtothedifferenceofapprobationfeltwhereconductisconcernedfromthatfeltinmattersoftasteoropinionbeacceptedassatisfactory，itisstrangethatheshouldnothaveseenthedifficultyofaccountingbyhistheoryfortheabsenceofanythinglikemoralapprobationinanumberofcaseswheresympathynonethelessstronglyimpelsustoshareandenterintotheemotionsofanotherperson。Forinstance，ifweseeamaninimminentdangerofhislifepursuedbyabullorseemingtofallfromatightropethoughwemayfullysympathizewithhisrealorpretendedfear，inneithercasedoweforthatreasonmorallyapproveofit。Inthesameway，wemaysympathizewithorenterintoanyotheremotionhemanifestshislove，hishope，orhisjoywithoutanythemoreapprovingthemorpassinganyjudgmentonthemwhatever。Sympathyhasbeenwelldefinedas"aspeciesofinvoluntaryimitationofthedisplaysoffeelingenactedinourpresence，whichisfollowedbytheriseofthefeelingsthemselves。"13Thuswebecomeaffectedwithwhateverthementalstatemaybethatismanifestedbytheexpressedfeelingsofanotherperson；butunlesshisemotionalreadycontainstheelementofmoralapprobation，orthecontrary，asinacaseofgratitudeorresentment，themerefactofsympathywillnomoregiverisetoitthanwillsympathywithanotherperson'sfeargiverisetoanymoralapprovalofit。Itisevident，therefore，thatsympathydoesnotnecessarilyinvolveapprobation，andthatitonlyinvolvesmoralapprobationwherethesentimentssharedbysympathybelongtotheclassofemotionsdenominatedmoral。
　　What，then，istherealrelationbetweensympathyandapprobation？andtowhatextentisthefact，ofsympathyanexplanationofthefactofapprobation？
　　ItisdifficulttoreadAdamSmith'saccountoftheidentificationofsympathyandapprobation，withoutfeelingthatthroughouthisargumentthereisanunconsciousplayuponwords，andthatanequivocaluseoftheword"sympathy"lendsallitsspeciousnesstothetheoryheexpounds。Thefirstmeaningofthewordsympathyisfellow-feeling，ortheparticipationofanotherperson'semotion，inwhichsensewemaybesaidtosympathizewithanotherperson'shopeorfear；thesecondmeaningcontainstheideaofapprovalorpraise，inwhichsensewemaybesaidtosympathizewithanotherperson'sgratitudeorresentment。AdamSmithbeginsbyusingthewordsympathyinitsfirstandprimarysense，asmeaningparticipationinanotherperson'sfeelings，andthenproceedstouseitinitssecondaryandlesspropersense，inwhichtheideaofapprobationisinvolved。Butthesympathyintheonecaseistotallydifferentfromthesympathyintheother。Intheonecaseamerestateoffeelingisintended，intheotherajudgmentofreason。Toshareanotherperson'sfeelingbelongsonlytooursensibility；toapproveofitasproper，good，andright，impliestheexerciseofourintelligence。Toemploytheword"sympathy"initslatteruseasitissometimesemployedinpopularparlanceissimplytoemployitasasynonymfor"approbation；"sothatsympathy，insteadofbeingreallythesourceofapprobation，isonlyanotherwordforthatapprobationitself。Tosaythatweapproveofanotherperson'ssentimentswhenwesympathizewiththemis，therefore，nothingmorethansayingthatweapproveofthemwhenweapproveofthemapurelytautologicalproposition。
　　ItcannotthereforebesaidthatAdamSmith'sattempttotracethefeelingofmoralapprobationtoemotionsofsympathyisaltogethersuccessful，incontestableasisthetruthofhisappli-cationofittomanyofthephenomenaoflifeandconduct。Yetalthoughsympathyisnottheonlyfactorinmoralapprobation，itisonethatentersverywidelyintothegrowthofourmoralperceptions。Itplays，forinstance，animportantpartinevolvinginusthatsenseofrightandwrongwhichisgenerallyknownasConscienceortheMoralFaculty。Itisoneoftheelements，justasself-loveisanother，inthatever-formingchainofassociationwhichgoestodistinguishonesetofactionsasgoodfromanothersetofactionsasbad。Ourobservationinothersofthesameoutwardsymptomswhichweknowinourowncasetoattendjoyorgrief，pleasureorpain，leadsusbythemereforceoftheremembranceofourownpleasuresandpains，andindependentlyofanycontrolofourwill，toenterintothoseofotherpeople，andtopromoteasmuchaswecantheoneandpreventtheother。
　　Sympathyaccordinglyisthesourceofalldisinterestedmotivesinaction，ofourreadinesstogiveuppleasuresandincurpainsforthesakeofothers；
　　andAdamSmithwassofarright，thatheestablished，byreferencetothisforceofoursympatheticemotions，therealityofadisinterestedelementasthefoundationofourbenevolentaffections。Inthesameway，self-loveisthesourceofalltheprudentialsideofmorality；andtothegeneralformationofourmoralsentiments，allourotheremotions，suchasanger，fear，love，contributetogetherwithsympathy，inlesserperhapsbutconsiderabledegree。Noneofthemtakensinglywouldsufficetoaccountformoralapprobation。
　　Althoughanyactionthathurtsanotherpersonmaysoaffectournaturalsympathyastogiverisetothefeelingofdisapprobationinvolvedinsympatheticresentment，andalthoughanactionthatisinjurioustoourselvesmayalsoberegardedwithsimilarfeelingsofdislike，theconstantpressureofauthority，exercisedasitisbydomesticeducation，bygovernment，bylaw，andbypunishment，mustfirstbebroughttobearonsuchactionsbeforethefeelingofmoraldisapprobationcanarisewithregardtothem。Theassociationofthepainofpunishmentwithcertainactions，andtheassociationoftheabsenceofsuchpainanegativepleasurewithcertainothers，enforcesthenaturaldictatesofoursympatheticorselfishemotions，andimpressesonthemthecharacterofmorality，ofobligation，andofduty。
　　Theassociationissocloseandconstant，thatincourseoftimethefeelingoftheapprobationordisapprobationofcertainactionsbecomesperfectlyindependentofthevariousmeans，necessaryatfirsttoenforceortopreventthem；justasinmanyothercasesourlikesanddislikesbecomefreeoftheassociationswhichfirstpermanentlyfixedthem。
　　Inthiswaythefeelingofmoralapprobationisseentobetheproductoftimeandslowgrowthofcircumstance，aphenomenontowhichbothreasonandsentimentcontributeinequalsharesinaccordancewiththelawsthatconditiontheirdevelopment。Moralapprobationisnomoregiveninstantaneouslybysympathythanitisgiveninstantaneouslybyamoralsense。Sympathyismerelyoneoftheconditionsunderwhichitisevolved，oneofthefeelingswhichassistinitsformation。Itisindeedthefeelingonwhich，morethanonanyother，themoralagenciesexistingintheworldbuildupandconfirmthenotionsofrightandwrong；butitdoesofitselfnothingmorethantranslatefeelingsfromonemindtoanother，andunlessthereisapre-existentmoralelementinthefeelingsotranslated，theactualpassagewillnotgiverisetoit。Sympathyenablesoneman'sfear，resentment，orgratitudetobecomeanotherman'sfear，resentment，orgratitude；butthefeelingofmoralapprobationwhichattendsemotionssodiffused，arisesfromreferencetoideasotherwisederivedthanfromapurelyinvoluntarysympathyfromreference，thatis，toastandardsetupbycustomandopinion。
　　Achildtoldforthefirsttimeofamurdermightsofarenterbysympathyintotheresentmentofthevictimastofeelindignationpromptinghimtovengeance；buthisideaofthemurderitselfasawrongandwickedacthisideaofitasadeedmorallyworsethantheslaughterofasheepbyabutcher，wouldonlyariseastheresultofthevariousforcesofeducation，availingthemselvesoftheoriginallawofsympathy，bywhichanactdisagreeabletoourselvesseemsdisagreeableinitsapplicationtoothers。Andwhatistrueinthiscase，theextremeformofmoraldisapprobation，isnolesstrueinalltheminorcases，inwhichapprobationorthecontraryisfelt。
　　ThefeelingofmoralapprobationisthereforemuchmorecomplexthanitisinAdamSmith'stheory。Aboveallthingsitisoneandindivisible，anditisimpossibletodistinguishourmoraljudgmentsofourselvesfromourjudgmentsofothers。Thereisanobviousinconsistencyinsayingthatwecanonlyjudgeofotherpeople'ssentimentsandactionsbyreferencetoourownpowertosympathizewiththem，andyetthatwecanonlyjudgeofourownbyreferencetothesamepowerinthem。Themoralstandardcannotprimarilyexistinourselves，andyet，atthesametime，beonlyderivablefromwithout。Ifbythehypothesismoralfeelingsrelatingtoourselvesonlyexistbypriorreferencetothefeelingsofothers，howcanweatthesametimeformanymoraljudgmentofthefeelingsofothersbyreferencetoanyfeelingsofourown？
　　Butalthoughthetwosidesofmoralfeelingarethusreallyindistinguishable，thefeelingofself-approbationorthecontrarymayindeedbesomuchstrongerthanourfeelingofapprovalordisapprovalofothersastojustifytheapplicationtoitofsuchtermsasConscience，Shame，Remorse。Thedifferenceoffeeling，however，isonlyoneofdegree，andineithercase，whetherourownconductorthatofothersisunderreview，themoralfeelingthatarisesisduetotheforceofeducationandopinionactinguponthevariousemotionsofournature。Forinstance，aMohammedanwomanseenwithoutaveilwouldhavethesamefeelingofremorseorofmoraldisapprobationwithregardtoherselfthatshewouldhavewithregardtoanyotherwomanwhomshemightseeinthesamecondition，thoughofcourseinalessstrongdegree。Ineithercaseherfeelingwouldbearesultofallthecomplexsurroundingsofherlife，whichismeantbyeducationinitsbroadestsense。
　　Sympathyitselfwouldbeinsufficienttoexplainthefeeling，thoughitmighthelptoexplainhowitwasdeveloped。Allthatsympathycoulddowouldbetoextendthedreadofpunishmentassociatedbythewomanherselfwithabreachofthelaw，toallwomenwhomightoffendinasimilarway；
　　theoriginalfeelingoftimeimmoralityofexposurebeingaccountableforinnootherwaythanbyitsassociationwithpunishment，ordainedbycivilorreligiouslaw，orbysocialcustom，andenforcedbythedisciplineofearlyhomelife。Itisobviousthatthesameexplanationappliestoallcasesinwhichmoraldisapprobationisfelt，andconverselytoallcasesinwhichthesentimentofmoralapprobationarises。